

# Paradoxes of Peace in Nineteenth Century Europe

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## Perpetual Peace as Irony, as Utopia, and as Politics

*Bo Stråth*

### I. Peace as Paradox

What is peace? Reinhart Koselleck, the chief architect of conceptual history, asked the question when he recounted his memory of 8 May 1945. Listening to the tolls of the peace bells from the churches everywhere around him he began, as a Soviet prisoner of war, a long march on foot to a distant goal that he did not know about. It proved to be Auschwitz where he had to participate in the cleaning up after the Holocaust. What was then peace, he asked decades later recollecting a moment of his life that never passed. Peace can, like war, mean many things.

What is then paradox of peace?

A *paradox* is a true statement that leads to a seeming contradiction. The statement does not really imply the contradiction, it only seems to. It resolves itself upon later inspection. A paradox is when war is peace and peace is war. Hans Blumenberg referred to Melancthon's baccalaureate disputation—'for good deeds to be sins is not dissimilar to the truth'—as a reformational paradox. Translated into today's language Melancthon said that the road to hell is paved with good intentions of those who foresaw it leading in the opposite direction. The lesson is that paradoxes might appear only retrospectively.<sup>1</sup>

The approach of conceptual history is a key to understanding the phenomenon of paradox. Conceptual history looks upon political key concepts in terms of both agreement and disagreement. There is a general agreement on key concepts with a positive value load like democracy, reform, progressive, freedom, equality and peace, but also on concepts with a negative connotation like war, reactionary and dictatorship. The general agreement on the concepts as such goes hand in hand with a disagreement on their precise meaning. The most recent examples of this kind of paradoxes are the Cold War as a stalemate bringing peace through balance of terror, and the War on Terror for final peace. The simultaneous conceptual agreement and disagreement constitutes the political process. Without agreement there is no

<sup>1</sup> Robert Savage, 'Introduction' *Thesis Eleven. Critical Theory and Historical Sociology* 104 (2011), 3–4.

language community and no framework of the debate. Without disagreement there is no politics.<sup>2</sup> Conceptual struggles are about saying one thing and meaning various things. Conceptual history is about analysing such struggles, when one says war and means peace, war of liberation and social revolution for final peace, peace as a long-term goal with war as a means, or the Cold War when formal peace was called war, for instance.

Peace at a first glance looks like a clear-cut and well-defined concept, a counter concept of war. Peace and war are like white and black, good and evil. They constitute each other at the same time as they are unambiguously separated. At a second glance, they are much less clear and separated, however. They are interwoven rather than demarcated. This fact constitutes the core of the frequent paradoxes in the languages of peace. George Orwell described the complex connection between peace and war in his horror vision of the future world of the emerging Cold War and terror balance, written in 1948 and published in 1949. The scenario of the novel is an imagined future, a dystopia, where the globe has gone through yet another world war and is controlled by competing totalitarian states. Peace between them means war within them:

#### War Is Peace

The war, therefore, if we judge it by the standards of previous wars, is merely an imposture. It is like the battles between certain ruminant animals whose horns are set at such an angle that they are incapable of hurting one another. But though it is unreal it is not meaningless. It eats up the surplus of consumable goods, and it helps to preserve the special mental atmosphere that a hierarchical society needs. War, it will be seen, is now a purely internal affair. In the past, the ruling groups of all countries, although they might recognize their common interest and therefore limit the destructiveness of war, did fight against one another, and the victors always plundered the vanquished. In our own day they are not fighting against one another at all. The war is waged by each ruling group against its own subjects, and the object of the war is not to make or prevent conquests of territory, but to keep the structure of society intact. The very word 'war', therefore, has become misleading. It would probably be accurate to say that by becoming continuous war has ceased to exist. The peculiar pressure that it exerted on human beings between the Neolithic Age and the early twentieth century has disappeared and has been replaced by something quite different. The effect would be much the same if the three superstates, instead of fighting one another, should agree to live in perpetual peace, each inviolate within its own boundaries. For in that case each would still be a self-contained universe, freed forever from the sobering influence of external danger. A peace that was truly permanent would be the same as a permanent war. This—although the vast majority of Party members understand it only in a shallow sense—is the inner meaning of the Party slogan: WAR IS PEACE.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Reinhart Koselleck, 'Einleitung', in Werner Conze, Otto Brunner, and Reinhart Koselleck (eds), *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta 1979.

<sup>3</sup> George Orwell, 1984. *A Novel*, Cutchogue, N Y Buccaneer Books Inc 1949.

Orwell reflected not only on the connection between war and peace but also on the relationships between the internal and the international war and peace.

## II. The Debate before 1800: Philosophical Perpetual Peace as Irony, Utopia, and Practical Reason

The terms of war and peace are inscribed in a long history of philosophical and political debate and military practice. The debate and the practice show that the concepts were anything but clear-cut. They were entangled as well as contested categories.

Carl von Rotteck, one of the liberal forethinkers in the German *Vormärz*, wrote in *Staatslexikon* that peace from the viewpoint of reason is the normal state of order, but historically war is the rule, and peace is only the interruption of war. Rotteck was one of the editors of this encyclopaedia in 15 volumes (1834–1843) on social and political key concepts which was a point of reference in the liberal debate in Germany between the revolutions in 1830 and 1848. Peace was by no means the same as justice as little as war necessarily was unlawful. On the contrary, peace might much more represent injustice, like in Orwell's scenario, for instance, where external peace was internal warfare.<sup>4</sup> Rotteck was engaged in a conceptual struggle on the definition of the key concepts of peace and war, where violent revolution was seen as the instrument to change monarchical oppression. Peace was the concept of the Vienna restoration of monarchical power and continental stability. The Vienna order was the target of the liberal attack, and this attack required a conceptual confrontation with the language of the Holy Alliance.

In the same vein, international law professor August Wilhelm Heffter considered war as the preparation of peace, 'a protection against the disturbances of the freedom of reason and people's will'. The task of international law was not to pretend that war does not exist, but to prescribe laws for warfare.<sup>5</sup>

The more militant and revolutionary embedding of the peace concept from the 1830s was preceded by over a century of dreams and debates about perpetual peace. This was a political project where the concept of peace was not problematized, but was rather given an unambiguous interpretation. Probably the first modern perpetual peace project was the French proposal by Sully. The immediate purpose was to reduce the preponderance of the Habsburg dynasty. Sully drew up new maps of Europe and the machinery for perpetual peace. A European League of Princes was outlined as the instrument of perpetual peace. The key concept behind the map and the league was equilibrium. In order to establish the new European state system a final war was required. The new order, after this last war,

<sup>4</sup> Carl von Rotteck, 'Friede, Friedensstand, Friedensschluss, Friedensinstrument, Ewiger Friede', in Carl von Rotteck and Carl Theodor Welcker (eds), *Das Staatslexikon: Enzyklopädie der sämtlichen Staatswissenschaften für alle Stände*, Altona, Hammerich 1847 [1837], pp 192, 197.

<sup>5</sup> August Wilhelm Heffter, *Das europäische Völkerrecht der Gegenwart*, Berlin 1848 (1844), p 6.

was a Christian republic consisting of 15 states as equal as possible in terms of power, five hereditary and six elective monarchies, two democratic (Switzerland and the Netherlands) and two aristocratic (Venice and the other Italian city states, the second under the supremacy of the pope) republics. Equilibrium meant that no power should be strong enough to impose its will on the others. Beyond the borders of this Christian European republic of peace, the Ottoman realm should be destroyed and 'convenient conquests' should be made in Asia and North Africa.<sup>6</sup> In what has become known as the '*grand dessin*' of Sully, war was not a counter concept of peace but the tool for it. War was both the instrument and the very thing to be abolished.

A century later, in the year of the peace of Utrecht in 1713, abbé Saint Pierre published his *Projet de paix éternelle*. The first article prescribed a perpetual alliance of the European states for mutual security. The allied powers would abstain from use of violence against one another once and for all. Changes of the treaty required unanimity. The necessary decisions to implement the treaty were based on majority vote. The mediation and arbitration when conflicts emerged occurred in a confederative assembly.<sup>7</sup>

The project of abbé Saint Pierre was exposed to critical comments. One of them was Montesquieu who in *L'esprit des lois* put off the military dimension of the underlying power equilibrium assumption.<sup>8</sup> Voltaire was not only critical but also sarcastic in his military satires in, for instance, *Candide*. A new disease had caught the European princes: to keep endless troops. As soon as one state had increased the size of its army, the other princes were contaminated and accelerated the armament spiral. The status of the utmost armament efforts by all against all is called peace, Voltaire exclaimed with a mix of irony and despair.

Rousseau published in 1761 *Extrait du projet de paix perpétuelle de St Pierre*. He was more understanding of Saint Pierre's project than Voltaire. However, although Saint Pierre had indicated a solution to the problem of the predominance of individual powers, his proposal was, in the view of Rousseau, institutionally too weak. Saint Pierre's loose association of states was not sufficient. Rousseau argued for peace through a solid and lasting confederation of all states of Europe based on a legislative assembly, a supreme court of justice and sufficient executive power to maintain authority. With this argument Rousseau opened up a gap between peace and war. The latter was no longer the instrument of peace but its counterpart.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Sully referred to the perpetual peace project of the king in his memoirs in 1638. Henry IV is argued to have been the originator of the project. The degree of distribution of labour between the king, who died in 1610, and his adviser is unclear, however. Norman Davies, *Europe. A History*, Oxford, Oxford University Press 1996, p 662 and Daniele Archibugi, 'Models of international organization in perpetual peace projects' *Review of International Studies* 18 (1992), 295–317, at 300. Cf Leopold Neumann, 'Vom ewigen Frieden' *Zeitschrift für das Privat- und öffentliche Recht der Gegenwart* 1 (1874), 570–83.

Neumann, 'Vom ewigen Frieden', 572.

<sup>8</sup> Neumann, 'Vom ewigen Frieden', 570.

<sup>9</sup> Neumann, 'Vom ewigen Frieden', 572.



The critique of abbé Saint Pierre's perpetual peace project varied between rejecting it as utopian and dismissing it with irony. Abbé St Pierre was criticized for outlining a utopia, a *belle chimère*, and for not exploring the true roots of the existing 'perpetual international state of war' and therefore not being able to discern the real preconditions of perpetual peace.<sup>10</sup>

One of the most prominent thinkers in the ironic vein was Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. He commented on Saint Pierre's proposal, made in connection with the peace in Utrecht, in a letter to de Grimarest, the biographer of Molière.<sup>11</sup> Leibniz began his comment by referring to the inscription on a cemetery gate he knew about: *Ewiger Friede*. The dead did certainly not fight any more, he noted, but the living did it the more. Perpetual peace was only conceivable among the dead.

For the living, power struggles were the essence of life for those who had power. The most powerful did not care about, and did not pay any attention or respect to the verdicts of the courts of justice. The only solution to this problem would be to enforce all the warriors to deposit large sums of guarantee money in order to prevent them from breaking the peace. The king of France, for instance, should pay one hundred million thaler to the fund of the arbitration court, and the king of England about the same money, Leibniz noted in his mockery with St Pierre's proposal. The money would be forfeited if verdicts were not obeyed. The court of arbitration would be established in Rome with the Pope as president of the court as he used to be in conflicts with and between Christian princes. However, the Pope per se was not sufficient. The earlier authority of the clerical institutions had to be reestablished so that interdict and church ban could be used again against disobeying princes. In order to get the acceptance of the new order also among the Protestants, one had to ask His Holiness to re-establish the church constitution of Charlemagne, Leibniz ironized. Moreover, the popes had to become more like the first Roman bishops. Such plans would be implemented as easily as those by abbé Saint Pierre. However, since it is allowed to write novels, why should one blame a text that brought the contemporaneity back into the golden age of the early popes, Leibniz asked. At this point his initial irony, where only the dead are capable of perpetual peace, had become ridiculizing satire or sarcasm.

Voltaire carried on Leibniz's sarcasm commenting in an epigram about a portrait of Saint Pierre:

Fortunately we only see a dumb portrait  
Of the abbot in this room.  
Because, if we had had the original  
We would certainly have heard something foolish.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Wilhelm Janssen, 'Friede', in Conze, Brunner, and Koselleck, *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, Vol 2 E-G, p 570.

<sup>11</sup> It must have been one of the last letters that Grimarest received. The peace treaty was signed in July and Grimarest died in August of 1713. The ironic comment was thus an immediate reaction to Saint Pierre's proposal. The discussion here of Leibniz and Saint Pierre's perpetual-peace project builds on Franz von Holtzendorff, *Idee des ewigen Völkerfriedens*, Berlin, Carl Habel 1882, pp 25-7.

<sup>12</sup> von Holtzendorff, *Idee des ewigen Völkerfriedens*, 27.

In his essay on perpetual peace, Immanuel Kant started out from Leibniz's irony. The cemetery in Leibniz's satire was changed for a picture of a cemetery on the signboard of a Dutch inn called *Zum ewigen Frieden*, perpetual peace. The message of the sign to the travellers was the same as that of Leibniz. Perpetual peace connoted the dead in the earth of the cemetery. Whether the message of the sign was aimed to speak to humans in general, to those heads of state who never were tired of warfare, or to those philosophers with the sweet dreams of perpetual peace, was not the problem of Kant. His concern dealt with the possibility of the rule of reason. The application of the practical reason was an alternative road to perpetual peace than the churchyard peace of the dead.

Perpetual peace, in the churchyard image of Kant, was obviously not of the same kind as St Augustine's heavenly *pax aeterna*. Kant talked about the earthly world in a double sense, earth as opposed to heaven and the earth where the corpses of the dead rested. The irony of Kant (and Leibniz) was a paradox. Perpetual peace is possible on the earth but only among the dead in the earth. There was an ambiguity between the obvious but seeming, and the not immediately obvious but deeper meaning of the phrase *zum ewigen Frieden*.

Kant's irony did not stop at the cemetery as is obvious from his reference to the secret article in his text organized as a treaty. He prescribed *public* debate and *public* treaties as the instrument for perpetual peace, ie the opposite of secrecy. The six preliminary articles forbade among others peace agreements with secret clauses, which were argued to prepare the ground for continued warfare. The preliminaries furthermore stipulated that no state was allowed to appropriate another state through heritage, change, or purchase, and that standing armies should in the long run come to an end. The three definite articles laid down the republican constitutions in a confederation of states, which was based on international law and on cosmopolitan citizenship (*Weltbürgerrechte*) with universal hospitality, ie free movement of humans across state borders.

Humans were by nature predestined for conflict and war. Kant did not believe in a world without conflicts. As a kind of anthropological category, he talks about the 'unsocial sociability' of humans in the first supplementary article of the treaty for perpetual peace. He had developed this idea already in *Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View* (1784). Humans had a propensity to enter into society, bound together with a mutual opposition which constantly threatens to break up the society. Man has an inclination to associate with others, because in society he feels himself to be more than man, ie as more than the developed form of his natural capacities. But he also has a strong propensity to isolate himself from others, because he finds in himself at the same time the unsocial characteristic of wishing to have everything go according to his own desires, Kant argued. Thus humans expect opposition on all sides because, in knowing themselves, they know that they, on their own part, are inclined to oppose others. It is this opposition that awakens all the human powers, brings them to conquer their inclination to laziness and, propelled by vain glory, lust for power, and avarice, to achieve a rank among their fellows whom they cannot tolerate but from whom they cannot withdraw. Thus the first true steps are taken from barbarism

to culture, which consists in the social worth of man; gradually talents develop and taste is refined; through continued enlightenment the beginnings are laid for a way of thought which can in time convert the coarse, natural disposition for moral discrimination into definite practical principles, and thereby change a society of men driven together by their natural feelings into a moral whole.<sup>13</sup> With the accumulation of conflicts a reason-based insight about an alternative world grew that at the end would lead to perpetual peace.

This reason-based insight emerged in public debates, where the thoughts of the philosophers were not exclusive, although their capacity to chisel the reason and the truth through critique was critical. Reason manifested itself through critique in public debates where the philosophers had to avoid becoming politicians. There was a distribution of labour between philosophy and politics. The politicians should listen to the philosophers, but after having done so they should act on their own responsibility. In the second supplement of his perpetual peace treaty Kant referred to a secret article where the governments would make their decisions after having heard the philosophers and listened to the public debate. The reference to the secret article was, of course, deep irony and sarcasm. The substance would only be publicly *dictirt* but not decided by the philosophers. The secret article outdid the public debate as if the debate was of no value, just a kind of smokescreen, but Kant made the article public in the supplement of his draft treaty for perpetual peace. He simply made fun of the clandestine practices of the court and cabinet politics.<sup>14</sup>

Kant linked the churchyard irony of Leibniz to his philosophy of reason. He understood perpetual peace as an unconditional requirement of the reason rather than as a utopian imagination of the future. The question whether perpetual peace was at all possible he circumvented as unimportant. The important thing was to act by means of reason, as if the thing is what it may not be, as if perpetual peace was possible even if it wasn't. Kant was a philosopher not a historian. Like individuals, by the use of reason, could agree on 'mine' and 'yours', states could also find peace and security through a legally binding agreement, Kant argued. Kant confronts the resignating loss of hopes, expectations, and visions and develops in his treaty on perpetual peace a kind of social utopia. At the same time, he realizes that his own pragmatic scepticism as the road to reason is the opposite of utopian thinking. However, his utopia is not of the eschatological kind searching

<sup>13</sup> Immanuel Kant, 'Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht', in Wilhelm Weischedel (ed), *XI. Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik*, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1977 (1784), p 5.

<sup>14</sup> Immanuel Kant, 'Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf', in Wilhelm Weischedel (ed), *Immanuel Kant Werkausgabe in 12 Bänden. XI. Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik*, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp 1977 (1795), p 5. Zusatzartikel. Cf Volker Gerhardt, 'Der Thronverzicht der Philosophie. Über das moderne Verhältnis von Philosophie und Politik bei Kant', in Otfried Höffe (ed), *Immanuel Kant. Zum ewigen Frieden*. Berlin, Akademie Verlag 1995, pp 171–2 and Otfried Höffe, 'Einleitung: Der Friede—ein vernachlässigtes Ideal', in Otfried Höffe, (ed), *Immanuel Kant. Zum ewigen Frieden*. Berlin, Berlin, Akademie Verlag 1995. About the sarcasm as to the secret article ('publicly *dictirt* but not decided by the philosophers'), see Gerhardt, *ibid*, p 171.

for a definite nowhere, but an ideal of what is not yet but on principle and in the long run possible to achieve. His hope is invested in reason as it is expressed in public law, of which international law is one dimension. He sees the risk of perpetual peace not being realizable and writes at the beginning of the treaty about a sweet dream, which only philosophers dream. He considers the possibility that his goal is only a chimera, a figment of the brain.

Kant underpinned his argument about the key role of reason by sticking to Hobbes's conceptualization of peace as a legal compulsory order that established a state of security. However, he rejected the peace view developed by Thomas Hobbes where peace was achieved by an irresistible authority which guaranteed security through the monopoly of the use of violence.<sup>15</sup>

Kant believed in peace through contract by means of the use of reason, but he did not believe in any kind of natural brotherhood of all human beings as the foundation of peace. The republics signing a treaty of peace did not do so because their peoples were in some sense naturally good but because it was in the material interest of every citizen. The spirit of trade, the *Handelsgeist*, could not exist under conditions of war, and this spirit would sooner or later take possession of all peoples and become the strongest real force for the establishment of perpetual peace.<sup>16</sup>

However, Kant played down the connection between trade and peace. He looked with some contempt on the commercial practices. Kant certainly regarded the spirit of trade as a driving force towards perpetual peace. However, his peace concept based on reason was different from, for instance, Jeremy Bentham's utilitarian definition. Kant's point of departure was the assumption that human beings are not only *homines oeconomici* but also driven by reason. Peace combined utility and morality. Kant had rather a purpose-free moral in mind and regarded a peace based only on the trade spirit with condescension. Peace had to be based on something more fundamental and more pure. *Reason* made peace an immediate *duty*. Kant was afraid that a long peace would promote not only the spirit of trade but in its wake also the lower characters of commercial practices—selfishness, cowardice, and weakness—and thereby degrade the power that reason exerted on people. Kant understood perpetual peace as unconditional imposition of reason through the application of ideals of duty.<sup>17</sup>

This connection between reason and duty demarcated Kant from imaginations of peace, which, through influences from English and French enlightenment thoughts, would attract great attention in the nineteenth century, where liberal free trade was argued to go hand in hand with peace. (See for this discussion the contributions by Thomas Hopkins and Niels Petersson in this volume.) The connection between reason and duty made Kant, and in the wake of him the

<sup>15</sup> The connection between Hobbes and Kant is underinvestigated. For a beginning and for Hobbes' theory of international relation, and for the social dimension of peace, see Noel Malcolm, *Aspects of Hobbes*, Oxford, Oxford University Press 2002. I am grateful to Thomas Hopkins for comments on this point.

<sup>16</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Zum ewigen Frieden*, AA Vol 8, p 386.

<sup>17</sup> Kant, *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, p 263.

German nineteenth-century philosophy, hesitant to thoughts about alternative links between the science of political economy and the science of peace. Political economy was about to break up from its early moral philosophical approach.

Kant's certitude, that 'the thing' (*das Ding*), as he paraphrased peace, would appear if just reason was applied, contained, as argued, a utopian dimension. At the end, Kant speculated, war itself would be seen not only as artificial and uncertain in outcome for the potential enemies. Together with the painful after-effects in the form of an ever-growing war debt ('a new invention', Kant noted) that could not be met, the result would be that war disappeared. Wars had begun to cost too much. This was a time when the mass armies of the French revolution were giving the war a new dimension and scale. The impact of any revolution on all states in Europe, so closely knit together through commerce, would be so obvious that the other states, driven by their own danger but without any legal basis, would offer themselves as arbiters and prepare the way for a distant international government without precedence in world history.<sup>18</sup>

The precondition of the innovative dimension of the debt financing of wars—the 'new invention', according to Kant—was the fact that Parliaments, which borrowed money began to be seen as more reliable than monarchs who borrowed in their own names, which often led to refusal by their successors to pay back. The promissory notes guaranteed by the Parliaments were seen as public and binding irrespective of who was sitting on the throne. Parliamentary state orders got with the language of today higher credit ratings than absolute regimes. Kant had good reasons to look with contempt upon wars financed by public debt. The contempt was closely connected to his disdain for commerce. The paradox was, however, that the requirements for war financing with debts promoted state orders with a strong institutional power for the Parliament. Great Britain and the Netherlands were most active in the development towards war on credit. Parliamentary states were also commercial states. Absolutist regimes had not the same access to credits. For them the solution was rather the printing press for banknotes.

Although Kant's world government in his own words existed only as a rough outline, it provided hope that 'finally, after many reformatory revolutions, a universal cosmopolitan order, which Nature has as her ultimate purpose, will come into being as the womb wherein all the original capacities of the human race can develop'. When Kant talked about international law, he emphasized that it could only function under certain specific conditions. Such a condition was the existence of an international court of justice to which the governments were prepared to submit. There was no such ultimate instance of justice and therefore the situation among the states was lawless and anarchical. Kant did not develop closer thoughts on how such an instance could be established, however.

Kant was afraid that a long peace would promote not only the spirit of trade but in its wake also the lower characters of commercial practices—selfishness, cowardice, and weakness—and thereby degrade the power that reason exerted on people.<sup>19</sup> There was in his argument on this point an ever-present tension between two viewpoints.

<sup>18</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht*, 1977 (1784).

<sup>19</sup> Kant, *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, p 263.

In *Perpetual Peace* Kant discusses the preconditions for a transformation of war as the *natural* human condition to lasting peace as a *cultural* phenomenon. The war articles, which bring the soldiers to obedience, are put in opposition to the peace articles on the morally emancipated humanity through voluntary fulfilment of civic duties. The situation where no state intervenes in the politics of other states through inheritance, exchange, purchase, or conquest, that is the situation of perpetual peace, was to be based on a moral rebirth of humanity. There was a kind of 'new man' imagination in this argument.<sup>20</sup> Kant did not see perpetual peace as a possibility in his own time, but as a goal, which humanity, on principle capable of perfection, would approach *peu en peu* through moral progress, which basically belonged to the same category as technological progress. Both dealt with the implementation of reason.

There was in Kant's peace vision an ambiguity between a utopian and a practical argument, between the expectations in the imposition of a legal order and the insights about the realities of political practices, between short-term and long-term outcomes, and between (free) trade for peace and demoralizing commercial practices triggering wars. These tensions were present—with changing relative weight—in his mindset and resulted in an overall tension in the peace language of Kant with paradoxical consequences.

The paradoxes were not only derived from Kant's peace philosophy but also from his occasional view on war. He had almost ten years before he published *Perpetual Peace* in 1795, before the revolution, formulated his view not on peace but on war in great accordance with mainstream thinking: 'On the stage of culture where humanity still stands, war is an indispensable instrument in order to develop it [the culture] even further; and only after (God knows when) the achievement of the accomplished culture an everlasting peace would be healthy and also only achievable in such a perfect culture.' The war was, despite the most

<sup>20</sup> The future peaceful society was, in the philosophical vision of Kant, based on the moral responsibility and conscience of the individuals, and their use of reason as a categoric imperative. Later historical versions of New Man were less philosophical and more economic with a harder ideological core. Visions of work were the foundation of the chiliastic ideas of the New Man in Soviet Russia. With socialism as a basis, the emergence of a new type of man was anticipated: solidaristic instead of egoistic, collective-minded instead of individually oriented. The icon of this New Man was a male and muscular manufacturing worker with a powerful faith in future progress. The neoliberal counterpart to this Soviet model New Man, propagated a couple of generations later, in the 1990s, was a figure as strong but also as utopian as the Soviet version. The neoliberal Flexible Man was an all-rounder, highly adaptable to new challenges, creative and innovative. He was independent and emancipated from all restraining social bounds. From the self-realization of the Flexible Man was postulated the emergence of a new and better society; although the tension between adaptability and creativity was not addressed. Thus a critical question arises as to how creative and innovative the remote-controlled Flexible Man really was. Does not his ability to roll with changes make him an achievement-oriented, rather than socially stable character, with little political loyalty? Is here a key to understanding the growing signs of nationalism and populism in the 2000s, and to the attraction of a more bellicose language in expressions like 'war on terror' and 'clash of civilizations'? Bo Stråth, 'The Concept of Work in the Construction of Community', in Bo Stråth (ed), *After Full Employment. European Discourses on Work and Flexibility*, Brussels, PIE-Peter Lang 2000, pp 95–6.

terrible harassments which it imposed upon humanity, nevertheless a mainspring for the development of all talents into their highest capabilities.<sup>21</sup>

One possible argument on this point would be that the Kant of *Perpetual Peace* in 1795 had changed his mind as compared to when he wrote about the invigorating war. More reasonably it seems, however, to see Kant in terms of the ambiguity between two lines of thought. The one constituted the other and although the one might have dominated in certain situations and periods the other was not absent. Kant was the one among the philosophers who testified to the war a certain inherent dignity with an ennobling impact on humanity, as a step towards the end stage of perpetual peace. In *perpetual peace* he played down this argumentative line considerably, but he expressed this view later in other contexts, like in the *Rechtslehre* (1797) (see fn 21).<sup>22</sup> Peace and war were not clear-cut categories well demarcated from one another but intertwined slipping over into each other. The combining thought between the two argumentative veins was a kind of purifying-war-for-perpetual-peace.

### III. The Nineteenth Century Philosophical and Political Debate on Peace

The world changed after the French Revolution and Napoleon. The *mass armies* based on conscription connected military service with citizenship in new forms

<sup>21</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Mutmasslicher Anfang des Menschengeschlechts*, 1786, AA Vol 8 p 121. Cf ibid *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, 1790, AA Vol 5 § 83. There Kant argues that war is majestic and magnificent ('erhaben') given that it is made with order and respect of civic rights, whereas a long peace based on the mere spirit of trade promotes mean selfishness, cowardice and weakness, which degrades the people's way of thinking. Quoted from Reinhard Brandt, 'Historisch-kritische Beobachtungen zu Kants Friedensschrift', in Reinhard Merkel and Roland Wittmann (eds) 'Zum ewigen Frieden'. *Grundlagen, Aktualität und Aussichten einer Idee von Immanuel Kant*, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp 1996, p 31. In the international law section of *Die Metaphysischen Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre* two years after *Perpetual Peace*, Kant reflects on the preconditions under which states can claim a right to declare war. Oliver Eberl and Peter Niesen (eds), *Immanuel Kant. Zum ewigen Frieden und Auszüge aus der Rechtslehre. Kommentar von Oliver Eberl und Peter Niesen*, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp 2011, pp 98–101 argue convincingly that the difference should not be interpreted as change of mind by Kant, but as the difference between a short-term pragmatic and a long-term utopian view on the possibility of abolition of war. Kant operated with both time scales. In both views his conclusion was that peace required a legal framing. The different time perspectives in the view of Kant is obvious also if *Perpetual Peace* is related to *Critique of Judgement*, in which war rather is seen as a transitory instrument in the universal evolution of humankind. By means of modern technology weapons had got such destructive force that they could not distinguish between civilians and combatants, in extreme cases not even between one's own population and that of the aggressor. War had lost its function, Kant stated on the eve of the mass armies which came over Europe after the French revolution. Instead of war would come not the feared Hobbesian universal monarchy or the mere commercial society, but the peaceful competition between peoples separated through language and religion, Kant prognosticated or dreamt in a utopian twist of the pragmatic conclusion of the technological impact on the weapons. In the same vein, the *Perpetual Peace Treaty* in 1795 should not be read as pure theory but as a theory-practice problem between pragmatism and utopianism. *Perpetual Peace* is a polemical pamphlet against adherents of feudal state power who deduce theory from the usual practice instead of letting the theory determine political practice. Brandt, 'Historisch-kritische Beobachtungen zu Kants Friedensschrift', pp 32–3.

<sup>22</sup> Cf Janssen, 'Friede', p 579.

and was defined as both a duty and a right.<sup>23</sup> The postrevolutionary world also meant the emergence of *mass politics* in new forms all over Europe. The aim of the restoration after the revolution and Napoleon was to stop this development. However, this was, seen in retrospect, a vain enterprise. Ideas of revolution and social change remained on the agenda as well as ideas of progress and improvement in a technological as well as moral sense towards some kind of distant goal of perfection. The ideological struggles about what precisely the goals should be and about how to achieve or prevent them grew in intensity. The philosophical speculation was transformed into the specialized search for truth in the name of science in a growing number of academic disciplines around professionalized cadres of scientists who accompanied and underpinned the political debates. Each discipline developed its special project for a better future, and also those which dealt with the past. It would be too strong to talk about mass sciences, but there was an unmistakable scientification of the nineteenth-century European societies.

The mass armies and the mass politics were driven by new kinds of *mass media*, which intensified the debate and reported from the battlefields faster and more immediately than before. Photos illustrated the martial disgustingness from the Crimean War onwards. The exchange of information speeded up and the availability of information expanded to ever-broader social strata. The 'massification' of the nineteenth-century societies was one of the most important dimensions of the fast changes that characterized the century. The masses got a more distinct profile when they became guided by images of self-determination through political action. The campaign of the middle classes against birth as the basis of power and the workers' class language transformed the ruling elites as well as the masses.

The nineteenth-century mass societies and the condensation of space and acceleration of time through new means of communication provided new preconditions for the debate on the old theme of war and peace. The oppositions, confrontations, and clashes about alternative views became stronger and more intense, and they involved growing numbers of participants and listeners. Kant had certainly commented in a revolutionary time of an unprecedented scale, which in many respects foreboded these developments, but his and his predecessors' thoughts can nevertheless be summarized in terms of philosophical reflection rather than political debate and ideological struggle; although Sully, for instance, was an *homme politique* rather than a philosopher.

These developments meant that Kant's appeal for perpetual peace through human use of reason in the wake of the French Revolution and Napoleon was soon superimposed by a more martial language. Earlier, the sufferings and pains of war were often referred to in terms of blindness of destiny or divine punishment. Now the language changed towards war as the outcome of human action and as the instrument to achieve political goals. Fichte, Arndt, and others invoked a German nation which with weapons should liberate itself from the French yoke. Others

<sup>23</sup> Thomas Hippler, *Citizens, Soldiers and National Armies: Military Service in France and Germany, 1789-1830*, London, Routledge 2008.



admired Napoleon as the man who with the sword had repressed the revolution and purified Europe from the pernicious fumes of the cries for emancipation.<sup>24</sup>

Friedrich von Gentz, who had been a student of Kant and between 1812 and 1822 was in close touch with all the great events of European history, secretary to the Congress of Vienna and to the following congresses for restoration, the adviser of Metternich, developed Kant's proposal for perpetual peace in a different direction. In an essay on perpetual peace published in 1800, he connected peace to balance of political power, which was an old idea in European politics that later was to be the idea that dictated the Vienna Peace.<sup>25</sup>

Gentz's Hobbesian thought was that the state of nature is rather the state of war and that the state of peace has to be institutionalized. Gentz evokes in his article the concept of nature under rejection of perpetual peace as progressive development. 'Nature has proclaimed that perpetual peace is impossible to realize.'<sup>26</sup> Therefore, Gentz suggests, it is necessary to plan for peace starting from the awareness that perpetual peace, although being an everlasting ideal of reason, cannot be anything more than this. Gentz's solution is to rethink the problem of war and peace using political rather than moral and judicial categories, approaching the vastness of the problems of humankind with a humble attitude that would enable humans to find viable solutions to big problems. The instrument to establish peace as durable as possible was 'political balance' which had ruled the European state order for 150 years, according to Gentz.<sup>27</sup>

Also philosophers supported ideas like those of Gentz. Hegel argued in his natural law essay that war, as well as peace, was absolutely necessary. He connected war to the moral (*sittliche*) health of the peoples and maintained that perpetual peace would put people in a state of stillness.<sup>28</sup> As we have seen, Kant, too, sometimes touched upon similar thoughts. Kant at such occasions formulated what was to become a frequent view on war in nineteenth-century Europe: the war as a fortifying and invigorating baptism of fire. Johann Gottlieb Fichte said more or less the same thing in 1804. How wrongful the purposes of war might seem, they are nevertheless promoting the main outlines of the world plan, the general spreading of culture. And so it will continue incessantly until the whole of humanity has amalgamated into one single global Peoples' Republic of Culture.<sup>29</sup>

During the decades until 1830, Kant's peace spirit based on reason and law was swept away. The Vienna congress did not locate the source of peace in the

<sup>24</sup> von Holtzendorff, *Idee des ewigen Völkerfriedens*, pp 34–5.

<sup>25</sup> Friedrich Von Gentz, 'Über den ewigen Frieden', *Historisches Journal* (1800), 711–90. Cf Maria Pia Paternó, 'Diplomacy of Treatises and Political Balance between XVIII and XIX Century', *Publikationsportal Europäische Friedensverträge*, Mainz, Institut für Europäische Geschichte 2009 <[http://www.ieg-friedensvertraege.de/uploads/\\_ieg\\_publications\\_pdf\\_51dacfe6e35e8/paterno07200901.pdf](http://www.ieg-friedensvertraege.de/uploads/_ieg_publications_pdf_51dacfe6e35e8/paterno07200901.pdf)>.

<sup>26</sup> Gentz, 'Über den ewigen Frieden', 717–18. Quoted from Paternó, 'Diplomacy of Treatises and Political Balance between XVIII and XIX Century', 7.

<sup>27</sup> Gentz, 'Über den ewigen Frieden', 763. Quoted from Paternó, 'Diplomacy of Treatises and Political Balance between XVIII and XIX Century', 8.

<sup>28</sup> Höffe, *Immanuel Kant*, p 26.

<sup>29</sup> Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters*, SW Vol 7 (1846), p 163.

individual use of reason but in secret cabinet intrigues and police surveillance. This was the implantation of the idea of power balance in political practices. The holy alliance applied a conceptualization of peace reminiscent of Leibniz's cemetery peace, as the liberal jurist Franz von Holtzendorff put it in his retrospect view at the end of the nineteenth century. Europe was after 1815 divided in two big camps of ideological confrontation: those who believed that a recreation of the political freedoms required wars of independence and those who considered peace as the instrument to maintain princely power interests. Holtzendorff outlined a perspective where war meant emancipation and peace was equal to police surveillance and military oppression.<sup>30</sup> This was what would become Orwell's view on peace.

On the other side of the coin, the conservative pro-war bellicism was contrasted to and opposed by the radical against-war pacifism. However, the languages of war and peace also became less dichotomic and more complex in the nineteenth century. They split up and were transformed into several parallel and intertwined development strings:

1. the pronounced anti-pacifistic bellicism with arguments about the war as purification;
2. peace through internal repression as in the Holy Alliance, ie the line of thought from Hobbes to Orwell;
3. an interpretation of peace that connected to the traditional Christian social theory, peace through mission and civilization where war was a civilizing instrument for final peace;
4. a moderate-liberal peace concept where peace follows from competition and free trade;
5. a liberal or socialist utopian peace under transformation of Christian chiliastic visions;
6. peace through technological developments making weapons a deterrent of war.

These languages of war and peace confirmed or transformed Hobbes' prescription for peace and harmony through the state and through fear. The bellicistic idea of war for national purification and invigoration had connections to the Christian doctrines of peace through love and civilization brought about by means of 'Holy War' as well as to the economic theories of interest-based competition where trade and commerce would bring peace. There was also a link to the utopian peace line of thought through concepts like class war.

The bellicistic language became louder during the second half of the nineteenth century. '*Der Krieg bringt wieder die wahren Kräfte zu Ehren*' ('The war brings the true forces into favour again'), Jakob Burckhardt argued around 1850.<sup>31</sup> The

<sup>30</sup> von Holtzendorff, *Idee des ewigen Völkerfriedens*, p 35.

<sup>31</sup> Jacob Burckhardt, *Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen*. Handwritten lectures edited by his nephew Jacob Oeri. Published in Burckhardt, *Gesammelte Werke* Vol 4, Stuttgart, Schwabe 1905, pp 117–19.

protagonist in this vein was Heinrich von Treitschke, of course. According to him, the dream of perpetual peace was the surest sign of a politically exhausted epoch's dearth of ideas. Hermann Baumgarten in Strasbourg was another conservative historian on the bellicist barricades. In a letter to Treitschke, just after the outbreak of the Prussian-French war in 1870, he saw war as the instrument of moral ('*sittliche*') invigoration and cultural progress against the miserable *Manchestertum*.<sup>32</sup>

An early critic of bellicism was Heinrich von Kleist, who before he took his life in 1811 at the age of 34 in his plays responded to the recuperative war discourse. *Penthesilea* (1807) and the *Hermannsschlacht* (1808) performed striking critique of the positive valuations of war. This does not mean that he believed in a pacifist agenda. He was born into a family of officers and destined for a career in the Prussian army where he also served from the age of 15 until he was 22 when he decided to quit. His vivid portraits of the terror of war demonstrated that war was not the 'other' of civil society, but integrated into its very core. Society was in the view of Kleist the continuation of war by other means.<sup>33</sup>

Friedrich Nietzsche defined war as invigorating and purposeful, but criticized attempts to camouflage aggressive impulses with a moral sheen. He inverted Clausewitz when he argued that war is not the carrier of politics but the other way round, war uses politics for its own ends. As Elisabeth Krimmer has emphasized, Nietzsche's glorification of war was surpassed only by his commitment to unveil the political lies and subterfuges that served to justify war. On that point he appealed to both right-wing bellicists and left-wing pacifists. However, unlike the pacifists he never held out any promise of a future without wars.<sup>34</sup>

Sigmund Freud shared Nietzsche's pessimism regarding the possibility of lasting peace. In an essay half a year after the outbreak of World War I he commented on the astonishment felt by many that a war of such cruelty could be fought in civilized Europe. There was nothing to be surprised at, according to Freud. Human behaviour is determined by drives, also aggressive and destructive ones. The effects of such drives can be temporarily controlled or repressed but not eradicated. '*In Wirklichkeit gibt es keine Ausrottung des Bösen*', in reality there is no extermination of evil. Culture has a thin veneer, there are far more cultural hypocrites than really cultural humans, he argued. War represents a return of the repressed that is bound to haunt mankind's present and future. One should not be so upset about war since it is just one of the many distressing exigencies of life, he said.<sup>35</sup>

The bellicistic line of thought continued under adjustment to ever-new contexts all the way up to World War I where Ernst Jünger emphatically articulated it. His

<sup>32</sup> Janssen, 'Friede', p 580.

<sup>33</sup> Elisabeth Krimmer, *The Representation of War in German Literature. From 1800 to the present*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2010, pp 46–7.

<sup>34</sup> Krimmer, *The Representation of War in German Literature*, p 66.

<sup>35</sup> Freud developed his thoughts on war in the essay 'Zeitgemässes über Krieg und Tod' (1915). Here quoted from Krimmer, *The Representation of War in German Literature*, pp 66–7.

*In Stahlgewittern* (Storm of Steel), self-published in 1920, glorified war. *Feuer und Blut* (Fire and Blood, 1925) described the war experiences as an internal sublimate event which elevated the soldier's life and isolated it from normal humanity into a mystical experience. The extreme experiences of modern military techniques brought the capacity of the human senses to its utmost trial.<sup>36</sup> The experiences of war had changed dramatically and the capacity of mass killing had grown almost exponentially during the four generations since Kant and Fichte wrote about the purifying war, but the *Denkfigur* remained.

The German nineteenth-century conservative bellicism drew on strong etatistic feelings against the *bürgerliche* commercial and civic society. The martial language against external enemies was based on Hobbesian assumptions of domestic peace through public order and security, not through liberal freedoms. This was the solution of the holy alliance translated into German politics.

The liberal idea of peace through law and civic rights was developed by Robert von Mohl among others. The adherents of this thought agreed on the ideal of perpetual peace but asked themselves how it could be organized. They agreed fully with Kant that a confederation of republics, or states as was the key concept half a century after Kant, was a *sine qua non* and the only reasonable point of departure, and rejected all ideas about a world federation. Liberal universalism narrowed down its scope to the nation state. However, state-oriented liberalism had difficulty in asserting itself against the conservatives. After the conceptual shift from republic to state during the first half of the nineteenth century, Kant's *Bürger* with civic virtues, in the wake of the restoration after the failed revolution in 1848, became the *Staatsbürger*, closer to the Hobbesian figure of the subject under the ruler, the *Untertan*, than to the *citoyen* of the French Revolution. The German *Staatsbürger* was also different from the British citizen.<sup>37</sup> The differences resulted in different preconditions for the war and peace discourses.

From about the mid-nineteenth century the liberals doubted ever more that perpetual peace could at all be organized. The framework was the monarchical mood of restoration and reaction during the second half of the nineteenth century Europe with the aim to create a postrevolutionary order. The reaction, in turn, provoked from the 1870s onwards a polarizing language of class struggle that ignited the revolutionary spirits again. The liberal hopes were ever more invested in a distant future, with expectations that a growing *Gesittung* ('civilization') of the peoples would pave the way towards perpetual peace. The goal would be achieved only when reason and humanity had become the general rule through civilizing progress, which, in turn, might require war as an instrument.

As a vague and distant goal the peace of the moderate liberals merged with the peace of the utopian liberals and early socialists (Saint Simon) based on the power of reason. Peace was in the utopian view a necessary outcome of reason

<sup>36</sup> Ernst Jünger, *In Stahlgewittern* 1920 and *ibid*, *Feuer und Blut* 1925.

<sup>37</sup> Reinhart Koselleck, 'Drei bürgerliche Welten? Zur vergleichenden Semantik der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft in Deutschland, England und Frankreich', in Hans-Jürgen Puhle (ed), *Bürger in der Gesellschaft der Neuzeit. Wirtschaft-Politik-Kultur*, Göttingen, V & R 1991.

in progressive unfolding. The differences among the liberals thus dealt with the velocity of the progress and the precise road to the final power of reason. There was no dispute about the goal as such. Peace was not only according to reason but also the natural status of all peoples. Peace did not have to be created against nature as Hobbes and Kant argued.

Some believed that the goal of the triumph of reason could be achieved faster and more immediately through a transmutation of existing political and social relationships in a new revolution, the final. This was the basic conviction of the socialists and to a certain degree the left liberals followed them, although the definition of the final destiny was not identical.<sup>38</sup> Karl Marx gave this line of thought a more scientific and deterministic language, which, in turn, paradoxically, promoted ideas about the need for violent revolutionary action through feelings of being on the side of history.

The assumed connection between peace and civilization implied that world peace only was a question for the civilized peoples. With the understanding that peace was the outcome of civilizational progress the implication was that uncivilized peoples had to be civilized. The consequence was a call for the spread of the European civilization beyond Europe. Under certain circumstances, violent colonization could be seen as an instrument for peace. August Wilhelm Heffter, professor of law and known for *Das europäische Völkerrecht der Gegenwart* (1844), yearned for a completed general European state of peace so that war thereafter only had to be made outside Europe in order to finally establish perpetual peace on earth.<sup>39</sup>

The link between peace, law, and justice established in political practices over centuries was challenged by the emerging understanding of peace as being based on progressive perfection towards natural harmony of interests and fraternal sentiments, which Henri de Saint Simon had formulated already in 1814: '*L'âge d'or du genre humain n'est point derrière, il est au devant, il est dans la perfection de l'ordre social.*' Such imaginations remained strong throughout the century in various socialist and liberal utopian projects.<sup>40</sup> They constituted the counter-trend to the conservative bellicism about ennobling wars. Kant's perpetual peace project got a new ideological framework. The liberal and socialist peace utopia got even a chiliastic dimension with phrases like those of Saint Simon. This kind of conceptualization of peace connected clearly to the old Christian idea of *pax aeterna* with the decisive difference, however, that the eternal heavenly peace had become perpetual peace on earth. Its realization did not imply the end of time, only the end of history. Henry MacNamara, a British baron and author of an prize-winning article rewarded by the London Peace Society in 1841, glanced into the future and saw 'a rainbow across the political horizon, telling man, that the storm of ages had passed away and that peace, happy peace was restored'.<sup>41</sup> The diction

<sup>38</sup> Koselleck, 'Drei bürgerliche Welten?', p 582.

<sup>39</sup> Koselleck, 'Drei bürgerliche Welten?', p 583, fn 191.

<sup>40</sup> Henri de Saint Simon, *De la réorganisation de la société européenne*, ed by Alfred Pereire, Paris, les Presses françaises 1925, p 97.

<sup>41</sup> Janssen, 'Friede', p 584.

in a religious-biblical language was not by pure chance but an example of the transformation of the religious peace concept into a utopian language by the early socialists. The belief in the perfection of the minds went hand in hand with the belief in the perfection of societies and in technological progress. Later, socialists with a Marxian not less utopian language would additionally also operate with the enemy concept. Those who opposed the road towards the future peace were understood as the absolute enemy or the enemy of humanity. They thereby drew on similar conceptualizations in the French Revolution.

The chiliastic utopian peace language introduced two forms of war as instruments of peace: the violent revolution and the civil war or the class war. With this view the peace discourse was short-circuited, which is not to say that it was not attractive. A poem in the journal of the German metal workers' union in 1911 demonstrates the language of a long and potentially violent struggle before the arrival to the end goal:

<i>Bis ihr an das Ziel gedrungen</i>	Until you have reached the goal
<i>Wo der Preis des Kampfes winkt</i>	Where the award of the struggle awaits
<i>Bis der grosse Sieg errungen</i>	Until you have won the great victory
<i>Der den ew'gen Frieden bringt</i>	Which brings perpetual peace

In parallel with the transformation of peace visions based on reason, or on a liberal political economy, into utopian and chiliastic languages, another model was propagated in the nineteenth century. The early modern political term for peace, *pax civilis*, focused on domestic public peace and security in a Hobbesian perspective. The *pactum pacis*, which became ever more relevant as an argument during the nineteenth century, aimed at an interstate relation where peace was based on the will of sovereign contracting partners. It was often the matter of a temporary precarious peace, not seldom close to armistice, based on interests, which did not fit well with the enlightenment idea of permanent peace based on reason. A tension emerged between peace based on reason and peace based on interests, between optimistic beliefs in progress and immanent forces in history on the one side, and realism and doubts about such forces, on the other.

The peace concept was in the nineteenth century not only ambiguous but also attractive. 'Attractive' means here that every politically established order was keen to adorn itself in a language of peace. '*L'empire c'est la paix*', Napoleon III argued. '*Das deutsche Kaiserreich ist wahrhaft der Friede*', the echo resounded from Berlin in 1871. This was peace as hypocrisy in a Koselleckian sense.<sup>42</sup> The war between states became a crusade for the future realm of peace.

The *political liberalism* was against the backdrop of the illiberal constitutions predominantly martial and this situation remained in many respects after the defeat of the revolutionaries in 1848. National liberalism regarded revolution and war as the tool of emancipation.

<sup>42</sup> Reinhart Koselleck, *Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society*, Oxford, Berg 1988 (1959).

The *economic liberalism* focused on peace through free trade, however. The war was like an armed stoppage of work of the nations, uneconomic and destructive for victors as well as the defeated. War was a regression of human culture through the mass destruction of valuable commodities which necessarily contributed to the pauperization of peoples. The perpetual peace among the peoples would emerge from the free trade, and the free trade from the perpetual peace. So the argument went among the liberal adherents of the free trade ideology. To a large extent their free trade programme remained politically unimplemented, however, as Thomas Hopkins and Niels Petersson demonstrate in their contributions in this volume. And consequently their peace programme, too, of course.

Instead of war the adherents of free trade argued for an alternative struggle: peaceful competition between economic interests, which would lead to the harmonization of all contradictions. Franz von Holtzendorff noted the distinction between theory and practice, however: The economic interests were promoted by guns in Africa, China, and India to teach trade politics to weaker peoples. Kant had argued that the military spirit of the absolute monarchies would find its strongest and closest equivalent in the spirit of the world trade, but his subtle indications in a philosophical language were not understood by his contemporaries, von Holtzendorff ironically noted.<sup>43</sup>

The *ethical liberalism* was propagated by local peace societies, which appeared at the end of the Napoleonic wars in England, Belgium, and the USA. The peace societies were part of a motley liberal movement for political reform that aimed for human rights, social improvements, free trade, the abolition of slavery, and an end to the waging of war. Typical examples were the American Peace Society in New York, founded in 1815, and the Society for the Promotion of Permanent and Universal Peace, better known as the London Peace Society, formed on Quaker initiative in 1816. The ethical pacifism of these first societies was later strengthened by ideas emanating from France which saw international law as an alternative to wars and as a way to solve international conflicts. The movement spread gradually. The first continental European peace society was founded in Geneva 1830. The London Peace Society created a network of local groups, and its membership grew in what became more of a middle class movement.<sup>44</sup>

The emerging ethical peace movement had a heterogeneous programme. Many of the peace friends had their particular affairs of the heart, which if necessary should be carried through with military violence before the stage of perpetual peace arrived. Among the various goals, were the establishment of a European order based on the nationality principle, the establishment of a confederated European republic of states, or—in versions that connected to socialist's projects—the violent

<sup>43</sup> von Holtzendorff, *Idee des ewigen Völkerfriedens*, p 37.

<sup>44</sup> Rainer Santi, '100 Jahre Friedensarbeit' in *Friedenszeitung* (Switzerland) Nr 125-126 1992. This section is based on the analysis of Santi.

redistribution of private property, the dissolution of state power and the introduction of autonomous local governments.

The bellicist language of war contained an obvious *religious* dimension, which was not only visible in Saint Simon's utopia. The Christian argument about privation and sacrifice for God was transformed into an argument for privation and sacrifice for the nation in the exegetics of Treitschke and others. The war discourse had a religious undertone, which not least built on the secularized ascetic pietism at the end of the eighteenth century, which had prepared the ground emotionally and intellectually. Protestant theologian Heinrich Gottlieb Tzschirner in Wittenberg, influenced by Kant and working on a reason-based and ethical Christian doctrine, argued in *Über den Krieg* (1815) that a people which had enjoyed a long peace tended to godlessness and loss of *Sittlichkeit*, whereas the war promoted insights about the divine dependence.<sup>45</sup> The connection to religion was, as stated above, in the nineteenth century also transformed into the civilizing mission project. The imposition of Christian values by missionaries with the goal to convert the pagans to Christians was seen as a project through education and enlightenment. This is not to say that the Christian missions were just about violence, but there were no doubt points in common with the bellicistic approach.

However, the religious connotation was, after all, stronger in the peace than in the war concept. The theological interpretation of *pax* as a cosmic principle of order had from early on profound impacts on the political discourses. Applied on human social life *pax* played certainly only a secondary role as compared to its transcending dimension, and it had rather than a social a moral connotation. The deeper aim of *pax* was the final reconciliation between God and the humans. The Christian understanding of peace was moral and eschatological. The great impact of this understanding came in the early nineteenth century when the Christian view on the world and on time was secularized to a world-immanent salvation doctrine about the perfect society. The early utopian socialists, and after them Karl Marx, charged the political peace concept with secularized moral end-of-history dreams. *Pax aeterna* became perpetual peace on earth, not in earth as Leibniz argued. The peace project can obviously not be disconnected from its Christian origin.<sup>46</sup>

The question of war and peace had also a *technological* dimension, indicated already by Kant in his argument that modern technology had made war meaningless because one could no longer control the weapons (see n 21). Strong arguments for *technology* as an instrument for peace through deterrent were brought forward by Alfred Nobel. This was a trope of thoughts that would peak in the terror balance of the Cold War.

<sup>45</sup> Janssen 'Krieg', in Conze, Brunner, and Koselleck, *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, Vol 3 H-ME, p 602. For a critical discussion of the secularized ascetic pietism, see George Becker, 'Pietism's Confrontation with Enlightenment Rationalism: An Examination of the Relation between Ascetic Protestantism and Science', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 30 (1991), 139–58.

<sup>46</sup> Janssen, 'Friede', pp 544–5.



Alfred Nobel's inventions of dynamite and explosive gelatin were not, as many believe, mainly thought of for military purposes, but rather for road and railway construction. However, another invention where he was involved, the ballistit—a powder that develops little smoke when it ignites gel and through its slow explosion gives the projectile an effective drive without developing too high a pressure in the rifle—revolutionized the shooting technology from pistols to canons and got great military importance. A year before he wrote his will he also bought shares in the armaments company Bofors. Alfred Nobel argued that the best way to peace was through deterrent weapons of mass destruction. He made money on this business and donated it for peace.

Bertha von Suttner was the posthumous daughter of a Habsburg field marshal. She accepted the aristocratic and militarist family environment for half of her life and opposed it vehemently thereafter. She stayed in regular correspondence with Alfred Nobel all the time from 1878 until he died in 1896 and no doubt influenced him to put peace as one of the prizes in his will.<sup>47</sup> In 1889 she had published the book *Die Waffen nieder* (Lay Down Your Arms), which was paid much attention to in the debate. She became one of the leading figures in the international peace movement and did certainly not have the same view on the road to peace as Nobel. The two had a shared rather unproblematic understanding of the dichotomy between war and peace and two opposing views on the achievement of peace.

To require disarmament would in the view of Alfred Nobel more or less mean to make oneself ridiculous and was not in anybody's favour. To require the immediate establishment of an international court of arbitration would be to fight against a thousand prejudices. Nobel came with concrete suggestions: One should be content with the notification of a preliminary law for peace limited to one or two years. Not many governments would refuse to consider such a mild and limited proposal, in particular not if one managed to get the support from '*des hommes d'Etat de haute valeur*'. The European governments should commit themselves for one year either to transfer all disagreements between them to an arbitration court established to this purpose, or, if they refused to do so, to postpone any hostile action until the end of a respite agreed upon. Little by little one would achieve disarmament.

At other occasions Alfred Nobel saw the road to peace through a deterrent weapon as never seen before. Bertha von Suttner's struggle for peace was in her own experience a struggle for money and against heavy resistance where she was caricatured as Peace Bertha or the Peace Fury. She tried in her letters again and again to convince her rich pen friend to invest his money and inventor spirit in order to prevent wars. 'I wish you could invent a little pill to blow up all fort[ress]es and barra[c]ks at a single stroke', she wrote to him in the winter of 1893. Alfred Nobel's vision, on the other side, was to create a matter or a machine with such a terrible mass weapon with such an effect that war would be impossible. His formula for peace was deterrent force through armament. An armament

<sup>47</sup> For their correspondence, see Biedermann Edelgard (Hg.), *Chère Baronne et Amie Cher monsieur et amie. Der Briefwechsel zwischen Alfred Nobel und Bertha von Suttner*, Göttingen, Olms 2001.

competition spiral with growing dreadfulness of the weapons would according to him lead to the insight about the absurdity and thereby the impossibility of future wars. Suttner opposed him. She considered the ancient Roman motto of *si vis pacem, para bellum*, if you want peace arm for war, to be an 'altrömischen Idiotensatz'. She invested her expectations in disarmament and arbitration courts and tried to convince Nobel about her opinion. Instead of canons reason should speak and the arbitration courts negotiate peace treaties.<sup>48</sup>

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Depending on the many diverse views in the nineteenth century European languages of peace and war, the perpetual peace project had democratic, pragmatic, nationalist-patriotic, religious, civilizational, technological, economic or socialistic chiliastic contours. The peace movement saw the imagined goal emerge at the horizon after a more or less violent struggle to get there. Taken together the diverse interests of the movement belonged, according to Franz von Holtzendorff, to the same category as the holy alliance, which he regarded as the work of a general system of oppression operating as a mutual insurance society.<sup>49</sup>

In order to promote the movement, and to create a platform from which it could develop an international programme, pacifists and peace societies started to organize Peace Congresses. (See here Thomas Hippler's contribution in this volume.) Another aim of the Congresses was to establish pacifism as a major ideological current, distinct from socialism and liberalism. The programme was based on three principles: violent intervention in the internal affairs of other states only in exceptional cases, general disarmament through the abolition of standing armies, and the establishment of courts of arbitration. These principles were part of Kant's perpetual peace project, but Kant went one step further when he required a ban on all future territorial changes in Europe.<sup>50</sup> Nevertheless, the early peace movement developed the contours of what through professional and specialized jurists in the 1860s was to become an international law project.

The international lawyers infused over centuries, with concrete proposals for a new time, the philosophical debates and plans on how to solve the issue of war and peace.<sup>51</sup> However, they were philosophers rather than lawyers with a broad programme on legal and political theory. A new professional consciousness closer to liberal and socialist mass movements and to politics for peace during the second half of the nineteenth century gave new authority and a higher profile to international lawyers. They became lawyers rather than philosophers. Professionalization meant specialization.

The new professional trend in the late 1860s began as a specialization branching out from the International Association for the Progress of Social Sciences and

<sup>48</sup> Edelgard, *Chère Baronne et Amie*, pp 40–1.

<sup>49</sup> von Holtzendorff, *Idee des ewigen Völkerfriedens*, p 38.

<sup>50</sup> von Holtzendorff, *Idee des ewigen Völkerfriedens*, p 39.

<sup>51</sup> Martti Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations. The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2001.

had an important forum in the Institute of International Law and its mouth-piece *Revue de droit international et de législation comparée* from 1869 onwards. Here Martti Koskenniemi locates the birth of modern international law, not in Westphalia or Vienna as in many conventional views. The international lawyers articulated in great variety in contentious discussions proposals and positions in the accelerating peace debate after the Crimean War and the American civil war. They shared a certain centrism in their attempts to balance their moderate nationalism with liberal internationalism. They argued against the egoistic politics of the states and in favour of European integration through free trade, and of international integration of many aspects of domestic society including human rights. Their credo was less sovereignty than critique of sovereignty. On this point there was one important exception. They supported official imperialism and advocated until 1914 the extension of Western civilization to the colonies. International law became a project which commented on and participated in the growing peace debate, and as a project it also saw itself as a gentle civilizer in the still not civilized world.<sup>52</sup>

The peace idea outlined by Kant and other enlightenment philosophers as irony as well as long-term possibility through reason was not new, as we have seen, but from the 1870s onwards it got more political punch through the articulation by a professional cadre of international lawyers. They became a crucial part of the international peace movement. They canalized the visions of the peace activists in pragmatic directions for political implementation. They built a bridge between the enlightened philosophers and the expanding number of political practitioners under the conditions of mass politics, who tried to develop an arena for debate during the postrevolutionary restorative decades after 1848. The international lawyers did what they could to stabilize a violent time of nation building driven by industrialization and a growing social conflict, which canalized social frustration into civilizing and exploiting projects in the colonized world. The conflicts in the wake of this external canalization of energy made the international law project problematic.

The peace congresses in The Hague in 1899 and 1907 represented the culmination of the international law project and of the lawyers' attempt to canalize the utopian peace dream in pragmatic directions. The year 1914 made their triumph appear in a different light. The social issue was not included in their peace visions. The implications of this deficit would become clear in the 1930s. However, the argument that peace has a social dimension was much older.

<sup>52</sup> Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations*, pp 3–5.