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REPRESENTATIONS OF EUROPE AND THE NATION IN CURRENT AND PROSPECTIVE MEMBER-STATES: MEDIA, ELITES AND CIVIL SOCIETY

The Collective State of the Art and Historical Reports

Edited by

Bo Stråth and Anna Triandafyllidou

June 2003
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http://www.cordis.lu/improving/socio-economic/home.htm, for information on the Key Action “Improving the Socio-economic Knowledge Base” under the 5th Framework Programme.
http://improving-ser.sti.jrc.it/default/, the database of socio-economic projects funded under the 4th and 5th Framework Programme.
Foreword

The EURONAT project studies the relationship (intertwined or mutually exclusive) between national identity and representations of Europe and the EU in nine countries: Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom.

Its main objectives are to revise and increase existing knowledge on representations of the nation, Europe and the European Union in current member states and associated countries; to study the extent to which national loyalty and identification with Europe and/or the EU are mutually exclusive or compatible and intertwined with one another; to highlight similarities and differences between the media, the elite and lay people understandings and representations of the EU and the nation and study the role of the media and the elites in creating a discursive universe; to analyse comparatively findings from the different countries concerning the above three and study similarities and differences among countries along the East-West and North-South axes; and to inform media policies on European integration and Eastern enlargement.

The framework guiding the comparative analysis of the nine countries starts from the theoretical premise that national identity formation is related both to the historical heritage of state formation and nation-building in each country as well as to the geopolitical position of that country and its links with the European integration process. National identities are constituted by domestic and European components. The aim of the project is to analyse and compare the combination of national-cum-European components in national identities and representations of Europe and the EU with a special reference to the role of the media in their (trans)formation. In this first set of project reports, we shall outline the historical legacies and relational contexts in which national identity and relations with the EU and Europe have developed in the countries studied. We shall thus provide for the historical, geopolitical and theoretical background against which to analyse (in subsequent phases of the project), the representations and meanings of the nation, Europe and the EU and their inter-relations in media, elite and lay people discourses.

Bo Stråth, Anna Triandafyllidou- Project co-ordinators:
European University Insitute, Florence, April 2003.

The current report invites us to a historical journey in discovering the dynamics of identity construction in the set of countries examined by the project. The critical historical junctures that shaped and determined the choices and opportunities in arriving at the European crossroads are narrated and critically examined by the research consortium.
By increasing the understanding of the socio-political luggage that we carry, we get a greater insight into the profile and psyche of the passengers who have chosen as their final destination the European Union.

Aris Apollonatos- Scientific Officer:
European Commission, Brussels, June 2003
REPRESENTATIONS OF EUROPE AND THE NATION IN CURRENT AND PROSPECTIVE MEMBER-STATES: MEDIA, ELITES AND CIVIL SOCIETY

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AUSTRIA: Europe and the Nation in Austrian National Identity

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1. Scholarly and Public Debates on Austrian National Identity

In Austria like in Germany the collapse of the Nazi Third Reich in 1945 formed the crucial turning point in the reconstruction of national identity. But due to the “imposed” Anschluß of Austria by Nazi Germany, the collapse of the Third Reich played a different role in the public and scholarly debates on Austrian national identity as compared to the German discourse. Four main controversial topics dominated the Austrian debates: (1) the Anschluß to Nazi Germany as consensual or enforced or the corresponsibility or non-guilt for Nazi crimes; (2) the historical foundations of a separate Austrian national identity vis-à-vis a German identity; (3) the Austrian nation as based on ethnic-cultural or political-civic foundations of a political community; and (4) Austria as a Western oriented or a neutral nation mediating between East and West.

In post-world War II Austria, the collapse of Nazi Germany was experienced not so much as a national catastrophe rather than as a relief and liberation from a first ambiguous and finally disastrous common experience with Nazi Great Germany. Through this common Great-German experience, the Anschluß mentality vis-à-vis Germany, so strong in the inter-War period, had been severely undermined and gave way to the formation of a separate Austrian national identity. This time, after World War II, the plans of the Allies to create a separate neutral Austria were accepted by the majority of the Austrian elites and population, and this national consensus enabled, through the reunification of the four Allied occupation zones, the foundation of the Second Austrian Republic in 1955. Still, the formation of an Austrian national identity was a gradual process from a Great-German to a separate national identity and therefore inextricably intertwined with highly emotional public and scholarly debates about the role of German elements in Austrian identity (Botz and Sprengnagel 1994, Wodak 1997) A major focus formed the discussion about the consensual acceptance by or the enforced imposition of the Anschluß to Nazi Germany in 1938 on Austria. The evolving mainstream consensus soon agreed upon the enforced imposition of the Nazi Anschluß, downplayed the active role of the Austrians in Nazi crimes and instead emphasized the victimization under Nazi rule. As a corollary, the impetus to come to terms with the past was much weaker than in Germany and the continuing scandals such as Franz Murer (in charge of the Wilna-Ghetto) or Kurt Waldheim (as Austrian president involved in Nazi crimes) around Austrian Nazi complicity were more defensively negated and less used as a means to clarify self-critically the role of Austrians in Nazi dictatorship (Bruckmüller 1996: 35-60). As a consequence, also the continuity of Nazi currents within Austrian society remained stronger than in Germany. A conspicuous case here has been the FPÖ (Austrian Freedom Party) under its political leader Jörg Haider, its recent success with 26% in the national elections in 1999 and its entrance as a coalition partner into the current ÖVP-led government.

Whereas the role of Austrians in Nazi-Germany has played rather a marginal role in the formation of post-WW II Austrian national identity, the core controversial issue has centered on the relation between the German and Austrian layers of Austrian collective identity. Though after 1945, a pragmatic political consensus on a separate Austrian national development had emerged, it took some time to arrive also at a public and intellectual consensus in this core question. In the immediate post-War period, only the ÖVP in a continuity to the more Austrian minded Christian Social Party and the Austrian Communist Party on the basis of Stalin’s position on the nationality question argued publicly for the legitimacy of a separate Austrian nation. By contrast, the SPÖ still followed its inter-War Great-German democratic orientation and the FPÖ (founded in 1956 following the VdU (Verband der Unabhängigen) established in 1949) continued a German national course. But after the foundation of the Austrian Second Republic in 1955, also the Social Democrats turned to a national Austrian position and eventually also the FPÖ started
to play down its German national orientation. However, the public controversies on this core issue continued to resurface. One controversy centered on the question of whether in public education and universities German national positions should be officially permitted; another one on the relation between the German ethnic foundations and an Austrian identity; the third on the Austrian authenticity of the authoritarian Dollfuß/Schuschnigg regime in the 1930s; a fourth one on the ideological ill-birth of the Austrian nation (Bruckmüller 1996:35-60, Botz and Sprengnagel 1994). A crucial role in these controversies played the FPÖ and public figures close to its German national position, though Haider after 1990 transformed the traditional German national position into an Austrian patriotic orientation. On this backdrop of the continuing questioning of an Austrian national identity, a continuous state politics of Austrian identity supported the development of the Second Republic.

These public controversies on Austrian national identity have been accompanied by intensive scholarly debates, particularly in the historical sciences, on the relation between the German and Austrian elements in the formation of the Austrian national identity. The core of these debates centered on the foundational role of the German linguistical and cultural nation in the formation of a political nation—the predominant classical position which included Austria conceptually and politically as an integral part of a great-German nation-state. This classical position was still present in the thesis of the West German historian Karl-Dietrich Erdmann in 1985 that German history after 1945 has to be seen as the history of three states (FRG, GDR and Austria), two nations (German and Austrian) and one people (the German). Here the foundation of the German and Austrian political nations were still seen in a shared German linguistical and cultural nation. Against this reformulated classical position, a variety of Austrian historians tried to argue for the specific Austrian historical foundations of the modern Austrian national identity. First, some historians emphasized the ethnic-territorial foundations of an Austrian regional identity; it refers to the original name „Ostarrichi“, the landscapes of the Alpes, the mixture between German and Slavic groups and the cultural legacy in this „Ostreich“(Plaschka, et al. 1995, Stourzh 1992, Zöllner 1984). Second, other historians pointed to the Habsburg legacy as the political center of the German Roman empire and its historical impact on the Austrian regions (Lhotsky 1970, Kann 1986, Plaschka, Sourzh and Niederkorn 1995, Zöllner 1984). Third, again other historians tried to demonstrate for the 19th century that there emerged apart from the predominant modern German nationalism also an Austrian nationalism (Heer 1981, Kann 1986, Zöllner 1984). And fourth, some historians stressed that also in the contested inter-War period the Anschluß movement was opposed by a substantial Austrian identity (Heer 1981, Lutz and Rumpeler 1982). In other words, the majority of Austrian historians wanted to prove that the post-World War II development of a separate Austrian nation was not simply an artificial volunlaristic construct but based on objective historical foundations.

A further topic in the public and scholarly debates has been the relation of Austria to Europe. As already mentioned, one of the essentials inscribed in the constitution of the newly founded Austrian nation-state was the neutrality of Austria between the West and the East. A first temptation to undermine this neutrality principle emerged when the European Economic Community and the growing dependency of Austria from the Western European and West German economy made an accession to the emerging European institutions increasingly attractive. Nevertheless, despite the economic advantages for Austria, the Austrian government decided to ally itself with the EFTA and its politically also neutral Scandinavian members and not with the continental European Community. A major reason for this political decision was – apart from the state treaties’ neutrality clause and the necessity for a Soviet ok–also the fear to become again dominated by Germany—this time via European integration and institutions. This Austrian defensive attitude against the European Community changed only
when the Scandinavian countries decided to apply for European Union membership and with Sweden and Finland also Austria finally became member of the European Union in 1995 (Bruckmüller 1996: 82-86, Wodak 154-162). Now, after the end of the Cold War confrontation between the West and the Soviet Union, also the neutrality doctrine did not present any more a major obstacle to join the Western transnational institutions like the European Union and eventually also NATO. At the same time, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Iron Curtain, also the relationship of Austria to Eastern Europe became a controversial topic in the public and scholarly debates. On the one side, there were those who argued for a fortress Europe and a closer linkage to the West against the new potential dangers from the East. On the other side, the neutrality doctrine became – following interwar models - transformed into the special missionary role of Austria to mediate as a small nation between Western and Eastern Europe. The particular focus, here, is on the Danubian neighbors with its common culture and Habsburg legacy (Puntscher-Rieckmann 1995).

2. Disciplinary Approaches to National Identity

The above outline indicates that in post-World War II Austria, the public and scholarly debates were inextricably intertwined with the construction and reconstruction of national identity. In essence, the Austrian scholarly debates were oriented to the historical legitimacy and necessity of the construction of an independent Austrian nation and thus reflected the thrust of the public debates to foster an Austrian national identity in the face of remaining German national sentiments and movements. The following disciplines have been crucial in investigating the foundations and development of Austrian national identity in the context of Austrian nation-building. The historical sciences have been primarily concerned with the origins and evolution of an Austrian national identity in struggle with a (Great)-German national identity from the beginnings of the Habsburg Empire to the Third Reich (Bruckmüller 1996). The political sciences and sociology have focussed predominantly on the post-World War II development of the Austrian state, political system, political culture and social structure with only few studies on nation-building and national identity construction (Haller 1996). But quantitative survey research as well as qualitative cultural research have made special contributions to the analysis of Austrian national identity (Bruckmüller 1996: 61-85, Wodak 1999).

The post-WW II historical sciences in Austria have centered on the core question of how much weight the Austrian or German components had in Austrian nation-building and national identity formation. The historical legacy of Austrian (and German) historiography had been to emphasize the German foundations of Austrian nation-building and national identity construction and some few post-WW II Austrian historians such as Karl Dietrich Erdmann (1988) and Fritz Fellner (1985) still continued this tradition. But the majority of post-WW II Austrian historians started from a secure separate Austrian nation and tried to establish the specifically Austrian foundations and components in the development of Austrian nation-building and national identity formation. Felix Kreissler, an Austrian émigré historian, describes in his La prise de conscience de la nation Autrichienne 1938-1945-1978 (Kreissler 1980, 1984) the emergence of an Austrian national self-consciousness during the Third Reich and its crystallization after World War II. Friedrich Heer in his Der Kampf um die österreichische Identität (Heer 1981) goes back to the origins of Austrian nation-building, emphasizing that no other nation in Europe than Austria was to such a degree directed from outside. His main thesis is that in the German speaking parts of Habsburg Austria from the 16th to the 20th century two nations developed: a German one (Lutheran-Protestant and later Bismarck Germany as a model against Roman and Catholic Habsburg Austria) and an
Austrian one (less articulated, but in identification with Catholic Habsburg Austria). The volume edited by Georg Wagner Österreich. Von der Staatsidee zum Nationalbewußtsein (Wagner 1982) concentrated more on the autochthonous origins of Austrian national identity in the Austrian regions under the roof of the Habsburg imperial state. In a similar orientation, the volume edited by Erich Zöllner Volk, Land und Staat in der Geschichte Österreichs (Zöllner 1984) traced the Austrian regional, political, cultural and ideational roots of Austrian nation-building and national identity. A major synthesis of the Austrian historical investigations is Ernst Bruckmüller Nation Österreich in which the changing Austrian and German components in Austrian nation-building are brought together (Bruckmüller 1996). To this Austrian historical debate also the West German historical contributions such as Thomas Nipperdey (1987, 1991) or Hans Mommsen (1978) should be added. In a sort of mirror inversion, they argued for the early developmental tendency of national separation between Austria and small Germany, but were criticized by James Sheehan (1987) and Dieter Langewiesche (1999) for projecting the present existence of two separated nations into Habsburg Austrian and German history.

Whereas the Austrian historical debates centered on the relation and weight of Austrian and German components in the long-term process of Austrian nation-building and national identity formation, the political sciences and sociology have started from the fait accompli of the crystallized separate Austrian nation in the second half of the 20th century. The latter concentrated on the socio-political formation of Austrian society after 1945, interpreted, if at all, the history of Habsburg Austria as a pre-history to the Austrian post-WW II development and only seldomly addressed Austrian nation-building and national identity formation. Two earlier historical-sociological studies in the framework of the classical modernization paradigm, particularly following Karl Deutsch’s theory of nation-building (Deutsch 1975), should be mentioned first. William T. Bluhm in his Building an Austrian Nation (Bluhm 1973) has argued that until 1918 and continuing up to 1945, the Austrian state and society were determined through the Habsburg Empire and Nazi Germany primarily from outside and that only with the institutionalization of stable state institutions after 1945 and the development of a dynamical economy the formation of a self-conscious Austrian nation became possible. Peter Katzenstein in his Disjoined Partners (Katzenstein 1976) has analyzed the social and political forces of convergence and divergence in social communication between Austria and Germany from the aristocratic pattern (1815-1848) to the conflict pattern (1848-1870), the hierarchical pattern (1871-1918), the voluntaristic pattern (1918-1938), the structural pattern (1938-1945) and finally the pluralistic pattern after 1945. The result of this oscillating long-term development was in the end a separation of nation-building in the form of a „disjoined partnership“. Only in late 80s and then 90s, some political scientists turned also to the present predicament of the Austrian nation and national identity. Albert Reiterer has analyzed the national orientations in the intellectual and political party specter along the major controversial issues such as the defensive vs. proactive forms of coming to terms with the past, traditionalist vs. modernist attitudes regarding the political culture, centralized vs. decentralized conceptions of the political system or the definition of Austria as a potential great power vs. a small state (Reiterer 1988, 1993, 1996). And Anton Pelinka has concentrated on the European dimensions and challenges of the Austrian national identity, particularly United Germany, the European Union and the newly emerging Austrian Mitteleuropa as renewed cooperation between the small successor states within the contours of the former Habsburg Empire (Pelinka 1990). Finally, also sociology with the collaborative study directed by Max Haller (1996) joined the analysis of Austrian national identity. Max Haller sociological approach aims at a systematic description and comparative explanation of the dimensions and determinants of Austrian national identity (Haller 1996: 24). By using various social research indicators such as national pride and its components, the like and
dislike of other national and ethnic groups as well as regional, national and European attachment, Haller can demonstrate the constant growth of Austrian national identity since 1945 and its present stabilization on a high level as compared to other European nations and particularly Germany (Haller 1996).

In a sense, Max Haller summarizes the results of Austrian social research on Austrian national identity that developed since the foundation of the Second Republic in order to survey the success in Austrian nation-building (Haller 1996: also Bruckmüller 1996: 61-85). Major themes of this survey research have been the stability of Austrian national consciousness, its Austrian and German components, its relation to party preferences, its relation to the various territorial units from the local and regional to the European and world level; the strength of Austrian national pride, its components and its relation to attitudes towards National Socialism; as well as the attitudes and prejudices towards other nationalities, ethnic minorities and immigrant groups. This primarily quantitative survey research with its primary orientation to empirical generalization and national representativity has been critically complemented by a cultural-constructivist approach on Austrian national identity. Ruth Wodak and her research team (Wodak et al.1996) has addressed the same major dimensions of Austrian national identity as social research: the components of Austrian consciousness, the elements of the ‘homo austriacus’, regional identities, the German question, the relation between the Austrian nation and ethnic minorities, the modes of coming to terms with the past as well as the relation between Austria and Europe. But the hermeneutic-deconstructivist method of analyzing political memorial speeches across the political party specter from 1945 to the present leads to a different evaluation of the results of social research. Thus, Ruth Wodak, et al. can demonstrate the diversity, ambiguity and changing nature in the development of Austrian national identity. Particularly valuable here are the results on the foundational myth of Austria in 1945, the coming to terms with National Socialism, the relation between perpetrator and victimhood in Austrian national identity and the role of Austrian neutrality in relation to Western and Eastern Europe as well as the European Union and its enlargement to the East.
PART I: Nation Formation and National Identity

1. A Historical-Sociological Approach to Austrian Nation-Building and National Identity

In my analysis of the German case I have used as a frame of reference Anthony Smith’s historical-sociological approach to nation-building and national identity formation (Smith 1986, 1992). For his approach it is crucial to view modern nation-building as a historical continuation of the preceding process of ethnogenesis interwoven with modern state formation. This historical-sociological approach contrasts to primordialist positions assuming modern nations as an unfolding of a pregiven ethnic basis as well as to modernist positions conceptualizing modern nations as a by-product of modern state formation. Within this framework, Anthony Smith proposes an idealtypical distinction between the Western civic-territorial, vertical route and the Eastern ethnic-demotic, lateral trajectory of nation-building. With others (Brubaker 1998, Greenfeld 1998), I hold this idealtypical distinction conceptually and historically for too dichotomic. I therefore propose particularly two corrections: Regarding the process of ethnogenesis, I assume following Conze (1992) that it includes also in Eastern Europe political forms of aristocratic incorporation. And regarding the process of state formation, I propose to distinguish, instead of two, at least four main zones of state formation: the Western European Atlantic zone, the Central European imperial city-belt zone, the East Central European peripheral and the East Eastern European imperial zone. In this comparative framework, the German case of nation-building belongs, as I have argued, to the second zone combining a polycentric form of ethnogenesis and an overarching high culture within a fragmenting imperial roof.

In a parallel way, also Austria belongs in specific ways to this second zone of state formation and nation-building. Originally from the early medieval times on, Austria as a South Eastern border region where the southern and eastern expansion of the Alemani and Bavarians met with the neighboring Hungarian and Slavic reigns/kingdoms had come under Franconian influence and formed since the high middle ages an integral part of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation (Lhotsky 1967, Zoellner 1984). In this sense, Austria and the early Habsburg dynasty has to be seen as one center of the German polycentric form of ethnogenesis. Within this imperial framework, the historical development of Habsburg Austria in the modern era from 1500 to 1800 or 1806 as the year of the final dissolution of the German Roman Empire was characterized by two major political and cultural features: One the one hand, the Habsburg dynasty became the political center of the German Roman Empire, but at the same time substantially transcended in its imperial scope the German Roman borders and shifted over time its imperial zone of influence to the East and South East and, with it, its imperial influence within the German Roman Empire weakened (Barkey and von Hagen 1997, Goode and Rudolph 1992, Kann 1986). On the other hand, the Protestant Reformation divided the German speaking regions within the German Roman Empire in two parts and made the Habsburg dynasty to the center of the Catholic (Counter-) Reformation in cooperation with Catholic absolutist states in Germany against the decentralized conglomerate of Protestant absolutist states under the emerging leadership of Brandenburg-Prussia (Heer 1981). However, despite these political and religious divisions, Habsburg Austria and its capital Vienna remained an integral part and in fact one of the leading centers of the since the 18th century emerging overarching German linguistical and high-cultural nation (Kann 1986).

From that long-term historical-sociological perspective, modern nationalism emerging in the German-speaking part of Habsburg Austria shared important elements with German modern nationalism (Dann 1993, Heer 1981): First, the common political denominator was a liberal-democratic nationalism oriented to the French model of democratic centralized nation-state.
Second, the political frame of reference was the German Roman Empire and its political reconstruction as a Great-German democratic nation-state against the absolutist and fragmented dynasties within the imperial framework. Third, this political nationalism was based on a common cultural nationalism or the German *Kulturnation* encompassing first and foremost the German high culture articulated by educated middle-class intellectuals in opposition to the aristocratic court cultures, overarching the confessional Catholic-Protestant dualism in the German-speaking regions and in a democratic thrust tendentially incorporating the whole of the German speaking population. Fourth, the German cultural nationalism therefore included the German *Sprachnation* or the ethnic-linguistical nation with the exception of those parts of the German-speaking settlement community who like the Swiss or the Dutch had already formed a separate nation or who like the German emigrants to the United States had left the German nation. These Great-German democratic and imperial as well as cultural and linguistic commonalities of modern nationalism in German-Austria was at the core of the oscillating movements between a German identity and a separate Austrian identity during the 19th and the first half of the 20th centuries.

The separate Austrian layer of German-Austrian nationalism was grounded on several political and cultural particularities of the German-Austrian regions within the inherited framework of the German Empire and related differences in state formation. First, German Austria was from the dissolution of the German Roman Empire until the collapse of the Habsburg Empire the dominant imperial center of a multi-national empire. The Austrian Great-German component in German-Austrian nationalism since its first articulation in the Napoleonic wars thus included a specific Habsburg imperial orientation. Second, the unifying German nationalism, as a counter-reaction, tended to exclude the Austrian Germans as the Austrian Germans excluded themselves from this German unifying nationalism; and this mutual process of separation between a German national and an Austrian imperial identity gained stronger contours from the 1848 revolution to the foundation of the Bismarck Empire. Third, German nationalism in the *Kaiserreich* under the aegis of Prussia was predominantly a Protestant religious and secularized cultural nationalism and included strong evangelizing anti-Catholic and anti-Habsburg orientations. Despite of this, there evolved a strong German nationalism in Austria oriented against Habsburg’s authoritarian and ultramontane orientation. Fourth, also an Austrian Catholic nationalism was able to mobilize particularly the countryside and thus included particularly regional and local attachments (Bruckmueller 1996, Heer 1981).

These Habsburg imperial, Austrian Catholic and regional-local layers stood, during the course of the 19th and 20th centuries, in varying opposition to the Great German quasi-Protestant and secular-cultural layers in the emerging nationalism of the Austrian Germans. Generally speaking, the phase between 1815 and 1866 was characterized by a differentiation of these two layers; the phase between 1866 and 1945 by an increasing weight of the German components in conflict with the Austrian layer; and from 1945 on, the pluralistic integration of the German and Austrian elements in a separate Austrian national identity. According to this core thesis, the following comparative historical-sociological framework will guide my country report on the processes of Austrian nation-building, state formation and related forms of nationalism and national identity.
Table 1: Dimensions and phases of Austrian nation-building, state formation and the construction of nationalism and national identity

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2. Major Historical Phases of Austrian State Formation, Nation-building and Collective Identity Construction

a) Historical foundations (1500-1800)

Within the context of the polycentric ethnogenesis of the German speaking regions and the overarching political framework of the German Roman Empire, the Austrian lands–first upper and lower Austria, then including Styria and Carinthia and later Salzburg (the province of Burgenland only became part of Austria in 1921)–had been characterized since the early middle ages by several specific features. In ethnic-territorial terms, the Austrian lands originated from an expansion of German settlement to the South and East, formed a border region first in competition with Slavic and Hungarian reigns/kingdoms and later also with the Ottoman Empire and the Islamic civilization. In ethnic composition, the Austrian lands combined eastward migrating German people, Alemanni and Bavarians (developed during the fifth and sixth century out of various Germanic tribes and the local Roman/romanized population), and westward migrating Slavic and Hungarian people. In this sense, the Austrians did not form one ethnic group like the Saxons or Swabians, but an ethnic conglomerate held together by a common political estate order from the middle ages to the modern period. (Bruckmüller 1996: 155-199, Grothusen 1974, Kann 1993:17-30, Zöllner 1990: 39-110).

Also within the overarching framework of the German Roman Empire, the Austrian lands had a special position. The Habsburg dynasty, regionally concentrated around the Austrian territories, became since the high middle ages, first temporarily and then constantly, the emperor of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. In the modern period, in addition, the Habsburg dynasty expanded its sphere of domination both to Western and East Central Europe, creating in the early modern period a world empire. In this three-tiered function of a regional, German imperial and world imperial power, the Habsburg Empire only partially contributed to Austrian state formation. Although with the decline as a world power, the Habsburg Empire consolidated more its Austrian imperial core with an East Central European multinational focus and developed absolutist state structure, it never became an absolutist state as a proto-modern nation-state like France, Prussia or the German territorial absolutisms. Austrian state formation was thus until the dissolution of the German Roman Empire in 1806 a mixture between a regional state administration plus estate order and an imperial state holding together a multi-national empire (Kann 1993, Zöllner 1990). Moreover, regarding its position within the German-Roman Empire, the more the Habsburg dynasty consolidated its East Central European empire, the more it lost its core position within the German regions.

Two major geopolitical and socio-cultural developments in the modern era contributed to this Easternization of the Habsburg Empire. On the hand, the rise of the Atlantic economy through France and Great Britain weakened the Habsburg led Spanish colonial empire and, in addition, early modern state formation in Western Europe happened often in opposition to the Habsburg sphere of influence. At the same time, the Western expansion of the Ottoman Empire forced the Habsburg dynasty to concentrate on the Eastern frontier and contributed to the consolidation of the East-Central European based Habsburg Empire. On the other hand, the Protestant Reformation contributed substantially to the weakening of the Habsburg imperial center within the German-Roman Empire. The Protestant North German as well as the Protestant-Catholic South and Western German absolutist states increased their independence from the imperial roof and thus at the cost of the Habsburg imperial center. And in addition, the Protestant Reformation and the Habsburg led Catholic (Counter-) Reformation divided not only the German lands between predominantly Protestant and Catholic regions.
but also between an imperial Catholic Habsburg-Roman side and a proto-nation-state Protestant and Prussian oriented side (Kann 1993, Heer 1981).

b) The rise of Austrian and Great-German nationalism (1800-1866)

As in the whole of Germany also in German Austria, the French Revolution, following the Napoleonic wars in continental Europe, the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire and the modernizing reforms of the German absolutist states triggered a reactive nationalism. Unlike German nationalism which identified with the strongest and most modern neo-absolutist German state, Protestant Prussia, Austrian nationalism emerged as a mixture between Austrian and Great German components (Heer 1981, Langewiesche 1999, Sheehan 1987). On the one hand, the Austrian components consisted of imperial as well as regional layers. The imperial layer already crystallized in the previous Theresian and Josephine era became strengthened through the separation and restoration of the Habsburg Empire under Metternich. German Austrian aristocrats and middle class intellectuals oriented to the imperial court such as Count Johann von Hormayr or Foreign minister Count Philipp Stadion propagated an Austrian political nation, an Austrian cultural nation as well as an Austrian European nation. At the same time, a strong resistance movement against Napoleon in Tyrol under the leadership of Andreas Hofer articulated also an Austrian regional popular identity (Heer 1981). But characteristically, both aristocratic and popular, mostly regional layers did not connect with each other in a shared integrated Austrian nationalism.

On the other hand, also a Great German nationalism emerged under the impact of the French revolution and the Napoleonic wars. This Austrian-German nationalism shared with German-German nationalism the democratic-antidynastical national orientation emulating the French model of a modern democratic nation-state. At the same time, it had in common a German cultural nationalism based on German high culture that had developed since the second half of the eighteenth century in opposition to the Habsburg aristocratic court culture (Heer 1981, Sheehan 1987). Goethe, Schiller, Lessing, Kant and Herder, often against the direction of their thinking, became icons also in German Austria. Moreover, a Protestant-Evangelical anti-Catholic sub current, an open or secret identification with Protestant and allegedly more tolerant, democratic and modern Prussia played an important role in the emerging pro-German attitudes. Further, a romantic, even chiliastic orientation towards Germany and Prussia emerged. It played a particular role in the German and German-Austrian youth and student movements evolving the first half of the 19th century. (Heer 1981)

Both layers, the Austrian and the German ones, were present in the formation of German-Austrian national identity in the Metternich era. Metternich himself and the aristocratic elite of the Habsburg Empire continued to be oriented to the multi-national imperial identity of Austria. However, due to the anti-democratic and restorative features of his political system, the emerging educated middle classes defected increasingly from an identification with the Habsburg multi-national empire and instead became oriented to German liberal-democratic and cultural nationalism (Heer 1981, Sheehan 1987). In the Vormärz, the liberalizing period before the 1848 revolution, both intellectual currents became more articulated. Austrian writers like Ignaz Kuranda praised Habsburg Austria and the Austrian nation, whereas German-Austrian poets like Alfred Meissner or Moritz Hartmann made a plea for the unification of Germany. In the 1848 revolution which included up-risings in Vienna and other German-Austrian and Habsburg cities, the Great German nationalism became more pronounced. The German liberal and social democratic movement demanded “a democratic monarchy, popular sovereignty and closest connection with Germany, even at the price of giving up Austrian independence“ (Heer 1981: 199). In the Frankfurt Parliament, the Austrian
democratic delegates were divided between Austrian-Habsburg and Great German positions. At the same time, the German delegates were in the majority and started in their pro-Prussian orientation to exclude the German Austrians; the constitutional crown was offered to the Prussian king who however declined the honor. But despite Austria’s exclusion, also after the defeat of the 1848 revolution, the pro-German orientations remained strong—not least, because of the authoritarian, non-constitutional and pro-Catholic policies in the following era under Count Schwarzenberg and Emperor Franz Joseph (Heer 1981, Sheehan 1987). The German-speaking middle classes however had a strong interest in the continuation of the Empire as they dominated the army as well as the bureaucracy and entrepreneurs depended on the access to markets the Empire provided. Thus they backed the counter revolution as soon as the continuation of the Empire was put into question and aligned themselves with the neo-absolutist course pursued following 1848 (Bruckmüller 1996).

c) Habsburg’s decline and the rise of German nationalism (1866-1918)

The decline and final dissolution of the Habsburg Empire was basically caused by the rise of Central European nationalism (Barkey and von Hagen 1997, Good and Rudolph, Gumplovicz 1909, Kann 1993). The first important step in this direction was the unification of Italy that led to the loss of Habsburg’s Northern Italian provinces in 1859/60. The second major blow was the defeat of the Habsburg army against Prussia in 1866 that ended Habsburg Austria’s imperial influence in Germany. As a consequence, the Habsburg Empire turned more eastward and was restructured as a dual monarchy in which Austria shared the imperial power with Hungary. But this dual imperial structure only accelerated the nationalistic claims of the many other small nations within the Habsburg Empire. The nationalist movements in the Czech, Slovak, Polish and Romanian lands were growing against Hapsburg’s imperial structure and at the same time the national wars of independence in the Balkan countries led Habsburg to extend its imperial power further to the South East (Kann 1964). Against this internal erosion, there were only few reformers in the Habsburg political elites who envisioned a transformation of the imperial structure into a more decentralized and democratic federation of nations which could have potentially have contained a nationalistic break-up of the empire (Bauer 1924, Balakrishnan 1996). Instead, the imperial elite under Emperor Franz Joseph tried to suppress the nationalistic and democratic claims and thus prepared the final collapse of the Habsburg Empire after the military defeat in World War I (Heer 1981). The First World War created a revolutionary climate in Austria that permeated all levels of society from the bourgeoisie to the peasants and the authority of the state was challenged by its inability to guarantee sufficient food for the war-struck population (Bruckmüller 1996).

In this context, the existing layer of an Austrian identity was more connected to the Habsburg Empire and less oriented to an Austrian nationalism confined to German Austrian lands. A nationalism that had been discredited in wide sections of the population by the experience of the war. As compared to the growth of other peripheral nationalisms in the Habsburg Empire, a specific Austrian patriotism or nationalism had been the weakest of all. When it existed then primarily in the form of a great Austrian identity that was identical with the multinational Empire and carried by the imperial aristocracy, the imperial state administration, the army and the empire-oriented bourgeoisie, which benefited from these institutions or from the economic possibilities the Empire offered. There was also a more regional Austrian identity which became articulated in form of the Catholic Social Party as one of the Austrian based political parties in the imperial party system. However, this regional Catholic-Austrian identity was more latent than manifest. Instead, the predominant and even growing layer in German Austrian identity was German nationalism (Heer 1981). This is a certain paradox, considering
the defeat of Austria against Prussia in 1866, the foundation of the Bismarckian Empire without Austria and the growing power of Imperial Germany vis-à-vis declining Habsburg. However, it was precisely the stronger, more modern, economically more developed, politically more democratic, Protestant, anti-Catholic and secular Prussian Germany that was attractive and a core of identification for the rising German nationalism in German Austria.

There were several reasons for this growing German nationalism in German Austria. First, the educated middle classes continued to share German cultural nationalism, the belief in the German language and culture as the basis of a unified German nation. So it is characteristic that the academic elite at German-Austrian universities, in addition to often being born in Germany, were mostly oriented to German science and culture. As well, most student associations were often strongly German nationalistic. But also the emerging cultural associations and sports clubs connected first to the liberal-democratic and then also to the social-democratic movements were oriented to a parallel movement culture in Germany (Heer 1981, Langewiesche 1999). Second, also the emerging political parties were in their majority oriented to the German model. This was true for the left-wing democratic political specter, first the Liberal Party, and then after its decline also the Social-Democratic Party. This was also characteristic for the later emerging right-wing specter, first, the German National Party and then also the radical all-German and anti-Semitic movement (Heer 1981). Third, the background for the pro-German orientation of the majority of political parties was the basically authoritarian and ultramontane character of the Habsburg regime. And the major reason for the right-wing radicalization of German nationalism was the rise of nationalism in the non-German nations of the Habsburg Empire (Kann 1964, Lemberg 1950). In both aspects, the Habsburg regime was seen as backward, anti-democratic and anti-national, whereas Germany embodied a modern, democratic as well as national order.

d) Collision between Great German and Austrian nationalism (1918-1945)

The growing strength of this Great-German nationalism on the left and the right political specter came to the fore after the military defeat of Imperial Germany and the Habsburg Empire in World War I and the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire by the formation of independent nation-states. The First Austrian Republic, founded on October 30, 1918, was officially named German-Austria and the national assembly at its first gathering on November 12, voted unanimously for a state law that declared German Austria as an integral part of the German Republic. The same did the Germans in Bohemia and Moravia. Referenda in Tyrol and Salzburg voted with 99% for the unification with Germany. An attempt at unification with Switzerland was made by Austria’s most western province Vorarlberg. But the Allies did not permit the voluntary Anschluß, forbade in the Peace Treaty of St.Germain in 1919 to carry the name of German Austria and prohibited further public referenda. Under those circumstances, it became officially unrealistic to insist on unification with the German Reich. Underneath official politics, however, German nationalism began to radicalize. German Austrian Social-Democracy continued to aim at a Great German Republic. The German Nationals and later the Austrian National Socialists continuously propagated the unification of Austria with the German Reich. Only the Christian Social Party which came to power in 1922 accepted the international conditions and became the center of an emerging Austrian Catholic authoritarian nationalism. With the increasing polarization between left wing and right wing parties, it formed the Austrofascist dictatorship in 1934, yet was unable to prevent the annexation of Austria by Nazi Germany (Erdmann 1988, Heer 1981).

The basic reason for the predominance of a German nationalism in the First Austrian Republic was the unbroken belief in the German language and culture on the left as well as on
the right. The Social Democrats as inheritors of the liberal-democratic nationalism present the left wing version of this Great German cultural nationalism. For the Austrian Social Democratic leaders such as Victor Adler, Otto Bauer, Karl Renner, Friedrich Austerlitz or Julius Braunthal Germany represented the country of humanism, culture, education and the progress of humanity. This belief in the German *Kulturnation* was even not broken through the rise of Nazi Germany and this explains the first positive evaluation of Hitler Germany’s annexation of Austria by the Social Democratic leadership. In the right-wing versions of this German cultural nationalism as in the German Nationals and the National Socialists the democratic-liberal elements were replaced by authoritarian and totalitarian political components, but on the same basis of a belief in the superiority of the German people and the German Austrians as an integral part of this people. In its radical versions as in the German Austrian Hitler himself, it is interpreted as a chiliastic belief in the holy German Reich by Friedrich Heer (Heer 1981).

In contrast to this predominant versions of a German nationalism, the Austrian nationalism of the Christian Social Party and its social and political carriers was rather weak and developed more firmly only during the course of the First Austrian Republic. It articulated particularly mentalities of the countryside and the mountains against the city, regional and local identities as well as a Catholic culture. The transition to the authoritarian Dollfuß and Schuschnigg regime was thus not only motivated by the struggle against left and right wing radicalism, but also by the insistence on an independent Austrian-German nation vis-à-vis the German Reich. But characteristically even this Austrian nationalism in its Social-Catholic leadership remained ambivalent between a separate Austrian and a pan-German orientation. Thus, the „German way“ of the Dollfuß/Schuschnigg regime was by no means prepared to defend Austrian sovereignty against Hitler’s annexation policy. In a still independent survey in early 1938 about 60% of the Austrian population was for German *Anschluß*, in the referendum following the fait accompli of the annexation and prepared with huge propaganda efforts 99% voted for it (Heer 1981). However, the experience of the Nazi-dictatorship, the repression of all political opponents, the political reorganization and disempowerment of Austria and not least the catastrophic warfare undermined the predominant Great-German orientations and identifications and strengthened – at least on the elite level -- a separate Austrian identity.

e) Integration of German and Austrian nationalism (1945/55-1990)

With the military defeat, Austria was restored in the borders of 1937 and divided in four occupations zones with a separate status of Vienna. A provisional government composed of the Socialist, the People’s (former Christian Social) and the Communist party and again with Karl Renner as chancellor was formed and after the first elections in 1946 followed by a grand coalition of ÖVP and SPÖ with Leopold Figl (ÖVP) as chancellor and Karl Renner (SPÖ) as president. In 1955 Austria regained full national independence and sovereignty with the foundation of the Second Republic of Austria on the basis of the State Treaty with the Allies. It restored Austria in the borders of January 1938, prohibited the unification with Germany and prescribed a perennial neutrality of the Austrian foreign policy. The political system was characterized by a continuation of grand coalition governments until 1966 and then followed by changing ÖVP and SPÖ governments. The power in the country was divided between the two political camps, thus fostering cooperation between them. *(Proporzsystem)* With the formation of an independent, democratic and economically stable Austrian state, there developed also an independent and separate Austrian national identity. The traditional antagonisms between a Great German and an Austrian nationalism was finally overcome by an integrating Austrian identity (Bluhm 1973).
This integrating formation of an Austrian identity has to be understood as a process rather than an immediate outcome of World War II and the collapse of the Nazi German Reich. Regarding the political party specter, the newly found ÖVP as the follower of the Christian Social Party most forcefully supported an independent non-German course. Also the Communist Party, following the directives of Stalin, but gaining only 4% in the 1946 elections, propagated an independent Austria. The Social Democrats with its leader Karl Renner for a while still adhered to a pan-German republican ideal, but soon gave it up under the new realities of an independent Austria and a partitioned Germany. Only the Freedom Party (FPÖ) continued with diminishing influence the German national tradition. Regarding the policy of the Austrian state, in contrast to the First Republic, conscious efforts were now made to build an Austrian nation and to form and deepen an Austrian identity. There was a continuous effort to institutionalize national symbols, the universities became more national, the school books were rewritten and a public discourse on Austrian history and heritage developed. This did not happen without continuous conflicts, as the public scandals and historical debates demonstrated, but at the same time, they also were an integral part of a growing Austrian national identity (Bruckmüller 1996).

A crucial role in this construction of an Austrian national identity played, as in the German case, the coming to terms with the past in the context of the relation between the political and cultural layers of national identity. Supported by the perception and policy of the Allies, Austria was seen and saw itself as a small nation who became victimized by the forced annexation through Nazi-Germany (Bruckmüller 1996, Wodak 1999). The denazification policy of the Allies helped to construct this perception and for the majority of Austrians the decoupling from their former Great-German identification was accompanied by the construction of this self-perception. As a consequence, the predominant form of coming to terms with the past consisted of the suppression rather than a moral confrontation of the past. This attitude of suppression was originally also prominent in the West German case, but here the moral confrontation with the past was much more difficult to avoid and the cultural dynamics of this moral confrontation unfolded in the reconstruction of German national identity. In the Austrian case, the separation from the Great-German heritage included also a separation from the moral components of the German Kulturnation. Instead, the Austrians defined themselves primarily as a Staatsnation and then substituted the German Kulturnation by an Austrian culture either purified from the German and Habsburg cosmopolitan components or nationalized in a small-Austrian sense and thus reduced to regional and local cultural traditions. And when the German Kulturnation remained a layer of identification then in the unreconstructed form of conservative, right-wing and national-socialist orientation rather than a cosmopolitan-enlightenment tradition.

The crystallization of a separate Austrian national identity, despite its internal ambiguities, can be indicated by the continuous surveys undertaken since 1955 to control its success. In 1956, the question: „Do you think that we are a group of the German volk or are we a separate Austrian volk?“ only 49% answered that they belong to a separate Austrian volk, whereas still 46% responded to be part of the German volk. The percentage of those who identified with Austria as a nation then continuously increased and finally stabilized at a level of 80% (Bruckmüller 1996: 61).
Table 2: Austrian national consciousness 1964-1993 percentage of those who supported the following opinion:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ö is a nation</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ö starts to feel like a nation</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ö is not a nation</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bruckmüller 1996: 65

PART II: Austiran National and European Identity


By no means as fundamental as in Germany, the collapse of the Soviet communist empire and the accompanying geo-political sea-change in Europe has affected also Austria and Austrian national identity in several ways. First, there has been a further consolidation of an Austrian political national identity with diminishing tensions between the Austrian and German cultural components. Second, a contributing factor here is the rising importance of immigration and the salience of (im)migrant ethnic minorities as compared to the old historical ethnic minorities and conflicts. Third, as a reaction, nationalistic and xenophobic currents are growing, embodied in the FPÖ and Haider, but characteristically transforming the German nationalistic tradition into an Austrian right-wing nationalism. Fourth, the geopolitical repositioning of Austria has materialized in the accession to the European Union and has confronted Austria with the challenges of newly emerging international relations with its East Central European neighbors and the eastern enlargement of the European Union. In the last two sections, I will give some indications for the consequences of these changes to the transformation of Austrian national identity.

To begin with, the development of Austrian national identity in the decade after 1990 has been characterized by a further consolidation. Taking the above indicator of Austrian national consciousness from 1990 to 1995, those who think that Austria is a nation has grown from 74% in 1990 to 78% in 1992, 80% in 1993 and 85% in 1995; whereas those who think that Austria is not a nation in the same period first increased from 5% in 1990 to 9% in 1992 and the fell again to 5% in 1993 and 4% in 1995 (Haller 1996: 67). Although it is interesting to note that the transition period in 1989/1990 marked a certain crisis in Austrian national identification, the long-term trend of a further consolidation of an Austrian national identity is obvious. According to another survey in 1995, 51% feel very strongly attached to Austria, 31% strongly, 6% less, 9% feel attached to German nationality and 3% to other nationalities (Haller 1996: 66).

This consolidation of an Austrian national identity corresponds to a high degree of Austrian national pride in an international comparison: According to a survey in 1989 in Austria 53% of the population regarding the national pride were „very proud“ and „proud“ as compared to the United States with 87%, Great Britain with 58%, France 42%, Switzerland with 31% and Germany 21% (Plasser and Ulram 1993:40). In 1995, the part of those being very proud and proud of Austria had even risen to 67%, whereas only 20% were little or not at all proud of Austria. In a study of 17 to 19 year old Austrians, those very proud and proud of Austria in
1995 were even 87% in contrast to those not very proud and not proud at all (Langer 1998: 163). Regarding the objects of Austrian national pride, as shown in Table 3, in 1995 Austrians were particularly proud of Austrian sports, the social security system, science, history and art. It is worth while to note here that history and culture is in a much higher esteem in Austria than in West Germany.

Table 3: Objects of national pride in Austria (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sports</th>
<th>Social Security</th>
<th>Economy</th>
<th>Science</th>
<th>History</th>
<th>Art</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
<th>Influence on World Treatment</th>
<th>Equal Policy</th>
<th>Army</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very proud</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proud</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little or not proud at all</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Haller 1996 on the basis of ISSP 1995

Regarding the relation between the ethnic, cultural and political components of Austrian identity, Table 4 Features of a „true Austrian“ (%) shows three important characteristics: Firstly, the political components in Austrian national identity (being an Austrian citizen and obeying Austrian laws) have an important weight, but less than the official parlance of Austria as a Staatsnation would like to have it. Secondly, regarding cultural elements, the German language is highly important, whereas belonging to Christian religion has lost in significance. Thirdly, the ethno-national indicators (being born in Austria and feeling as an Austrian) are again highly important. In other words, the ethnic and cultural components have slightly more weight than the political and legal ones.

Table 4: Features of a „true Austrian“ in the opinion of interviewed person (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Feel as Austrian</th>
<th>Speak German</th>
<th>Austrian Citizen</th>
<th>Austrian Laws</th>
<th>Live in Austria</th>
<th>Born in Austria</th>
<th>Be a Christian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very important</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather important</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Haller 1996 on the basis of ISSP 1995

When Austrian national identity is specified with respect to political orientation, table 5 National Consciousness and Party Preferences shows that all political parties have a strong Austrian national orientation and the German, Austrian German or Austrian regional components are generally weak. This is also true for the FPÖ under Haider who has de-emphasized the Great-German legacy in order to win more Austrian minded voters. However, with this Austrian orientation the FPÖ has also emphasized more strongly than before the cultural-linguistical basis of the Austrian nation.
The other side of the self-definition of an Austrian identity is the construction of external boundaries vis-à-vis immigrants. As table 6 *Attitudes towards immigrants* demonstrates, positive and negative attitudes, depending on the type of question, have about the same weight in Austrian national identity.

### Table 6: Attitudes towards immigrants (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Immigrants:</th>
<th>Increase crimes</th>
<th>Take away jobs</th>
<th>Are good for the economy</th>
<th>Make open for other cultures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very positive</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very negative</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Haller 1996 on the basis of ISSP 1995  
N=1007

Table 7 *Political orientations and national identity* shows various indicators for national identity combined: identification with Austria, Austrian patriotism, national pride and acceptance of foreigners in their relations to political orientations and party preferences. On the one side, the highest identification with Austria is characteristic for the Social Democratic Party. On the other side, the Greens show the lowest national identification and this corresponds with the highest rate of acceptance for foreigners. ÖVP, FPÖ and the Liberal
Forum are relatively similar in their intensity of national identity and in their relatively low acceptance of foreigners.

Table 7: Political orientations, party preferences and national identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Orientation:</th>
<th>Identification with Austria %</th>
<th>Austrian Patriotism %</th>
<th>National Pride %</th>
<th>Acceptance of Foreigners %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Left</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center Left</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center Right</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Right</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Preference:</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPÖ</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ÖVP</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPÖ</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Forum</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Haller 1996: 94 on the basis of ISSP 1995

The high evaluation of history in Austria in comparison to Germany goes also together with lower critical attitudes towards the Nazi regime in Austria as compared to Germany. As table 8 Evaluation of National Socialism shows, Austrians think less negatively and more positively about the Nazi regime than West Germans and East Germans, though the differences are less conspicuous than one might expect.

Table 8: Evaluation of national socialism (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FRG 1989</th>
<th>WG 1990</th>
<th>EG 1990</th>
<th>Austria 1989</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People who think that NS had:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only bad aspects</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More bad aspects</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative total</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good and bad aspects</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More good aspects</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bruckmüller 1996: 81
In this context, it is interesting to note that the voters for the FPÖ - as table 9 demonstrates - are not evaluating the Nazi past significantly more positive than average voters for other parties.

Table 9: Relation between sympathy for Haider and attitudes toward Hitler

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>To Jörg Haider I have an opinion:</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Rather Good</th>
<th>Rather Bad</th>
<th>Bad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hitler was an Austrian but his opinions came from Germany</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hitler did not know of the burning of Jews in the gas chambers</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hitler has achieved some economic progress in Austria</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hitler was the greatest mass murder in history</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Haller 1996: 120 on the basis of ISSP

As Michael Minkenberg (2001) argues, the recent success of the FPÖ in the elections in 2000 and its participation in the current coalition government with the ÖVP is not to be interpreted as a revival of German oriented right-wing radicalism. Rather, the rise of the FPÖ, under the historical condition of the Proporzdemokratie, i.e. the alternating sharing of power not only political by ÖVP and SPÖ, was due to the ability to mobilize the ethno-cultural and xenophobic layers of an Austrian national identity.

2. Austria, European Integration and an Austrian European Identity (1955-2000)

As in the case of Germany, the historical foundation of Austrian European orientations were closely related to the geopolitical location of the German-Roman Empire within the European state and world order. With the fragmentation of the German-Roman Empire after the Reformation and the rise of the Atlantic great powers as well as the relocation and consolidation of the Habsburg Empire in East Central Europe, the Habsburg Austrian European orientations basically oscillated between a Western Great-German identity and an Eastern Great-Austrian identity. As the core Roman-Catholic power, these Habsburg Austrian European orientation were moreover anti-Protestant and anti-Prussian in its Western direction as well as anti-Ottoman and anti-Russian in its Eastern direction. Further, the more the Habsburg Empire became backward vis-à-vis Western Europe, the Western European orientation were directed towards a European power equilibrium, whereas vis-à-vis Eastern Europe, even more backward, it developed an imperial Catholic-cultural mission. After the dissolution of the German-Roman Empire, with the further reduction of Hapsburg’s influence in Germany and its parallel geopolitical shift towards an East Central European multinational empire, the basic coordinates of Habsburg-Austrian European orientations continued, but the Western European balance of power orientations became more defensive and the Eastern European imperial-missionary orientations more offensive. The further erosion of the
Habsburg empire through the rise of nationalism, the exclusion from Germany and the internal power shift within the Habsburg Empire towards Hungary and the other evolving nations, however, transformed also these coordinates of European orientations. On the basis of the growing Great-German nationalist orientations in Habsburg Austria and the strengthening political bonds between Imperial Germany and the Habsburg Empire, the anti-Western defensive and the anti-Eastern imperialistic missionary attitudes intensified. With it, Habsburg multiculturalism was progressively replaced by an Austrian cultural-imperialistic Great-German orientation to Mitteleuropa. As in Germany also in Austria, it only collapsed with its totalitarian and apocalyptic materialization in the Nazi Great-German Reich.

The reconstruction of an independent and separate Austrian state 1945/55 went together with a radical change in the European orientations in Austrian national identity. On the one hand, there emerged predominant pro-American and pro-Western attitudes, but only marginal pro-Soviet orientations. On the other, there evolved the crucial political-cultural shift from a pro-German to a separate and integrated Austrian identity. This identity shift facilitated the national attraction of the imposed neutrality status of an independent Austrian nation. Austria and its major political and cultural forces identified itself as small nation in Europe and as a neutral state between West and East. This neutrality doctrine was one of the foundational principles of Austria’s “national rebirth” and became part of the constitutional law of 1955. Here Austria declared: „For the purpose to keep for ever its national independence and to guarantee the inviolability its state territory...her eternal neutrality.“ (Cited in Wodak 1999: 156). This neutrality doctrine was not only a constitutional principle on paper, but became part of the predominant Austrian identity. Thus, in a survey on the components of national pride in 1989, 87% of the Austrian population were proud and very proud of Austrian neutrality (Bruckmüller 1996: 70). Under these conditions, Austria despite its predominant Western orientations remained neutral with regard to NATO and joined the third neutral bloc of the other small European nations. As well, despite the growing interconnection with the dynamical Western European economy, Austria abstained from an accession to the European integration project. Instead, it joined with the Scandinavian „third way“ countries the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). The coordinates of this neutrality doctrine started to erode only after the collapse of communism and the related geopolitical sea-change in Europe.

The question of NATO membership emerged in all urgency with the NATO interventions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo and triggered a domestic soul-searching on the neutrality doctrine. Whereas the Greens remained faithful to an anti-NATO course and the Freedom Party demanded a pro-NATO support, the then governing coalition between the SPÖ and ÖVP tried to keep a middle course between the neutrality doctrine and an isolation against the Western alliance, but an application for NATO membership was never seriously considered (Haller 1996, Wodak 1999). However, the current coalition government between the ÖVP and the FPÖ recently stated that under the new geopolitical conditions also the constitutional neutrality doctrine in favor of a potential NATO membership should be reconsidered. The question of EU membership was emotionally less problematic, but also here the application for EU accession in 1989 was accompanied by a redefinition of the neutrality doctrine and this redefinition was facilitated by the parallel EU application of the Scandinavian countries (Haller 1996. Wodak 1999). The accession to the European Union in 1995 was, after a strong pro-EU campaign by the government, approved by about two thirds (66.52 %) of the population in a referendum in 1994. At the same time, according to a parallel survey, the Austrian wished by 78% also as a member of the EU the protection of national independence (Haller 1996: 97). Thus, despite the overwhelming support of EU accession, the identification with Europe compared to other European countries - as table 10 change in...
national and European identification - remains relatively low. The recent punishment of Austria for the inclusion of the right-wing xenophobic FPÖ into the current coalition government may have contributed to even a further disenchantment of the European Union.

Table 10: Change in national and European identification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Nation and Europe</th>
<th>Europe and Nation</th>
<th>Europe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>52.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Germany</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>46.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Germany</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>44.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>58.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.Britain</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>45.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>36.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Also regarding the Eastern enlargement of the European Union, the Austrian governments - the former SPÖ/ÖVP as well as the present ÖVP/FPÖ - have developed a special position (Spohn 2001). On the one hand, they have followed the basic parameters set by the European Union regarding the opening of the accession negotiations on the basis of the Copenhagen criteria as well as the inclusion of all ten East Central accession candidates plus Turkey. On the other, the emphasis is not on European functional integration, but on European political and cultural cooperation with a clear priority on the neighboring former Habsburg countries. The official government language emphasizes the common cultural heritage in the Danubian region. (Streitenberger 1997). At the same time, the Austrian population is very little supportive of the Eastern enlargement, on the contrary, the majority of Austrians is strongly opposed to it. According to the recent Europolobarometer surveys in 1999 and 2000 only 29% of Austrians support the Eastern enlargement, whereas 59% were against it (Eurobarometer 51 and 53, 2000 and 2001). This reflects middle class as well as working class orientations. Thus, the Federation of Austrian Trade Unions (ÖGB), the Chamber of Labor, the Chamber of Agriculture and the Association of Austrian Industrialists (VÖI)–all agree on the demand for longer transition periods for the East Central European accession candidates in order to protect the Austrian labor market and Austrian economic interests. In particular, union leaders demand that the transition periods should include a substantial leveling down of the wage differences between Austria and the East Central European neighbors and suggest that the structural funds of the Southern European member states should be used for that purpose. At the same time, there is a fear that the Burgenland as one of the poorer Austrian border regions will lose the EU subsidies as a consequence of financial transfers to the East Central European accession candidates. The core reason for these fears are not economic per se, however, but the fears of rising immigration and related xenophobia in connection with rising economic challenges (Spohn 2000).
The two last tables 11 and 12 may illustrate the connection between the attitudes towards immigrants and perception of neighbors:

**Table 11: Foreigners provoke Austrian hostility by their behavior (1991)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Provocation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanians</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gypsies</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenes</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bruckmüller 1996: 141

**Table 12: Sympathy for other nations: rank order 1980 and 1987**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1987</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America/USA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia/Turkey</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary/CSSR</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada/Australia</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scandinavian countries</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other West European countries</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bruckmüller 1996: 138

In conclusion, there are marked differences between the German and Austrian European orientations. First, the German elites define themselves as a responsible part of the European integration project and in a parallel for its extension towards the East. By contrast, the Austrian elites are more inclined to a mediating role between the European Union and the East Central European small nations. This reflects different national attitudes of the elites and a different EU integration history of both nations. Germany has been one of the early core members of European integration, whereas Austria joined this project only very late and with differing national definitions. Second, both the German as the Austrian populations are rather
negative about the Eastern enlargement of the European Union. In both cases, the perceived migration pressure on national labor markets plays a major role in these negative attitudes. However, the negative attitude of the Austrian population is clearly more marked than that of the German one. Here, the different German and Austrian national identities play a major role in shaping also different European attitudes. This relates to the different levels in national pride, the differences in the composition of national identities as well as differing attitudes towards national and (im)migrant ethnic minorities. Third, these differences on the mass level are the result not only of different objective, socio-economic and political institutional factors, but also of of different subjective cultural-identitarian composition of national identity and European orientation and related internal and external boundary constructions.
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BRITAIN: State and Nation Formation, and Europe

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PART I

1. Introduction

National identity can never be a clear-cut phenomenon but the case of the United Kingdom poses an even more complex question in discussing its identity. The question is: what are we looking at? The full name of the UK is the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, which took its current form in 1922 as a result of Irish independence. Until the Union of Great Britain and Ireland in 1801, there were two separate independent states: Great Britain and Ireland. Going back further, until the Union of England and Scotland of 1707, there were two independent kingdoms on the largest island of the British Isles – England and Scotland, although since 1603 both had been ruled by the same monarch. A little further back, Wales was formally incorporated in England in 1536 although it was for long under de facto English rule since the fourteenth century. Due to the historical circumstances, the UK has at least four constituent nations: English, Scots, Welsh and Irish. In addition, there are a large number of ethnic minorities, both white and non-white, in the present day UK. The issue of national identity in this polity is indeed complicated.

What I propose to do, in this limited space within a limited period of time, is to concentrate on the Anglo-British polity, a fusion of England which has been a dominant force in the British Isles and Britain which came into a formal existence with the Union of 1707. In this way, we can take the historical background into account as well as focus on the arguably most dominant ideas about the nationhood and its relation to Europe, since the discussion of Britain and Europe is quite influenced by the English perspective as we shall see in the latter half of this report.

2. The Formation of Britain as an Independent State

As mentioned earlier, Great Britain as a state formally came into existence with the Union of England and Scotland in 1707, when the Scottish parliament agreed to vote itself out of existence, and the Westminster, i.e., English parliament was refashioned as the British parliament. The idea of Britain or Great Britain had been around for a while albeit more as a geographical category than a political unit. For instance, in 1474, when a marriage between the daughter of Edward IV of England and the son of James III of Scotland was proposed, one of the declared purposes of the plan was to advance the peace and prosperity of ‘this Nobill Isle, callit Gret Britanne’ (Hay 1956: 61). John Mair, a Glaswegian educated in Paris, published Historia Majoris Britanniae (History of greater Britain) in 1520 declaring that although there were two kingdoms on the island, those who lived there were ‘Britions’ (Robbins 1998a: 4). However, the process of producing Britons can be argued to have started in earnest when James VI of Scotland succeeded the English Crown in 1603. He styled himself the King of Great Britain, France and Ireland, and is known to have manoeuvred to bring about the formal political union of England and Scotland (Murdoch 1998; Kearney 2000). Although the Stuart dynasty did not succeed in bring about the political union of three

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1 Amongst others, Norman Davis has agonised over this question in the introduction of his ambitious book, The Isles: A History.
2 According to the latest available census result (conducted in 1991), 5.5 per cent of the population classified themselves as non-white.
3 This is not a new issue at all. A number of commentators have pointed out that there is no proper noun to refer to the people living in the UK; British excludes the Irish. Tom Nairn and Neal Ascherson have suggested the use of ‘Ukanian’ (Nairn 1988; Ashcerson 1988).
4 Contemporary Scots try to differentiate themselves from the English by painting a different picture of Scotland and Europe. For details, See Ichijo (1998)
kingdoms – England, Scotland and Ireland –, the period between 1603 and 1707 was formative in bringing about Great Britain: the idea of parliamentary sovereignty, which is still cherished by some, was reaffirmed firmly by two revolutions. Moreover, England, Scotland and Ireland were for once united, admittedly by force, under Oliver Cromwell to form the godly Commonwealth (1649-1660), as a consequence of which Protestantism was firmly established as the principle that bound the country, except in Ireland. The idea of Britain which was thus developed had a sectarian tone, i.e., it was the country of Protestants.

In her influential book, Britons: Forging A Nation 1707-1837, Linda Colley argues that Protestantism, War with the continent, especially Catholic France and Spain, and the Empire were the three elements that forged the British nation by the accession of Queen Victoria in 1837 (Colley 1992a). England was at war with France between 1669-1697, and between 1702-1713, during which the Union of England and Scotland took place. Newly formed Great Britain was at war with France between 1743-1748, 1756-1763, 1778-1783, 1793-1803 and the Napoleonic war of 1803-1815, which confirmed Great Britain’s status as the number one state in the world. During the succession of wars, France played the role of common enemy for the English, Welsh, Scots and, to some extent, the Irish. The war was fought not on the British soil and on various grounds; one of them was to defend Protestantism from despotic Catholic France. The religion and war were intertwined in ‘constructing’ Britishness. Colley stresses that the British nation is as young as the American nation, and that it is not a mystical entity which have organically grown; it is rather a modern construct in response to the changing socio-historical circumstances.

Forging Britons was not a smooth process. Although Scotland went into the Union with England voluntarily, there were a lot of popular dissent to the Union as well as the Hanoverian regime which had been installed in 1688. Those who supported the deposed Stuarts, who were originally Scottish, planned to regain the Crown twice in 1715 and 1745. The 1745 Jacobite Rising was the last civil war fought on the British soil. Although the Jacobite army was initially successful and marched down as far as Derby, in the end, a much modern army of King George II won and a severe punishment for the Jacobite supporters followed. The main casualty was the Highlands way of life; bagpipes were banned, and so was the wearing of weapons. The suppression was followed by Highland Clearance in which landlords forced crofters to leave the land in order to secure pasture for sheep. In other words, Highland society was one of the casualties of the formation of the British state.

Having quelled internal dissent by the mid-eighteenth century, post-union Britain were involved with many wars, not in Europe but overseas. The Seven Years’ war (1756-63) confirmed the Britain’s status as the dominant colonial power at the expense of France. The Treaty of Paris of 1773 which concluded the war between Britain and France allocated Quebec, Florida, Minorca, further parts of India and West Indies to Britain. Although Britain lost the Thirteen Colonies as a result of the Wars of American Independence (1775-83), the British overseas territory kept expanding especially in Asia. The effects of the wars on the forging Britons are fully discussed in Colley’s work as mentioned earlier (Colley 1992a). One interesting aspect of these wars is that they were fought somewhere else, and did not pose a direct threat on the British Isles. The British national anthem was composed in 1740 proclaiming Britain’s superiority.

5 To be precise, there were two phases in this period. The first was the Commonwealth and Free State of England, Wales and Ireland (1649-1654), which was followed by the Commonwealth of Great Britain and Ireland (1654-1660), often referred to as the ‘First British Republic’.
In the meantime, the British state was consolidating its position as the one and only world power due to the Industrial Revolution. The world’s first steam engine was invented in 1712, and the invention of the flying shuttle revolutionised the cotton industry. By the end of the eighteenth century, the Industrial Revolution was clearly making its impact felt.

It is perhaps worthwhile adding another viewpoint in relation to the formation of the British nation, and state. A group of historians have had another look at the British state which resulted from the Union of 1707, and argue it would be more helpful to see the British state as a union state or Unionist state, not a unitary state like post-revolutionary France was (Eastwood et al. 1999). It did not have an all abiding constitution or a strong centralising tendency. Therefore, the Scots were left to get on with their distinct educational and legal systems and their Church intact. Moreover, there was not an all-Union working environment which could have helped to forge a strong sense of being British amongst elite except military until well into the nineteenth century; engineers, lawyers, doctors and clergy continued to operate in their ‘national’ or regional framework (Brokliss 1999). The Unionist British state worked precisely because it did not ask too much from its subjects: what was demanded were ‘loyalty to the Crown, obedience to Parliament, tolerance of Church establishment, and acceptance of English as the primary public language’ (Eastwood et al. 1999: 194-5). According to these historians, Britishness, which came about as a consequence of the Union of 1707, emerged much later than Colley suggested: and it was largely institutional. There were no conscious attempt by the British state to create and promote a hegemonic cultural British identity; during the wartimes, some patriotic sentiments, especially in the form of Francophobia, were heightened as Colley pointed out. However, historians are at pains to point out that Britishness was something glossed over existing identities and was not a primary identity for many.

The relationship with Ireland was another issue that Great Britain as a union state tried to solve. Ireland, like Wales, was never politically unified which arguably made it vulnerable to threats from outside. After the Reformation in England, because it was a Catholic country, Ireland became a potential threat to England. England, and at times Scotland, too, tried to subjugate Ireland by means of military campaigns and plantation over years. In a sense, England, and later Great Britain, as the de facto ruler of Ireland was always looking for the optimal solution for the troubled relationship with Ireland. Great Britain gave Ireland an independent parliament as a return for their support at the Wars of American Independence, for instance. However, given the deepening confrontation between Catholics and Protestants and the impeding threats of invasion by Napoleon, the British government decided to form a union with Ireland which would enable them to rule it directly. Thus, in 1801, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland was born. Another symbol of Britishness, the Union Flag was redesigned to incorporate the red saltire of St Patrick in the same year. The Catholic Emancipation Act of 1829 was arguably another step in forging Britons, this time inclusive of Catholics and Irish, albeit up to a point.

The nineteenth century arguably saw Britain in its prime. Britain came through the Napoleonic Wars of 1803-15 victorious, thus consolidated its position as the greatest power in the world. Its colonies kept expanding and Queen Victoria was crowned the Empress of India in 1876. To the outside world, Britain represented modernity, and the Great Exhibition of 1851 and the Diamond Jubilee of Queen Victoria in 1897 were occasions of celebrating.

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6 The distinction between a union state and a unitary state derives from the work by Stein Rokkan and Derek Urwin. For more discussion, see Mitchell (1987: 38-9).
7 Davis argues that since there were two established churches – Anglican and the Church of Scotland – and no unified legal system, the United Kingdom could not have been a nation-state (Davis 1999: 1039).
British success. Internally, successive reform acts (1832, 1867, and 1884) eventually extended franchise to adult males, allowing the masses to have a say in the way Britain, or more precisely at that time, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland was run.

The Irish continued to be a problem for the UK state; following the Potato Famine of 1845-50, the demand for home rule persisted. As a result of the 1885 General Election, the Irish Home Rule party held the balance of power in the House of Commons. The then prime minister Gladstone introduced a home rule bill in 1886 in a bid to keep the unity of the UK, which was subsequently defeated. The defeat of the bill could be interpreted as the retreat of the all-inclusive Britishness which could accommodate all denominations, but the shift to a more ethnic, more English idea of Britishness in the late nineteenth century (Kearney 2000). But the home rule debate refused to disappear. The second bill was introduced in 1893 and defeated in the House of Lords. The third one introduced in 1912 became law in 1914, but with the outbreak of the First World War, it was suspended and then abandoned. By the time of the introduction of the third bill, the idea had grown to ‘Home-Rule-All-Around’ which included some devolution measures for Scotland and Wales as well as English regions (Bogdanor 1999: 44). The demand for some degree of Scottish autonomy was already growing with the formation of such organisations as the National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights (1854). Although the bill was killed off by the war, devolution continued to come back to the Westminster Parliament until the last years of twentieth century when devolution finally took place across the United Kingdom.

The First World War is often described to have killed a Liberal Britain since it coincided with the rise of the Labour party and the rapid decline of the Liberal party. The UK was a member of the Allied Powers, and came out of the long, traumatic war victorious. One can perhaps single out two effects of the First World War on the British state and Britishness. The War, firstly, reinforced the sense of Britishness. WWI appeared to have contributed to the strengthening of British identity with a greater magnitude than previous wars. There were several dimensions to the newly emerged unity of the country. Conscription was one of them; English, Welsh, Scots and Irish fought as British. The loss was felt across the UK; it was not confined to a certain area or class. The First World War therefore established some rituals which are still practised today. Remembrance Sunday, for instance, was institutionalised to commemorate the war dead after the First World War, and so was the Poppy appeal. Even today, from late October till Remembrance Sunday in November, one will see politicians, TV personalities, and people in the street wearing a poppy, whose significance is still widely recognised, and the Remembrance Sunday ceremony is televised. Whether or not it still has a mass resonance, these rituals are still repeated to symbolise the unity of the nation, and by so doing, the state, and the fact that WWI was instrumental in bringing about these rituals need to be considered carefully. The War had another effect on the British state and nation; Irish independence. Following the Easter Rising of 1916, Irish nationalists formed the Irish Free State in 1922 and succeeded from the UK, though leaving the six counties in the north part of the UK. This settlement has been the cause of the Troubles, as it is often known, the conflicts between the Protestant (Unionist) and Catholic (Nationalist) communities in Northern Ireland. It was also a birth of the current UK – the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and Britishness arguably lost a large part of its Irish dimension as a result of this.

The Second World War was also significant in terms of British identity as well as the future of Britain’s relationship with Europe as we shall see later in this report. In 1940, when France was occupied by Nazi Germany and before the participation of the USA, Britain literally stood alone in the face of the advancing undemocratic force. It is suggestive in our investigation into the British attitudes to Europe that what is often referred as ‘Britain’s finest
hour’ was experienced during the confrontation with the Axis power, when Britain was defending freedom and democracy on its own. In this vision, the continent was occupied by the evil powers of fascism and Nazism while the British Isles was seen as the last bastion of freedom and democracy. When the USA joined the War as a response to the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941, the UK forces fought with the Americans. This appears to have consolidated the idea that Britain has a special relationship with the US, which would have some effect on the relationship between Britain and Europe in the postwar era. The Second World War was important in the way it conditioned the ideas about Britain. The ideas that Britain was different from the continent, that the British constituted an Island race, and that it stood for democracy were reinforced during the War and they were circulated in the country through Winston Churchill’s speeches, history books and newspapers.

In discussing the British nation and its identity, WWII had another consequence on the sense of Britishness: the establishment of welfare state. War may or may not unite people and the country. It is probably wrong to make a sweeping statement that the sense of being British was heightened during the Great War of 1914-18, for Britain which went into the war with the Axis powers was socially divided. The Great Depression left many Britons destitute and the threat of class war was real. Welfare state, seen from this angle, was a bait from the government to secure popular support for the war. Although implementation of welfare state started with the Labour government which came to power in 1945, just after the Victory in Europe, the idea itself was conceived under the Tory government during war years. The pact worked, the war was won, and the post-war governments get on with the project; free medical care for all, pension for all, free secondary education for all, and full employment supported by Keynesian economic management. The welfare state operates on the notion of Britishness in that the entitlement to the services and benefits were defined on the bases of being British – it was a deal between the British people and the state - , and it works in a way to strengthen it. It is often argued that the welfare state symbolised a strong postwar consensus of the British people which was also a reflection of the unity of the British state.

In the 1950s there were a few occasions which suggested the existence of a prevailing Britishness: the Festival of Britain of 1951 and the coronation of the Queen Elizabeth II in 1953. The Festival of Britain was conceived as a celebration of ‘modern’ Britain at the centenary of the Great Exhibition. The Coronation was televised world-wide and it was also an occasion where the image of an ‘old’ Britain of tradition and grandeur, was superimposed on a ‘modern’ Britain of scientific progress and welfare state. The economy was recovering fast and it seemed that Britons had ‘never had so good’.

On the other hand, the world surrounding Britain was changing fast. Although the UK was on the winning side of the Second World War, its status as the world major power did not last long. From the 1950s, its colonies started gaining independence, not so much as a result of bloody conflicts but a more civilised negotiation. As the empire withered, so did the power of the British state on the international stage. At the Suez Crisis of 1956-57, in which Britain and France tried to prevent Egypt from nationalising Suez Canal by mounting a military intervention, Britain was effectively told by the US to stop the war. British economy was slowing compared to those of the continental countries, the US and Japan, and in 1967, the government was forced to devaluate the pound.

Immigration became an explosive issue as economy slipped into recession and stagnation. There were times when immigration was an important issue in the past: immigrants from Ireland in the nineteenth century and Jews fleeing persecution in continental countries in the interwar period were once political issues (Mason 2000: 19-22). However, the postwar
situation was different from earlier times since immigration became a race-relations issue (Schwarz 1992; Mason 2000). This is not to underplay anti-Semitism before 1945. It is simply a recognition that the majority of immigrants arriving after WWII were involved in a different social and power relationship from the Irish and Jewish people. In the 1950s, in order to compensate labour shortage, British companies and organisation actively recruited workers from the Commonwealth; the effort by the London Transport in West Indies is one of the well-known examples. It is worth noting that for these companies recruiting in the Commonwealth was a relatively easy option given that the British Nationality Act of 1948 had guaranteed people in the Commonwealth the right freely to enter, work and live in the UK (Mason 2000: 25). Probably because immigrants from the Commonwealth were much more visible than those who constituted earlier waves of immigrants, such as Poles and Italians, anti-immigrants feelings soon intensified and manifested themselves in incidents like Notting Hill riots of 1958. Hostility to and uneasiness about immigration from the Commonwealth fed into a series of immigration acts (1962, 1968 and 1971; 1981 Nationality Act) which increasingly worked to prohibit legal immigration, and restrict citizenship by the ‘partiality’, i.e. blood principle. Immigration has been a significant issue in postwar Britain. Enoch Powell’s notorious ‘rivers of blood’ speech of 1968 in which he warned of an imminent race war in Britain is still often evoked in the discussion of race relations. This is not a place for a detailed discussion of the merits and effects of these acts in contemporary Britain. However, it is fair to argue that because of these legislations, Britishness is now clearly linked to being white, a feature which may not have been too explicit before.

Thirdly, there is an issue of Europe. The details of Britain’s relations with Europe will be discussed later, and it should suffice to state that the British politicians and policy makers as well as many of British people did not consider the initiative for European integration relevant to them for a long while. When Britain woke up to the fact that it was now a middle-sized country at the edge of Europe, not a major power, Europe became a threat (Ellison 2000). Once Britain joined the European Economic Community, Europe has been seen as a threat to its parliamentary sovereignty, and national identity itself.

At the end of the last century, two more significant developments took place. The Labour government which came into power in 1997 held referenda on devolution in Scotland and Wales, and went on to implement it. In the meantime, for the first time ever, more and more people have begun to feel that the monarchy would not survive for a long time. According to MORI, the proportion of respondents predicting the survival of the monarchy for another fifty years was overtaken by that of those predicting that the monarchy would not survive in 1992 (annus horribilis, according to the Queen).
Figure 1: The future of the monarchy

‘Looking to the future, do you think Britain will or will not have a monarchy in 50 years’ (1990-2001)

The 1990s saw an avalanche of royal scandals, culminating in the divorce between Prince Charles and Princess Diana (1992), which have encouraged the trend to scrutinise the resilience of the institution of monarchy even more closely.\(^8\) Moreover, due to the sudden death of Diana, Princess of Wales in 1997 and a spontaneous public outpouring of grief, the monarchy is now taken up by scholars as a tool of investigating the state of British identity (Taylor 2000; McGuigan 2000).

That monarchy is an old institution in Britain and its condition may prove to be another indicator of the state of Britain, however, devolution has arguably had much more profound effects on the British state and therefore British national identity than the recent royal scandals (Nairn 2000; Parekh 2000; Marr 2000; Hazell 2000; Bagdanor 1999; Aughey 2001; Curtice and Heath 2000). Although it was finally implemented in the last years of the twentieth century, devolution was not a new idea. It secured a firm place in British political discourse at the end of the nineteenth century when Gladstone tried to resort to ‘home rule’ as a means of dealing with the Irish question.\(^9\) The move caught the imagination of those who wanted more autonomy for Scotland and Wales, and the twentieth century campaigns for devolution for Scotland and Wales had their roots in the movements at the end of the nineteenth century. As is always the case with the UK, devolution is also a complicated issue; as part of the settlement of Irish independence of 1922, a home rule assembly was installed in Northern Ireland which continued to operate till 1973 when it was abolished and replaced by direct rule from London as a response to the deteriorating conditions sparked by the civil rights movement. So in the case of Northern Ireland, the issue in the 1990s was to reinstate an assembly which used to be there while for the peoples of Scotland and Wales, it was to establish a brand new legislative body. The significance of the events in the 1990s are, however, about the establishment of devolved assemblies – Scottish Parliament, Welsh Assembly and Greater London Assembly - in Great Britain.

The demand for more autonomy for Scotland and Wales re-entered the political arena between the late 1960s and the early 1970s when votes for nationalist parties, the Scottish

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\(^8\) Perhaps, the most influential work in this area so far is Ton Nairn’s *The Enchanted Glass*, published in 1988.

\(^9\) Burgess argues that the tradition of federalism in the UK goes back much further and has a lot to do with the way England as a polity developed and the United Kingdom was formed (Burgess 1995).
National Party (SNP) in Scotland and Plaid Cymru in Wales surged. Although this surge of nationalism in Scotland and Wales were largely constitutional, in Wales, some holiday houses owned by English people were firebombed. During the late 1960s, the SNP’s electoral performance started to improve and at the 1970 General Election, it acquired 11 per cent of the vote cast in Scotland and secured one seat in Westminster; at the February 1974 election, it secured 22 per cent of the Scottish vote and send two MPs to London; at the subsequent October 1974 election, the SNP gained 30 per cent of the Scottish vote and the number of MPs jumped to eleven. Plaid Cymru was also coming out of obscurity and at the February 1974 election, gained 10.7 per cent of the Welsh vote and sent two MPs, and at the October election, scored 10.8 per cent and three seats. At the face of the rise of nationalism in Scotland and Wales, the Labour government was forced to hold referenda to ask if voters in Scotland and Wales would like to have their own legislative bodies in 1975. The result from Wales was clear no, but the Scottish result was very close. Although more ‘yes’ votes were cast than ‘no’ votes, because of a high proportion of absentees, the result was declared ‘no’, and the devolution seemed to have died.

The nationalist parties performance from the late 1970s to 1980s was miserable, but the Conservative government which came to power in 1979 nonetheless continued with so-called ‘administrative devolution’, in which some competence of governmental departments were handed over to the Scottish and Welsh Offices; a tacit acknowledgement from the central government of the need to appease growing feelings of alienation in Scotland and Wales. The rise of nationalism seemed to gain momentum during Thatcher years. Mrs Thatcher was seen by many in Scotland and Wales as the embodiment of a narrow-minded, market-oriented conservatism, a quality which was then linked to English nationalism in these people’s mind. Her programme of revitalising British economy by injecting the virtue of privatisation offended a more collectivist and corporatist ethos of the Scots and Welsh, as well as people of North England. When the Labour finally came to power in 1997, one of the first moves it took was to hold another round of referenda in Scotland and Wales, and later in London, about a Scottish Parliament, a Welsh Assembly and a Greater London Assembly. They were duly held in May 1998 in Scotland and Wales, and 1999 in London. The result from the Scottish referendum was a clear endorsement of the setting up of a Scottish Parliament with a power to raise or lower the income tax by 3 per cent. The Welsh result was much more ambiguous but it was declared that the Welsh voters supported the idea of a Welsh Assembly, and the London result also indicated that the majority of those voted wanted to have an assembly. The elections for the Scottish Parliament, Welsh and Greater London Assemblies took place in the following year, and in 1999, the Scottish Parliament ‘reconvened’ after almost three hundred years and the Welsh and London Assemblies were opened.

Those who supported devolutionary measures based their argument on democracy: that it is only democratic to have these parliaments and assemblies when people want it. In this way, the Labour government has positioned devolution as one of the cornerstones of their project of ‘modernising’ Britain; regeneration of democracy. However, there was fierce opposition to devolution, especially from the Conservative Party, for it may lead to the break-up of Britain. While the Labour and Liberal Democrat devolution supporters argued that devolution was necessary to stem the flow of nationalism and that devolution was a means to strengthen the Union, the Tory opponents voiced their fear that devolution would turn out to be a slippery slope for independence especially for the Scots. Two years since political devolution was officially implement, the jury is still out. However, the anxiety that Britain may break up persists.
Devolution has sparked off another kind of debate on Britishness. Some scholars and commentators who have been working in the field of race relations in the UK have expressed their concern that devolution might undermine the multicultural, multiethnic and inclusive Britishness since it revolves around four historical nations (Ahibahi-Brown 2000). These voices are not so much concerned with the unity of the UK as seen in the Tory politicians, but from their point of view, Britishness is too facing a challenge because of devolution.

3. Dominant Discourses of Nationhood

Britishness may be a relatively new identity, but it has in many respects incorporated a lot from English identity which has a longer history. This is largely due to the fact that England has always been the most powerful component in the British isles in terms of size, population and power. Therefore the discussion of Britishness is coloured by several themes which derive from English identity. These include the emphasis on Protestantism and the idea that the English and therefore the British are a chosen people, constitutional liberties which have been won through a series of stages from Magna Carta to the Glorious Revolution, common law which has gradually evolved, hostility to European powers cultivated through English confrontation with Spain and France and so on. Other undercurrents are the idea that the British are an island race which justifies its isolation or exceptionalism, that the UK is a global player with its status as a nuclear power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council which reflects the past status of the UK as the world power.

According to recent literature, British national identity or Britishness is facing a crisis (Dodd 1995; Leonard 1997; Marr 2000; Nairn 2000). The evidence of the decline of British identity in contemporary Britain are abundant. Trust in traditional British institutions, which have been the pillars of British identity, such as monarchy, the (Anglican) Church, Parliament, legal system, is declining (Leonard 1997: 27). According to a survey conducted for the Economist in September 1997, identification with Britain (40 per cent) appeared to be weaker compared to England/Scotland/Wales (45 per cent) and the regions where respondents lived (50 per cent); amongst the English respondents, while 49 per cent indicated strong identification with their regions, those who signalled a strong attachment to Britain was 43 per cent, while 41 per cent said they felt a strong identification with England.10

The causes of crisis have been discussed earlier: the loss of the empire and the status as the world power, immigration from the Commonwealth, Europe, and devolution. Looking at the current debates on the crisis of British identity, there are two contradicting aspects which appears to attract most attention: civic and imperial.

The dominant idea of Britishness by far is that it is a civic identity. It is civic because it is not ethnic; it did not organically grow out of a pre-existing entity, but was forged or constructed through institutions such as the Parliament and monarchy and wars against France as Colley has pointed out (Colley 1992a). This argument tends to play down the English influence on British identity. However, following this line of argument, British identity is sometimes labelled as a state identity, an attachment to the state, not to the people (McCrone 1997). Bernard Crick has even declared that British identity ‘does not corresponds to any real sense of a nation’ since there is no British nation in the way there is the French nation (Crick 1991:

10 MORI interviewed a representative quota sample of 932 respondents aged 18+ at 81 sampling points across Great Britain. In case of Scotland, 72 per cent of the respondents indicated a strong attachment to Scotland, while 18 per cent acknowledged a strong identification with Britain; in case of Wales, 81 per cent of the respondents indicated a strong attachment to Wales while 27 per cent signalled a strong identification with Britain.
British identity as a non-ethnic one is a useful tool in explaining some phenomena. First, the idea is frequently utilised by scholars working on Scottish and Welsh nationalism in explaining the dual identity structure which is often observed in Scotland and Wales. Various surveys have reported that the majority of the Scots and Welsh see themselves both Scottish/Welsh and British though with some differences in emphasis. This dual identity structure could be explained in many ways and one of the ways to go about is a hypothesis that there is a division of labour between British identity (civic and political) and Scottish/Welsh identity (ethnic and cultural). Although in the Scottish case, it is possible to argue that Scottish identity is as civic and institutional as British one, British identity as a civic identity is held to offer some clues in understanding the complexity of the identity issues.

The same logic can be applied to the understanding of the second- and third- generation of immigrants. That they would call themselves ‘Black British’ or ‘Asian British’ is often held to be indicative of the civic or institutional nature of British identity. Since British identity is an institutional, inclusive one, so the argument goes, everyone can be British. In this case, again, Britishness is contrasted to Englishness which is supposed to be ethnic and therefore exclusive.

The other aspect of British identity which is focused on also follows Colley’s thesis of Britishness; British identity is essentially imperial. Colley stressed the role of the British Empire in forging Britons as a common project where the English, Scots and Welsh (and Irish) could work together (Colley 1992a). The importance of the Empire, along with wars and intermarriages, in formulating British identity is widely recognised by historians (Davis 1999: 911-2). From this angle British identity is therefore informed by imperialism, which suggest that it has an element of the idea of white superiority, or what we may call racist.

The idea that being British implies being white is widely taken up by literature especially in the field of race relations. In this light, Britishness is exclusive and exploitative, and something that has to be changed in order to create a better British society. The racist aspect of Britishness has recently been drawing a lot of attention, largely due to two official reports published in 1999 and 2000. The Macpherson Report, which looked into the circumstances surrounding a murder of a black teenager, Stephan Lawrence by a white gang in 1993, loudly condemned the police for being ‘institutionally racist’. The accusation that the police, one of the key institutions of the state, was institutionally racist attracted enormous media coverage and the Government swiftly published action plans to eradicate institutional racism from public services. The debate on Britishness sparked by the MacPherson Report was taken further by another government commissioned report on the future of multi-ethnic Britain by

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11 For critique of this long standing conflation of England and Britain, see Davis (1999).
12 For an example of such survey results, see McCrone (1997). The usual complaint is that the English cannot distinguish being English and British. They tend to describe themselves as ‘equally British and English’ while a large proportion of Scots and Welsh opt for ‘More Scottish/Welsh than British’
13 However, to complicate the argument, some second- and third- generations of immigrants in Scotland call themselves ‘Asian Scots’. This is of course taken up by those who wish to stress the supposed civic, i.e., inclusive aspect of Scottish society.
14 Perhaps, the most eloquent statement of this is the title of the book by Paul Guilroy, There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack, London: Routledge, 1987.
the Runnymede Trust published in 2000. The report stated that Britishness does carry an unspoken, racial connotation, and given that Englishness cannot be an alternative because of its overt association with being white, the current notion of Britishness needs to be revised to be more inclusive and genuinely multicultural (Runnymede Trust 2000: 34-9). The report was ridiculed in certain quarters for supposedly advocating the abolition of the term Britain, an allegation which the members of the commission have vigorously denied (Hall 2000; Parekh 2000b). Contrary to the overall tone of media coverage, the report recognises the civic aspect of Britishness, which has been taken up by an increasing number of second- and third-generations of immigrants as their labels.

Multiculturalism is one of the issues arising from this on-going debate. The Immigration Act of 1967 not only restricted the Commonwealth citizens’ access to the UK but also set up the Commission for Racial Equality. Multiculturalism has long been a government policy in education and social services. The debate on Britishness being racist has prompted more rigorous discussion of multiculturalism in the UK. Some have expressed the fears that the current devolution programme could undermine this civic and inclusive aspect of Britishness by prioritising historical ethnic identities such as Scottish, Welsh and English as a reaction to devolution elsewhere (Alibhai-Brown 2000). These commentators would therefore argue for the need to encourage multiculturalism and foster a more inclusive form of British identity.

The current dominant discourses on Britishness are focusing on two opposing aspects of Britishness. Different aspects are illuminated in different contexts, which points to the fact that national identity is not homogeneous but a complex phenomenon. It poses different questions according to the socio-historical circumstances in which the people in question find themselves. One can also detect a strong aspirational element in these discussions: the shared understanding appears to be that ethnic based identity should be overridden by civic based identity in order to ensure inclusiveness. That is indicative of the environment in which the contemporary UK is situated in which social exclusion is held to be one of the most serious social problems.

4. Britain’s Significant Others

The significant others are another complex question in the British context. On one hand, one can argue that one of the significant others of Britishness is immigrants from the Commonwealth, i.e. non-white people, as the main anti-immigrant party is called the British National Party. On the other, those who belong to the second and third generation of immigrants from the Commonwealth are likely to identify themselves as British, not English (Jacobson 1997; Curtice and Heath 2000). In this case, their significant other could be the English, white Britons, or those non-white residents who do not possess a UK passport. At the same time, the issue of Britishness is bound up with that of Englishness, Scottishness, Welshness and Irishness. The Protestants of Northern Ireland probably have a very different idea as to what being British means from the people of the mainland. Scots and Welsh seem to have a clearer idea about what Britishness means than the English. For the purpose of retaining some clarity in the discussion, I am going to focus mainly on Anglo-Britishness, British identity which is strongly informed by English one in this section.

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15 Another example of the complicated situation in the UK. In this article, Hall suggested that the debate would be differently carried out in Scotland and Wales, thus implying that this particular reaction might be to do more with Englishness than Britishness (Hall 2000).
Robin Cohen has identified six dimensions to what he calls the fuzzy frontiers of British identity: Celtic, Dominion, Commonwealth, European, Anglophone and Alien (Cohen 1994; 1995). These six frontiers could be the starting point in identifying Britain’s significant others. As mentioned several times in this report, the thesis that Britishness was originally constructed through the confrontation with France is widely shared by scholars, and one of the recent labels given to the UK is ‘a reluctant European’. Therefore, the first significant other for the contemporary Britons is ‘Europe’ broadly defined (Marcussen et al. 1999). Europe has been the ‘Other’ against which Britain’s identity could be articulated, just as for the English Europe was an important ‘Other’ in their efforts to work out who they were. Europe in the form of continental countries used to be a great threat to England, though not to Scotland. However, since the defeat of Napoleon in 1815, Europe ceased to be a realistic military threat to Britain except a few years during the Second World War. As the project of European integration got under way, and once the UK joined the club, Europe in the form of the institutional structure of the EEC/EC/EU has become a threat to Britain, not because it poses a physical threat but because it is perceived to undermine Britain’s much cherished sovereignty. The issue of sovereignty is particularly important for the English whose self-definition is often described as ‘a free people’. A more detailed discussion of the relationship between Britain and Europe will be provided later in this report.

Cohen’s Dominion, Commonwealth and Anglophone are less important now than before due to changes in Britain’s relationship with Europe. Dominions are those colonies which achieved self-government and included Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Rhodesia, which have kept emotional, kinship, commercial and military ties with Britain. Their presence has influenced British identity in that Britain was their mother country, assuming a protective role in relation to these countries. A similar relationship was developed between Britain and the rest of the Empire and later Commonwealth. The status of these two as significant others have been extensively undermined because of Britain’s entry to the EEC (Cohen 1995). The idea of the ‘English speaking world’, which encompasses not only white Dominions but also the USA, has also lost its weight on the issue of British identity. This is also attributed to Britain’s shift to Europe. However, those who would like to play down the European dimension in contemporary British society would resort to the idea of the Anglophone world as a basis of their identity as well as the notion of a special relationship with the USA. Mrs Thatcher’s notorious claim that all troubles are coming from the continent while all solutions from the English speaking world is an example how the idea of the Anglophone world is used to describe that Britain is in contrast to Europe.

The second significant other for Britain is partly constituted of what Cohen called ‘aliens’. This is a label given to people who do not fall into any category of British nationality – British citizenship, British Dependent Territories citizenship, British Overseas citizenship, British Subject status, British Protected Person status, and British National (Overseas) status, and in practical terms, it refers to asylum seekers who do have no connection with the Commonwealth. However, in relation to British identity, the category of alien seems to cover a much wider ground. The original Alien Act was introduced in 1793 in the wake of the French Revolution, and it was mainly aimed to keep the internal tranquillity of Great Britain. As a result of the influx of Russian and Eastern European Jews at the end of the nineteenth century, another Alien Act was enacted in 1905, this time enabling the government to expel those deemed to be ‘undesirable’. The idea of aliens since then took a definite racial tone. One of the groups which constitute Britain’s internal others have therefore been the Jews who lived in the country. Another traditional segment of aliens was the Catholics. Ever since the Reformation, Catholics were the enemies within, and their civil rights were severely curtailed. The waves of immigration from Ireland in the nineteenth century are said to have deepened
racial and ethnic prejudices against the Irish on the part of the British, partly because they tended to take on low-wage jobs, but partly also because they were largely Catholics. However, the Union of Great Britain and Ireland of 1801 posed a difficult question of equality of the subjects of the Crown. The Catholic Emancipation Act was introduced in 1829, removing most of the restrictions that the Catholic used to face in public. However, a Catholic cannot accede to the Throne, and an element of anti-Catholicism and therefore an anti-Irish feeling still exists in the contemporary UK. Historically speaking, the Jews and Catholics-cum-Irish are two major internal others for the British.

According to the law, only those who have British citizenship, and the citizens of the EU member states, are free of immigration control (Mason 2000: 28). In terms of daily experience therefore, even with one of the remaining five statuses of British nationality mentioned above one could be treated as a non-member of Britain, as one of ‘them’. This has reflected the earlier discussion of British identity being racist. Ethnic minorities, that is those British citizens with non-British ancestry, are an internal significant other against whom a supposedly ‘superior’ Britishness is often articulated. The non-white population is a visible other. They could be seen as a problem – something to be dealt with or got rid of. Hence the BNP used to advocate forced repatriation of immigrants. A sense of fear arises on the part of white Britons from time to time in reaction to arrival of an increasing number of asylum seekers, or in some communities where non-white people are more numerous, but the main feelings towards the ethnic minority are superiority and, somewhat contradictory, resentment.

Another major internal significant other for the British is the Celts as Cohen puts it. Here, the Anglo-British angle becomes useful. In this formulation of British identity, Scots, Welsh and Irish take on the role of a significant other, sometimes threatening, sometimes as a source of amusement. Historically speaking, the Scots were seen with an element of fear by the English and their dominance in public life after the Union of 1707 resulted in periodical outbursts of anti-Scottish feelings (Cohen 1995; Colley 1992a). The fact that the Labour government which came to power in 1997 had at least four Scots as cabinet ministers (Gordon Brown, Chancellor of Exchequer; Robin Cook, Foreign Secretary; George Robertson, Defence Secretary; Donald Dewer, Scottish Secretary) was commented upon from time to time, betraying that some resentment towards Scots among the Anglo-British was running deep. While the Welsh in general do not evoke fear, at the surge of Welsh nationalism in the 1970s, the Welsh together with the Scots began to be treated as the Other by historians (Colley 1992b). The Irish have always presented a trouble; to put it simply, while the one of the binding principles of the British state and nation is Protestantism, the majority of the Irish population is Catholic, and therefore a potential menace. The Irish has been the internal other, and have recently (most notably since the 1960s when the ‘Troubles’ began) started to pose a physical and serious threat to the British state and nation in the form of the Irish Republican Army. The Celts have been, and still are the internal as well as external other for Anglo-Britishness. It has been widely predicted therefore that on-going devolution to Scotland and Wales would provoke an English backlash, not so much out of fear but out of resentment that Scots and Welsh are getting a better deal, a prediction so far has not explicitly materialised (Curtice and Heath 2000; Gillingham 2000; Harris 1998; Haseler 1996).

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17 The official policy of the BNP now is to promote ‘voluntary’ repatriation.
18 There is, however, a sign of polarisation of identities in England. While the British Election Study 1997 showed that those who described themselves as ‘English, not British’ were 7 per cent of the English respondent, the British Social Attitudes survey 1999 showed that 17 per cent of the English respondents identified themselves as ‘English, not British’. On the other hand, 9 per cent of the English respondents in 1997 identified themselves as ‘British, not English’ in 1999 the proportion went up to 14 per cent. An interesting finding from the 1999 survey is that those with exclusively English identity is less hostile to the idea of Scottish independence than those with exclusively British identity or dual identities. (Curtice and Heath 2000).
5. Concluding Remarks

Both the British state and identity are complex and perhaps more complex than other cases. As pointed out by some commentators, it is surprising that an antiquated state structure like that of the UK have survived till date (therefore the urge to ‘modernise’ Britain under the current Labour government) (Nairn 1977; 1988; Ascherson 1988). It is quite amusing that although scholars agree that British identity is a relatively new one, the perception that Britain, and therefore British people have been here for a thousand years is wide-spread. In this sense, British identity has acquired an ethnic or primordial quality over three hundred years. This is where the conflation of Britishness and Englishness becomes an issue. When politicians talking about ‘our thousand years of history of parliament’, they are not referring to the British Parliament which was formed in 1707, but to a rather mystical English parliament, which was legally submerged in the British Parliament in 1707.

One can perhaps identify a certain factor which seems to have exercised a profound influence on both how the British state evolved and how British identity emerged. British territorial integrity had not been seriously threatened until the First World War, and the threat was more imaginary than real. The major change to its border happened when Ireland succeeded in 1922 which arguably happened at the periphery, thus having little impact on the sense of Britishness. If there has not been any major upheaval caused by the outsiders, the political history of Britain has also been comparatively calm. Although England had gone through revolutions before the onset of industrialisation, the British state formed in 1707 did not go through any radical change of its structure.

PART II

6. Relations with Europe: A Brief Historical Overview

The history of the UK/Britain’s relationship with Europe is a long and eventful one, but what characterises it most is the prevailing image of ‘Europe as an elsewhere’ (Passerini 2000: 10). This detachedness was well captured by Winston Churchill’s statement: ‘We are with but not of Europe’ (Lord 1998: 23). There is another famous episode of a British newspaper running a title ‘Fog in the Channel, Europe cut off’. It is true that these islands which constitute today’s UK have been deeply involved with the Continent: the Roman invasion, Vikings raids, the Norman conquest of 1066, countless wars with forces of the Continent, the Reformation, to name but a few.19 There have also been intense intellectual exchange and trade between the two. However, partly because of the geography20, and partly because of the UK’s imperial past, ‘Europe as an elsewhere’ seems to describe best the underlying tone of the UK-Europe relationship. It is worth noting here that in the British context, the EU and Europe are largely conflated; both belong to ‘somewhere else’. Some intellectuals and politicians can articulate the difference between the two, but this differentiation does not make strong impacts on the discussions of the UK-Europe relationship.

19 For a good overview of the history of the relationship between Britain and the continent, see Black (1994).
20 Although it has been pointed out by many scholars that the sea was not an obstruct for communication in the pre-railways age, in the present discourse on Britain and Europe, Britain as ‘an island race’ is often cited as a reason for a perceived distant relationship between Britain and ‘Europe’. See Shore (2000), Radice (1992) and Thomas (1992) for this popularised version of history of Britain and Europe.
The British attitudes to the process which has led to the birth of the European Union could never be described as enthusiastic. Although Britain was a driving force behind setting up the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation in 1948, which was to administer Marshall Plan announced a year earlier, it did not show much interest in the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. It also did not take part in the negotiations which eventually produced the Treaty of Rome of 1957. Alarmed by the progress on the custom union of the European Economic Community, the UK proposed an alternative idea of international economic co-operation in the form of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which did not have an explicit political dimension. Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK became the signatories of the EFTA Convention in 1960.

In the following year, 1961, however, the Conservative Macmillan government, which had already become alarmed over the progress made by the six, submitted the first application to join the EEC. It is argued that the application did not indicate the wholehearted change of mind of the British government over the European issue, but a ‘reluctant recognition that … there was no real alternative to going in’ (Gowland and Tuner 2000: 115-6). In 1963 President De Gaulle of France vetoed UK membership of the EEC on the basis that Britain was not yet a suitable candidate. This seems to testify to the received wisdom that Anglo-French relationship was conditioned by ‘deep-seated suspicion and mistrust on both sides’ (Gowland and Turner 2000: 142). An interesting aspect of the first application was that the by September 1957, well before the submission of the application, ‘many people in Britain were under the impression that Britain was already a member [of the EEC]’, but at the same time, ‘the majority had not even heard of the EEC’ (Spence 1976: 19). The British public opinion during the Macmillan initiative was largely favourable of membership (Spence 1976: 20).

The Vietnam war and the crisis in Rhodesia finally pushed the Labour Wilson government to put the second application to join the EEC in May 1967. It was swiftly vetoed by President De Gaulle in November. Further negotiation for the British entry had to wait until President De Gaulle stepped down in 1969, and the return of the Conservative government lead by Edward Heath in 1970. The European Community opened membership negotiations with Denmark, Ireland, Norway and the UK in June 1970, and in January 1972, the UK signed the Treaty of Accession together with Denmark, Ireland and Norway, and in January 1973, the UK became formally a member of the EC.

In the meantime, a Labour government, which was more hostile to the EEC, came to power with a promise to renegotiate the terms of entry to the EEC in 1974, and the renegotiations concluded in 1975, which led to the establishment of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). In June the same year, the British government held a referendum over the renegotiated terms of entry, and with the turn-up of 65 per cent, the majority (67%) voted for ‘yes’, thus confirming British membership at least in a legalistic sense.

Even with its membership of the EEC confirmed, the UK has been described to be a ‘reluctant European’ (Gowland and Tuner 2000) or playing the ‘politics of detachment’ (Bulmer 1992). The UK has never been keen on any development which might lead to a further transfer of sovereignty to European institutions. The most visible representation of an ‘awkward partner’ has been Margaret Thatcher. She contributed a new English verb, ‘to handbag’ thanks to her manner of negotiating rebates for the UK contribution to the EU budget. Her Bruges speech, delivered in September 1998, is widely seen as a wholehearted attack on the process of

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21 The support for membership was stable even after De Gaulle’s veto. The public opinion turned hostile to the idea of membership around the second application in May 1967 and the devaluation of pounds in November (Jowell and Hoinville 1976: 30).
Although her successor, John Major adopted a far less hostile attitude to the European project, his policy was ‘wait and see’; hardly a positive policy towards Europe. The Major government has also been known for its lack of hesitance in exercising veto during the BSE crisis. In the meantime, the Labour Party abandoned its overtly hostile stance to the EC while the Tory Party, which was traditionally more pro-Europe, became to be seen more hostile to Europe (Hearl 1994; Daniels 1998). When the Labour government came to power, it quickly signed up the Social Chapter and styled itself as a new leader of Europe. However, the ultimate issue – the Euro – still divides the Eurozone and Britain, and the image of Britain being an odd existence continues (Barker 2001).

7. The British as Reluctant Europeans: Some Explanation

7.1 Geopolitical conditions

The fact that the UK was not defeated or occupied in World War II is argued to have particularly affected the British attitudes at the start of the current process of European integration (Gowland and Turner 2000; Shore 2000; Maitland 2001: 2-3; Bell 1996; Haseler 1996: 60; Jáuregui 1999). It did not need the assurance of peace and stability which the process of European integration promised as much as some continental countries. Moreover, British politicians were under the influence of the idea of the UK being the ‘third force’ in the postwar world, standing shoulder to shoulder to the USA and the Soviet Union, and thought a deeper involvement with Europe could undermine its status. Despite its economic and military decline which started in the late nineteenth century, the politicians and policy makers at the end of WWII still saw the UK as a global player. There were a few postwar developments which allowed the UK government to hang on to the idea of being a global player: the status of a permanent member of the United Nation Security Council and the successful development of nuclear weapons. In order to maintain its increasingly unrealistic position of a global player, the UK government tended to play down the significance of the European development in assessing its national interest.

Another, and interrelated with the first, source of British reluctance to Europe was the Commonwealth (Gowland and Turner 2000; Shore 2000: 170-2; Maitland 2001) The Commonwealth today is a collection of 54 countries, most of them are ex-British colonies, and acts as a forum for international co-operation. It was given an official and legal status in 1931 (Maitland 2001: 1). At the end of the World War II, the Commonwealth was politically, economically and emotionally significant to the UK population. First, it was indispensable in the idea of the UK being the ‘third force’. Even today the Commonwealth covers about 30 per cent of the world population, and it was thought that the weight of this huge organisation would enhance the British status in the world stage. The Commonwealth with its multi-racial, ethnic and cultural character was also ideal PR material in publicising the UK’s intention to bring about peace and prosperity in the world, not only in Europe (Ward 2001).

The Commonwealth was also an important trading partner of the UK. By 1950, 47.7 per cent of Britain’s total export went to the Commonwealth while 41.1 per cent of Britain’s total import came from the Commonwealth. On the other hand, between 1938 and 48, the share of export to the Six in the total British export fell from 21.7 per cent to 16.7 percent, the share of import from the Six from 18.6 per cent to 13.1 per cent (Gowland and Turner 2000: 86). Of course, this was largely due to the formation of bloc economies as response to the Great

22 Perhaps, the best known section of her speech is: ‘We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain only to see them reimposed at a European level, with a European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels’.
Depression of the 1930s and the peculiarity of the wartime economy. However, it is clear that at the end of the war and well into the 1950s, the Commonwealth was far more important to British Economy than the Continental countries.

Thirdly, there was the issue of emotion which strengthened the geopolitical case of not joining the process of European integration. The Commonwealth contributed to the UK’s war efforts in terms of goods and soldiers and it is argued that the British political elite and people in general felt gratitude to the Commonwealth, and therefore could not forsake it for a new future in Europe; in this aspect, the EEC represented selfishness in pursuit of economic benefits while the Commonwealth symbolised higher moral loyalty (Maitland 2001: 3; Russell 2001: 10). It is also important that a large section of the population had some kind of ties – family, business, intellectual – with Commonwealth countries, which could have affected their perception of the European project and Britain’s role in it.

A special relationship with the United States is another factor which has been exercising considerable influence over British foreign policy and public opinion, as the current ‘war on terrorism’ shows. The idea of a special relationship with the US also feeds in the idea of Britain as the third force and a global player, and therefore it has exercised a prolonged influence on the way in which British foreign policy has been formulated. Many politicians, policy makers and some lay people thought and, to some extent, still think, that ‘Going in Europe’ might undermine this cherished special relationship with the USA. Ironically, the US wants the UK in Europe, a fact which is now increasingly recognised by policy makers and politicians of the UK, but is not necessarily shared by the majority of the British public (Rachman 1998).

7.2 Historical conditions: English experiences

The necessity of focusing on Anglo-Britishness becomes clear when one looks into the historical conditions of the British reluctance to European integration in comparison to Scottish attitudes. To put it simply, the contemporary Scots are less hostile to European integration than the British in general (Ichijo 1998). Since British identity was forged through the wars with France, Protestantism and participation in the Empire, Anglo-British and Scottish views should be based on the same foundation vis-à-vis the continent. Because Scotland and England have shared most of historical experiences, especially those of external relationship, since the union of 1707, the fact that there is divergence suggests that the major reason should be found in their pre-Union histories, rather than the postwar geopolitical reasons.

Set in the English perspective, it can be argued that the present Anglo-British view of European integration reflects historical English antagonism towards the continent (Haseler 1996; Ash 2001; Condren 1999; Bell 1996). On the whole, for the English, Europe is somewhere else to which England does not belong. However, historians have now begun to stress the European past of England, that England was very much involved with and

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23 In 1962, the then Labour leader, Hugh Gaitskell made this remark at the party conference: ‘If I were a little younger today, and if I were looking around for a cause, I do not think I should be quite so certain that I would find it within the movement for greater unity in Europe. I would rather work for the Freedom From Hunger Campaign; I would rather work for War on Want, I would rather do something to solve world problems’ (Russell 2001: 9). Clearly, Europe stood for economically minded self-interest in his mind, which informed his view on the European project.

24 In one of the Labour Party’s publication entitled European Unity, there was a following sentence: ‘In every respect except distance we in Britain are closer to our kinsmen in Australia and New Zealand on the far side of the world than we are to Europe’ (Russell 2001: 15).
influenced by the affairs of the continent (Davis 1999; Kearney 1989; Black 1994). The invasions of the Romans and subsequently the Anglo-Saxons, Vikings, and the Norman conquest all demonstrate that Great Britain was not isolated in the North-Western corner of the area which we can roughly call Europe. However, the conventional view has it that the Hundred years war with France (1337-1453) marked the change of the scene. The English army left French soil in 1453, and when Calais was lost to the French in 1558, England did not make any further attempt to conquer the continent and concentrated on its maritime expansion.

It was in the following period when the idea of Great Britain as an island separated from the Continent, and that of English, and later British, exceptionalism evolved (Ash 2001; Haseler 1996; Bonnell 1999). The gradual strengthening of the parliament in relation to the power of the monarch, the Reformation, revolutions which established the principle of parliamentary sovereignty took place in this period. The people of the continent, especially the French became an important ‘Other’ for the English to form the idea as to who they were and who they were not. Europe became ‘a theatre, a means of showing Britain’s status and significance’ (Condren 1999: 18). In what way were the English different, then? The points of reference were ‘the slow, steady organic growth of institutions, of Common Law, Parliament, and a unique concept of sovereignty, vested in the Crown in Parliament’ (Ash 2001: 6). Furthermore, the idea of freedom became entrenched in British institutions (Robbins 1998: 133-5). These have translated into the idea that the English are freedom lovers who are democratic and who respect commonsense. The continent, especially revolutionary France was, on the other hand, where extremism ruled and despotism reined in the English eye.

Of these points of reference, the idea of parliamentary sovereignty seems to be particularly important in shaping the British attitudes towards Europe (Preston 1994: 130). It is often argued that this idea is at the core of Anglo-British identity and therefore cause more troubles than in any other member states. The strength of this hypothesis is enhanced by a variety of opinion polls. For instance, the polls MORI conducted from 1987 and 1993 shows a steady opposition, ranging from 50 per cent to 70 per cent, to a further transfer of power to the European Parliament.

The idea of English exceptionalism was further reinforced by another idea: the English is God’s elect (Haseler 1996: 20; Greenfeld 1992) The idea was mobilised by a series of historical actors: Oliver Cromwell was one of them. Indeed, in 1559, a bishop declared that God was English, suggesting the view that ‘the English people was chosen, separated from others and distinguished by God’ was in fashion (Greenfeld 1992: 60-1). The English was a special people in their mind. This implies that foreigners from the continent were inferior to the English, an idea which conditioned the underlying tone of English and Anglo-British understanding of Europe. It is especially pronounced vis-à-vis France, and a certain anti-French feeling still prevails (Haseler 1996; Paxman 1998). To illustrate the point, when De Gaul vetoed the UK’s application for membership of the EEC, it appeared to testify to the received wisdom that Anglo-French relationship was conditioned by ‘deep-seated suspicion and mistrust on both sides’ (Gowland and Turner 2000: 142). The Anglo-British view of Europe is therefore underpinned by certain antagonism which emerged and have been maintained through the history.

25 From the Anglo-British perspective, ‘Britain’ in this quote is understood to refer to ‘England’. Another example of the messiness one encounters when investigating the UK case.
26 The notion of parliamentary sovereignty is more strongly associated with Tory politicians (Parekh 2000), but it is also held by some Labour politicians such as Tony Benn.
It is not this report’s contention, however, to argue that the English have historically been, and are now, entirely anti-European. There is a wealth of evidence to demonstrate that English fascination with the continent also has a long history; the custom of grand tour whereby children of the well-off class finished off their education with an extended tour of the continental countries is one example. In the eighteenth century, at the height of Enlightenment, the intellectual and social exchange between England (and Britain as a whole) and France was lively and ‘cultivated Englishmen’ would express their Francophile tendency without any inhibition (Newman 1987: 1-2). What is stressed here is that the traditional English hostility to European countries and people is a significant element in colouring the contemporary Anglo-British attitudes to European integration, which comes out stronger than English affinity with the continent.

8. Attitudes Toward Europe

British public opinion about EEC/EC/EU has been nothing but volatile. As mentioned above, before the first application, the British public was largely in favour of membership of the EEC. Between 1967 and 1975, while the second application was vetoed and the Heath initiative was taking place, public opinion polls reported that those opposing to join the EEC outnumbered those in favour (Spence 1976: Nugent 1992). As the 1975 EEC referendum demonstrated, the public mood changed by the time of the accession. According to the results of the polls conducted by MORI, public endorsement of British membership has been fluctuating since then:

Table 1: Support for British membership of the EEC/EC, 1977-1990

‘If there were a referendum now (tomorrow) on whether Britain should stay in or get out of the European Community (Common Market), how would you vote?’

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stay in</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Get out</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the British Public Opinion December 1996, MORI

Support for the continuation of membership dropped at the beginning of the 1980s, which seems to coincide with the arrival of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, but recovered to the pre-1980 level in the late 1980s. The voters seemed to have become more enthusiastic about the EU in the early 1990s, although Mrs Thatcher was still in power. Moreover, the subsequent MORI results indicate that the aversion to EU membership has been growing in the past decade:
Table 2: Support for British membership of the EC/EU, 1991-2001

‘If there were a referendum now (tomorrow) on whether Britain should stay in or get out of the European Community/Union (Common Market), how would you vote?’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>91</th>
<th>92</th>
<th>93</th>
<th>94</th>
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<th>97</th>
<th>98</th>
<th>99</th>
<th>00</th>
<th>01</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stay in</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Get out</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MORI

The level of support has dropped from its highest point of 62 per cent in 1990 to 48 per cent in 2001. The fluctuation seems to have no direct correlation with political events in the UK and EU, and interpreting the data requires a careful analysis of political, economic and social backgrounds to these changes.

Focusing on more recent years, the Eurobarometer results give a slightly more complicated picture. The percentage of the respondents who described the EU as a good thing dropped from 36 per cent in 1996 to 28 per cent in 2000, while the EU average did not change much. The drop was quite steep from 1998 to 1999. The percentage of the respondents feeling the UK has benefited from the EU also dropped, again especially sharply from 1998 to 1999. The EU average for the both categories also fell during the same period, but not as drastic as in the British case. Support for joint EU decision-making shows a declining trend. What is interesting is, however, while the percentage of the respondents conceding the EU’s role becoming more important in the future is growing, the percentage of those who would like an enhanced EU’s role in their life is declining. There seem to be a sober recognition of the inevitable, i.e., the EU is increasingly becoming important, which is accompanied by a growing disillusion. In addition, the British respondents appear to be markedly more hesitant towards the deepening of the EU’s influence in their daily life than the EU average, which seems to suggest that a diversion of expectations and desires in relation to the EU between the British public on one hand and other member states on the other is emerging.

27 MORI dropped ‘Common Market’ from this question in 1999, a fact which may or may not reflect the deepening understanding of what the EU is about.

28 Data for 1991 to 1996 is taken from the Future of Europe survey for the European newspaper, published in December 1996; the 1997 data is from the Attitudes to Europe in Great Britain survey for the Sun newspaper, conducted in November 1997 (sample size: 603); the 1998 date is from the Political Attitudes in Great Britain for June 1998 survey for the Times newspaper, conducted in June 1998 (sample size: 1760); the 1999 data is from the Political Attitudes in Great Britain for May 1999 survey for the Times newspaper, conducted in May 1999 (sample size: 2046); the 2000 data is from the Political Attitudes in Great Britain for June 2000 survey for the Times newspaper, conducted in June 2000 (sample size: 1915); the 2001 data is from the Political Attitudes in Great Britain survey for the Sun newspaper conducted April 2001 (sample size: 1008).
Table 3: Support for the EU, 1996-2000 (%)  
(figures in brackets show the EU average)

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support for EU (a good thing)</td>
<td>36 (48)</td>
<td>36 (49)</td>
<td>37 (54)</td>
<td>29 (51)</td>
<td>28 (50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived benefit from the EU (benefited)</td>
<td>34 (42)</td>
<td>37 (44)</td>
<td>37 (49)</td>
<td>29 (46)</td>
<td>30 (47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average level of support for joint EU decision-making</td>
<td>42 (54)</td>
<td>41 (53)</td>
<td>45 (57)</td>
<td>36 (53)</td>
<td>37 (52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 21st century: perceived role of the EU in people’s daily life to be more important</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>43 (46)</td>
<td>45 (52)</td>
<td>34 (51)</td>
<td>50 (51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 21st century: Desired role of the EU in people’s daily life to be more important</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>30 (45)</td>
<td>29 (48)</td>
<td>24 (45)</td>
<td>24 (45)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer, Reports No. 46 48 50, 52, 54

Looking at the British attitudes towards Europe more widely, the label ‘reluctant Europeans’ appears to be suitable. Although the percentage of British respondents identifying themselves as exclusively European does not differ much from the EU average, a clear difference is shown in the categories of ‘British first, European second’ and ‘British only’. The EU average figures show that on average, people in the EU tend to profess to a dual identity structure with an emphasis on their nationality. However, the British are not forthcoming in admitting a European element in their identity; more than 60 per cent has been consistently declaring that they are British, no more, no less.

Table 1.4: National and European Identity (%)  
(figures in brackets show the EU average)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>European only</th>
<th>European and nationality</th>
<th>Nationality and European</th>
<th>Nationality only</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>5 (5)</td>
<td>6 (6)</td>
<td>26 (40)</td>
<td>60 (46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>6 (5)</td>
<td>3 (6)</td>
<td>29 (40)</td>
<td>57 (45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>5 (4)</td>
<td>4 (7)</td>
<td>27 (43)</td>
<td>62 (43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>3 (4)</td>
<td>3 (6)</td>
<td>24 (42)</td>
<td>67 (45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>3 (4)</td>
<td>3 (7)</td>
<td>27 (49)</td>
<td>62 (38)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer, Reports No. 46, 47, 50, 52, 54

This may need to be evaluated in the context that Europe has, in a vague way, represented the ‘Other’ to many of British people, which may have reinforced a stronger identification with their nation (or the state) than the average.

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29 The figures for 1996 and 1997 are calculated from 18 questions concerning joint decision-making; figures for 1998 to 2000 are calculated from 25 questions.
9. Studies on European Integration and Collective Identity in the UK

There are a large number of articles and books published on European integration and on the theme of Britain and Europe. However, the relationship between British national identity and European integration is dealt with, at most, in a cursory or, at best, polemic manner (Shearman 1999; Brewin 2000; Harvie 2000; Kearney 2000). The most common observation in this regard is that Europe is seen as ‘the Other’ by the British people as this report has already touched upon. For instance, Marcussen et al. (1999) offered a broad comparison of French, German and British cases in their relations to a European identity, and concluded that the prime function of ‘Europe’ in the British case is to serve as its Other. Another aspect which is often pointed out is that the issue of European integration, and therefore, a European identity has largely remained an elite’s concern, not really a concern of the public (Shearman 1999; Rachman 1998). Time and again opinion polls have shown that the issue of European integration is not high on voters’ agenda, and it is also suggested that the leading politicians’ hostility to Europe has not directly reflected on the level of public support for EU membership (Rasmussen 1997).

There are a few attempts which aim to provide a more theoretical framework to analyse the relationship between British or national identity and European one. For example, Howorth (2000) deals with the issue by differentiating ‘being’ and ‘doing’; being, in this case, is a shorthand for identity and doing for politics. She argues when there is a harmony between being and doing, some tangible entity emerges, an example of which is a medieval commune in France where a community and a unit of collective action coincided. According to her scheme, the relationship between Britain and Europe since 1945 is the case where doing has been subordinate to being; since Britain has identified itself somewhere else than Europe, its participation in the European project (doing) has been hindered. In a similar fashion to functionalism, Howorth suggests that as the accumulation of doing by the European entity mounts, the level of consciousness could be raised.

10. Conclusion

Britain’s relationship with the EU is best described as ‘half-detachment’, which is not characterised by clear hostility but a still widely-found indifference and ignorance.³⁰ Europe is a significant other for the contemporary British, but it is not the source of fear or inspiration, for that matter. As mentioned earlier, given that the recognition that the EU is going to play a more prominent role in people’s daily life is growing, public perception of Europe may take a much sharper form in the near future. Because of the current war against terrorism, the Euro issue has recently become less visible. It has been widely predicted by the media and scholars alike, however, that the government is likely to make a more decisive move, i.e., to call a referendum on the introduction of the Euro during the lifetime of this parliament (by 2006). According to opinion polls, the majority of the public is against the Euro, and the forthcoming Euro debate will also contribute to the further definition of British opinion of Europe.

³⁰ The Eurobarometer often reports that the British is one of the least informed of the EU. For example, according to the Eurobarometer 49 (conducted in Spring 1998), 36 per cent of the British respondents have said that they know (almost) nothing, compared to 9 per cent of the Danish respondents. The self-professed ignorance of the EU issues of the British is only surpassed by the Spanish (32 per cent) and Portuguese (42 per cent).
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NATION FORMATION,
CZECH REPUBLIC AND EUROPE

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Ms. Karolína Ružicková, Dr. Michael Voríšek

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PART I

1. Introduction

In Part I the report presents a brief overview of the historical development of Czech statehood based on a national principle; it characterizes perceptions of important significant others in contemporary Czech society; and most of, all it provides a survey of the basic discourse on perceptions of Czech national identity. Part II deals with the relations towards the EU also in a brief chronological overview. Then we present works and studies on the attitudes of Czech citizens towards the EU. An annotated analysis of the literature on attitudes for and against the integration of the Czech Republic into the EU follows. It particularly relates to the overview of the literature and surveys on the relations between the Czech and European identity. The key conclusions of our work up to now, including the conclusions of this study, are summed up in the part entitled Concluding Remarks.

2. Historical Overview

‘Why are the Czechs a small nation?’ (Seibt 1996:27). Today’s Czech citizen has to cope with the awareness that he is a member of a small nation. After 40 years of fruitless education to socialist internationalism the Czechs (and also the Slovaks) are affected with this awareness more than before and more than they would admit themselves. This also includes a part of the national elites and paradoxically even they do not want to admit this fact. It could probably be explained on the basis that returning to the horizons and values of fathers and grandfathers is simpler and more certain than turning to indistinct contours of the new system represented by European identity in a general sense and by the EU in particular. The difficulty with new paths lies in the lack of familiarity. The elites are not even ready to recognise and classify the phenomena of the new European code, nor are they able to explain them to ordinary citizens. If you feel helpless it is simpler to resort to the past, which is relatively familiar and can provide arguments in defence of national interests and a means to formulate national identity in opposition towards plentiful Germans, plentiful Poles, more successful (or less successful) Poles, Hungarians etc.

The Czech nation has embarked on the path to a modern national state with a wider detachment from its own aristocratic elite than the rest of Central Europe (Seibt 1996: 10; see also the same author’s brief but accurate recapitulation of the thousand-year development of the Czech state and Czech statehood in the same volume, p. 16-19).

The Czech nation in a modern sense existed as a peripheral ethnic group since the end of the eighteenth century within the territory of a large multi-national state (the Habsburg monarchy) with one reigning nation. The real national movement existed within the framework of the land unity of Bohemia and Moravia. Those are the lands which have traditionally had political self-rule and permanent borders since the Middle Ages. These borders were not however congruent with ethnic distinctions. The Czech national movement had, relatively speaking, the richest and most complex social structure. A great deal was represented by tiny intelligence both sacred and secular. The aims of Czech patriots were based on the language as a basic identifying hallmark of the Czech ethnic group and the aim of the Czech national movement was to re-establish the autonomous position of the formerly independent Czech state. The phase of national agitation came several decades after the abolition of serfdom. The transition to the phase of a mass national movement is connected with the revolution in 1848, which had the consequence of abolishing the feudal dependence of the peasantry (Hroch 1986: 251). 1848 also brought hope that the Czechs would achieve equal status within the
multi-national Habsburg monarchy. At that time, the prominent historian and politician František Palacký could not imagine the continued existence of the Czech nation out of the Habsburgs’ complex of states.

The revolution in 1848 and the swift reaction of the government seriously disappointed the liberal hopes of the German-Czech community. Within one generation attitudes as to the final aim of the whole Czech struggle had changed. On the pretext of the historical Czech right, a Czech national state was required.

A new hope of an independent self-rule existence for the Czech nation arose from the qualitatively new situation of the First World War. In the second half of First World War, the Allies started to take a more favourable view of the Central European and Balkan national movements, particularly after the Russian revolution of February 1917. Masaryk’s activities in America and Beneš’ and Štefánik’s in France met with overwhelming success. In October 1918 the Allies recognised the Czechoslovak National Council as the first Czechoslovak government.

The modern Czechoslovak state was formed on 28 October 1918 and arose out of the will of the Czech and Slovak people, through the union of the historical Czech lands forming the centre of the state and the more eastern Slovakia. Carpathian Ruthenia was incorporated in the summer of 1919 as a result of the wishes of the Allies, after the Hungarian Bolshevist revolution. Three million Germans and half a million Hungarians remained inside the borders of the Czechoslovak Republic. The new state was ready to make an agreement on minorities immediately after the declaration of the peace treaties. The German minority in Bohemia and Moravia was not willing to recognise the new state of affairs at that time. Despite all of the difficulties the so-called builders of the state achieved a lot during the first ten years. The hostility of Hitler’s Germany in the 1930s had been gradually increasing. The western powers failed to react firmly to the actions with which Hitler was testing their resolve. Their policy of appeasement put heavy pressure on Czechoslovak politicians to comply with the wishes of Hitler and led to the Munich agreement. Munich left its imprint on the nation, causing an ingrained distrust of the Allies and a deep long-term depression at Czechoslovakia’s own weakness. In March 1939 Hitler formed the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia which ceased to exist only by the end of the Second World War. At the same time, the Slovakian representation declared an independent Slovak state that was closely related to the Third Empire.

After the Slovak National Uprising (1944) and deliberation of the whole former Czechoslovakia (1945) the post-war Czechoslovak Republic was renewed but in the form in which it had not existed before September 1938 (the Munich agreement).

The national composition of the population was also significantly transformed. By the decisive conference of the victorious powers at Potsdam, the transfer of German inhabitants from Bohemia and Moravia into defeated Germany was carried out. The transfer of Hungarians from Slovakia was halted. The distribution of power in the international arena and the increasing role of the USSR had fatefuly marked the Czechoslovak republic which belonged, since the Communist coup in February 1948, to the Soviet sphere of interest or to ‘eastern Europe’. The ‘Prague spring’ in 1968 was a short period within the process of the public revival, which was stopped by the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact in August 1968. During the ‘velvet revolution’ in November 1989 the Communist regime was peacefully destroyed. In the second free parliamentary elections in June 1992 left wing forces triumphed in Slovakia. On the contrary, the right oriented parties in the Czech lands (Bohemia and
Moravia) gained a convincing victory. That was one principal reason for the split of Czechoslovakia in two separate autonomous and independent national states, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. Masaryk’s dream of one democratic nation composed by two branches definitely came to an end.

3. Significant Others

The Czech nation was formed in the relation to approximately four ethnic groups that fundamentally influenced the process of creating Czech national identity. First of all the Germans living in Austria-Hungary who were the most important group of so called ‘significant others’ from the beginning of the national movement until the formation of the independent state. Czechs define themselves in contrast to Germans, as a group that is principally different from their own national identity. After 1918, the Slovaks come to the fore and on the contrary they play the part of a related ethnic group. It is even desirable to create a common nation with them. In this case the Czechs were in the opposite role of an ethnic group towards which the Slovaks defined themselves as an independent nation and to which they were ultimately opposed when defending the claim for their own state. Nowadays the Roma, who are almost the only one different ethnic group living in the Czech Republic, play an important role. The Roma ethnic group demands the right of self-determination and in this way they help to define the Czech national identity. Last but not least, it is necessary to stress that Czechs speak of national feeling more and more in conjunction with the European Union and with the contemporary and future members of the EU. The next sections of the paper deal with this topic.

3.1 The Czech-German relationship

The Czech nation began to be formed approximately from the end of the eighteenth century as a peripheral ethnic group within the framework of the multi-national Habsburg monarchy. This process began very quickly and it had relatively soon afterwards attained considerable success among wide social strata, compared to other nations of Eastern and Central Europe. The process of the formation of the Czech nation used to be defined in relation to a strong German minority living in the territory of the historical Bohemian Kingdom since at least the thirteenth century. The ethnic border between the Czech and German population was in some areas also a social border between a richer urban class and a poorer, mostly Czech, country.

The Czech patriots’ attitude was based on language as a fundamental identifying hallmark of the Czech ethnic group. National autonomy and the related demand to use the mother tongue in schools and in administration expressed the effort to balance social differences among the particular ethnic groups in the Austrian monarchy. The Czech national consciousness was only formed in opposition towards German identity. The confrontation of the Czech and German elements formed, according to some national revivalists, a fundamental part in the acquisition of national consciousness (Suda: 107).

At the end of the nineteenth century, Thomas Garrigue Masaryk presented an alternative to the Czech nationalism that was only defined on the basis of language. Masaryk realized that the Czech question could not be defined only negatively in confrontation with the Germans. Masaryk initially operated with the concept of the ‘meaning of Czech history’ mostly in the sphere of intellectual discussions that did not meet with a positive response from among the Czech population. (Suda 1995: 21-22) Czech inhabitants’ negative identification towards the Germans prevailed, a feeling that continued to increase thanks to the dramatic affairs of the inter-war development in Germany and particularly to the experience with the German
totalitarian regime during the Second World War, that ended with a mass transfer of the Czech [Sudeten] Germans beyond the border of the Czechoslovak state.

The year 1989 was a turning point in the Czech-German relationship. The opening of the western border, the penetration of the German capital into the Czech Republic, the establishment of new democratic top level relations; all this influenced the re-evaluation of the Czech public attitude towards the Germans.

The character of mutual Czech-German relations was distinctly influenced by voices of the Sudeten Germans and particularly the Sudeten German Landsmanschaft that were making the establishment of new relations dependent on the solution to the so called Sudeten-German question. The Sudeten Germans began to raise a claim to repeal the decrees of Benes legalising the collective transfer of Czech and Moravian Germans. They were calling for the right of return to Sudeten and they requested the re-evaluation of the transfer of the Germans which they considered to be an unjust and illegal act of collective guilt. The Czech population understood the contemporary claims of the Sudeten Germans, in the context of their historical experience, as an act which called into question the integrity of free Czechoslovakia.

Germany remains one of the most important political and economic partners of the Czech Republic and Czech public opinion accepts this fact mostly positively. As the results of the National Identity polls show, Germany is understood by the Czech public as the most important partner (73 per cent of respondents). Simultaneously it is also a desirable political partner (56 per cent of respondents) although roughly the same number of respondents consider Germany as a potential danger for the Czech Republic (Kostelecký, Nedomová: 25). There is an ambivalent attitude towards Germany. On one hand a pragmatic effort to use the co-operation with an economically developed partner, on the other hand a cautious attitude arising from historical experience with Germany. Further surveys confirm that the people who participate actively in cross-border co-operation, either in political, economic or personal areas, maintain a more positive attitude towards Germans. Although they express strong national consciousness they appreciate the co-operation and they do not consider Germany to be a real threat to the independence of the Czech Republic. They also significantly differ from the rest of the population when evaluating democratic principles in Germany and they find their abolition extremely improbable (Zich: 21-28).

The mutual relations of both nations are not at an entirely normal, problem-free, level. The reason is that the historical memory of both nations has not yet been set in order. Reservations over the wild transfer (although entirely incommensurate in the light of historical experience of the Czech nation during the Second World War) bear nevertheless a certain moral appeal as the transfer of the Sudeten Germans was based on a principle of collective guilt and was accompanied by excesses of uncontrolled violence (Musil, Suda: 138).

The Czech educational system is still encumbered, with some exceptions, with stereotyped interpretations of the continuous expansion of the German neighbour to the east and of the consequent threat of the Czech nation. These emotive prejudices, sometimes based on false historical interpretations, had influenced long-term trajectories of Czech foreign policy, in particular during the period of the First Republic (Musil, Suda 1998: 147). Such a concept could hardly be compatible with the aim of integration into the European Union – at the time when Europe is undergoing the process of continental integration and a concept of European citizenship, joining together all the citizens of national European states, has been established.
3.2 Czech-Slovak relations

The relationship between the Czechs and the Slovaks differs considerably from that between the Czechs and the Germans. On the Czech side, the Czechs placed hopes on the creation of Czechoslovakia and in bringing the Czech and Slovak nations together. At the end of the First World War, Czech representatives raised the idea of creating an independent state. T. G. Masaryk developed a national programme of a future state, at that time also embracing the Slovak nation. He saw the main motive for the enlargement of the national basis in the necessity to attain the majority over the three-million minority of the Czech Germans. By joining with Slovakia, and later also with Sub-Carpatic Ukraine, the Slavonic population became the majority and pushed the Germans into the position of one of the minorities. Czechoslovakia had become a state of the single Czechoslovak nation. Reasons for the creation of the new nation arose from the ethnic structure of the Czechoslovak state. A unique phenomenon of the nation created artificially by joining two ethnically different national movements appeared. This artificially created construct had survived for more than seven decades and although a common consciousness did not emerge across the Czechoslovak nation, the majority of the Czechs and Slovaks considered the common state to be natural and well-functioning until its cessation.

In the Czech national consciousness the idea of Czechoslovakism was accepted naturally as the logical result of forming the Czech national identity. The Czechs accepted the new state as their own, because it offered them a political framework for a fully constituted Czech nation. They perceived the notion ‘Czechoslovak’ as more and more coinciding with the notion ‘Czech’ (Suda: 118).

In 1939, Slovak separatists created an independent Slovak state under the auspices of Nazi Germany. After the War, the Czechoslovak representatives had to abandon the conception of one Czechoslovak nation and to accept the existence of the Slovak nation as an irreversible fact.

In connection with the split of Czechoslovakia in 1993, numerous social scientists asked why it had to happen. The idea of the Czechoslovak nation suffered a fatal defeat at the moment when it had to pass through its first democratic test.

Although opinion polls showed that the majority of Czechs and Slovaks did not wish to divide the common state, the split as such did not give rise to any protests among the Czech or Slovak population, in an attempt to rescue it. One of reasons for the low interest in preserving the integrity of the state was the growing gap in hopes for the future transformation process (Machonin 1994: 338).

The national feeling within the Czech ethnic community had so fully occupied the Czechoslovak identity that there was little space left for the specifically Slovak content. No wonder that the Slovaks did not figure in such an identity – Czechoslovak in its nominal meaning, but Czech in its factual meaning (Barša: 258).

Attempts to enforce the programme of autonomy, where only defence, financial and foreign powers are conferred on federal institutions, were made several times, before and after the Second World War and in 1968 (Rychlík: 181, 189-196). Such conditions were unacceptable to the Czech side. When the elections in 1992 ended in stalemate, both winning parties gave preference to the division of the state and to separate paths of political and economic transformation.
On the other hand it should be stressed that despite considerable discord on the division of political power between the two nations, during the final stages, the majority of the population were opposed to the minority solution to the Czech-Slovak conflict, i.e. the division of the Czechoslovak state. Opinion polls showed that the opinion that it was necessary to divide the state did not prevail in any of nations. The state was divided without the approval of its citizens being expressed in a referendum. Nevertheless it appeared that the Czechs regard the division of Czechoslovakia with almost no sentiment. The Czechs perceived problems with the Slovak state in the early stage of its existence with satisfaction and as confirming the rightfulness of the minority solution.

3.3 Czech-Russian relations

The relationship with Russia played an important role in the period of the National Revival. The Russians performed the role of a big Slavonic brother who stood alongside other, subdued, Slavonic nations. In this interpretation the Russians were characterised as peace-loving Slavs caring for their smaller brother nations, in contrast to the Germans who played a negative role in subduing the Slavs. This interpretation was based on Herder’s thesis of the democratic nature of the Slavonic race, which was contrasted to the feudal nature of the Germans. Such a picture of Russia was backed up by part of the conservative wing of national revivalists who disregarded both factual Russian aims, i.e. taking control of the Slavonic territories after the fall of Austria-Hungary (the experience of Poles under Russian domination, very often more repressive than the Austria-Hungary domination, was not taken into account), and the underdeveloped political and social situation in Russia.

After 1917, the Russians were perceived as an example of a model nation that had succeeded in enforcing ideas of the socialist revolution among leftist intellectuals. Nevertheless, such opinions were not backed up by the real experience gained from Bolshevik, and subsequently, Soviet Russia.

During the Second World War and in the period that followed, the Russians were again perceived as liberators and contrasted to the Germans. This relationship with the Russians survived until 1948 when the Communists took power and Czechoslovakia officially found itself in the Eastern block under the direct domination of the Soviet Union. At that moment the Russians were transformed into the foreign power restricting the freedom of the Czech nation. It should be added that official policy differed significantly from the opinion of the population, which opposed the Russians, but bearers of such opinions could not freely express their ideas. Direct hostility toward the Russians developed after the occupation in 1968. The Russian domination was directly contrasted to the Czech national identity. The Russians were again perceived as oppressors, although the real power was held by the Czechs, as part of a normalisation process. During the demonstrations at the end of the 1980s, the Russians were in the position of direct enemies of the Czech nation. It is not a coincidence that the negotiating opposition required the removal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia as the nation’s foremost aim (Holy).

3.4 Czech-Romany relations

The last distinctive group that stayed on the territory of the Czech Republic, now nearly ethnically homogeneous, are the Romanies. Today, the problematic co-existence with the Romanies is not only the subject of criticism from the part of international organisations supervising the Czech adherence to human rights, but it also complicates Czech foreign policy
toward countries that have become a shelter for Romany emigrants seeking the political asylum granted to some of them due to racial discrimination.

The majority Czech society bears considerable responsibility for the safety of all its citizens and for adherence to fundamental human rights. With regard to the Romanies, Czech society often fails to achieve this aim. The Romanies are often a target of racially motivated attacks, the initiators of which often get off with low sentences. Collective attempts by the Romanies at emigration, prompted by racial intolerance, have on several occasions damaged diplomatic relations with Canada and Great Britain. The fear and uncertainty, as well as the difficulty in achieving at least full basic education, leads to high unemployment among the Romany community. It is a vicious circle, the result of which is the Romanies living on the dole. The Romany ethnic group does not enjoy equal opportunities in achieving education and adopting a satisfactory position in the labour market.

The majority of Czech society is not yet willing to assume responsibility for problems arising from the Czech-Romany co-existence. Today, the Romanies form the only ethnically different community claiming tolerance and support from the majority society. Besides, the Romanies form the community that had been historically living on the Czech territory since the fifteenth century (Necas 1995: 17). For many centuries, the Romany ethnic group, like the Jews, had to face pressure for assimilation with the majority society. On the other hand, the Romanies were perceived as culturally different and non-Czech, even in the period of the Czechoslovak state (Necas 1995: 33).

Today’s Romanies living in the territory of the Czech Republic are mainly descendants of the Slovak Romanies who came from Slovakia after the Second World War. (Holomek: 160). The assimilation policy carried out since the time of Maria Theresa until the Communist era, resulted in a destruction of the traditional manner of the Romany living. In the 1950s and 1960s, the forced settlement of the Romanies into flats amongst the Czech citizens had broken strong family ties and worsened relations between the Romany community and the majority society, which had to face the consequences of the inability of the Romany ethnic group to adapt to the new environment (Necas 1995: 47).

Since 1989, when the obligation of all the employable population to work was discharged, social differences between the Romany and non-Romany society have deepened. The growth of unemployment inside the Romany ethnic group, which in 1997/1998 was estimated to be 75 per cent (in some localities even 90 per cent) led to a rise in criminality.

Opinion polls aimed at ascertaining the attitudes of the Czech population toward the Romanies show that the Czech population perceives the Romany ethnic group rather negatively. Opinions prevail that the Romanies are not true Czechs. Nevertheless, the Czech population does not seem to adhere fully to the preclusive approach to the Romany minority based on the racial theory of the unalterable temperament of a certain group. The majority of Czechs believe that capable and hardworking individuals exist among the Romany population, however, such an approach is still influenced by the long-standing tendency to accept the Romany ethnic group only if it is fully assimilated into the majority society.

The solution to the social problems of the Romany community is only one aspect of the complex of problems in the Czech-Romany co-existence. Nearly half of the society still insists on the opinion that the Romanies are a quite different ethnic group, which does not constitute an integral part of Czech society. Negative, emotional and sometimes even racist
opinions having been based on objective grounds for the conflict co-existence form a significant barrier to the full integration of the Romany population into Czech society.

Part of the Czech national consciousness is the belief that ethnically different individuals can be integrated into Czech society, but only if they submit to assimilation, a fact which will enable them to become socially flexible, enjoy all their rights and fulfil all obligations.

It may seem that the Czech-Romany relation can be solved by giving support to deliberate assimilation and acknowledging Romany cultural peculiarities, which will gradually become part of the Czech citizen identity. The integration of the Romanies into the educational system, and support for engagement and representation of the Romanies in the state administration and political life, should enable the Czech majority to regard Romany fellow-citizens as different, but equal fellow-citizens fully enjoying their rights.

4. Czech National Identity: Dominant Discourses of Nationhood

4.1 Forming modern national identity

4.1.1 Already existing potential sources of identity

Modern Czech identity has been formed since the end of the eighteenth century under the conditions of the beginning of the Czech national movement (see Part I section 2). Among contemporary streams of thought, the Enlightenment and romanticism had the strongest influence on this process, in particular, in Czech lands, the philosophy of J. G. Herder and the ideas of early German nationalism. From this source the conviction of the natural and autonomous cultural value of the Czech nation was inspired, as well as defining the nation through the mediation of a language. Besides this, the national movement was inspired by some older discourses related to the Czech identity. First, of influence was the historical set of political values and representations connected with Czech statehood: constitutional unity of the Crown Lands of Bohemia, national saints as their symbolic representatives, the rights of estates guaranteed by country laws. The ethnic conflict of the resident Czech population with foreign, particularly German immigrants (colonists, burghers or nobility) was projected onto some older discourses. The issue of Czech identity was considerably reflected, apart from other things, in religious controversies: the ethnic identity of the Czechs as advocates of the ‘right’ faith was important (but not principal, see Šmahel 2000) for the Hussite movement in the fifteenth century; representatives of the ‘baroque nationalism’ in the seventeenth and eighteenth century were on the contrary demonstrating that the Czechs no longer have anything in common with Hussitism and other heresies.

4.1.2 Possibilities of the eighteenth/nineteenth century

A number of potential building blocks of national identity for the population of Czech lands were to follow Austrian identity, Pan-German identity, Slavic identity, Bohemian identity, and Czech identity (Koralka: 16-82).

Austrian identity – identification with the wider system of states and first of all with the reigning Habsburg dynasty – was not able to cross the limits of a narrow elite directly involved in the machinery of government (officers, bureaucrats, part of aristocracy) and it did not become a mass civic identity. The Pan-German identity had gradually overcome this obstacle but it succeeded only with German-speaking inhabitants of Czech lands – the Czech-speaking population was (quite rightly) afraid that they would have been disadvantaged in the
midst of the dominant German culture. The Slavic identity, a Pan-Slavic identity, was more a hypothetical than a real possibility – on its considerable symbolic value see below Part 1, section 4.3. Bohemism (from the word böhmisch derived from the toponym Böhmen in opposition to an ethnic tschechisch) was based on the identification with the whole state of the Czech lands regardless of the inhabitants’ ethnicity. Its mainstay was a country patriotism of mostly German-speaking nobility that was, however, very often well-disposed towards Czech cultural efforts. In the first quarter of the nineteenth century there was also an attempt to create a more modern, civic variation of the Bohemian identity (B. Bolzano), in the contest with the Pan-German and Czech programmes, however, it failed.

The Czech identity was asserted within the majority population of the Czech lands. It was defined in an ethnic way, i.e. on a language base. The country patriotism became its inspiration and also a provisional strategic ally. Most representatives of the Czech national movement were in the nineteenth century searching for a mutually useful compromise with Austrian identity, which did not often meet with the required response from the other side. The relations to the Pan-German identity were reactive, mostly defensive and negative. (A compromise was probably possible only with Germans identified with Bohemia or with the German-speaking inhabitants indifferent to the Pan-German conception whose number was decreasing.)

4.2 Identity in the Czech national movement

The Czech national movement was established in the name of the nation defined on a language base. It also applied the values of Enlightenment, Bohemian and Austrian propaganda discourse. It was particularly the image of homeland – identified with the Crown Lands of Bohemia – accompanied by the accent on the famous history of the nation or on its historical rights. (Hroch 1999) A further feature of the national identity being formed was the image of the plebeian or a folk character of the nation originally responding to the objective social composition of the participants in the national movement. But that had also been the case at the time when even the ‘own’ social elite declared itself a follower of the nation. In the course of the nineteenth century this identity had been getting stronger and the idea of the ‘Czech state right’ became its political dimension. This view asserted the autonomy of historical Czech lands based on ancient privilege of the estates, and reckoned with administration of autonomous Czech (böhmisch) territory in favour of ethnic Czechs who had majority here at this time (see Part I, section 4.3). This idea was not the only alternative – it could have, for example, merged with ‘Austroslavism’ (the image, represented by historian F. Palacký, of bringing Austria to federation and democracy that would have led to the political victory of the Slavic ethnic groups). There were also attempts to divide and federate Czech lands on an ethnic basis. The variants however did not succeed.

4.3 The civic-liberal and ‘Slavic'-ethnic dimension of national identity

For the Czech national movement, political democratisation was a basic means to achieve its demands. The ethnic and civic principles were in agreement, national identity defined itself as democratic. Yet the attitude of Czech identity to liberalism and citizenship brought some complications, first of all thanks to the conflict with the Pan-Germanism. The condition of the success of the movement in both the Czech and the German case was the achievement of an ethnic majority in an autonomous and liberal state (Koralka: 138-149). In relation to the German version, it meant a liberal, whole-Austrian, Cisleithanian or Pan-German political system with self-rule for Czech lands brought to an end. The Czech version was the maximum political autonomy of Czech lands within a system as democratic as possible. It was logical
that from 1848 the Czechs had become opponents of the whole-Austrian or pan-German liberalism, while the Pan-Germans in the Czech lands diets opposed any liberalisation. The Czech movement seemed to the Germans to be non-liberal and the Czech identity to be non-civic. The Czechs were accused of ‘Pan-Slavism’ but such accusations were mostly polemic topos of German opponents of the Czech national movement. Rather than anti-liberalism, the political motive of the Czech movement was the effort to show that liberalism and civic principles became in the hands of German nationalists a weapon against the ethnic (and consequently also civic) rights of the Czech-speaking population.

‘Slavic identity’ unambiguously played an important part in the Czech national movement. It helped to stress the constituent difference from the dominant German culture and occasionally it was also a tactical political manoeuvre. Political fondness for the absolutism of a tsar was in fact minimal in the Czech context, and in the situation of a small nation the Czechs were much closer to, for example, the Estonians or Latvians than to the Russians (Macura 1983: 178-197). The Czech considerations of Slavic identity remained deep-rooted in Western Europe culture (Herder was their ideal!) and we can say that Slavic identity was most of all an original path of the Czech identity to European identity. The formation of Czech ethnic identity was based on a primary orientation towards European and civic values, and on the effort to fill them under the conditions of its own existence, not because of the aversion to them. We do not want to say that the Czech national identity did not include a non-liberal or anti-civic potential. But this came much later, under considerably different conditions.

4.4 Contests for the form of national identity

4.4.1 The period until the first republic

After forming the fundaments of the national movement, the efforts to modernise the national discourse became a dominant topic. In the so-called ‘fight for the Manuscripts’ at the end of the nineteenth century the young scientific generation rejected the romantic fakes of the supposedly historical old literary documents that should have boosted national self-confidence. Czech origin itself ceased to be an argument for the intellectual elite. This also found expression in the so-called ‘dispute on the meaning of Czech history’ at the turn of the century. Philosopher T. G. Masaryk tried to interpret Czech history, including the national movement, as a vanguard of a historic process in which the ideas of modern humanism and democracy were elaborated. His opponents, particularly among historians, considered this interpretation to be unscientific – they preferred to incorporate the Czech development into the all-European context of formation of peoples, which enabled them, inter alia, to reject Masaryk’s anti-catholic attitude. Both streams could, however, be considered as a search for the European dimension of national identity.

The formation of the independent Czechoslovak Republic in 1918 became an important impulse to the re-formation of national identity. The Czechs considered the state as a natural result of their emancipation efforts and they strongly identified themselves with it: the Czech national identity acquired etatist dimensions. Masaryk and (more controversially) Beneš, the inter-war presidents, have been strong identification symbols for several generations until today. An accent on Czechoslovak economy, science and culture at a European level was an important part of the identity. A large number of intellectuals vigorously took up a ‘state-constructive’ task: for example, a discussion on the topic of the ‘Czech (Czechoslovak) national character’ appeared. Despite the participation of professional sociologists, the discussion had the hallmarks of enthusiastic dilettantism (Kiliš 2000) The Czechs also quite ethnocentrically adopted the Slovaks into their own identity – Czechoslovak identity was
created as an image of the ‘Czechoslovak’ nation, consisting of Czech and Slovak ‘branches’ but with an obvious superiority of the Czech element. The civic principle should have been united with the ethnic one in the Czechoslovak Republic. But the Czechs adopted the policy they had earlier criticised in German liberals: to connect civic equality with ethnic supremacy. Czechoslovakia as a national state of the Czechoslovaks guaranteed all political, cultural and civic rights to ethnic minorities. But the Republic uncompromisingly blocked any efforts by the German ethnic enclaves to acquire political territorial autonomy, and made them adopt the role of minority regardless, throwing in its lot with the ethnic majority. Criticisms of this arrogance, raised for example by philosopher Emanuel Rádl, were ignored in the name of scientific-state ideology. (Kiliás 2000).

4.4.2 Time after the Munich Agreement

The Munich Agreement (1938) and the following decline of the Czechoslovak Republic in 1939 struck a hard blow to Czech self-confidence and engendered serious disillusionment with the West. Most of the population felt betrayed and their identification with European liberalism was shattered. The Czech and German strategies of the nineteenth century, struggling for ethnic hegemony through the mediation of political dominance over mixed territory, had ended in disaster. First, in the terror of German administration (including the almost total extermination of the Jews and Roma) in the Protectorate (1939-1945) and then in the post-war forcible transfer of the Germans from the Czechoslovak Republic. Now an extreme Slavic identity was considered to be the core of Czech identity – an identity that had to date been an ideal of some isolated individuals or a property of short-term political manoeuvres (Pfaiff) or that was undergoing a remarkable discourse of ‘Europeanisation’ (Palacky, Masaryk). After the shocking experience with German occupation it would be understandable. The unambiguous orientation towards the West was replaced with the image of a re-established Czechoslovakia as a ‘bridge’ between the East and the West or directly with the inclination to the East and to the project of Soviet socialism that was perceived as an unravelling of the Czech Slavic identity. National history was consistently interpreted in an anti-German and Slavic spirit, and Czechoslovak identity was restored. The ideology of Czechoslovak communism added to these motives a stress on a social aspect, exploiting the element of plebeianship in the national movement. As a background to this development, the civic content of national identity was eradicated after the Communist takeover.

4.4.3 After 1989

The attempts to restore liberal-civic identities after 1989 were naturally quite half-hearted. It was difficult for the intellectual elite to overcome the inertia of the, on the whole, viable fragments of later Communist-national ideology that had relatively successfully poached the charisma of its predecessors – not only the national movement but also paradoxically partly e.g. Masaryk. The post-war transfer of the Germans still lies heavily on the conscience of Czech society, and attempts to begin a rigorous discussion on this topic usually evoke a hostile reaction. The original Slavic sympathies of the Czechs had been deeply discredited by the pro-Soviet regime and by the military occupation of the country in 1968. The Czech public got over the division of Czechoslovakia quite calmly and Czech statehood organically replaced the Czechoslovak one in the concept of the national identity. (For example the flag of the new state is the same as the flag of Czechoslovakia, the date of the proclamation of the Czechoslovak Republic on the 28th October 1918 is a national holiday in the Czech Republic). The attempt to exploit post-modern motives of a social constructivism for restoration of the liberal-civic identity has not yet succeeded.
4.5 Main elements of the national identity image

Even today the language, which defines affiliation to the nation, occupies a prominent place in the representations set. Other indices such as origin or race have almost not asserted themselves. National state is a further important value. The image of a natural unity of the nation and state was strengthened by the post-war reality of the state territory that was in fact language-homogenous. The articulation of the national raison d’etre is usually represented by history, or better, some of its interpretation created in accordance with the needs of a certain opinion stream. What M. Havelka (1995: 9) said is relevant, in a wider context, for the ‘dispute on the sense of the Czech history’: ‘The past and its reflections take over to a certain extent functions of society theory [and] they become … a fundament for illumination of the national identity.’ The national cultural abundance and the image of its asset to Europe are an important part of this historical image. Also the conviction that the Czech nation naturally belongs to the European West is an important part of the national identity. But this conviction could also acquire a dissident or aggrieved feature, in the view that the nation was (or is being) sacrificed to mercenary interests of the West that, in the Czech case, hypocritically ignore the principles of humanity.

Democratic tendencies or egalitarianism of an Enlightenment-plebeian character, often putting the Catholic variant of national identity in the shade, is still a living motivation. The Slavic identity has been successfully discredited by the Communist regime but as defined in relation to the Germans, often based on the feeling of a threatened national existence still remains as a strong driving force. Most of all, the memories of the Second World War have an impact here – but they are projected onto the overarching negative image of the historical relations between the two nations, as finalised within the Communist era.

*The civic principle* became one of the leitmotivs in the attempt to re-build the Czech national identity in 1989. It can be based upon the Czech attraction to the West, with the consequence of a spontaneous desire for ‘getting back to Europe’ after the revolution and of the self-interpretation of Czechs as a culturally European nation. An image of the democratic first republic and a traditional democratic-plebeian dimension of the Czech identity are a certain support. The state undoubtedly plays an increasing role in national identity, which seems to be good for development of the civic principle. On the other hand there are serious obstacles in the way of this principle. The Czech state has so far been defined, at least implicitly, ethnically – as a natural home of the Czech people. The co-existence of ethnic and civic principles (although both sincerely respected) has so far favoured the ethnic one. A popular image of history justifies such a concept of the state for the time being, and the attempts to call it into question are problematic. The tendency towards bitterness towards the West has become another obstacle. It is probable that the further expansion of the civic principle could occur first of all at the expense of the today’s predominant image of the Czech past and at the expense of national unity.
PART II

1. Relations with Europe: A Brief Historical Overview

The relationship of the former Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (CSSR) with the countries participating in the process of European integration corresponded to the relations of that period between the East and the West of Europe in the context of the Cold War and its overcoming. Post-war Czechoslovakia entered into trade agreements with all the founding countries of the EC. In connection with adopting the Werner Plan, the enlargement of integration and introduction of the principles of the EMU, exclusive powers in the sphere of common trade policy have passed to the European Communities since 1 January 1973. Centrally Planned Economies (CPE) frowned upon changes in the existing practice, which they expressed both by cooling mutual relations with the EC countries and simultaneously by efforts to further deepen their own integration within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). The system intentions of such integration have, however, failed. In addition, in the conditions of the world-wide energy crisis at the beginning of the 1970s, the raw material dependence on the USSR increased, followed by the growing separation from the world economy. At the turn of the 1970s and 1980s this intention resulted in crisis phenomenon in the individual centrally planned economies. A response to the difficult economic conditions was an effort to launch reforms (these efforts culminated in the late 1980s in connection with Gorbachev’s ‘perestroika’) that also embraced the policy of gradually overcoming self-sufficiency and more ‘opening up to the world’.

For Czechoslovakia, this slow turnover meant only partial steps in its relationship with the EC (some autolimitation bilateral agreements in 1978 and 1982). The real change in mutual relations occurred at the end of the 1980s after the establishment of an official relationship between the CMEA and the EC, particularly after the approval of the Declaration on Establishing Mutual Relations in June 1988. The Declaration opened possibilities for concrete bilateral co-operation and arrangement of bilateral diplomatic and economic relations. Unlike the neighbouring Communist countries (Hungary, the USSR, and Poland, not to mention the GDR, which was considered the ‘thirteenth EC country’ at that time) that had concluded wider agreements to co-operate in the sphere of economics and science and technology by the end of 1989, the CSSR entered into a closer Agreement to Trade in Industrial Products between the CSSR and the EEC in Brussels on 19 December 1988 (it came into force on 1 April 1989). The Agreement was concluded under the GATT rules on the most-favoured-nation principles and should have been valid for four years. The Agreement, which did not contain any anti-concessions or any elements of effective reciprocity, thus constituted only a pragmatic trade agreement of a non-preferential nature that liberalised mutual trade relations.

The break-up of the Communist block, the collapse of the Communist regime in the CSSR (November 1989) and the end of the CMEA (28 June 1991) constituted a fresh impetus to co-operation between the EC and Czechoslovakia and gave such co-operation a new quality. (In April 1990 the CSSR became the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic – CSFR, and on 1 January 1993 after the dissolution of the Federation, the Czech Republic was established). The new situation also became evident in the new quality of mutual contractual documents. The 1988 Agreement was revised after a year of its effect in 1990, and in May 1990 it was replaced by a wider and qualitatively more significant so-called co-operation agreement, i.e. the Agreement on Trade and Commercial and Economic Co-operation signed between the CSFR and the EEC and the European Atomic Energy Community (which corresponded to similar agreements that other East European countries had concluded as early as in 1989). Since 1 January 1991 Czechoslovakia was included in the General System of Customs
Preferences. By this step it achieved the same position that Poland and Hungary had taken earlier in their relations to the EC. The performance of these Agreements resulted in the establishment of the first joint Czech(oslovak)-European bodies: after the temporarily existing joint consultative committee, the transitory existence of which was based on the 1988 Agreement, the Joint Committee between the CSFR and the Community was established after the Co-operation Agreement was adopted in 1990. The Committee held its constituent session in Prague on 9 March 1991.

The validity of the Co-operation Agreement expired at the moment of the implementation of an association agreement that was entered into in Brussels on 4 October 1993 and after respective ratifications, it came into force on 1 February 1995. The discussions over the Europe Agreement were complicated by the process of dissolution of the CSFR (1 March 1993) into two successor countries, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic.

The first (so-called federal) association agreement between the then CSFR and the EC was agreed as early as 16 December 1991. In order to speed up the implementation of the trade parts of this federal association agreement and in order not to hamper the creation of a joint free trade area, the so-called Interim Agreement was simultaneously worked out. The Council of the EC approved the Interim Agreement in February 1992 (the document came into effect on 1 March 1993).

The already mentioned process of dividing the CSFR meant that the compromise federal association agreement had never been ratified and therefore it had never come in force. In contrast, the Interim Agreement has remained preserved in an amended form. The Czech Republic as one of the successor countries assumed all obligations ensuing from the Interim Agreement and agreed with the Slovak Republic upon the division of respective customs quotas, customs ceilings and other agreed rights and obligations arising from the Agreement. This situation was also respected by the EC, which assented to the application of two independent contractual relations (EC and CR, EC and SR) even after the dissolution of the Federation (from 1 January 1993).

The Czech Republic opened independent discussions on the timetable of negotiations on a new association agreement (the Europe Agreement) as early as 8 December 1992. The prose of the newly agreed Europe Agreement was based on the so-called Copenhagen criteria that the EU stipulated at a session of the European Council in Copenhagen in June 1993 for the candidates from post-Communist countries (CPE) applying for the membership. After two-rounds of negotiations the text was agreed on 23 June 1993 and festively signed at the session of the Council of the EC on 4 October 1993. By the end of that month (27 October 1993) the European Parliament had ratified the Agreement and the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Parliament followed suit at its 15th session held on 8 December 1993 where 155 deputies voted for the Europe Agreement (that is, 92.8 per cent out of 167 present deputies); 2 deputies were against, 4 deputies abstained from voting and 6 deputies did not use their mandate at all. The Europe Agreement came into effect on 1 February 1995.

In contrast to similar association agreements that had been negotiated earlier between the EC and Poland or Hungary, in connection with the Czech Republic the Europe Agreement contains the so-called suspension (i.e. non-implementing) clause allowing one of the parties to interrupt the performance of the Agreement (even without previous consultation) if the other party substantially breaches its contractual obligations. In addition, it respects all Copenhagen criteria, too. In the years 1995-1998 the Europe Agreement was supplemented by a total of four additional protocols that defined the Czech Republic’s participation in some EC
framework programmes (education, culture, environment, conditions of mutual trade in textile products, sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures, etc.).

Based on the *Europe Agreement* new common bodies of the Czech Republic and the European Community have been established, in particular, the Association Council and the Association Committee which controls respective sub-committees; the so-called Association Parliamentary Committee has an advisory function; this Committee is particularly a forum for members of the Czech Republic Parliament and the European Parliament to meet and exchange views.

In December 1994 the European Council adopted a pre-accession strategy towards the former CPE. This pre-accession strategy of the EU concentrated on four key elements: the performance of the *Europe Agreement*, the maintenance of a multilateral structured dialogue, on preparations of central and East European countries (former CPE) for joining the single EU internal market and on the aid to these countries within the PHARE programme. In June 1995 at its Cannes session the European Council adopted the so-called *White Paper (Preparation of Associated Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for integration to the Union's internal market)* and at its Madrid session held in December 1995 it authorised the European Commission to work out an opinion on each candidate country, the sense of which was to consider the ability of each country to satisfy the Copenhagen criteria. Each candidate country was to draw up a detailed questionnaire (about 3,200 questions) that became an important basis for working out the opinion concerned.

The Czech Republic submitted an official application for membership of the EU together with the explanatory memorandum on 23 January 1996. In December 1997 the European Council decided at its session in Luxembourg to launch negotiations on membership of the EU with the Czech Republic, within a group of six countries (the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Estonia, Slovenia and Cyprus) which complied most fully with the Copenhagen criteria. On 31 March 1998, bilateral interstate conferences of the EU with delegations from the group of six mentioned countries including the Czech Republic started within the framework of the wider enlargement process (including a total of 12 countries). Under the pre-accession strategy the European Commission has prepared the *Accession Partnership*, a document that is to unite all forms of support provided by the EU to individual candidate countries into one framework, and simultaneously to accommodate them to each candidate country.

The Czech Republic has prepared a mirror document to the *Accession Partnership*, the NP (*The National Programme for the Preparation of the Czech Republic for Membership of the EU*). The NP has been drawn up more comprehensively and has also outlined some other priority areas from the Czech viewpoint within preparations for the Czech membership of the EU (e.g. statistics, communication strategy, education of state administration in European matters, arranging official translations of EC legislation into Czech). The preparation of these *National Programmes* was based on the European Commission’s opinions as well as the individual needs apprehended by the Czech side. In preparing the *National Programmes* all branches of the state administration took part. On 31 May 2000 the Czech Government approved an enlarged version of the NP. This plan sees its priority in completing the implementation of EU Law. Its timetable is determined both in its short-term and medium-term variant so that at 1 January 2003 the Czech Republic can be fully prepared to join the EU. Since opening negotiations the Czech Republic has completed a preliminary 24 chapters (out of the total number of 31 chapters) as at 18 December 2001.
Details on the Czech Republic’s negotiations on its membership of the EU and particular documents concerning the policy of enlargement are available at the website of the Task Force for the Accession Negotiations – http://europa.eu.int/comm/tfan in English or at the web address – http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/index.htm, again in English, and http://europa.eu.int/comm/tfan/index_cs.html in Czech.

The most comprehensive and extensive Czech information server devoted to the communication strategy of the Czech Government before the Czech Republic’s accession to the EU is EUROskop (http://www.euroskop.cz). Valuable information can be also found at the web address http://www.evropska-uniq.cz, – a Delegation of the European Commission in the Czech Republic. The European Documentation Centre of Charles University in Prague, http://www.eis.cuni.cz, disposes of wide documentation and a library (including its own magazine Information from Europe in an electronic form). also available in an electronic form is the magazine Integration for European studies and the process of enlargement of the EU http://www.integrace.cz, the documentation part of which also contains some data concerning the Slovak Republic. References to other important servers, translations of several hundreds of legal documents and a library of collections of technical harmonisation are available at the address http://www.eu.cz.

2. Literature on Pro and Anti EU Attitudes

Quantitative surveys concerning the opinion of Czech citizens on the European Union, their own nation and national identity occur in two main forms. First there is the public opinion poll, the results of which are presented in the form of press releases for the media and political parties. The latest press releases are usually available on the web pages of individual agencies. The second form involves the projects organized by individual institutions, mainly in the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Science or at universities.

One of the most significant of these is the Institution for the Public Opinion (IVVM), now under the Center for the Survey of a Public Opinion [CVVM], which is a part of the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Science (www.soc.cas.cz). On its web pages http://www.soc.cas.cz/cvvm/ a list of surveys conducted during the year 2001 is provided. Further information is also available on the web page (http://www.econ.muni.cz/svi/ivvm.htm), and there are full press releases available in libraries. It concerns so-called longitudinal surveys, and a record is kept of the development of the attitudes since 1996. Under the heading ‘REGARDING OPINIONS ABOUT THE ENTRANCE OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC INTO THE EUROPEAN UNION’, the results of the surveys are presented from July 2001, where the main questions are whether respondents would participate in a referendum on entry into the EU and whether or not they would favour such a move. Approximately 40 per cent of those who responded were in favour of the Czech Republic joining the EU; 20 per cent said they would vote against joining; 20 per cent were undecided; and 20 per cent said they would not participate in such a referendum at all.

Respondents were also asked about the possible advantages and disadvantages of joining the EU. The main advantages were seen as improvement in the quality of life, improvements in the legal structure and environment and freer movement of people. At the same time, joining the EU was also seen to have a symbolic meaning, namely, the unification of Europe. Among the disadvantages of joining the EU were the loss of national sovereignty and identity, but these questions were raised by a minority of respondents and are not considered a major threat or problem. The respondents also expressed their views regarding the possible effects of EU membership on education, the state sector, agriculture, health, the army etc. Subsequent
surveys by the CVVM contained more specific aspects of the process of the integration of the Czech Republic into the EU.

At a present time, the most heated problem is the question of the free movement of labour in the EU countries. As a result of this, a survey was carried out concerning the willingness of Czech citizens to move abroad in search of work and the prospects for working abroad at the moment (respondents were asked the question whether they have friends or relatives who work outside of the Czech Republic). Part of this survey also discussed the possibility of foreigners purchasing land in the Czech Republic once it becomes an EU member. The same survey was carried out simultaneously in Poland and the CVVM presented it under the title ‘THE ATTITUDE OF THE CZECH AND POLISH PUBLIC REGARDING A FREE MOVEMENT OF LABOR AND THE PURCHASE OF LAND BY FOREIGN CITIZENS with comparable data from the Polish survey as well.

Another survey carried out by the CVVM was titled THE AVAILIBILITY OF INFORMATION AND THE INTEREST OF CZECH CITIZENS IN JOINING THE EUROPEAN UNION. In this survey, Czech citizens expressed their opinions about the availability of the information both to experts and ordinary people.

CVVM periodically returns to the surveys concerning the entry of the Czech Republic into the EU and how this process is perceived by public opinion. A survey similar to the one in July was carried out in March 2001, this time as a part of a comprehensive survey (CR, Poland, Hungary, Latvia, Russia) in cooperation with the Central European Opinion Research Group. Apart from their willingness to join the EU, respondents were asked to discuss the estimated date of entry and to subjectively define how close they felt to the EU. At the same time the citizens were asked about the appropriate strategy in the integration process, or to be more precise, whether joining the EU should take priority and modernizing the economy should occur subsequently within the EU.

In connection with the view of the EU, the CVVM also asked about the activity of parliamentary parties in this process. The citizens assessed individual political parties for their activity in the integration process. Social democrats and the ‘Fourth-coalition’ received the most positive assessment for their involvement.

Another agency which is intensively engaged in public opinion polls is the STEM which is working on a project called Feedback – a communicative strategy of the Czech Republic before the entry into the European Union. STEM made public the data from the latest surveys from the year 2001 on its web pages www.stemmark.cz. They are under a heading: ‘ACCESSION OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC TO THE EUROPEAN UNION’. The individual studies are concerned with several questions: first, the question of a referendum – the willingness of the Czech citizens to participate in a referendum and whether of not they favour joining the EU. The results are presented in comparison to the surveys from November 1999, October 2000 and March 2001. Another important chapter is the opinion of Czech citizens about the future Eastern Enlargement of the EU. It is essential to point out that barely half of the population in the Czech Republic believes that European citizens really want to accept the country. At the same time over 60 per cent of people hold the opinion that the EU puts requirements on candidate countries that conflict with the candidates’ national interest. STEM also presents these opinions according to the voting preferences, which shows surprisingly that the most optimistic are the ODS (civic democrats) voters even though this party represents the more sceptical approach towards our future membership in the EU. Left wing voters are traditionally less optimistic towards the openness of the present EU members.
to the new candidates, and are both convinced of the disadvantages of the claims of the EU for our national interests. People are also afraid of the loss of their cultural traditions and national sovereignty. Approximately half of the respondents are convinced of the negative consequences mentioned above. It is interesting to mention that Czech people connect the entry into the EU with economic advantages, and the improvement of political culture. On the other hand, more than two thirds of citizens do not expect that they will be able to influence public matters (STEM, www.stemmark.cz).

The agency SOFRES FACTUM (http://www.tnsofres.cz/) is also involved in similar surveys. Within the international project The European Union, which includes 11 candidate countries, similar questions are being asked as in the above mentioned surveys. There is an English written report available for sale EU Accession Opinion Survey dated July the 2nd 2001, providing the following information: Interest in EU Accession, Opinion on the relationship between the respective countries and the EU, the accessibility of information about the EU and level of knowledge, readiness of the to associate with the EU, General and Personal Expectations connected with the membership of the EU.

There are more detailed surveys, with a deeper analysis of public opinion on the EU and national identity, the results of which are published in professional articles and book; of these, it is worth mentioning the publication of the results of the comparable survey National Identity (1995), presented in the Working papers of P. Kostelecký and A. Nedomová published by the Institute of Sociology AV ČR.

The research within National Identity directly tried to answer questions about the content of Czech national consciousness. Mainly it showed that the most significant features of Czech national identity centred on the language and Czech citizenship. Another means to assess national identity was the issue of specific qualities of being Czech. It showed that Czech national identity is based mainly on the positive relationship towards the history and values which the Czech nation brought to the rest of the world in the past, mainly in the areas of art, science and technology. The defensive character of national consciousness manifests itself in an antipathy towards foreign influences, which can also be seen in other European nations. Similar views, which are typical of societies isolated for a long time, concern the reluctance to accept and positively evaluate the increasing number of immigrants. The Czech Republic witnessed significant migration after the opening of its borders and has often viewed the effects as negative (Nedomová, Kostelecký 1996).

The survey of national identity reveals Czechs’ view of this relationship towards different groups and reflects the character of national feelings, which are often expressed by a determined stance ‘against the enemy’. The low number of different nationalities and the determination of national consciousness contributes more to a traditional European conception of their own nation. The willingness to accept groups with different traditions and customs is therefore relatively low. Despite this fact, the attitudes towards small minorities are different depending on the social structure. Past experience with a foreign culture, the ability to speak foreign languages, a financially secure situation, and a higher education are all factors which affect the attitude towards other ethnic groups. On the other hand, it is essential to emphasize that the view of the Czechs towards their own nation shows relatively significant objectivity, which is manifested mainly in the critical assessment of the present state of the Czech society.

Among the older surveys concerning the attitude of the public towards the EU, the following must be mentioned: the survey of social stratification and mobility in Czech society in the
period of the transformation process (1991-2000). (Project Decade of Societal Transformation and Modernization in the Czech Republic, 1989-2000). The main theme was the research of the life paths of Czech citizens in the period of transformation and their opinion of this process. Transformation and modernization of the Czech society is understood more as an institutional change of society, the main features of which are the implementation of a market economy, political change in the system of parliamentary democracy and its function. In this context, the process of transformation is understood against the background of integration of the Czech Republic into the EU. The agreement on accession to the EU is analyzed in the context of the life quality, type of profession and professional status, and political or voting preferences (Machonin 1998, Ružicková 2000, Tucek a kol. 1994).

The pro-integration view is mostly supported by people who support limitations on the power of government and believe that people should take more responsibility for their own circumstances. The policy of a speedy entry into the European Union corresponds more to the liberal philosophy of the right wing oriented respondents. The view towards the entry of the Czech Republic into the EU is therefore influenced by voting preferences. Despite the growing reservations of the strongest right wing party towards entry into the European Union, ODS voters prefer the quickest possible integration.

Mainly young and educated people prefer a rapid entry into the EU based on a belief that it will increase their lifestyle options. This process is at the same time perceived positively by citizens with a favourable economic and social situation. These people are not worried about the decrease in their standard of living as a consequence of a freeing of the domestic market. Integration into the Union is therefore connected with the right wing policy of a free market. By contrast, people who have had a lower standard of living for the past ten years express their anxiety about the possible consequences of integration. This group turns to the state as an available institution which is easier to control and on the basis of its democratic procedures can modify their social circumstances.

The entry into the EU is simultaneously perceived as part of a modernization trend, and also as something which fully corresponds with the opinion of a swift narrowing of the gap between the more modernized western European countries with the eastern European countries. On the other hand, the Czech people view the European Union in the tradition of a social state. In particular, the issue of unemployment and a social support corresponds fully to the EU principles, while one third of respondents who support expenditure on a social sector fully agree with the integration politics of the state.

Last but not least, in the context of projects dealing with the attitude towards the EU, are projects called The changing relation between sovereignty and identity in the process of European Integration – the Significant Role of Czech-German Border-Regions and Ethnic Identities of Inhabitants in Euroregion Nissa/Neisse, which explore the problem of identity in relation to the area of more intensive cooperation on the northern border between the Czech Republic and Germany. These projects aim to identify the bearers of those activities and their roles in the projects. Those who take part actively in the border cooperation both in political, economic, or personal areas maintain a more positive approach towards Germans. Even though they express a strong national consciousness, they appreciate the cooperation and most of all do not consider Germany as a real threat to the independence of the Czech Republic. They differ strongly from the rest of the population when they evaluate the function of democratic principles in Germany and find it very unlikely that these principles could be eradicated (Zich, 1999).
From the international surveys, the following results are worth mentioning: *PERCEPTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION – A QUALITATIVE STUDY OF THE PUBLIC’S ATTITUDES TO AND EXPECTATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE 15 MEMBER STATES AND IN 9 CANDIDATE COUNTRIES*, prepared for the European Committee in June 2001. In this comparison, Czechs are restricting the definition of Europe, for which they feel an affinity, to the most highly developed countries, mostly in the Northwest of the continent (OPTEM 2001). This survey reveals that Czechs as well as Germans are not especially optimistic in their view of the EU, which they see mainly as an economic union of individual national markets. Unlike Slovenia, for example, they are much more sceptical towards the broader concept of individual nations coming closer together. This may also be caused by insufficient information that Czech people have about the EU and its institutional mechanisms – especially compared to other central European countries that find themselves at roughly the same stage of the negotiation process. Despite this fact, the European Committee has a very good reputation among Czech inhabitants due to the high standing of the ambassador of the European Committee in the CR. In general, Czech inhabitants perceive European integration of the post-Communist countries positively, but again the more pragmatic and less emotional attitude predominates. (It is possible to find further information on the web pages of the Institute of Sociology AS CR [http://www.soc.cas.cz/sou/publikace-f.htm](http://www.soc.cas.cz/sou/publikace-f.htm)).

3. Literature on the Relationship between National Identity and European Identities and in relation to European Integration in the Czech Republic

The fall of the Communist regime and the dissolution of Czechoslovakia raised the need to restore the democratic roots of Czech society and newly define its place in the world, often under the motto ‘back to Europe’. In addition to academic institutes and institutions dealing with public opinion polls (see Part II, section 2), the problems of the relationship between the Czech Republic and the EU have also been at the centre of attention of many universities. In most cases this is not, however, a research approach but the implementation of education programmes of ‘European studies’ currently offered by almost every university in the Czech Republic in the form of special courses and independent study modules (e.g. a comprehensive bachelor’s course of studies). Therefore, the relationship between national identity and European identity was a subject of some specialised texts (Goncová 2000, Kucerová 1996 and 1998, Krejčí 1993 and 1995), that, however, dealt with it in an indirect way and on a contemplative basis at the most. In addition to public information (most of which is particularly of a documentary or generally informative character and the representative list of which can be found at the website [http://www.euroskop.cz/euroskop/site/cr/dalsizdroje/-publikace.html](http://www.euroskop.cz/euroskop/site/cr/dalsizdroje/-publikace.html)), European discussions on identity were also contained, among others, in survey university textbooks containing an attempt to describe the ‘Czecholovak contribution’ (Gonec 2000:p. 162-181) and in a collection of philosophical and sociological articles dealing with European identity (Szaló 1998). The monograph on the *Idea of Europe* from antiquity to the present (Horyna 2000) deals with the unique historical interpretation of European identity and authenticity of Europeanism (particularly from the viewpoint of the philosophy of history and religions).

Research on national identity and its European context concentrates particularly on the period from the end of the eighteenth century when the modern Czech identity was constructed (see Part I, sections 2 and 4). The most comprehensive are particularly views on the national movement drawing on methods of social history (Koralka 1996, Hroch 1986 and 1999). J. Kren (1992) made an attempt to map Czech identity in history, D. Treštík (1999) lays stress on non-obviousness and the construing character of national and European identity in the spirit of postmodernism and social constructivism. A joint analysis by German researchers
Hilde Weiss and Christoph Reinprecht (1998) focuses on a comparative view of the issues of nationalism and national identity in the modernisation concept of the Central European development (including relations between Communism and nationalism), particularly in the context of the dynamism of Czech, Slovak, Hungarian and Polish collective consciousness after 1989.

Many research projects that cannot all be mentioned here concentrate on the interpretation of motifs from Czech religious or political history (Bednár 1996, Cornej and Prahl 1993, Kilias 2000, Pfaff 1996, Pynsent 1996, compare also Havelka 1995), traditionally great attention is paid e.g. to Masaryk (e.g. Bednár 1996, Broklová 1997, Kilias 1998). Particularly interesting are publications striving for a more comprehensive semiotic interpretation of national culture as a whole (Macura 1983, Rad 1994, to a certain extent Pynsent 1996) Attempts to summarize the specific problem of regional identity in Moravia that some consider as potentially national identity are contained in the work of I. Bock (1994), J. Pernes (1996). Czech national identity in relation to national minorities is also a subject of various sociological (demographic) research projects or essays (see Part II, section 2) both in connection with the outline of the development of Czech and Polish relations in Silesia (Siwek 1996), Czech and German relations (Barša 1999, pages 254-265) and the relations of Czechs and Roms (Barša 1999, pages 264-299) and Czech and Slovak relations in connection with the dissolution of the CSFR (Barša, Strmiska 1999, pages 192-212).

In addition to the already published works, the problems of national identity or Europeanism have also become at least partially (and mostly only tangentially) the subject of existing research projects within leading universities (compare http://www.vyzkum.cz/ and particularly http://www.msmt.cz/cp1250/skupina3/-hankeweb/Vzseznam_HK1.htm). An original contribution in this respect is constituted by the research activities of the Institute of International Relations, Prague (http://www.iir.cz/). The IIR concentrates on partial programmes Dissemination of Information on EU and Changes in Identities (more details including references to Internet discussions and conferences including papers dealing with European and national identity in candidate countries [in English] can be found at http://www.euintegration.net).

4. Concluding Remarks

The view of the Czech Republic towards the EU countries, as in the case of other countries from the Soviet block, was determined by the global relationship between East and West. The major breakthrough for advancing the relationship from the previous business level to a new level opening the way towards the process of extending the EU were the events of 1989: the break up of the Soviet block and the totalitarian systems in Central and Eastern Europe. The specific aspect of the Czech development was mainly the break up of Czechoslovakia, which as a consequence revived the debate about a Czech nationality and national identity (that on the other hand, reached none of the intensity of national feeling in Slovakia).

In connection with the domestic changes in the early 1990s and at the end of the twentieth century, the debates about Czechs belonging to Europe intensified. Election statements such as ‘Back to Europe!’ were supposed to mean clearly the end of the Communist past, that turned into a specific debate about joining Europe. The victory of the liberal conservative parties also influenced the public debate about ‘our way to Europe’ which began to be marked by a certain sceptical view towards Europe in the period 1993-1997. Compared to the particularly etatistic and ‘socialistic’ Europe, the preference was emphasized on the need for NATO membership and the emphasis was put on the inspiration of the British (Thatcherite)
attitude held towards the EU. There is no doubt in the public perception about the Czech Republic belonging to Europe; the question of EU membership is mostly connected with the profits of such a step. It is essential to say that these aspects of European identity do not predominate over the ‘national interests’: the arguments in the discussions about the economic advantages of the unified market predominate over any other integration aspects. The impact of the conflicts between the political parties thus influenced the attitude of the public towards the EU, which reflects a certain caution (the CR has permanently the lowest public support for the EU among the central and eastern countries). All of this was caused mainly by the previous negative assessment about the readiness of the CR to join the EU which did not correspond to public opinion, mainly in relation to the economic level of the CR within the Central European region. Recently, this attitude has been exacerbated by the reluctance of the neighbouring EU countries to open their labour markets to new members. The above mentioned aspects intensify the conviction as to the inadequacy of the membership and suspicion (which also has support in the national discourse) towards the Western European countries (anxieties such as ‘others want to benefit from us’).

Nevertheless, the intensity of the negotiations grew stronger after 1997, while the acceleration in the improvements of legal system, which initiated the process of harmonisation with EU law, was considered especially positive. Border cooperation is developing positively within the so-called Euroregion; these are areas which are situated in the parts where the ‘iron curtain’ stood and presented the inner peripheries within the former Czechoslovakia. The government campaign to explain the process of enlarging the EU is to some extent overshadowed by the approaching elections in the summer of 2002 (with the exception of the Communists, all the parliamentary parties support the accession to the EU even though there is a difference in their scepticism towards Europe). In this context (the question of membership might become the conflicting issue in the campaign), the political representatives of the CR are making an effort to defer the main negotiations until the end of the election period so that the Czech Republic would be fully prepared by the 1 January 2003 to join the EU.
### Table 1: Czech Republic: Nation formation and relations with Europe

#### A. Spatial dimensions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Europe</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dominant nation (different discourses of nationhood)</td>
<td>Internal Others</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### B. Temporal dimensions

1. **History**

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>West and East Europe</td>
<td>Political goal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. **Future**

| Czech | 1. Roma 2. Immigrants | Immigrants ??? | Europe as a continent | Full identification |

#### C. Societal dimensions

1. **Ethnic**

| Czech, Czechoslovak | Germans, Roma, Slovaks, Russkies (people from the former USSR), Immigrants | Germans, Russians, Slovaks and neighbours (Poles, Magyars and Austrians) | 1. Europe of Nations 2. Multiethnic Europe, | Multiethnicity |

2. **Culture and language**

| Language as essence of identity | Germans, ‘Russkies’, Roma, Slovaks, Immigrants | Germans, Russians, Slovaks and neighbours (Poles, Magyars and Austrians) | Common sphere of civilization, but diversity of national cultures | Europe of regions, diversity of cultural elements |

3. **Political**

| Czech state-governmental law (i.e. claims for historical-state autonomy within the framework of the Austrian Empire), Czechoslovak Republic, Czech Republic | Perceived as minorities: approval of civic rights, non-acceptance of a right to political autonomy (self-government) | 1. Neighbouring nations in their own state formations 2. Dominant Great Powers in Central Europe | 1. Pan-Europe 2. Europe of blocks (East/West division after 1948) | Federation of Nations or Confederation of Nations |

4. **Socio-economic**

<p>| Plebeianism, egalitarianism and determined effort to equal to more advanced nations (image of Czech skill, flexibility and capability of make-do, i.e. golden Czech hands) | Perceived as exploiters, parasites or younger brothers | Czech endeavour to be the prize-winner (‘we are the best’ or ‘better than others’) | 1. Free market (open economy) 2. Planned economy in the concept of divided Europe (1945-1989) | Economic advantages or Fear of ‘foreign economic dominance’ |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5. Geopolitical and military</th>
<th>Always perceived closely with state independence and sovereignty</th>
<th>Perceived as an integral part of a Czech(oslovak) sovereign state (and sometimes as a tool of alien outland policy)</th>
<th>Syndrome of fear of Great-Powers policy (interests) = (experience of Munich and the Soviet occupation, i.e. 'about us, but without us')</th>
<th>Europe of military blocks: Warsaw Pact and N.A.T.O. (East/West division) Primacy of the Atlantic policy</th>
<th>Fear of domination and hegemony of the unified Germany (or West-European Great-Powers)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6. Religious</td>
<td>1. Roman-catholic tradition with strong trends towards secularization 2. Attempt to turn Protestantism (or religious opposition) into the national ethos (T. Masaryk) 3. Atheism</td>
<td>1. Roman-Catholicism (perceived as an reactionary force) 2. Other denominations as a religious minorities</td>
<td>Religion as a secondary characteristic of other nations</td>
<td>Profane and secular</td>
<td>Profane and secular</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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GERMANY

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Introduction

Scholarly debates about German history and German national identity after World War II have always had to cope with a strange paradox: While terms such as “national history” and “national identity” seem to imply a notion of historical continuity, the “German Catastrophe” (Meinecke 1946), epitomized in the Holocaust and the division of Germany after 1945, has forced students of the German nation to think of it in terms of discontinuity. German national history and national identity must therefore be seen as topics that are in many ways fractured and somewhat incoherent. Attempts at constructing a rather homogeneous, if not teleological image of the development of German history over the centuries, e.g. the debate on a German Sonderweg (special path) to modernity (Wehler 1987, for critical assessments see Blackbourn/Eley 1984), have thus had difficulties to prevail. In fact, major proponents of these approaches have had to acknowledge recently that several aspects of their writings may have been misconceived in order to help building up, however unconsciously, some sort of a progressive, liberal West German national identity during the Cold War (e.g. Winkler 2000, vol. 2). Instead of being able to explain the course of German history as a progressive (or degressive) development, they have nonetheless served as discursive landmarks in the development of a post-war German identity. They have also brought to the fore more clearly an aspect of German identity formation that had been hidden from the official agenda of historical research before the break-up of the German Reich, namely, the interplay of German history with its European surroundings and circumstances.

In what follows, we shall seek, first, to give a short overview of the basic developments in the history of nation-building in Germany, and second, to investigate in which ways German national identity interacted with its European context in defining friends and foes, self and the “other”. The second part of our analysis will focus more closely on the relationship between German and European identities in contemporary Germany, exploring attitudes of the wider populace as well as élite discourses about the role of Germany in Europe and official national policies toward the European Community/European Union. Before we proceed, however, some preliminary remarks on the theoretical conceptualization of nation, nation formation, and national identity may be in order.

Classic definitions of the “nation” always refer to an idea of a community or communalisation, associated with their institutionalisation, which, usually, took shape in the form of the national state. Thus, Max Weber defines “‘Nation’ als eine spezifische Art von Pathos, welches sich in einer durch Sprach-, Konfessions-, Sitten- oder Schicksalsgemeinschaft verbundenen Menschengruppe mit dem Gedanken einer ihr eigenen, schon bestehenden oder von ihr ersehnten politischen Machorganisation verbindet” (Weber 1980:243; cf. also ibid.:527-530).¹ It is not only Weber who characterizes the difference between the nation and other forms of collective identity by referring to the political power structure, the national state as the institution for the

¹ “… ‘nation’ as a specific type of pathos, which, in a group of people unified by a common language, confession, ethic or destiny, is linked to the idea of an own political power structure which either is already existent or strongly wished for”; with regard to the concept of the nation as a “community with a shared destiny”, as a contrary concept to the one of a community bound together purely by language or, even more, by nature, see, for instance, Otto Bauer’s standard work in its second edition of 1924 (Bauer 1975:91).
monopolization of legitimate use of force. At the same time, this concept of a nation assumes something imaginary whenever he does not want to see it being reduced either to a state’s people or to a community bound together merely by origin or language. Nations, after all, are not exclusively imagined, and definitely not "invented", as the title of Anderson’s book Imagined Communities (Anderson 1983) wrongly translated into German as "Die Erfindung der Nation” suggests, but they always refer, to varying degrees of emphasis, to real criteria as well (cf. Alter 1985:9-13). It is crucial, therefore, to establish the respective significance of subjective and objective factors within a given conception of the nation.

The widespread differentiation of nation types into political and cultural nations can serve as an input into a methodology of establishing those different significances, as it suggests a classification of the nation type by either voluntary, "subjective”, i.e. politically formed criteria, or by "objective”, i.e. culture-based, criteria. As we know, this distinction goes back to Friedrich Meinecke, who distinguished between nations of culture, and nations of state; the nations of culture being nations bound together by a "collectively experienced cultural fund”, especially a religion ("the greatest and most powerful of all intellectual goods”), whereas the nations of state represented the ones which are based on a "unifying force of a common political history and constitution” (cf. Meinecke 1908:2-3). Meinecke himself, though, modifies this straight away by stating that one cannot strictly separate "internal” and "external”, i.e. that within each nation, both types are to be found (ibid. p.3, 13). Meinecke, like Weber, bases his concept of a nation ultimately on the national state as its origin, or, at least, its destiny, but fails to acknowledge the possibility of the nation as an (imagined) community of origin, which contains criteria for the membership of a nation that are far more exclusionary than the cultural concept of the nation.

Contrary to this, some authors attribute the origin of nations mainly, or even exclusively, to ethnic communities of descent. Anthony Smith, for instance, argues, that the differentiation between nation and ethnic community, indicated by the production of other frames of reference for collective identity, such as a common territory or a common legal system, is a Western "invention”. The fact that it has been spread so widely is, from his point of view, due to European colonialism, or, Western imperialism, and the adaptation by non-European elites. Right from the beginning, though, and to an increasing extent, this competed with the ethnic model of the nation and its emphasis on "descent, populism, vernacular culture and nativism” (Smith 1986:145).

Walker Connor even takes it further when stating that, equally on all continents, with the exception of the USA, nation and ethnic community as collective self-identifications are interchangeable, because what eventually counts in all nations is the subjective self-commitment of the individual to a collective (cf. Connor 1994:90-100). This is why "jede Nation ist … eine Ethnonation und jeder Nationalismus ein Ethnonationalismus. Aber nur selten [ist] ein Staat ein Nationalstaat !”2 (Langewiesche 1995:203). According to Connor, the nationalist fiction of ethnic homogeneity usually encounters the reality of ethnic heterogeneity. Only few states meet with the criteria of a national state, which implies that almost the whole

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2 “every nation is … an ethno-nation and every nationalism an ethno-nationalism, whereas a state only rarely [is] a national state !”
population needs to consist of one nation or ethnic community, which is why, around 1970, only 12 of 132 states could be counted as national states (e.g. Japan or Sweden) (cf. Connor 1994:29). This new outline of a typology of national states, which conceives them to be an exception from the rule of multinational states in their various forms (cf. ibid. p.77), may very well be beneficial with regard to a global comparative analysis. What appears to be problematic, however, is, that Connor subsumes different criteria of collective identity, such as language, culture, descent or religion under the category of an ethnic community, and, in the end, puts the definition of ethnicity on a purely subjective basis. The respective frame of reference for the "imagination" of a nation, and the distinction from other collectives, can have, however, very different effects on the individual’s room for manoeuvre in making a decision. Thus, one can differentiate, by all means, between a culturalistic and a naturalistic, or primordialistic, version of an ethnic community, or nation, where the former stresses changeability over time, a principal openness and the will to form a collective. This leaves unconsidered the type of the political nation or nation of state which, as a rule, applies to countries of immigration, for which an ethnic harmony or equilibrium cannot, after all, be established, but which are treated as special cases by Connor (with regard to this see Jaffrelot 1991). In the following, we will, therefore, suggest a tripartite typology with regard to modern Western nations, which takes the narrowly defined criteria of membership, i.e. the open-mindedness towards decisions for membership, as a frame of reference, and which is to be conceptualised as a continuum (apart from the authors mentioned above, see also Seton-Watson 1977; Delannoi/Taguieff 1991; Schieder 1991, esp. pp.65-86):

1. The political nation, which regulates membership primarily by political criteria, i.e. acceptance of basic political values and traditions as well as constitutional principles, and whose sense of a common bond is generated by its common (political) history. Ethnic communities are recognized as groups in the sense of interest groups, language constitutes a cultural minimum, but is not a criteria to define the nation;

2. The cultural nation, within which the belief in the cultural peculiarities of the nation predominates, and where the decisive factor is, apart from the commitment to political values and institutions, the cultural assimilation of its members by means of different institutions (language, religion, ethics, i.e. cultural and intellectual traditions). The cultural nation is "colour-blind", its mindset does not allow for ethnic groups, but only for members of the nation (who are ready to assimilate);

3. The ethnic nation, or people’s nation, which, beyond the criteria mentioned under 1. and 2., is based on the principle of descent. Nation is conceptualised in terms of the family and defined by particularly restrictive criteria of inclusion. The assimilation of other ethnic communities is neither possible nor desirable. Political and cultural traditions are, therefore, rather a mere expression than a constitutive principle of this community of descent.

As "nation" cannot be, ultimately, conceptualised without "the Others", we will expound the interactive relationship between nation and the construction of the other further below. With regard to a discussion of the concepts of ethnic community, ethnicity and ethnicization, compare Weber (1975), Smith (1986) and, within the context of theories of modernization, Esser (1988, 1996) and Nassehi (1990)

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In all three types, language, as a means of social communication, is a decisive factor with regard to the constitution of nations (cf. Deutsch 1966; Anderson 1983). In all empirically established nations, or communities constituted as a national state, there can be found, without doubt, elements of all three types. Finally, historic transformation processes from one type to another, can occur within given nations. As Max Weber has already emphasized, ethnic or cultural communities only turn into a nation at the point where they refer to a given or imagined political power structure, that is, a (nation) state. The constitution and the continuity of the nation within the various types are, moreover, determined to a decisive degree by the political history and, in particular, the very process of nation-state-building. Thus, it is necessary to take a closer look at concepts of nation formation.

PART I: Nation Formation and National Identity

1. Theorizing the German Case of Nation Formation: A Historical-Sociological Approach

For our purposes, we take as a point of departure the conceptual proposals advanced by Anthony Smith (1987, 1991), but attempt to situate them in a more elaborated historical comparative framework of nation-building and state formation. Smith defines a nation as a "named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and common legal rights for all members." (Smith 1991: 14) He assumes that a nation is historically based on one or more ethnic groups and that through a long-term process of ethno-genesis and nation-building a modern nation is finally formed. According to Smith, an ethnic group is defined by the following elements: "a collective proper name, a myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more differentiating elements of a common culture, an association with a common homeland and a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population" (Smith 1991: 21).

If one compares both definitions of a nation and an ethnic group, the six elements of an ethnic group reoccur in the first three elements of a nation, whereas the second three elements are constitutive for the building of a political community in interrelation with the formation of a state. Translated into historical terms, the process of ethno-genesis continues with a process of nation-building only when a parallel process of state formation occurs.

Based on this definition, and drawing on the classical work of Hans Kohn, Smith develops two ideal types of nation-building in Europe. On the one hand, the Western model is characterized by a process of lateral integration of an ethnic group by aristocracy and clergy transformed by early state formation into a modern nation with historic territory, legal-political equality of members and a common civic culture and ideology. On the other hand, in the Eastern model the ethnic-organic elements of a community are retained, whereby an ethnic-cultural form of nation-building develops out of vertical integration of the ethnic group and late state formation. This dichotomy between the Western and Eastern model echoes the classical division between *Staatsnation* and *Kulturation*, dividing Europe between the Western civic-territorial
type of nation-building (ending at the Rhine) and the Eastern ethnic-democratic model characteristic for the rest of Europe including Germany.

From our perspective, these two models are too dichotomic and ahistorical. Regarding nation-building, the German historian Werner Conze has developed a historical-sociological model of ethno-genesis which starts from the assumption that only where a lateral form of political community comes into existence, an ethnic group with a long-term group history and identity can form. In this sense, the lateral model including political, cultural and ethnic elements is constitutive not only for Western Europe but also for Eastern Europe, the difference being that in Western Europe the processes of state formation were settled much earlier than in the East (Conze 1985, 1992). As a consequence, according to Conze, the basic mechanisms of ethno-genesis, filiation or separation, on the one hand, and accumulation, assimilation and integration on the other, worked much earlier in West, leading here to rather homogenized nations by contrast to the East, where accumulative-assimilative processes were more fragile and belated due to the lack of parallel ethno-genesis and state formation.

Thus, the different forms of nation-building are themselves closely related to state formation. But not only did state formation processes emerge much earlier in the West than in the East, but here, too, they developed in different forms. In other words, while we can stick to the ideal type of Western nation formation proposed by Smith and others, we have to differentiate several, not just one, paths of nation formation in what in Smith’s model is labeled Eastern Europe.

In contrast to the parallel evolution of states and nations in Western Europe, developing state institutions further to the east were not related to nation-states, but to imperial states and local and regional forms dependent on overarching state structures. With Stein Rokkan (Flora 1999) and Ernest Gellner (1994), we would therefore rather suggest four different ideal type zones of state formation (Spohn 2002 forthcoming). The first is the Western European type of early state formation and early consolidated nations. Here, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands and Spain are the most important examples. The second is the Central European imperial zone with high political and regional fragmentation and nations consolidating later. Germany and Italy belong to this zone. The third is the East Central European zone with overarching foreign imperial states and a late consolidation of nations against these imperial states. This East-Central European zone covers all the peripheral states from the Baltic region to the East Central European region and the Balkans. And the fourth is the Eastern European zone proper with long lasting empire-building which contracts only in the 20th century to nation-states. Here, Tsarist Empire/Soviet Union and the Ottoman Empire transforming themselves in post-Soviet Russia and modern Turkey are the main cases.

Corresponding to these different trajectories and zones of nation-building and state formation, the types of nationalism and national identity differ. Anthony Smith proposes to distinguish between “nationalism” as an ideology and movement directed towards a sovereign nation-state and ”national identity” as a multi-dimensional concept of varying identification with the many aspects of the ”nation”. Translated to the historically varying forms of nationalism and national identity formation in modern Europe, four major patterns can be distinguished. In the Western European
zone, nationalism is "tamed" by the state and its political, civil, ethnic, and cultural components are combined on the basis of an early formed national identity. In the Central European zone, political nationalism, though with liberal-democratic orientations, is based on a cultural and ethnic nationalism, both of which are, however, not necessarily interwoven organically; the unifying nationalism is strong, but its political and civic elements remain ambivalent. In the East Central European zone, nationalism is formed within late consolidating nations with weak political and civic components; the separating form of nationalism contains strong integrating and weak liberal-democratic aspects. Finally, in the Eastern European zone, the two Empires, the Ottoman and the Tsarist Empire, are characterized by an Empire-contracting nationalism oscillating between imperial and national identities and autocratic and democratic forms.

From such a comparative perspective, the German case of nation-building is not simply following the Eastern model as presupposed by Anthony Smith, but is in a specific form related to the Central European zone of state formation. The main characteristics thus are:

1. The polycentric form of ethno-genesis in different regional political centers and ethnic cultures;
2. The interconnection of these ethnic groups in a common high language and culture;
3. The in pre-modern times still existing imperial framework of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation; and
4. On the basis of the common culture and a federal structure the continuation of this polycentric form of ethno-genesis into modern nation-building.

We do acknowledge, however, that our attempt of theorizing the German case of nation formation has its limits, as have all attempts at theorizing when it comes down to such an abstract and complex issue as the nation and nation-building. For example, when proceeding to the next chapters, one ought to bear in mind Ernest Renan’s famous phrase that "Forgetting, I might even go so far to say historical error, is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation.” (Renan 1996: 45) It should remind us of the fact that writing about history, and "national history" in particular, always includes aspects of fabrication, of construction (Dening 1991; White 1973); and in our theorizing about historical phenomena, such as the nation, we have to account for the problem that we do not have direct access to the "facts", but must always rely on representations of these "facts". It is thus no coincidence that Anthony Smith has come to call his own theoretical approach "ethno-symbolism" (Smith 1999). We shall therefore be careful to expect too much of an explanation of our own schema, as we have to keep in mind that it is, of course, based on representations of events which were themselves shaped by certain forms of national identity.

2. Historical Overview of Nation Formation in Germany

German national history, as depicted in the major popular narratives and encyclopedias, can be summed up as having taken roughly the course outlined in the following pages. (We will draw here especially on the views expounded in Nipperdey 1984 and Wehler 1987.) It should suffice for the purpose of this paper to briefly sketch this narrative, with only a few annotations relevant to our inquiry, as it is part
of the common images or myths of national history taught in German schools and probably held by a majority of the population. Nevertheless, it should be noted that, while national historiography has naturally to focus on events within a given national territory, German history cannot be written and understood without reference to the broader European context, especially because of Germany’s geographical position. This seemingly simple observation ought not to be underestimated, as it not only holds true for almost all periods of German history proper, but also as it is a very distinctive feature in German history, perhaps more distinctive than in most other European national histories.

2.1 Historical foundations, 1500-1800

The process of German nation-building emerged as a polycentric form of ethno- genesis with overarching linguistic and cultural commonalities within the framework of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation (Conze 1985, 1992; Dann 1996). The Protestant Reformation and Catholic Counterreformation strengthened the aristocratic rulers and fostered the development of absolutist states. At the same time, the translation of the Bible into vernacular German unified the German language. On these linguistic and religious bases, German literature, art and philosophy as well as church and popular songs emerged in the 17th and 18th centuries and created the German Kulturnation – those who were able to speak the German language and participated in the values of humanistic Bildung.

Although more and more fragmented, the German Roman Empire presented an overarching imperial corporate structure that continued to connect the numerous dynasties and principalities – more than 300 – until it became finally dissolved under the impact of the French Revolution and the Napoleon wars in 1803-06. The original and most powerful center of this German Roman Empire was Habsburg Austria, although it was weakened by the Protestant Reformation and the rise of other absolutist regimes, particularly Prussia. During the 19th century, Prussia became not only the stronger state in both economic and military terms, but was also seen as the more enlightened and modern state within the German speaking regions (Nipperdey 1987, Sheehan 1987, Wehler 1987).

This polycentric form of ethnogenesis, nation-building and state formation constituted a major obstacle towards a unified German nation-state. Moreover, the economic decentralization of the city-belt restricted political center formation (Rokkan 1980). The lasting result was that in the modern age the German speaking lands represented a weak and relatively backward center within the European state order.

2.2 The road towards a unified German nation-state, 1800-1871

The major force to disrupt the entropy of the imperial polycentric order of the German Roman Empire did not come from inside, but from outside. The French Revolution created the modern democratic nation-state and exported this model to Continental Europe by the Napoleonic Wars. Many reformers and revolutionaries in Germany sympathized with the French Revolution and, especially in the West of the Holy Roman Empire, cooperated with Napoleon to dissolve the Empire and to modernize the larger and centralizing absolutist states. There is a certain paradox in this
development, however. In the so-called liberation wars against French dominance in Germany, the principles of the French Revolution were turned against Napoleonic France itself, and even if the first beginnings of what would later develop into a German nationalist movement grew out of these wars, their primary result was a strengthening of the absolutist states against the cause of a united German nation-state.

German nationalism, then, emerged not only as a resistance movement against a foreign power, but soon turned into an opposition movement against the still mostly absolutist governments in the several German and now quasi-sovereign states, too. With the tide of events, German nationalism, which was never a wholly coherent ideology, changed and was transformed from one code to another, thus mirroring the problems about defining the boundaries of a German nation which remained prominent during the 19th century (see Giesen 1993). Whatever its transformations over time, however, two main currents or layers can be made out as distinctive features of German nationalism. The first layer was the political dimension of German nationalism. Here the French revolutionary model gave the orientation towards a sovereign, centralized and strong nation-state able to end the French semi-dependency and play an equal part in the European state order. The French revolutionary model also included the orientation towards a parliamentarian, democratic and constitutional nation-state – both in a more radical revolutionary direction as well as in a more liberal-conservative orientation. The second layer of German nationalism was cultural. This included a linguistic basis – the German speaking regions (except those in the West already belonging to other nation-states such as Switzerland, the Netherlands or France) – and a cultural basis – the German Kultur as a superior value orientation against the Western materialistic civilization (Elias 1969, Mosse 1988). Both layers were not a structural essence, but a historically developing political-cultural figurations with different components and changing weights between them.

The decisive moment in the development of German liberal and cultural nationalism came when in the revolution of 1848 the Frankfurter Nationalversammlung attempted to institutionalize a unified national state first against the established dynasties and then in cooperation with the Prussian king. The effort failed, not merely because of the political powerlessness of the democratic movement, but also because of the inherent contradictions and difficulties to define the territorial borders of a unified Germany without destabilizing the European state order and including other nationalities against their will. The defeat of the Nationalversammlung as well as the expulsion and domestication of many participants of the national-democratic movement through the traditional political powers in Germany, Prussia and Habsburg Austria, closed the chapter of unifying Germany through German democracy from below. Instead, Prussia as the growing economic and military power took the lead in the unification of Germany. In three wars against Denmark 1864, Austria 1866 and France 1870/71 the German Empire was founded on iron and blood and in a

31 It should be noted, nonetheless, that the drive for German unification among the early liberal theoreticians and politicians, such as Karl von Rotteck and his circle, was less forceful than usually assumed. Mediated through their reading of Kant, these "enlightened liberals" (Blänkner 1998) were also influenced by English trans-atlantic thought as well the Scottish Enlightenment. Thus their main focus, quite influential until the eve of the 1848 revolution, was laid more upon a "democratic" constitution than on a unified German nation-state.
compromise between Prussian dynastic interests and German democratic-liberal nationalism (Nipperdey 1991, Wehler 1995).\footnote{The role of Prussia and its minister president, Otto von Bismarck, is usually given a lot of space in the historiography of the process of German unification. What gets lost in this picture, however, is the fact that the German Reich suffered from internal incoherence much more than other nation-states of similar size did. This is in turn related to a factor mostly overlooked when Prussian history is depicted as German, not as European history, namely that by the mid-19th century, Prussia had effectively become a nation-state of its own. The unification of Germany "from above" by Bismarck and King (and later Emperor) William I in fact turned out to be an enlargement of Prussia, a structural deficit of the Reich which survived through the Weimar Republic and was only remedied by the Nazi Gleichschaltung in the 1930s.}

In terms of nation-building, the whole period was characterized by the intensification of the polyvocal German national movement which differentiated after 1835 in a distinct party specter and proliferated nationally oriented cultural associations. Both deepened the sense of a common political community (Langewiesche 1999). However, the complexity of the German political framework limited a clear political shape of the German nation and allowed the Kulturnation to play a primary role in defining the boundaries of a unified nation-state. As a consequence, a structural tension between the political nation and the cultural nation evolved. On the one hand, the German Kulturnation implied a great German solution which was not only unacceptable to the other great powers in Europe, but was also opposed to the three-tiered political structure between the German Bund, Prussia and the Habsburg Empire. On the other hand, any realistic form of political unification – in the form of centralized German Bund, a combination of the German Bund plus either Prussia or Austria – implied not only a major political restructuration of the traditional dynastic states in Germany, but also remained insufficient as compared to the common German Kulturnation. These structural tensions between the political and cultural nation also were of crucial importance after the unification Germany.

After the failure of the 1848-49 revolution, the "small-German" solution of this dilemma, culminating in 1871 in the proclamation of King William I of Prussia as German Emperor, was propagated most vigorously by a loose group of intellectuals who have later been dubbed the "Prussian School". Most of them were notable historians, starting from a more or less liberal, bourgeois standpoint, but affiliating themselves first with the "strong" state of Prussia, and then launching a publicistic campaign in order to persuade the Prussian political élite of their "German mission." After 1849, they had had to realize that unification could not be achieved against Prussia, and valuing national unification more than political liberalization, an alliance with political forces seen as more or less progressive seemed like the most viable alternative. It is noteworthy in this context that many of these intellectuals had their origins outside of Prussia, some of them in border regions – a fact which may help to explain why German political liberalism in the 19th century did not, after the collapse of the Frankfurt national assembly, set out on a course to liberalize Prussia. Instead, they followed a course prussifying (and thereby uniting) Germany (see Igers 1971: 120-163, Lees 1974, Giesen 1993: 200-232, Hardtwig 1990, for a good exemplary study, on J.G. Droysen, see Birtsch 1964). As a consequence, the quests for national unification and political liberalization became more and more alienated.

When there is mention of a "special path of Germany" (Sonderweg Deutschlands), this usually refers to the discrepancy between a comprehensive socio-economic
modernization in the course of the 19th century on the one hand, and an only fragmentary political modernization and a late constitution of the national state on the other. Even though it is a fact that, in Germany, the idea of a nation and the idea of democracy do not coincide and, therefore, represent a special case in comparison with "Western nations", one should not overlook structural similarities in the initial conditions and in the course of the nation-building process.

The territorial question constituted an unsolved problem until the very recent past. The answers to the famous question in the Xenien of Goethe and Schiller (1796) "Deutschland ! Aber wo liegt es ?"5, in the context of the revolution of 1848 and the discussion about national unification, showed great variation. It is well-known, that the assembly of the Paulskirche defined the German territory, finally, along the borders of the German League (Deutscher Bund). Accordingly, Czechs, Slovenians, many Italians and a few Danes were asked to elect deputies to the Frankfurt parliament, whereas no one had the idea to also include Alsatians or Lorrainers (cf. Brandt 1987: 116f.). During the time of the first German national state, they also were included, as well as the Polish majority of the population in Posen and Western Prussia, whereas the Germans in the Habsburg Empire remained excluded. This territorial problem encouraged the emergence of a specific concept of a German cultural nation, meaning not only the intellectual and cultural traditions of Germany in the sense of Meinecke’s definition, but also the idea of a community of the German people. This implied major consequences for the non-German population of the Empire as well as for the relationship between the national state and the Germans who were living outside the Empire and, later, were to be "brought home" (see below, "Germans and the Others").

Instead of revolution and civil war, it was violence, in the form of war, which, not least because of the territorial fragmentation of Germany before the first unification, assumed a central function. During the Napoleonic Wars from 1806 to 1815, German national sentiment was articulated on a broader basis for the first time. The so-called "unification wars" of 1864, 1866 and 1870/71 resolved the territorial problem in favour of a "Germany Minor" excluding the Germans in the Habsburg Empire, favouring a Prussian-Protestant predominance within the Empire, and a far-reaching disassociation of the national and the democratic idea. This course towards a German union accentuated the role of war and violence as a unifying factor in the process of nation-building, and added the "congenital defect" of a lack of democratic legitimacy to the German variant.

2.3 The German Empire, 1871-1918

The successful implementation of the "small German solution" produced an imbalance between the predominantly Prussian North and the South, which had fought, three years before the Empire was founded, against Prussia at the side of Austria. This territorial tension was intensified by the Kulturkampf in the 1870s and

5 “Germany ! But where is it ?” ; cf. Jeismann 1992:27, according to whom the answer of the time was rooted, at most, in a geographic, but not a political, concept of Germany. If one takes into account the settlement structures of Germans in Mid- and Eastern Europe and the several multinational states with a German majority in the population, and especially the inexact borders, one can, however, conceive of the question as an expression of a political as well as a geographic, i.e. territorial, indistinctness.
relaxed only after the separation of the two German states after 1945, and a reorganization of the Federal Republic in federal and party political terms.6

Moreover, the internal tensions of the German nation-state became aggravated because of the international and geopolitical consequences of its foundation. The existence of the German Empire meant a thorough change of the traditional power balance of the European state order (Hildebrand 1996, Calleo 1986). A strong, unified state had emerged in the center of Europe, challenging the power balance between the great powers at the fringes of Europe. Of course, the increased power of Germany was not only a consequence of changed international relations, but also of the German dynamic industrial capitalist economy that had, by the turn of the century, not only overtaken weakened France, but also the leading European economy, Great Britain (Spohn 1995). While Bismarck still tried to return to a new balance of power and consciously restricted any further power ambitions of the German Empire, his successors, encouraged by the young Emperor William II, gave up this prudence and aspired to an "appropriate" place of Germany in the world (Meinecke 1908). The transition from European Realpolitik to German Weltpolitik lay at the core of the coming World Wars.

The crucial "deficiency" the German national state showed in comparison with other Western democracies was, without any doubt, its lack of democratisation. Even though there was a constitution in most of the German states since 1848, it was precisely the failure of the assembly of the Paulskirche that reinforced the illiberal elements. A number of basic political rights were introduced only in 1867 with the foundation of the Northern German League (Norddeutscher Bund), which, at the time, contained the most liberal suffrage in Europe and which, later, would be adopted for elections to the Reichstag as well (cf. Rokkan 1970:33). The continued existence of the Prussian three-class electoral system until 1917, the approach towards civil rights during the Kulturkampf and under the socialist laws, as well as the limitation of freedom of expression, and the lack of responsibility of the executive towards the electorate showed, that this made no difference whatsoever to the authoritarian nature of the new regime and the continuing disassociation of the national state and democracy.

With German unification, German democratic-liberal nationalism had reached its core aims to a certain extent. As the semi-democratic, but basically authoritarian state, took great pains at accommodating the interests of national liberalism by a certain degree of power-sharing and by, though in a somewhat illiberal fashion, easing the social tensions arising from rapid economic and technical modernization, the liberal national movement was somewhat stalled. Instead of pushing for political liberalization after national unification had been achieved, a majority of the bourgeois nationalists settled in (and profited from) the structure of the prussified Reich.

Furthermore, the identification with the authoritarian state intensified with the perceived threat of the German nation-state from outside. Thus, the liberal elements in German nationalism weakened, whereas the cultural, missionary components

6 At the begin of the Weimar Republic, there were serious separatist efforts, especially in Bavaria and the Rhineland. One can, therefore, despite all failures and deficiencies of the Weimar Republic, establish as a positive result of its politics, that it succeeded in maintaining the unity of the national state, and consequently, in re-establishing it a second time (cf. Schieder 1991:159)
intensified. This intensifying cultural nationalism was the basis of the effort to Germanize the other nationalities inside Germany, but also to include the German Catholic and German Jewish minorities into the German predominantly Protestant Kulturnation. At the same time, German cultural nationalism served also as a basis of German missionary Weltpolitik against French and British hegemony. The missionary German culturalism was thus directed against both the perceived internal and external threats of the German nation-state based on the German Kulturnation (Nipperdey 1991).

2.4 Weimar Republic and Nazi-Germany, 1918-1945

During the course of World War I, the Reich had finally become a full parliamentary system. Interestingly enough, this transformation could be achieved without a formal amendment of the text of the constitution, simply by parliamentary procedure (Eschenburg 1963). However, the transformed monarchy (which had, during the course of the war, effectively been replaced by some sort of military dictatorship) could not survive the armistice at the end of a lost war. For a short time, illiberal, extreme German nationalism was retreating, giving way to the constitution of the Weimar Republic which was at that time considered to be the most liberal constitution in the world. The Weimar Republic was basically a democratic-constitutional political regime with a democratic constitution and a parliamentarian party system and a strong presidential power position. In terms of contemporary transition research, it was even a consolidated democracy (Linz and Stepan 1996).

However, it had two structural limitations which would, under the conditions of the world crisis in the late 1920s, lead to the destruction of the Weimar Republic and its replacement by the Nazi dictatorship. The first was the lack of democratic nation-building and the growing (re-) mobilization of a humiliated authoritarian and totalitarian German nationalism. The Peace Accord of Versailles, which blamed sole responsibility for the outbreak of World War I on Germany and forced the German delegation to accept significant cessations of territory, partial occupation of the Reich, and high amounts of reparations payments, became the most important focus and source of anti-system propaganda of the radical right. This strong German irridenta nationalism, as well as the fight against a democratic nation torn apart internally, were constitutive for the rising mobilization of the most extreme form of re-unifying integral nationalism: German National Socialism (Lepsius 1966, Winkler 2000).

The second structural limitation was the still unbroken power position of the old élites in state and society, who did not accept the Weimar Republic as a legitimate form of government and worked for a restoration of a monarchical or dictatorial regime. In this context, the strong constitutional position of the President – originally conceived of by Max Weber as a counterweight against democratic populism – became a gateway for anti-system policies when the aging archconservative General von Hindenburg was elected as head of state in 1925 (Winkler 1996). This is not to say that Hindenburg’s victory sealed the fate of the first German republic; quite to the contrary, Hitler’s appointment as chancellor seemed to be an inconceivable option until well into January 1933 (Jasper 1986). By this time, however, the only constitutional organ that was left intact as a power base was the presidency, inhabited by an ailing man who had never wanted to become a politician in the first place. Thus the republic had become a hollow construction, a “power vacuum” (Bracher 1971),
unable to attain allegiance to itself by some sort of convincing civic nationalism which would have sealed party divisions in order to overcome the economic crisis (Lehnert and Megerle 1989). In the end, all parties were rallying mass support for a cause that seemed to be directed against the system without anyone really making clear what ought to replace it (Lieberman 1998, Peukert 1987).

On the eve of the "German Revolution" (Mosse 1978), Germany seemed to be on the verge of civil war, an image to which the National Socialists had contributed to a considerable degree. The internal divisions of the German nation that they declared they wanted to overcome were to a large part due to their own policies of street warfare (Wirsching 1999). National Socialism was a totalitarian-racist movement, but integrated various forms of authoritarian political nationalism, broad sentiments of cultural-missionary nationalism and streams of Protestant and Catholic religious nationalism. On this basis, it excluded and finally annihilated the Jews, discriminated against all other minor races and nationalities and suppressed all independent democratic, liberal, socialist and communist currents that seemed to threaten the unity of the German nation. As a result, the process of German nation-building found an ethnic-national coherence as never before, but at the same time this völkisch definition excluded also the German pluralist and democratic elements and thus again split the German political nation (Burleigh 1999, Winkler 2000).

The "Great Germany" and its hegemony over Europe that Nazism aspired to and finally created in World War II was based on the legacy of the Roman German Empire and the German Kulturnation. This was the core legitimacy basis of Nazism for its aggressive foreign policy and warfare in order to create a European racial order. At the same time, on the grounds of its racist totalitarian ideology, Nazism transgressed not only the moral boundaries and territorial borders of the German Kulturnation, but also led to the catastrophic destruction of Germany itself. This was also the moral and political starting point of the resistance movement against Hitler (Steinbach 1998). As a consequence, German nationalism in its political and cultural currents collapsed with the German nation as a political and cultural order. But paradoxically, this collapse and traumatization of national identity occurred on the basis of an ethnically and culturally enormously more integrated nation, as a result of the warfare, the common fate, the extinction of ethnic minorities and the resettlement of the Reich Germans inside Germany.

2.5 Post-War divided Germany, 1945-1990

The collapse of Nazi-Germany and the subsequent occupation of Germany by the Allies, the division of Germany in four zones and the expulsion and resettlement of the Reich Germans from the East were accompanied by a collapsing German nationalism. This collapse of German nationalism was not only a reflection of the complete military defeat of Nazi Germany, but also of the destruction of the traditional belief in the destiny and superiority of the German nation. Although the war had in the end homogenized the German ethnic settlement space, the missionary belief in the German Kulturnation as well as in the restoration of a strong German nation-state were destroyed by Nazism’s "total warfare". In post-War Germany, therefore, German nationalism existed politically in the will of the surviving Weimar democratic spectrum to re-build a new democratic Germany and culturally in the wish to be morally re-accepted and re-respected in cooperation and reconciliation with the
Allies. After World War II, unlike after World War I, there was no resentful and humiliated nationalism, but rather a broken and traumatized nationalism. However, with the division of Germany into two states, the West German Federal Republic and the Eastern German People’s Republic, German nationalism and national identity followed two different paths (Kleßmann 1987, Winkler 2000).

In West Germany, the German nation existed as a political wish and moral obligation for a reunified and democratic nation-state. Not only did the "reunification imperative" receive a prominent part in the preamble of the West German (provisional) constitution, but was also widely shared in the West German population, at least until well into the 1970s. The imagined territorial boundaries of this future reunified German nation-state remained for some time oriented to the borders of the German Reich in 1937, but increasingly and by a growing number of West Germans adjusted to the present Oder-Neisse border and unofficially recognized by the West German Ostpolitik of Brandt and Kohl. Nonetheless, the division of Germany, the deepening of the East-West antagonism, the construction of the Berlin Wall, the diverging development of West and East Germany increasingly weakened the common, pan-German national bond over time, giving way to a genuine "West German historical consciousness" (Wolfrum 1999). The unified political nation became more and more remote, a distant and utopian aim in the future. Still, the acceptance of two states was more a tribute to the reality of the Cold War rather than a consequence of the development of separate West German nationalism that would have propagated the creation of a West German nation (Büsch and Sheehan 1985, Kleßmann 1987, Winkler 2000).

The increasing loyalty to the West German constitution ("Verfassungspatriotismus", constitutional patriotism) was a result of the widespread experience of the well functioning West German political order supported by its internationally secured peaceful development, its economic dynamism ("Wirtschaftswunder", economic miracle) and its welfare system ("Modell Deutschland"). But this wide-spread acceptance of a democratic-federal order never stood in contrast or opposition to the German nation. Rather, the German nation in its West German gestalt became politically transformed in a civic-territorial nation as a partial reality and a future aim. At the same time, as emphasized here, the formation of a (West) German political-democratic identity was accompanied and influenced by the widening public discourse to come to terms with the past. In essence, this moral public discussion was driven by and resulted in a reconstruction and redefinition of the German Kulturnation (either formally denied or acknowledged). The West German survey research has pictured these political and cultural elements of West German national identity formation over the decades very well. The identification with Germany increased over the years, but in comparison with other European nations the positive identification remained relatively low. The indicators for national pride show that West Germans had a low but rising level of national pride and self-esteem. The characteristic descriptive term in the eighties was the troubled or hurt nation (Noelle-Neumann 1984). The question remains, however, whether being German meant, by the 1980s, being West German to the inhabitants of the Federal Republic, thus establishing West Germany as a nation-state in its own right. (Arguments in this direction can be found, for example in Fulbrook 1999 and especially Wolfrum 1999, who can convincingly show that the intra-German systemic competition enhanced the
development of two rather distinct political cultures and "national" identities in the two German states vis-à-vis each other.)

One of the peculiarities of the Bonn Republic was certainly the discontinuance, or better, the "suspension" (von Aleman 1992:95), of the centre-periphery conflict. The new federalist structure, and even more the separation of the two Germanys, i.e. the absence of the traditional formative forces of the nation state imposed "from above" (Prussia, the capital of Berlin, the established national elites, and the state apparatus geared to them), meant, that what had been the periphery of the Empire, became now the new polycentric arena of the political competition on the national level. The integrative effect of the new national party system, which, since 1957, impeded the permanent establishment of regional parties, was also heightened by the loss of the agrarian areas in the East and a massive intermingling of the population, especially the East-West migration after the war. The ideological trauma of the NS-era, moreover, inhibited the political Left and Right from ideologically reinforced polarization (cf. von Beyme 1993:129).

In East Germany, the German nation remained the reference frame of national identity (Schweigler 1972, Kotowski 1985). In ethnic-territorial terms, there is some evidence that though the GDR was forced to recognize the Odra-Neisse border, the imagined boundaries of national territory only slowly adjusted to the new realities. In political terms, the dominant layer identified the German nation with a socialist Germany. Yet the socialist GDR was seen only as a transitional state towards a future pan-German socialist nation. The construction of the wall therefore was depicted not as fostering of the division of Germany, but as a temporal security measure for socialist Germany on East German soil with a future perspective of a common socialist Germany. Economic success and political stability after the wall had been built contributed to the legitimacy of the GDR system. However, the official image of the GDR was constantly questioned and finally undermined by the alternative model of the West German more prosperous and more liberal nation (present by television and personal visits).

The German Kulturnation also went a different course: In East Germany the moral guilt feeling never developed in the same way as in the West. As a suppressed political current in Nazi Germany, East German communism never saw itself responsible for the Nazi past. Instead, the official picture painted by GDR propaganda let the East German state end up on the side of the "winners of history" (a figure of thought which was in itself very German rather than dialectical) (Kittsteiner 1994). Rather, it saw itself and not the Jews as the main victims of Nazism, and relegated the Holocaust to a side aspect of the past and thus had no problems in participating in Soviet-communist anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism. The best way to come to terms with the past was to build socialism on German soil. From this perspective it was then also unproblematic to include the good legacies of the German political and cultural history into the East German national identity. These included Luther and the Protestant Reformation, Frederick the Great and Prussian enlightened absolutism, Bismarck and the first German nation-state as well as the classical German cultural tradition and its continuation in German socialist humanism. It can therefore be argued with some reason that the GDR had become the "more German" of the two states by the end of the 1980s (Winkler 2000: vol. 2, 619; Fulbrook 1999: 155). Again, it has to be noted, that these dominant cultural elements in East German
national identity formation were opposed by subdominant currents (particularly in the East German literature circles and Protestant milieus), but they came to the fore only after German unification (Kaelble and Kocka 1994).

3. Defining Germanness, Drawing Boundaries: The National Self and the "Others"

3.1 The fiction of homogeneity: German self-images

The German concept of a nation is generally regarded as the prototype of an ethnically defined cultural nation, which is neither associated with a (national) state, nor an originally democratic legitimation, but which relates to the German people as a community (cf. Brubaker 1992: 9f., Greenfield 1992: 358-371). References to Herder’s concept of the "spirit of the people" (Volksgeist) and to Fichte’s "Speeches to the German Nation”, respectively to the romantic period as a whole, are meant to demonstrate that the concept of the German nation, apparently, includes an "essentialist" (self-) perception of Germanness that is antithetical to the US-American or French way of thinking7. This construction avoids the difficulty of having to base a specific national identity on universal values and makes the German approach to distinguish between "own" and "foreign" appear more consistent, but also more exclusive outwardly.

Until as recently as the end of the 1990s, the official German mode of self-presentation was based on the fiction of an ethnically homogeneous population. Accordingly, a brochure issued by the New York German Information Center from 1991 reads: "For Americans to understand the psychological underpinnings of the current debate among Germans on how to deal with immigration, it is necessary to realize that, unlike the multi-ethnic tapestry of the U.S., the nation-states of Europe have traditionally been ethnically homogeneous” (quoted in Dittgen 1996:10f.).

This self-assessment, as well as the widespread characterization of the German nation as a "cultural nation”, proves, however, to be problematic (cf. Dann 1995). First of all, Germany can hardly be regarded as a prototype of a nation in which ethnic community, the idea of a nation, and the national state coincide. Here, one could rather consider Japan, if one disregards the Korean minority, which has only been existent since the middle of the 20th century (cf. Eisenstat 1991:35-37; with regard to the German-Japanese comparison of nation-building processes see also Bendix 1977, ch. 6). Apart from this, one must take into account that the concept of the cultural nation, as Meinecke introduced it with regard to the German development, refers primarily to a shared culture – which, in Meinecke’s view, mainly means a shared religion. There is no mention in his writings either of a people or a spirit of the people (cf. Meinecke 1908:3; Dann 1995:71).

The nation-building process culminated in the German laws issued in 1913, regulating membership in the Empire and the state (Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz) and codifying the idea of ethnic homogeneity of the German nation, which is inherent to the concept of the community of the people (Volksgemeinschaft), and which finally

7 With regard to the problem of an "essentialist” vs. "constructivist” conception of ethnicity, comp. Heitmeyer (1996:34-36) and Esser (1996:10f.)
found its expression in a popular, that is: racist, form of politics. This development, however, had not at all been clearly determined by Herder and the romantic period, but was characterized by open situations. Especially in the face of the fragmentation of states in 19th-century Germany, the will to form a German nation played a central part in the national movement (cf. Jeismann 1992:45-76). It is, therefore, perhaps more fitting to speak, instead of a cultural nation, rather of an informal German "cultural society" in this period, including all those who, in reality, shared in German high culture, in particular the linguistic-cultural standardization (cf. Dann 1991:68).

This is illustrated by the fact that the consciousness of a German "cultural nation" did not evolve extensively or on a massive scale. Rather, it had been developed and carried by very specific institutions like the educated classes, the reading societies, and, later, by the student fraternities and gymnastics clubs by means of a condensation of "communalization codes" into a romantic idea of the nation (cf. Giesen/Junge 1996).

This idea of the nation which articulated itself in the age of German romanticism and which turned away from the universal principles of German enlightenment and the principles of the French Revolution does indeed indicate the beginning of the special course (Sonderweg) the process of nation-building took in Germany. Even as late as 1848, the question of who was a German or how to become one was answered with a political argument. Accordingly, in the debate about basic rights held in the Paulskirche on the 4th of July 1848 (!), Wilhelm Jordan reflected the majority opinion when he made the following statement: "Jeder ist ein Deutscher, der auf dem deutschen Gebiete wohnt ... die Nationalität ist nicht mehr begrenzt durch die Abstammung und die Sprache, sondern ganz einfach bestimmt durch den politischen Organismus, durch den Staat ... das Wort 'Deutschland' wird fortan ein politischer Begriff"8 (quoted in Schieder 1991:25).

The failure of the revolution, with its attempt to establish a national state in 1848 and the foundation of the Empire some time later, produced the following paradox: On the one hand, the national state imposed "from above" was a political construction of the highest order, on the other hand this was exactly what deprived a possible political conception of the nation completely of its foundations. It was in the context of the 1870/71 war, therefore, that a new way to conceive of Germanness gained acceptance. Whereas this had been determined, from the wars of liberation until 1848, predominantly by the voluntary act of decision to belong to the "German Fatherland", the main criteria applying now was the recognition of the fact that one possessed German nationality. The appeal "You need to have the will to be German" was changed into the attribute "You are German" (Jeismann 1992:254).

In the Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz of 1913, this process was brought to its formal close. This law not only swept away the liberal conception of the nation from 1848, but also replaced the equally liberal Prussian citizenship law of 1842, which had not been based on ethnic criteria, but had taken into account the reality of a state constituted by two peoples (comp. Brubaker 1992:63). From now on, there applied a definition of German nationality which was solely based on the right of origin, the ius sanguinis. There had been, after all, a numeric majority in the German parliament

8 "All those are German who live on German territory … nationality is not limited anymore by origin and language, but simply is determined by the political organism, the state … the word Germany will be a political term from now on"
(Reichstag) consisting of SPD, National Liberals and liberals who advocated a regulation similar to the French citizenship laws, but the authoritarian construction of the Empire prevented it from being put to practice. It was only a small step from this law to the racially based (völkisch) definition of the German nation, which provided legitimacy not only for the war against the Western powers from 1914 onwards, but also for the special, partly anti-modernist, course Germany took into modernity and, finally, the criticism of any liberal form of politics, including the rejection of the Weimar Republic (cf. Mommsen 1990:87-105).

The law of 1913 and the idea of the community of the people still lie at the centre of the definition of the people constituting the state as it can be found in the German constitution (Grundgesetz). It can be deduced from the preamble, in which "the German people" appears as a "racist (völkisch) – national substratum" (Oberdörfer 1991:60), as well as from article 116 and the laws from 1953 concerning those Germans who were driven out of their homeland after the war (comp. ibid. and Brubaker 1992:168-171). The stubborn rejection of all governments to recognize the reality of Germany being an immigrant country also helped to consolidate this concept (cf. Kurthen/Minkenberg 1995; Hollifield 1996).

The law from 1913 needs to be interpreted also with having in mind that Germany, traditionally, was an emigrant country (cf. Bade 1992). Its significance, however, cannot be explained by this, since the awareness of more liberal alternatives was definitely prevalent in a large part of the political class, as the debates in the Reichstag illustrated. The law, therefore, rather brought to its close a long-term development, in which the national identity was imposed “from above” as part of an internal unification of the Empire in the spirit of an ethnical, and, therefore, particularly exclusive, interpretation. This law can be viewed as an additional expression of the "negative ideology of integration" adhered to by the political elites of the Empire, which postulated the unification of the nation by means of exclusion, rather than by means of inclusion (cf. Wehler 1985, chs. 2 and 3).

3.2 The “Others”: French, Poles, Jews, and Internal “Enemies of the Reich”

The German nation-building process, which had come to an end with the constitution of the national state and an ethnic conception of the nation, generated a constellation seeming to be a paradoxon. On the one hand, the fact that Germany was a classical case of an emigrant country (cf. Bade 1992) was inimical to the development of a pronounced tradition of a xenophobic nativism towards labour immigrants. A tradition of colonialism, moreover, started to develop comparatively late with the acquisition of “protectorates” in 1884/85 and ended quite soon when World War I broke out, having as a result that there were almost no ethnic cleavages in the "motherland". On the other hand, racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia were not, in

9 This is not intended to mean that racist stereotypes towards the natives in the colonies were not existent or only remotely developed – during the Empire, they were reproduced on a wide scale by the media and the school system. We may cite one example from everyday life to be found in the text of a Hessian schoolbook from 1918: “Gegen jede geregelte Arbeit haben die Samoaner eine unüberwindliche Abneigung, umsonst winken ihnen Lohn und Genüsse für die Arbeit in den Pflanzungen. In neuerer Zeit fangen ihre jungen Leute erst an, mit Hilfe der Missionare sich etwas geistig zu entwickeln” (Hessischer Volksschullehrerverein 1918:518). ["The Samoans show an insurmountable aversion to every kind of regular work; rewards and pleasures to be expected for their

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the first German national state, expressions of political conflicts between social groups within the context of a pluralistic social system or a "colourblind" constitution. They rather were integrated into the domain of the regime and, therefore, were legitimated in a way that was principally different from the ones pursued in the USA and France. They were, as Hans-Ulrich Wehler puts it, part of a "negative ideology of integration" of the authoritarian national state, in which the political elites made extremely effective decisions as to who would be a friend, an enemy or a foreigner (cf. Wehler 1985).

Part of this was the "ethnicization" of the concept of the enemy that was France, which took place prior to the foundation of the Empire. The cultivation of the hostility towards France and towards the ideas of 1789 can be traced back to Ernst Moritz Arndt, Friedrich Jahn and others, who, under the influence of the Napoleonic wars, stylized it into a cultural and potentially ethnic conflict which occasionally changed into a general anti-Western attitude (cf. Jeismann 1992:379; Greenfield 1992:358-378; see also James 1989:15-19). There was also a religious component which played into the construction of the "arch-enemy" France, i.e. the "secularized form of the Christian Arch-fiend" (Langewiesche 1995:197).

In the course of the process of the "internal unification of the Empire", in particular since the middle of the 1880s, several endeavours coincided: The policies of Germanization with regard to the predominantly Polish ethnic minorities in the Empire, colonialism and populist politics of integration (Sammlungspolitik), the socio-biological approach of social-Darwinism within anti-Semitism and racism as well as the ethnicization and naturalization of the German conception of the people. They reinforced each other and resulted in the formation of a racist (völkisch) nationalism which conjoined with anti-Liberalism and militarism and served, later in time, as an important basis for the ideology of national socialism.

The fact that Germany took the same path as France by pursuing its imperialist policies with missionary zeal, did not, however, have anything in common with the ideas of civilization displayed by the French Leftists. There were no, however limited, ideas of human rights hidden behind German colonialism which assumed a principal equality and pressed for assimilation. It was rather a matter of racially underpinned great-power politics, in which the ideology of white supremacy was intended to help legitimate the acquisition of colonies. In his Berlin lectures 1897, Heinrich von Treitschke criticized the German emigration to the USA as a loss to the German people and argued: "So ist jene Kolonisation, welche das einheitliche Volksthum..."
erhält, für die Zukunft der Welt ein Factor von ungeheurer Bedeutung geworden. Von ihr wird abhängen, in welchem Maße jedes Volk an der Beherrschung der Welt durch die weiße Rasse teilnehmen wird.\(^\text{12}\) (quoted in Ripper 1978:341). The effects of the "white race", in the form of the German people, would have on the population of the colonies became evident, for instance, in the brutal suppression of the Herero-revolt in Southwest Africa (today Namibia) in the year 1906, which resulted in an almost complete wiping out of the Hereros. In addition, the German administration in the colonies displayed an exceptional stringency and hardness which included forced labour and complete segregation (cf. Baumgart 1982:879-82; Opitz 1992:29-44). This racist legacy of the Empire and of colonialism was kept alive in the Weimar Republic. It was directed, i.a., against the blacks in the French occupying army in the Rhineland, which led to a further "ethnicization" of the conception of France, and formed an integral part of the colonial propaganda of the Nationalists and the National Socialists. This racism took on its extreme form with the policies of forced sterilization and "Rassenschande"\(^\text{13}\) during the NS-regime (cf. Opitz 1992:45-58).

In the Empire itself, however, social-Darwinism, racism and xenophobia within the Pan-Germanic movement, which was mainly directed against the Poles, and within anti-Semitism had more severe consequences. With the emergence of biological racism and social-Darwinism, anti-Judaism, which had predominantly been generated by religious views, changed into a political ideology exactly at the moment where, in the course of the establishment of the German national state, the equal legal status of Jews was to be part of the constitution of 1871 (cf. Jaschke 1994:71). As early as 1879, there were outbreaks of anti-Semitism in Berlin, the following year the cry "Jews Out" ("Juden raus!") rang out on the occasion of an anti-Semitic demonstration, and at the court of the Emperor, the court chaplain Stöcker propagated anti-Semitism on the highest level. In the course of the 1880s, several anti-Semitic political parties were formed, which mobilized only a few voters for themselves. Their slogans, however, were gradually adopted by the Conservatives and by a number of members of the catholic Center-party (Zentrumspartei) and, towards the end of the Empire and during the Weimar Republic, formed an integral part of the ideological standard repertoire of the traditional power elites and of anti-capitalist and anti-democratic conservatism (cf. Bracher 1971:138-142; Wehler 1985: 105-109).

This is even more remarkable considering that the proportion of Jews, at the end of the Weimar Republic, in relation to the general population was only one percent.

What was also to be noted with regard to the Polish minority, which, by 1918, constituted ten percent of the Prussian population, was a growing xenophobia which was legitimated already under Bismarck by the official politics of the state. This included language policies which determined German to be the only language spoken at school and within the administration even if the majority of the population in the municipalities was Polish. In 1885, 30,000 Poles (one third of them Jews) from the eastern provinces were deported to Russia, and a series of laws limited the property rights and basic rights of the Poles (cf. Wehler 1985:110-112). Also within the German-Polish relations, which were exposed to new dimensions of strain due to the regulations in the Versailles treaty of 1919 and the German occupation of Poland

\(^{12}\) "It is such that this colonialization, which preserves nationhood in its unity, is a factor of tremendous importance for the future of the world. This will determine to which degree each people will share in the world supremacy of the white race"

\(^{13}\) Nazi term for sexual relations with a non-Aryan
during World War II, there was an increased articulation of social Darwinism on the German part, which presupposed a superiority of the Germans to the "Slavs" in Eastern Europe and the dominance of the mighty in the struggle between the peoples. There is no doubt that, with regard not only to the concept of France as the arch-enemy, but also to anti-Semitism and the anti-Polish policies of Germanization, the religious component performed a particular legitimating function in the generation of internal national unity by excluding minorities. The protestant character of the national state and its elites was also applied to the internal "enemies of the Empire", i.e. believing Catholics as well as Socialists, who, for some time, were "Germans with minor rights" (Deutsche minderen Rechts) (Mommsen 1990:107). Especially the arch-enmity with France showed great potential for being linked to the suspicion displayed towards Catholics during the struggle between church and state 1872-1887 (Kulturkampf). The parallel to the USA which comes to mind here should be, however, drawn with caution. What applies to the German case is, on the one hand, that the regime in office was an illiberal one which did not leave the integration of religious minorities up to an already existent civil society. On the other hand, the anti-Catholic "defense reaction" did not emerge with regard to immigrants, but was directed against citizens who had been residents for a long time. This means that the confessionally based exclusion by the majority culture could not fall back on a democratic argumentation (i.e. the suspicion of lacking loyalty to liberal principles). Within the context of an authoritarian state it appealed, instead, to the loyalty to the ethnic nation, the German people, and its political representatives. As a counter-reaction, there could be observed a particularly persistent formation of the Catholic milieu which continues to the present day\textsuperscript{14}. This did not lead, however, to a Catholic integrism, as was the case in France, just as Protestant pietism, for instance in Pomerania and Württemberg, did not provide a source for fundamentalist mobilization.

The dynamics of suppression and milieu formation were illustrated particularly well by the case of the Socialists, or rather, the political Left. In this case, a primarily political conflict was underpinned by subcultures. The stigmatization of the Socialists as "enemies of the Empire" and "fellows without a Fatherland" corresponded with the overtures to the labour movement and the establishment of institutions of the welfare state, but it was not able to prevent the work force from becoming politically estranged and forming milieus. The fact that the SPD, during the Weimar Republic, formed part of the government, strained rather than remedied the fractured relationship of the nation with the Left, or rather that of the Left with the nation. The context was one of a lack of legitimacy of the German democratic system, and of an increasing polarization of the political forces at play. The seizure of power by the National Socialists in 1933 was to be followed by a new wave of persecution and suppression of the political Left, which, eventually, led to a "multiple persecution trauma" within the SPD (Lösche 1995:45).

The defeat in World War I, the revolution of 1918, and the transition from the Empire to the Weimar Republic was equally traumatic for the political Right and resulted in a reconfiguration and radicalization of the discourse within the radical Right. The anti-Liberal ideology of the state, displayed by the ancien régime during the Empire, now happened to constitute a starting point for a process of ideological differentiation, in

\textsuperscript{14} With regard to the term "milieu" see Minkenberg 1998, ch. 15
the course of which the ultraconservative forces were challenged by a new competing counterrevolutionary nationalism which lent an increased substance to the rejection of liberal democracy as well as to the German idea of nation by condensing both into a new programme of action. The revolutionary movement of the Conservatives, among which Hans Freyer, Ernst Jünger, Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, Ernst Nikisch, Oswald Spengler and Carl Schmitt are numbered, combined, to differing degrees of emphasis, topics of anti-capitalism, anti-liberalism and anti-parliamentarism of a racist (völkisch) nationalism, and a hierarchic social system (cf. Gerstenberger 1969; Saage 1983). Coinciding with this is a deliberate rejection of Christian traditions.

The ideology of National Socialism added distinct racist and anti-Semitic components to this agenda, as well as the political formulation of a state under a Fuehrer which, though it accepts modernity in the form of the preconditions of industrial mass society (especially mass media and mass mobilization), radically opposes the "ideals of 1789".

The German, like the Italian, fascists tried to win the support of the working classes and blended together anti-capitalist ("crushing of the Zinsknechtschaft") with anti-socialist intentions. "Der primär, aber nicht ausschließlich rassenideologisch motivierte Antisemitismus unterscheidet die Nationalsozialisten von Anfang an von den italienischen Faschisten. Nur der Vernichtungswille ist vergleichbar, der sich in Italien zwar nicht gegen die wenigen Juden, wohl aber gegen die Marxisten und, was häufig übersehen wird, gegen die nationalen Minderheiten richtet" (Wippermann 1983:45f.; cf. also Bracher 1971:100-106; Larsen/Hagtvet/Myklebust 1980).

In German fascism, the relationship between religion and politics assumed a new function. The rejection of Christianity was accompanied by the stylization of National Socialism to a "surrogate religion" and by the functional incorporation of – mainly Protestant – religion into the new regime. Protestantism, since the foundation of the Empire, had been subject to an increased ideologization and politicization, within which especially Stoecker’s idea of a linkage between "religion, politics and anti-Semitism" constituted an ominous legacy (cf. Smid 1988:66; see also Thamer 1988). What had been, within the action française, outlined only theoretically with regard to French Catholicism, became concrete reality during the Nazi-regime. The state under the Fuehrer and racism could be put into practice as rapidly, comprehensively and destructively, only because, besides the political and economic

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15 In his attempt to prove that the "conservative revolution" did not constitute an "independent line of political thought within the 20th century" (Breuer 1990:603), Stefan Breuer cogently demonstrates, where, and to what extent, the authors differed from each other in their views of central topics. This very detailed analysis of nuances cannot escape the observation, that there was something like a unifying bond between "religion, politics and anti-Semitism" constituted an ominous legacy (cf. Smid 1988:66; see also Thamer 1988). What had been, within the action française, outlined only theoretically with regard to French Catholicism, became concrete reality during the Nazi-regime. The state under the Fuehrer and racism could be put into practice as rapidly, comprehensively and destructively, only because, besides the political and economic

16 historic term referring to a system of holding land in tenancy to a landlord

17 "What distinguished the National Socialists from the Italian fascists right from the beginning was their anti-Semitism, which was motivated primarily, even though not exclusively, by their racial ideology. What is comparable is only their destructive will, which, though not directed at the few Jews, was, in Italy, aimed at the Marxists and, a fact that is often overlooked, at the national minorities"

18 With regard to this subject, see, for instance, the "critique of religion" by Alfred Rosenberg, who contrasts Germanic cults, Indian and Chinese philosophy, and German mysticism, i.e. the teachings of "honour and freedom" with the Christian ethical concept of caritas and the "hostility of the church towards Europe" (Rosenberg 1935:218)
elites, the cultural elites, in particular the Protestant church, cooperated with the new rulers. What needs to be mentioned is also the fact that, of all regimes, it was precisely the Nazi-regime which, even though most concerned about the "racial purity" of the German people, for the purposes of war economy, initiated, in concerted action with the industry, the first state-organized work migration on a larger scale. Whereas, in World War I, less than 500,000 "foreign workers" were employed in the German Empire, in 1944 there were 7.6 million "foreign workers", prisoners of war and concentration camp prisoners, most of them deported from the Eastern European regions, "in action" (cf. Bade 1994:41). This implied that, even before the influx of migrants from Southern Europe began in the late 1950s, (West-)German industry possessed all the relevant experience to deal with foreign members of the workforce (cf. Katzenstein 1987:212).

The development of the two Germanys during the post-war era revealed that, also with regard to the figures of exclusion, neither the clock was turned back to zero, nor did the continuity of old traditions merely take on a new complexion. The period of anti-Catholicism can definitely be regarded as concluded by the time of separation of the two Germanys and the successful establishment of an interdenominational Christian people's party. What was conducive to this development, was also the loss of the Eastern provinces of Prussia, which had been the "heartland" of Protestantism, as Protestantism was a classic component of the discourse of the radical Right. The possibilities to ethnicize regional or religious differences are largely limited by these developments and the federalist system of the Federal Republic of Germany, and have been relegated to the spheres of mere regional folklore (cf. Connor 1994:109). A similar historic achievement of overcoming traditional stereotypes and hostilities is represented by the reconciliatory efforts made by France and Germany, in the course of which the German efforts, without doubt, cut much deeper to the core of national identity, but were, simultaneously, facilitated by the separation of the two German states (cf. von Thadden 1990:65 f.). It is hard to imagine that an anti-French attitude will ever again be a component of the discourse of the radical Right.

At the level of the regime, the integration of the Right-wing margin, especially in the CDU/CSU, and the transformation of the West-German political culture, resulted in a weakening of the illiberal element. This does not leave much breeding-ground to an authoritarian fundamental opposition such as was the radical Right in Weimar. Nevertheless, there have been attempts, as, for instance, within the Socialist Reichspartei, which, in 1956, was declared to be illegal, as well as in parts of the National-democratic Party of Germany (NPD) founded in 1964, to organize a national

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19 The question whether the "destructive will" formed an integral part of German anti-Semitism, and not only of nazi-ideology, is subject to the controversy about the book of Daniel Goldhagen. He writes: "The eliminationist mind-set that characterized virtually all who spoke out on the 'Jewish problem' from the end of the eighteenth century onward was another constant in Germans' thinking about Jews. For Germany to be properly ordered, regulated, and, for many, safeguarded, Jewishness had to be eliminated from German society" (Goldhagen 1996:69). This controversy shall not be further discussed here (for a further discussion see the articles in the ZEIT No. 16-18/96, 20-22/96, 24-25/96 and Goldhagen's reply in the ZEIT No. 32/96. See also STERN 1996).

20 With regard to the cooperation between the Nazi-regime and the German industry during World War II, Peter Katzenstein makes the following statement: "German industry had had substantial experience employing foreign labor before the influx of workers from Southern Europe began in the late 1950s" (Katzenstein 1987:212).
opposition against the post-war "system" and the Western allies (cf. Stöss 1989: 96-147; see also Kühnl/Rilling/Sager 1969).

More decisive factors with regard to the cultural context of the post-war era seem to be, however, the unsolved question of national identity, and the separation of the two German states, characterized by the following phenomena. On the one hand, also the Federal Republic held onto the ethnically based concept of the German nation. The officially legitimised distinction between Germans and "Others" of the Imperial era continued to be drawn via citizenship rights. On the other hand, a critical reappraisal of the Nazi past was suspended, which resulted in the delegitimisation of any fundamental critique of this period of German history. "Historical revisionism", therefore, did not remain to be the business of obscure minorities, but was displayed also within the framework of established institutions right up to the Historikerstreit\textsuperscript{21} (cf. Stöss 1989:29-35: Maier 1988\textsuperscript{22}).

The bitter consequence of the Holocaust, and of the separation of Germany, was also, that, precisely during the years after 1945, the fiction of an ethnically homogeneous community of the German people turned (for a while) into reality in the Federal Republic and the GDR. This special situation is, nonetheless, reinforced rhetorically by the discourse, constantly renewed by the various elites, about the immigrant workers (Gastarbeiter) and the contra-factual affirmation that Germany is "not an immigrant country". What applies to the whole era of the old Federal Republic, contrary to France is, therefore, that "West Germans shrink from any measure that smacks of assimilation, be it cultural or political" (Katzenstein 1987:224). At the same time, a factual immigration occurred, which was made up of three migration waves, the first one of them constituted by the Germans driven out of their homeland after 1945, followed by the labour migration that started in the late 1950s and, finally, the growing number of asylum seekers at the end of the Cold War. All this was conducive to the fact that, in historic comparison, Germany showed its highest degree of ethnic and cultural heterogeneity. This could potentially trigger off a combination of xenophobia and nativism, which is typical for classic immigrant countries, even though it cannot, prima facie, be rated as a symptom of pluralist battles for a share, because of the particular, racist and anti-Semitic legacy of the German past.

Racism and anti-Semitism play, now as before, a distinctive role in Germany. What needs to be mentioned beforehand is that, as a consequence of the Holocaust, the presence of Jews within the west of Germany has been reduced to the insignificant number of 30,000, or 0.08 % of the population (before reunification). Still, anti-Semitism persisted. Just as one can speak of a "racism without races" (cf. Minkenberg 1998, ch. 14), one can refer to the situation in Germany as an "anti-Semitism without Jews" (Stöss). This includes pronounced anti-Semitic views held by approximately one fifth of the population, as well as the frequently occurring desecration of graveyards and several other public activities (cf. Stöss 1989:48; Jaschke 1994:70-76). Contrary to this, overt anti-Semites has become a taboo within the political culture of the Federal Republic, which induces a "communicative latency" of the Anti-Semites, that is, their cautious and conformist articulation (cf. Bergmann/Erb

\textsuperscript{21} this term refers to a controversy between some historians, philosophers and journalists, triggered in 1986 by an article of Jürgen Habermas in "Die Zeit" and revolving around the question of how to evaluate National Socialism

\textsuperscript{22} see also the very instructive comparison between Germany and Japan by Buruma (1995)
What becomes apparent in comparative studies dealing with anti-Semitism is a tendency to "normalize" the German situation, in which the traditional, biological anti-Semitism is replaced by a modern concept, i.e. political and ethnocentric, similar to the ones in the USA and France in its orientations and socio-structural characteristics (cf. Weil 1990).

PART II: National and European Identities

1. German Relations with the EEC/EU

1.1 German-European relations before 1945

As in other European nations, the formation of German nationalism and national identity contained a European dimension, both in relation to the surrounding neighbors and to the broader European civilization. From the Protestant Reformation to the French Revolution, the German meaning of Europe centered on the Roman German Empire as a continuation of Charlemagne’s Empire and the core of Christian Europe (Conze 1985). After the weakening of Germany in the post-Reformation religious wars and the stabilization of the European inter-state order with the Peace of Westphalia, in addition, Europe became connected with the idea of a European political power equilibrium and peace order (Gollwitzer 1964). But the French Revolution with its civilizational mission, the Napoleonic attempt to create a continental Europe dominated by France, and the dissolution of the German Roman Empire marked an important caesura in German European orientations.

The European peace order after the defeat of Napoleonic France was directed by a renewed doctrine of a European power balance, propagated and supported particularly by the two main powers in Germany, the Habsburg Empire under Count Metternich and Prussia with its new reform bureaucracy. At the same time, the emerging German liberal and cultural nationalism, conveyed to Europe two different meanings. On the one hand, the liberal-democratic currents following the French model of a democratic nation-state aspired to a democratic-national Europe against the traditional dynasties and power arithmetics. On the other hand, the cultural currents in a counter-move against the secularist-revolutionary model aspired to a restoration of the Christian German Roman Empire – either in a Habsburg Catholic universalistic or a Prussian Protestant missionary version. With the failure of the 1848 revolution, the idea of Europe based on the equality of democratic nation-states considerably weakened in German nationalism. Instead, the idea of Europe oscillated primarily between a political conception of a power balance between the European states and a cultural conception of a German Mitteleuropa dominated by Christian values and German culture.

After German unification in 1870-71, Bismarck was eager to construct a new European peace order based on the traditional balance of power doctrine, though dominated by a drive to isolate and contain France, but during the reign of William II the concept of a German cultural Mitteleuropa was increasingly seen as the core of Europe between a materialistic West and a "barbaric" East. German warfare in World War I did thus not only aim at the materialization of an economically and politically strong German Europe, but it was also motivated by a cultural nationalism that
aspired to a Europe dominated by German culture (Büsch 1985). The democratic spectrum in the Weimar Republic brought to the fore again the traditional doctrine of a balance of power in a European peace order. Some outspoken Europeanists such as the leader of the European Movement, Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi and foreign minister Gustav Stresemann even envisioned a politically united Western Europe for a more distant future. However, the rise of National Socialism turned the tide again to a Germanized Europe, the German Reich and Germania at the core of a racial order of Europe able to survive in the struggle with the liberal West and the “barbarian” East. But the collapse of Nazi-Germany opened anew the prospect of a democratic and unified Europe – kept alive in the surviving democratic forces of the Weimar Republic and the moral transformation of the German Kultur nation.

1.2 The role of the Federal Republic in the European framework

The foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany was thus not only motivated as the first step on the road to a new democratic and unified Germany, but also closely linked to bind Germany firmly to the West. The Western powers, particularly France, saw this Westbindung of the Federal Republic as the best way to keep Germany under control and to prevent a renewed nationalistic Germany. But the West German political elite under the leadership of Konrad Adenauer also saw Westbindung as the only way to renew Germany politically, economically and morally. On this basis, the first steps of European integration were done: the foundation of ECCS, EURATOM, and, finally, the EEC. The stagnation in the 60s was followed by a phase of deepening European integration in the 70s and 80s, again with the German governments under Brandt, Schmidt, and Kohl playing an active role.

1.3 German foreign policy after reunification

The reopening of the German question with the collapse of communism and the answers found followed the same post-War pattern. The unification of Germany was accompanied by a strengthening of European integration through the foundation of the European Union. The core architects for this European solution of the German question were again not only the Western allies, but also the German government (Spohn 1995).

To Kohl and Genscher, it was quite clear that a larger, and thus significantly stronger Germany would cause doubts of Germany’s continuing reliability as political partner among the former Allies as well as other European countries. To the surprise of scholars of international politics of a realist persuasion, increased power did not lead the German government to a more forceful performance in the European and international arena (Duffield 1998). To the contrary, during the first half of the 1990s, German foreign policy was determined to embed Germany and the other European states in a stronger supranational structure, pushing for a delegation of sovereign powers to the newly-established European Union, and giving the German Länder a larger share of power regarding European integration. To counter fears within the Thatcher/Major government in Britain and the Mitterrand administration in France, chancellor Helmut Kohl proposed European Monetary Union, leading to the introduction of the common European currency in 1999-2002, a move which, over time, encountered many reservations, if not outward hostility, in Germany itself as it set out to abolish one of the most important symbols of post-war national pride: the
Deutsche Mark, symbol of the "economic miracle" and the German success story the Kohl government sought to “export” into the former GDR, too (Görttemaker 1999: 785-787, Schöllgen 1999: 193-201). After a first attempt at independent foreign policy action turned out to be a political and diplomatic disaster, namely, when the unilateral recognition of the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, escalated the civil war in crumbling Yugoslavia, and diminished the prospects of a quick diplomatic solution, Kohl and Genscher returned, for the time being, to a foreign policy course showing almost too much restraint so that their international partners turned out to be somewhat annoyed by “German check-book diplomacy,” first experienced with the German non-involvement in second Gulf War (Schöllgen 1999: 205-210).

Only in the second half of the 1990s did German foreign policy become more involved in international matters, letting parts of the German army participate in UN missions, such as in Bosnia, Somalia, and Cambodia. “National interest” became a phrase of official foreign policy wildly utilized only when the center-left government of Gerhard Schröder took office in 1998, which combined "national interest" with a new sense of "international responsibility”. Participation in the 1999 NATO attacks on Serbia over the question of Kosovo constituted the first dispatching of German troops in genuine warfare, and polarized and divided German public opinion. The Kosovo War also marked a caesura in German political culture and historical consciousness, paving the way for a “return of history” beyond the focus on the Holocaust that had been so prominent in the public debates in West Germany since the end of the 1970s (Becker 2001: ch. 6).

A less unquestioning stance toward the European Union can also be made out with regard to its enlargement to the East. Germany would, of course, be one of the member states most directly affected by such a decision. The federal governments under both Kohl and Schröder also like playing the role of the candidates’ advocate. However, calls for restrictions on one or more of the essential freedoms guaranteed to each citizen of a member state by the EU Treaty, at least for a limited time, to ensure the economic survival of the East German borderlands, belies this notion to a considerable degree. Being a child of the post-war generation, chancellor Schröder seems to have no inclination to dwell in a perpetual feeling of guilt and grief over Nazi crimes. Instead, his government displays a certain degree of nationalism for which a government formed by politicians of a different generation would probably been blamed as being politically incorrect.

2. German Attitudes Toward the European Union

In this context, the formation of West German national identity was from the beginning closely connected to Western Europe. The political stabilization of the Federal Republic, the preservation of peace in confrontation with Soviet communism, the economic reconstruction and regained economic prosperity, the moral re-acceptance by and reconciliation with the West – all this was also closely connected to Europe and European integration. As in other West European countries, the West German identification with Europe was a gradual process and never replaced the building-up of a new German national identity. At the same time, because of the low national pride and self-esteem, this growing European component had a particular weight in West German identity. This contrasts the West German case to most other West European cases and justifies the statement by Max Haller (1999) that the strong
German identification with Europe can be interpreted as a re-compensation for a weak national identity.

However, also here with German unification a certain and mostly unnoticed re-composition of the relation between the German and European components in national identity has set in. As in other West European countries, German national identity (when the nation is measured as one form of identification besides Europe or the region and home town), moves in a parallel with an identification with Europe. However, when measured as an alternative, the national components in German identity have become stronger and the European components stagnated or even slightly weakened. In other words, with German unification the stronger German self-esteem has also diminished the compensatory identification with Europe.

Table 1: Change in National and European Identification, by country

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>W. Germany</td>
<td>32.8 45.6 12.8</td>
<td>46.5 40.1 -6.4</td>
<td>12.4 9.4 -3.0</td>
<td>8.3 4.9 -3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Germany</td>
<td>42.4 50.2 7.8</td>
<td>44.8 41.0 -3.8</td>
<td>8.5 6.2 -2.3</td>
<td>4.4 2.6 -1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>53.5 53.9 0.4</td>
<td>36.8 35.0 -1.8</td>
<td>7.6 7.5 -0.1</td>
<td>2.1 3.6 1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>23.3 25.2 1.9</td>
<td>58.7 60.3 1.6</td>
<td>11.7 9.1 -2.6</td>
<td>6.3 5.4 -0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>28.7 28.5 -0.2</td>
<td>52.8 55.0 2.2</td>
<td>9.3 10.6 1.3</td>
<td>9.2 5.9 -3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.Britain</td>
<td>55.2 66.6 11.4</td>
<td>32.5 27.3 -5.2</td>
<td>6.3 3.7 -2.6</td>
<td>6.0 2.3 -3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>52.8 55.0 2.2</td>
<td>41.8 39.7 -2.1</td>
<td>4.0 4.0 0.0</td>
<td>1.4 1.3 -0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>43.6 27.3 -16.3</td>
<td>45.9 59.9 13.2</td>
<td>6.0 8.3 2.3</td>
<td>4.6 5.3 0.7</td>
</tr>
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The Western German identification with Western Europe and European integration, however, does not cover the whole meaning of Europe in German national identity. In a divided form, German national identity did not only include East Germany as a part of the German nation, but also implied the relation to Eastern Europe. In West Germany, underneath a strong anti-communism in political culture, the same motif of peace and reconciliation vis-à-vis the West was also present vis-à-vis the East. This reconciliation motivation was at the heart of the new Ostpolitik since Willi Brandt and lays also at the core of the moral mission after the collapse of communism to develop a new peace order in Eastern Europe and to promote the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union. Still in communist East Germany, the dominant official layer was a strong identification with the Communist East, but also on the mass level a reevaluation of German attitudes to the Eastern neighbors took place. On this backdrop, in present East Germany there is a special sense to find a European peace order with Eastern Europe in contrast to a lower identification with the Western European based European Union.
3. German National and European Identities

3.1 Two countries, one nation? The construction of national identities in divided Germany

The division of Germany into two states as it developed as a result of the emerging Cold-War confrontation between the Western Allies and the Soviet had first not been accepted on the basis of a common and self-evident German national identity (Westle 1999, Winkler 2000). The West German constitution was understood as preliminary and began with a moral imperative to the German people to continue to work for the reunification of Germany “in freedom and self-determination.” On the other side of the “iron curtain”, the East German “anti-fascist people’s democracy” was also viewed as the first step towards a common Socialist Germany. With the construction of the Berlin wall in 1961 this pan-German identity became questioned and public and scholarly debates on the relationship between the German nation and the two German states started in the 1960s and 1970s. On the West German side, though all political camps still agreed upon the existence of a pan-German nation, politicians and intellectuals appealed at the same time to develop a patriotism to the West German state (Jaspers 1966). On the East German side, the political leaders were also still oriented to German unity, but at the same time emphasized the necessity to form a “class nation” and to promote patriotism to the GDR state (Schweigler 1972). On this basis, the new Ostpolitik of the Brandt government and its agreements with the GDR in 1970-72 accepted the GDR de facto as a second German state, though the West German Constitutional Court denied the right to abandon the ultimate goal of German unification.

This pan-German consensus of a common German nation eroded further in the 1980s when parts of the left and liberal spectrums in West Germany publicly renounced any further attempts at bringing about German unification. In East Germany, too, the Communist leadership started to mobilize the German national heritage for GDR patriotism. By the end of the 1980s, people in the Federal Republic had developed a distinctive notion of a West German identity, even though the Berlin Wall remained a thorn in the side of a sleeping pan-German consciousness. Had the civil rights movement in the GDR not succeeded in peacefully overthrowing the SED regime, West Germans would probably have had no great difficulty with further accommodating to the status quo (Wolfrum 1999). And when the motto of the East German resistance movement changed from “We are the people” to “We are one people”, this may only partially be related to the still lingering feelings of pan-German national consciousness. It may well have had to do with a more pragmatic notion, namely, that the West German model had proven to be more successful. It is not altogether unlikely that calls for unification were motivated much more by material needs and wishes that the devastated GDR economy could no longer meet, than by feelings of belonging together, and having a common history and ancestry, especially as West Germans became far more reluctant to embrace their newly regained brethren in the East when it became clear that unification would mean sacrifices for both sides of the former iron curtain (Görtemaker 1999: 770-77).

In order to better understand the phenomenon that Jürgen Kocka (1995) has aptly called “unification crisis” (Vereinigungskrise), we need to shed some light on the principal debates (or non-debates) that shaped the development of two rather distinct
notions of historical consciousness and national identity in the two German states. At least since the student movement at the end of the 1960s had succeeded in putting it on the public agenda, the burden of the Nazi past was a prominent feature in political debates in the Federal Republic. These debates culminated in the 1980s, beginning with the clumsy management of Ronald Reagan’s visit to Germany in April, 1985, and the critically acclaimed speech delivered by president Richard von Weizsäcker on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the end of World War II (Reichel 1999: 231-54), reaching a first climax in the “historians’ debate” over the uniqueness of the Nazi annihilation of the Jews (Historikerstreit 1987, Evans 1989, Maier 1988), and going on to quarrels about a speech held by Philipp Jenninger, president of the Bundestag, at the 50th anniversary of the November 9, 1938, nation-wide pogrom (Reichel 1999: 269-79). This culture of discourses about the Nazi past continued somewhat unabated in the 1990s, although some changes in rhetoric and connotation can be made out (Becker 2001).

On the West German side, two main positions crystallized in the public and scholarly debates until the late 1980s. A left-liberal, social-democratic and green spectrum, articulated first by Dolf Sternberger (1982) and later, and in much more “metaphysical” way, by Jürgen Habermas (1990), wanted to ground West German patriotism solely on the loyalty to the West German constitution (“Verfassungspatriotismus”); whereas the opposition conservative-liberal camp articulated by Lübke (1989) or Nipperdey (1990) emphasized also the salience of German culture and history. Although both camps shared basic democratic value orientations, they denounced each other as nationalists – either ”positive” or ”negative”.

To a lesser extent, German history between 1933 and 1945 also played an important role in the political culture in the GDR, albeit in a less sophisticated form of official anti-fascism (Grunenberg 1991). It is not altogether clear whether the grand narrative which placed the GDR in the position of the highest level of German national development could command as much support as the “negative” or “positive” West German identity. However, we follow Mary Fulbrook’s (1999: 155) thesis that

3.2 One country, two nations? Problems of national identity after reunification

With the unification of Germany, there is now a general trend in the public and scholarly debates to reconcile the ethnic-cultural and political civic dimension of the German nation. As a consequence, the major oppositions between the political and cultural constitutions are tuned down, but also complemented by revitalized nation of the German nation as a solely ethno-cultural community (Westle 1999a,b).

In this context, it is important to note that the unification of Germany finally brought about a basic congruence of nation and state. For the first time in the history of German nation-building and state formation the ethnic-linguistic settlement space of
the German population as well as the cultural self-definition coincided with the political borders of the German state. Due to the resettlement of millions of Germans from the East after World War II and the reflow of ethnic Germans (Aussiedler) from Eastern Europe in the 1980s and 1990s as well as to the separate national path of the German Austrians, any German irredenta nationalism has ceased to exist. At the same time, the originally missionary German cultural nationalism based on the German Kulturnation has been transformed in a moral self-critical attitude towards any renewed misuse of the German nation. And political nationalism has overcome the authoritarian, collectivist and totalitarian attitudes in the direction of a democratic constitutional and more civic, participatory political culture.

However, the unification of Germany has also led to a stronger German national consciousness, growing national pride and a stronger identification with Germany as well as to a strengthening of right-wing nationalism and increased xenophobia. Although left and liberal intellectuals are still dominating public discourse to great extent, voices calling for a "healthy" national self-confidence and an end to self-accusation and political self-restraint are finding greater audiences and more reputation. (Schwilch and Schacht 1994 is the somewhat self-styled manifesto of a new democratic right, and the debates on whether one ought to be proud to be German or on a German Leitkultur testify to this development.) This re-nationalization of German national identity has nonetheless been accompanied by the continuation of a self-critical discourse on German national identity (Westle 1999a,b. In these debates, the old West German principal oppositions between the anti-nationalist and pro-nationalist intellectual camps were still visible. But on the whole, on the basis of a consolidated German nation-state and a more self-assured German identity, the debates became less principled and more pragmatic.

Despite the common pan-German national identity, the division between the two forms of national identity in West and East Germany continued to exist and have crystallized in mutual boundary constructions. These two German identities are not two different regional identities, but two forms of national identity based on the different historical legacies and their reconstruction under the different social and political conditions in both parts of Germany. One of the starting points of this division of identities was the unequal form of national unification. Although the majority of the East Germans voted for it, the East German political, economic and cultural systems were all reconstructed according to the West German model (disregarding the need for a reform of this system which had been articulated in West Germany in the 1980s). Attempts at taking the call for a new, all-German constitution laid out in the West German Basic Law and considered as desirable at the round table talks before the first (and last) free elections to the East German parliament, were soon muted by the pressures of day to day politics (see Guggenberger 1991, Görtemaker 1999: 773). So to speak, a political and cultural expropriation of East Germany took place. In addition, the socio-economic development of Eastern Germany, despite its relative success, has not really been catching up with the West German economy. For East Germany, a dual economy is characteristic. One half of the East German economy and population participates in the growth dynamic of the West German and European economic development, the other half is excluded with stagnating economic growth, high unemployment rates and continuing migration flows from the East to the West. As a consequence, the enormous financial transfers and the corresponding dependence of East on West Germany continue.
In this context, the two German national identities show interesting differences. According to the recent study of Bettina Westle (1999), the following differences can be observed. First, German national pride is conspicuously lower than in other European nations. At the same time, national pride in East Germany is higher than in West Germany. As Figure 1 shows, East German pride was relatively high in 1989/90, decreased considerably through the transformation crisis 1990-1993, but then overtook again the West German level. West German national pride was traditionally low, fell even more after German unification, but then showed a slow movement of self-assurance.

**Figure 1: National Pride (means 1=not, 4=very proud)**

4

3.5

3

2.5

2

1.5

1

80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96

* EC without Germany <West Germany >East Germany

(Source: Westle 1999a: 181 on the basis of Eurobarometer surveys)

Second, the components of East and West German national identity also differ. On the one hand, East Germans show a stronger ethnically based German national identification than West Germans. As often observed, the East Germans are "more German" than the West Germans (Gauss 1983). As Table 2 shows, the East Germans feel more closely attached to their town and region as well as to the former GDR than the West Germans do to their respective regions and to the former Federal Republic.
Table 2: Closeness to geopolitical units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>West Germany</th>
<th>East Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>91 92 93 95</td>
<td>90 92 93 95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town and country</td>
<td>2.87 2.93 2.82 2.81</td>
<td>3.16 2.89 2.89 2.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former FRG/GDR</td>
<td>2.85 2.75</td>
<td>3.04 2.52 2.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old/new countries</td>
<td>2.93 2.73</td>
<td>2.87 2.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany/nation</td>
<td>2.93 2.85 2.77 3.01</td>
<td>3.30 2.80 2.59 3.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>2.46 2.38 2.26 2.61</td>
<td>2.14 1.89 2.62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Westle 1999a: 183

At the same time, as Table 3 indicates, the West Germans identify more with the political-legal system, constitutional law and the social security system, whereas the East Germans are more proud of scientific, cultural and sports achievements.

Table 3: Pride in collective goods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>West Germany</th>
<th>East Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>88 92 96</td>
<td>90 92 96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political legal system</td>
<td>51 48 53</td>
<td>23 17 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social security</td>
<td>39 45 49</td>
<td>31 15 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic achievements</td>
<td>51 59 44</td>
<td>60 54 41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific achievements</td>
<td>37 38 41</td>
<td>56 48 57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievements in arts</td>
<td>22 22 23</td>
<td>47 44 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievements in sports</td>
<td>21 20 23</td>
<td>41 50 54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Westle 1999a: 185

Third, the types of nationalism have a different composition. Whereas in West Germany strong and moderate anti-nationalism has more weight, in East Germany strong patriotic and nationalistic positions are more wide-spread.
Table 4: Extreme nationalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>West Germany</th>
<th>East Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong antinationalist</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antinationalist</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>46.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong nationalist</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Westle 1999a: 189 on the basis of ISSP 1995

These findings also correspond to the differing attitudes towards foreigners and immigration. Whereas in West Germany a multicultural society in which ethnic minorities are accepted in keeping their distinct traditions can gain more support, in East Germany the emphasis is more on assimilating ethnic minorities into German culture. This corresponds to stronger xenophobic attitudes towards and violent acts against foreigners in East Germany than in West Germany (Minkenberg 1998, Westle 1999a: 189-192).

3.3 European elements in German national identity

A general feature of the public and scholarly debates on German national identity was and to a diminishing degree still is the moral and political emphasis on the internal predicament of the German nation and only secondarily the thematization of the relation between the German nation and Europe and other European nations. To many foreign observers, the German discourse on national identity has bee characterized by soul-searching, moral and political vagueness and suspicious in its anti-nationalist identification with Europe. The German-British sociologist, Ralf Dahrendorf articulated this international concern when he criticized the lack of a stable political definition of German national interests in relation to Europe (Dahrendorf 1990, Dahrendorf, Furet, Geremek 1992). Nevertheless, two main elements in the relation between German and Europe in West German identity discourse can be distinguished. On the one hand, there has developed a consensus in the West German political elite that Germany can morally and politically renewed only in integration with the West, Western Europe and particularly France. This was the basic premise from Adenauers Westpolitik to the foundation of the European Economic Community, the accession to NATO and the policy of deepening European integration by the Brandt/Schmidt and Kohl/Genscher governments. On this basis, the Kohl government also pressured for the deepening of European integration as a counterbalance against German unification. On the other hand, this political elite position was accompanied by a public and scholarly discourse that emphasized the moral renewal of Germany in reconciliation with its European neighbors on the basis of a European culture. This German moral and cultural Europeanness continued the cosmopolitan elements of German classical cultural nationalism, but this time without any claim for German cultural superiority, but in a fusion between German and European culture. Indeed, until German unification, the crystallizing German political and cultural orientations to Europe imagined an identity of Germanness and Europeanness. Only in United Germany, this fusion is differentiating in its German and European elements in clearer definition of a distinct German national position within and vis-à-vis Europe (Jarausch 1997).
Conclusion

In conclusion, German national identity after German unification is not only internally divided into West German and East German identities, but also externally in its European components. Regarding the weight of Europe in relation to the nation, the region and the home town, Western German national identity is more European and less ethnic than the East German counterpart. But this relates to the dimension of European integration or a European integrating identity in German national identity. At the same time, the support for the Eastern enlargement of the European Union is until to date slightly higher in East Germany than in West Germany. Our hypothesis is that this difference is an expression of the higher attachment by East Germans to a peace order with Eastern Europe in terms of a European civilizational identity and less of an attachment to the European Union, whereas the West Germans tend to identify more with the Western European based European Union and fear more the implications of the Eastern enlargements for Germany. Empirical research investigating this hypothesis would be a fruitful task for the future.
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MODERN GREECE:
A PROFILE OF IDENTITY AND NATIONALISM

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Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences
Athens, Greece
PART I

1. Introduction

The long history of Greece, from pre-classical antiquity to the present, makes the question of the representation of modern Greek ethnic identity a particularly complex and debated issue. Placed as it is in the South-eastern part of Europe, what is today’s Greece has been subject not only to numerous invasions and conquests over the centuries but also a theatre of cultural and political tensions, pressures and conflicts between East and West.

Having produced, in ancient, classical and Hellenistic times, a great civilization of its own, upon which a substantial part of modern European civilization rests, Greece has the rightful claim to be and feel quintessentially European. Yet, modern Greece is also heir to another important Christian civilization, the Byzantine, which for the greater part of the middle ages and up to the present day has been in tension with western, Latin Christianity. Hellenism and Orthodox Christianity, combined and in synthesis or in conflict and in tension, according to the historical, socio-economic and political circumstances, constitute the basis of modern Greek identity and have often divided it.

In the turbulent political history of modern Greece, from its establishment in the 1830s as a nation state to the present day, this long and complex cultural heritage, in the context of its dialectic with modernity and the west, has constituted the basic framework of representation of Greek identity and of Greek nationalism. The specificity and the transformations of this nationalism, which at times looked inconsistent and contradictory, can be explained by the fact that Modern Greece has tried to transform a long historical cultural identity into a political one (Tsaoussis 1983:21). It should be, thus, stressed that the tensions in modern Greek identity have been largely generated by complex internal and external political and socio-economic interests on the one hand and by the country’s aspirations to modernization on the other.

This circumstance - in the context of an ambiguous cultural fusion of Hellenism and Orthodoxia and “Europe” or “the west” always in the background - set the framework for a turbulent political process of nation building, riddled with cleavages, tensions and contradictions. Although the initial institutions of the Greek state were designed to function on the basis of western ideas and the Enlightenment - all of which were conducive with the classical Greek spirit and culture, espoused by many intellectuals and the urban and commercial Greek middle class, inside and outside the country - the whole policy of the nation from the 1840s to the early 1920s operated on the basis of an unrealistic and utopian vision of irredentism (Megali Idea), aiming to repossess what were once Greek Byzantine lands.

In all this the Greek Orthodox Church played an important role as a central institution of Modern Greek society tied to the state. Being the actual institution, which represents the continuation of Byzantine culture in modern Greece it has also functioned as the basic institution, which embodies the representation of the idea of ethnic identity as inseparable from Orthodoxia. The Church, however, although an important institution for all Greeks, until very recently, has been used by the state and the various governments to pursue their power and, often, party political ends. This
has placed the Church, from the beginning of the establishment of the Greek state, in an invidious position vis-a-vis the modernization and democratisation of Greek society (Kokosalakis 1987).

The rise of a liberal middle class and the forces for democratisation, reflected in the liberal party of Venizelos from about 1910, clashed with the policies of the Monarchy during and after the First World War. This, and the large influx of Greek refugees from Asia Minor in 1922, led to a deep long lasting division (dichasmos) in the country between the liberal forces of the centre and the left and the conservative and reactionary forces of the right. With the prevailing of the right, in the mid-war and post Second World-War period, the division took a severe ethnic character during the civil war (1947-1949) and led to the dictatorship of the Colonels (1967-1974). All this obstructed and delayed seriously the democratisation and modernization of Greek society. Indeed, the process of modernization took at times an ambivalent and even schizophrenic character towards the West and towards Europe. Modernization has been always a policy by all political parties and forces but at the level of culture and ethnic identity the west has been often understood as a threat. Certainly this has been so for a considerable section of the population and especially certain political and ecclesiastical circles, which understand Greek identity in terms of a fusion of Hellenism and Orthodoxy.

Yet, it should be stressed that opposition to the EU by the Greek people has not followed the accession of Greece as a member state of the EU. On the whole, Greece’s membership to the EU seems to be well accepted and understood as part of the process of modernization of Greek society. Certainly there is no evidence of incompatibility between the European and the Greek identity, although there have been heightened nationalist feelings in Greece due to events in the Balkans during the 1990s and a historical distinction between Greek and western culture always remains. Yet, emphasis on the cultural heritage of each European nation seems and needs to be at the heart of building a united Europe if building a “fortress Europe” is to be avoided. Greece’s geopolitical position and its specific cultural and religious heritage give it a special significance and role in the European family.

In this report we shall attempt to present a brief profile of the transformations and the historical landmarks of the representation of Greek ethnic identity and the basic discourses within which it has taken place. The report is synthetic rather than analytic and is highly condensed. The spatial-temporal dimension underpinning the formation and transformations of modern Greek society involved the European dimension all along and has become closely intertwined with it after Greece’s membership in the EU. Thus, Greek politics always involved European politics and now Greek politics are European politics. For the specific reasons outlined above in part I we shall have to concentrate on the historical dimensions and on 19th century more specifically as it is through that that the various significant others and the dominant discourses become also explicit. In part II we shall present developments, discourses and attitudes concerning the relationship of Greece and the EU from 1974 onwards.
2. The Constituent Elements of Greek Identity

A union between the Greek classical and Hellenistic culture on the one hand and Christianity on the other is believed to have taken place during the first four centuries B.C. Some locate that union in the New Testament itself and in St. Paul’s Hellenic education in particular and point to the fact that the Churches of Asia Minor and of today’s Greece were established by S. Paul and other Apostles. This union between Christianity and Hellenism was strengthened, indeed, consolidated in 330 when the Emperor Constantine transferred the capital of the Roman Empire from Rome to Constantinople. Christianity then became the official religion of the state. In a theological, philosophical and cultural context the connections between classical philosophy and Christianity were formally worked out, particularly by the Cappadocian fathers, of whom St. Basil, St. Chrysostom and S. Gregory the theologian have become patrons of letters and education in modern Greece. The importance of these connections for Greek identity have been discussed by politicians, theologians and historians and the sociologist T. Parson (1979) has pointed out their significance for the religious and economic symbolism of Europe at large.

For the evolution of the Byzantine and modern Greek culture the importance of these connections are recognised by all Greeks, although there are varying, and sometimes diametrically opposed interpretations of their value and significance for modern Greek identity and society. Many Greeks, especially clergymen, some academics and certain politicians, believe and argue that there is a bond between Hellenism and Greek Orthodoxy which together with the Greek language constitute the basis of both Greek ethnic identity and the unity of the Greek nation. Others, some intellectuals in particular and politicians of the left, maintain that this is only a historical relic but it has been often used as a tool for political control and has served as an obstacle to modernization of Greek society. However, polarities apart, religion always had and continues to have important functions in Greek society especially at the juncture of culture and politics. It cannot be denied that Greek Orthodoxy, the Hellenic heritage, along with the Greek language, have been basic constituents in the shaping of modern Greek identity.

Historical events within the unfolding of Greek history and culture have sometimes strengthened the Hellenic and sometimes the Christian dimension but have never separated them completely. Rather external forces have contributed to strengthen and consolidate the fusion between the religious and the ethnic factor. Because of the conflict between the Eastern and Western Church, which was also a conflict about political power between the papacy and the Byzantines, after the schism in 1054 the Greeks of Byzantium, especially the intellectuals, started calling themselves Hellenes. Before that and especially during the early centuries A.D the term Hellene and the term ethnos carried negative connotations and were attributed to non-Christians, to idolaters (ethnikoi) (Campell and Sherrard 1968: 20-21). Thus, the 11th century in Byzantium marks both, the beginning of the modern Greek ethnic consciousness and a historical land mark for the consolidation of the cultural and political distance and mistrust between the Greek Orthodox East and the Latin Catholic West. During the late centuries of Byzantium, especially during the dynasty of Palaiologoi, the idea of a distinctive Greek consciousness developed and a link with the classical Greek heritage was attempted. The so called ‘hellenizing’ movement mainly by intellectuals led by George Gemistos Pletho, claimed a direct continuity of Byzantium with
Hellenic classical antiquity. (Campell and Sherrard 1968:23-24; Clogg 1979:87; Svoronos 1975:21). This movement was interrupted by the fall of Constantinople (1453) but the idea and the image of the nation as a dream of aspirations for freedom and independence, grew and became the moving force for the Greek revolution (1821).

The mistrust between Byzantium and the west, which gradually grew to become a cultural gulf, was assisted by special historical events like: the Crusades and especially the sack of Constantinople (1204); the imperialist tendencies of the Church of Rome and the supremacy of the papal authority (Stefanides 1959: 370-396); the Venetian occupation of much of today’s Greece; the Uniate efforts to procelytize Orthodox believers during the Ottoman occupation etc. Since the birth of the Greek nation state in the late 1820s the cultural distance and mistrust for the west has continued well until very recently because of the constant intervention in Greek affairs by one or another western power.

History then and political theology had a substantial impact and contributed to the hardening of the boundaries of Greek ethnic identity at both a popular and official level. The fusion of religion and ethnicity was strengthened and consolidated in order to serve as shield against external threatening forces but also in order to carry forward the survival of the nation (to genos) during Ottoman rule (Svoronos 1975:22). Throughout that period the Orthodox Church, led by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, was the institution which, carried the ethno-religious identity of the Greeks and became a cultural symbol and a bridge between Byzantium and modern Greece.

3. The Background to the Formation of Modern Greece

Along with the 25th of March 1821 - the date of the launching of the Greek War of Independence - the 29th of May 1453 are the most important dates of modern Greek history, which every school child has to memorise. The Conquest of Constantinople by Mahmout B’ meant not just the end of the Byzantine Empire but the beginning of a dream for the birth of a new Greek nation. Soon after the fall of the ‘Polis’, with its magnificent Byzantine churches, especially that of St. Sophia, popular songs were expressing the aspirations of the Greeks: “Pali me chronia me kairous, pali dika mas thane” (Again with years, with time, again they will be ours). A myth thus developed that a new Greek Orthodox Christian Commonwealth, like the Phoenix, could arise out of the ashes of Byzantium.

The Institution which shouldered the responsibility of administering the Orthodox Millet after the conquest was the Patriarchate of Constantinople. As Svoronos (1975:22) points out, the fundamental preoccupation of the Greek Orthodox Church, throughout the period of occupation, was the protection of Orthodoxy from the threat of Islam as well as from western propaganda. The defence mechanisms of ethnic identity and the national idea strengthened even further the already strong fusion between popular culture, official religion and the political fortunes of the enslaved Greeks. From the 15th to the 19th centuries the Church was the sole cultural and political agent of the nation. The combination of religious ethnic and civic functions in its hands and the daily interaction of the clergy with the people of all social levels generated an ethos of reverence towards ecclesiastical office which became deeply rooted in the masses of enslaved Christians. The prestige of the Church was also
enhanced by the fact that up to the 18\textsuperscript{th} century she was liberal, humanistic and at times revolutionary (Svoronos 1975; Runciman 1972). On the other hand, the concentration of civic, religious and political functions in the hands of the higher clergy meant that the more unscrupulous of them got involved in corrupt dealings with the High Porte. They became part of the ruling elite and were on the whole highly conservative and inimical to new western ideas. On the whole, however, the esteem and prestige of the Church was high in the popular mind and was further enhanced by its role in the war of independence (1821-1827). More than 6000 priests and a large number of bishops were killed during the revolution (Frazee 1969:101; Woodhouse 1952) and the Patriarch Gregorios V was martyred at its declaration. Although the role of the Church during the Greek uprising has been at times exaggerated the fact remains that, by its very institutional position, its contribution was outstanding. This was not because the Church was or is a revolutionary or progressive institution but because she was and continues to be tied to the ethnic identity of the Greeks. At the dawn of Greece as a nation state the Church was the basic institution, which embodied the national dream in a new social and political setting.

But there was another vision substantially or drastically different from it. As mentioned earlier, already before Independence the ideas of the Enlightenment were widespread amongst Greek intellectuals (some of them clergy), who questioned the cultural hegemony of the Patriarchate. For many of them in fact Byzantium meant a period of obscurantism, religious dogmatism, superstition, and corruption; the very antithesis of the values of the Enlightenment. A secular Hellenic rationalist spirit had been cultivated for sometime by some eminent Greeks amongst whom Theofilos Korydaleas (1563-1646) is considered as a precursor of the free thought in modern Greece (Svoronos 1975:50). But the most prominent amongst them, by common acknowledgement (Dimaras 1953), has been Adamandios Koraes (1743-1833), the son of a merchant from Smyrna who studied in Europe and settled in Paris. He visualised the rebirth of Greece and her identity in the modern world not on the basis of the Byzantine religious culture but in the context of a secular civil society guided by the old Hellenic spirit and rational, humanistic and philosophical values. Yet, he was not a secularist but tried to steer a course between what he termed the Skylla of superstition and the Charybdis of atheism (Clogg 1979:40). He was above all a liberal and a reformist and thus a strong advocate of modernity.

Modern tendencies amongst intellectual circles were strong if we judge from the large number of publications of a secular character which appeared in Greek during the first two decades of 19\textsuperscript{th} century. According to Clogg (1979:36) 1300 Greek books were published during that period and some editions run to several thousands. There were also many translations of the French Encyclopaedists and other philosophers and scientists. Some sections of the small but vibrant Greek middle class, which was spread in the Balkans and in Europe, had turned to the Greek classics and many of them baptised their children by giving them ancient Greek names. These tendencies, which emphasised the secular and rational strand of Greek culture were congruent with the secular spirit of the time and the subsequent secularization and modernization of European societies. They were also congruent with the ideas of modernity and the general revival of neo-classicism, which was then sweeping Europe (Jenkyns: 1980).
Yet, it should be strongly emphasised that the Enlightenment and the revival of classical ideas were not endogenous developments in Greece as they were in western Europe. Although the classical Greek civilization has always been latent in Greek culture the modernizing ideas of the Enlightenment were imported into Greece and touched the general Greek population only marginally, if at all. There were substantive sociological reasons for this. Economically, politically and culturally Greek society, before and after the Revolution, was unable to adopt rationalist modernizing ideas and programmes. Such ideas were clearly romantic and utopian in the face of Greek social reality as Philhellenes such as Byron and others discovered. The mass of Greek people were illiterate and landless peasants who were steeped in popular religious culture and the superstitions of rural society. Over 60% of the population was rural and 80% of these had no property at all. The rest owned small holdings of between ½ and 1 acre in the mountainous areas and the richer ones between 5 and 20 acres in the fertile planes (Svoronos 1975:79). Both in the time of Kapodistria (1827-1831), the first Governor of the new-born Greece, and King Otto (1833-1862), land distribution and reform remained the crucial problem. Up to 1856 out of 721,000 acres of national arable lands only 28,00 were distributed to the peasantry and even those went to the stronger ones (Svoronos 1975: 79-80).

Apart from a small middle class, the general population was largely uneducated and even in the lower clergy only one per cent could write their names (Frazee 1969:101). Also, socio-cultural developments in the new-born nation, throughout the 19th century, were influenced by a multiplicity of conflicting interests both internal and foreign. Certainly what determined modernization and the formation of national identity were not the ideas of the Enlightenment and of modernity but harsh and conflicting political, ideological and economic realities and interests.

After the assassination of Kapodistria (1831) there was anarchy for sometime and then Greece was governed by an imported young monarch, Prince Frederic Otto of Wittelsbach, the seventeen year old son of King Ludwig of Bavaria. This was a cultural and political anomaly, for not only was the young king a Catholic and a foreigner invited to rule over an Orthodox nation, but besides this, the three man regency council which was in fact to rule was also Bavarian and Protestant. What came to be called «the Protecting Powers» exercised such an influence on the newly-born state that the first political parties were named appropriately ‘the English party’, ‘the French party’, and ‘the Russian party’. Supporters of these parties represented nascent class structures of Greek society but above all these parties represented corresponding foreign influences and interests.

The foreign administrators had no understanding of the indigenous culture. As they attempted to adapt western legal and cultural norms to Greek society their original aims of modernizing the country were compromised and failed (Legg, 1969:54; Legg and Roberts, 1997:29). The antagonisms of the protecting powers amongst themselves over Greece, and the policies of the Bavarian administration along with the activities of various Protestant Biblical societies, contributed as a reaction to produce a revival of the Orthodox ethos at both a popular and official ecclesiastical level. That ethos and its protesting function against the regime was expressed in the deep popular religiosity of General Makryannis (Kitromilides 1984:31) who was initially friendly with the king but was later against the injustices, discrimination and clientilistic policies of his administration (Makryannis 1996: 150,154).
4. Greek Irredentism and Nation Building 1844-1922

The ideology of the Greek revolution, albeit well underpinned by the ideas of the French Revolution and the Enlightenment, also had a nationalist irredentist character from the beginning. Rigas Feraios (1757-1798), a major revolutionary and the protomartyr for Greek independence, was dreaming a free democratic society not just for the Greeks but for all the Balkan peoples and even for the Turks themselves (Svoronos 1975:62; Clogg 1979:44). Also, Philiki Etairia, (the secret Friendly Society which prepared the Revolution), consisted of people from various walks of life and envisioned a free Greece to include all enslaved Greeks.

Against this ambition the initial Greek kingdom included only the Peloponese, the provinces south of Thessaly and some of the islands of the Aegean. In 1840 Athens had about 26,000 inhabitants whereas Istanbul had about 120,000 Greeks. In 1861 the total population of the Greek state was 1,100,000 whereas the Greek population still under Ottoman rule together with that of the British ruled Ionian islands was three times that (Statistical Yearbook of Greece 1970, p.18). So the dream of ‘unredeemed brothers’ (alytrotoi adelphi) dominated Greek thought throughout the 19th century and up to 1922 - the year of what is known in Greece as ‘Asia Minor catastrophe’. So, as Triandafyllidou (2001:79) states “Greek national consciousness was ‘constructed’ throughout the nineteenth century with reference to the nation’s irredenda, namely the regions inhabited by Greek-speaking Christian Orthodox populations that had not been included in the Greek state at the moment of its creation”. The boundaries of the Greek state itself kept changing by adding: the Ionian islands from the British in 1864; Thessaly and Arta in 1881; Greek Macedonia, Epirus, Crete and other islands of the Aegean after the Balkan Wars in 1913; and Thrace by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. Later in 1947 the Dodecanese were ceded by Italy to complete what are the boundaries of the contemporary Greek state.

By 1840 it was obvious that Greece was unlikely to develop along the cultural patterns of modernization prevalent in western Europe. Greek nationalism was evolving along a specific, idiosyncratic pattern. Industrialization was virtually absent and the whole structure of the economy was clearly precapitalist. The whole political edifice was underdeveloped and functioned in the context of personalised clientilistic politics which expressed the web of powerful family relations and interests. The political parties which existed, as already mentioned, reflected the interests and the antagonisms of foreign powers (Petropoulos 1968). Both Kapodistria and the King’s administration intended Greece to develop along the European prototype but the regency especially, being conservative and oligarchic, proved entirely inept as they attempted to impose changes from above without sensitivity to the problems of the infrastructure of society. One of the major problems in the new state was its strained relations with the Ecumenical Patriarchate because the Church of Greece was severed unilaterally from it (Frazee 1969). Maurer, the head of the Regency Council, in his efforts to modernize the country closed down most of the monasteries (412 out of 593) and confiscated their property. The King, after severe pressure from the grass roots and the intervention of the army (Sept. 3, 1843) was forced to concede a constitution. Yet, the oligarchic policies of the King continued to function.
So apart from the fact that the socio-economic and political structure of the country was not brought to develop along western paths of democratization (Filias 1974; Tsoukalas 1981; Mouzelis 1978), the ideological and cultural development also pointed to a different direction from that which Koraes and other intellectuals had envisaged. Instead, a romantic, utopian nationalism was born, underpinned on the one hand by the Byzantine religious culture and on the other by a nostalgic vision of ancient Greece. The Greeks seemed able to combine those two strands of identity and culture ever since. Mid-nineteenth century was characterised by revolutionary movements not only in the rest of the Balkans but also in Europe. This gave the opportunity to Kolettis, the man chosen by the King to head the government, to exploit nationalist aspirations towards a greater Greece. The ‘Megali Idea’ (the Great Idea) to expand the Kingdom eastwards and redeem all enslaved Greeks formed an essential policy of the state well up to 1922. As a vision it was supported by almost all Greeks at that time and Otto himself became an enthusiastic advocate of it. In reality, however, this unrealistic, irredentist idea served as a smoke screen for corruption and the severe socio-economic problems faced by the government and as an excuse for the even greater blatant intervention of the great powers in Greek affairs (Campbell and Sherrard 1968:89; Clogg 1979:76-79; Svoronos 1975:85).

There were failures, tragedies and disappointments as well as some successes in trying to implement the ‘Great Idea’ but there is no space here to deal with these. Suffice to say that the vision revived the historical connections between Orthodoxy and Hellenism and constituted a fusion which became, in varying intensity and form, the basic discourse for modern Greek identity. This was during the time when nations in the Balkans and in Europe at large were seeking to consolidate their cultural and historical roots. For a new, small and weak state like Greece it was imperative that the continuity of its cultural heritage, going back to classical and ancient times, should not be doubted. Yet, the cultural historian, Falmerayer put forward theories to question precisely that. The reaction inside and outside Greece was very strong. Spyridon Zampelios (1857: 464) coined the term «Hellenochristianikos» (Greek-Christian), in order to point to the unbroken continuity from ancient Greece to Byzantium to modern Greece. In the 1860s and 1870s, K.Paparigopoulos produced a full and detailed history of Greece from antiquity to his time in order to make explicit the unbroken continuity of Greek civilization. At the same period and up to the end of the century, N. Politis exploring the Greek popular culture and folklore produced indisputable evidence of the presence of the glorious past in contemporary everyday life. Later at the turn of the century the linguistic problem, that is the problem of the use of archaic (katharevousa) or the demotic language, also revived the problems and the debates over the continuity of Greek civilization and all, of course, was linked back to the problems and discourses over Greek identity and nationalism.

On the political plane Otto’s rule was becoming increasingly discredited and after the Crimean war the forces of the opposition rallied together demanding liberalization and western style parliamentary polity. In October 1862 Otto was dethroned and left Greece but the protecting powers, England in particular, found a new King in the person of William-George Glyxbourg of Denmark, who took the throne under the title George A? King of the Hellenes (Svoronos 1975:96). England, as a goodwill gesture, ceded to Greece the Ionian Islands in 1864, which she held as a protector since 1815, and all this fitted well with the policy of ‘megali idea’. There was a new democratic Constitution (1864), which limited the powers of the King, and in 1875 Charilaos
Trikoupis introduced the system of crowned parliamentary democracy. There followed substantial socio-economic development with the Greeks of the diaspora contributing significantly to it.

Throughout the second half of the 19th century and up to the first World War, the policies and aspirations of the emerging Balkan states, the problems of the disintegrating Ottoman Empire and the interests of the Great powers in the region were combined to constitute what has been called the «the Eastern Question» (to anatoliko provlima). It is essential to understand that the interests between these parties were mostly in conflict and all together presented a problem of great complexity. Certainly, the interests of the Balkan states were in conflict not just with Turkey but also with each other. Thus, along with frequent warfare, a substantial amount of horse trading had to take place between the interested parties for any part of the Ottoman empire which was ceded to any Balkan state. Following the treaty of St. Stefano (1878) and the Congress of Berlin (1878) Greece and Turkey signed a treaty in Constantinople (1881) by which Greece was acquiring the province of Thessaly and the county of Arta from Epirus. In 1897 the policy of the «Great idea» got a substantial set back by the defeat of Greece in a short war with Turkey. The great complexity of interests in the region led to the Balkan Wars 1912-13, which were followed by the First World War.

The outcome of these developments was congruent with the aspirations of «Megali Idea». After successive treaties, (London 1913; Bucharest 1913), Greece acquired much of Macedonia, Epirus, Crete and the north-eastern islands of the Aegean. Greek land increased by 70% and the population almost doubled from 2.800.000 to 4.800.000, some of whom were Slavs and Turks. Venizelos, the young liberal politician, had contributed to this expanse with his shrewd diplomacy and exceptional political capacity. After the assassination by a madman of King George I, Prince Constantine took the throne. In the excitement at the time about the Greek victories many hailed the new king as the successor of Constantine XI Palaiologos, for as the prophecy had it another Constantine would recapture Constantinople (Clogg 1979:104). Yet, in reality, it was largely due to the type of nationalism of this King and his clash with Venizelos over the policy on the First World War that Greece was to enter a long period of a divided nation, the consequences of which have been plaguing Greek society to the present day.

The problem, of what became ‘Ethnikos Dichamos’ (national schism), started with the different attitude between the King and his Prime-minister Venizelos towards the powers of the Entente (Britain, France and Russia). The King insisted on neutrality whereas Venizelos opted for alliance with the Entente at the outbreak of the war. Both men subscribed to the Greek irredentism but the clash over the issue of neutrality was such that Venizelos had to resign (March 1915). The real cause, however, lied in the fundamentally different politics of the two men. The politics of the King and of his supporters were deeply conservative whereas the politics of Venizelos were liberal and reformist. At bottom the issue was about democratic politics and a clash and deep division on this between royalists and venizelists. After internal political turmoil and pressure from Entente, the King without abdicating went into exile (1917) but came back to the throne in 1920 after the defeat of Venizelos in the national elections of a nation exhausted after eight years of wars.
In the spring of 1921 the Greek Army, under the command of Constantine himself, undertook a major expedition in Asia Minor aiming eventually at Istanbul itself. The expedition, however, was ill-fated, as in August 1922 the Turkish Army under Mustafa Kemal in a counter-offensive forced the Greek troops out of Asia Minor altogether and looted and burned Smyrna which was virtually a Greek city. About 1,100,000 refugees fled to Greece from Asia Minor. The King abdicated and a revolutionary Government came to power. In January 1923 there was an agreement of exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey and this had a decisive impact on the socio-economic life of the country throughout the twentieth century (Pentzopoulos 1962). ‘The catastrophe’, put an end to Greek irredentism and Greek nationalism itself took a different orientation. With the treaty of Lausanne (24 July 1923) Greece had to abandon any claims for Asia Minor and limit its border west of the river Evros in Thrace. Politics was never the same again. The question whether Greece was going to be a Monarchy or a republic became crucial and the division between Venizelists and royalists was to dominate Greek political life throughout the mid-war period.

5. The Crisis of Politics and Identity 1922-1974

The year 1922 constitutes a historical landmark because events since then took a new direction in the whole socio-economic, ideological and political life of the country. The shock of the Greek defeat in Asia Minor meant a deep soul searching for Greek nationalism and a deep appraisal of the relationship of Greece and the West. Indeed, the trial of the six men, politicians and military, accused for high treason for the defeat, was not over tactical mistakes but over the issue whether Greece really could follow a policy of isolation from the Great powers which was the issue dividing royalists and venizelists.

In 1928 the Greek population had risen to 6,204,674 out of 5,016,589 in 1920. The large influx of the refugees had set in motion a significant labour movement in the urban centres and an acute problem of agrarian reform in the countryside. There was a large anti-royalist feeling which resulted in the establishment of the first republic which, with intermittent military interventions, lasted from 1924 to 1936. Throughout that period there is a struggle to shift from an ethnic nationalism as it was expressed in the «Great idea» to a civic nationalism which would be based on modern political institutions. Yet, the democratic forces were weak and unable to function due to a weak economy and deep ideological and political divisions. Thus, Mavrogordatos (1983) describes the developments of 1922-1936 as «Stillborn Republic». Apart from a short period of political stability 1928 -1932, under the premiership of Venizelos, constant changes of government and the severe international economic crisis of the period never really allowed democracy to function. Meanwhile new political forces, largely as a result of the settlement of refugees but not only, deepened the gulf between royalists and liberals.

In 1935, after the intervention of army officers and a plebiscite with a «patently rigged result» (Clogg 1978:129), the monarchy was restored. Following political unrest General Metaxas, who was appointed Prime-Minister by the King, suspended the Constitution in August 1936. Metaxas’s dictatorship divided deeper an already divided country. His ideology of the «Third Hellenic Civilization», (akin to the Italian and Nazi fascism), claimed to be a combination of the virtues of ancient Greece and
Byzantium but in practice it suppressed any democratic idea and banned the texts of Anigoni by Sophocles and the Epitaphios by Thucidedes. Thus, demagogic declarations to cure the ills of Greek society were belied by the deepening corruption of the civil services, by large scale borrowing from Germany and rapid economic decline. Yet, he could not but refuse Mussolini’s ultimatum (28 October 1940) to let the Italian forces enter the country. The Greek people, united now with a heightened national sentiment, rallied to the call to resist the Italian invasion.

The German occupation of the country 1941-1944, provoke a substantial resistance at the grass roots of Greek society and provided an opportunity for the political forces of the left to organise themselves for the first time. Heroic acts of resistance and sabotage became frequent from the beginning by the National Liberation Front (EAM), the major organization of the left and the communists (Ekdotike Athinon 2000: 15-27; Svoronos 1975:139; Clogg 1979:). By 1942 EAM also had a military organization, the National Popular Liberation Army (E.L.A.S) pronounced as Ellas, the name of the country itself.

Other resistance organizations such as the National Republican Greek League (EDES), initially of liberal democratic tendencies, soon developed an anticommunist orientation. So, the resistance failed from the beginning to act in unison and carried, in embryonic form, the camps of the civil war, which followed. The great majority of the people were not communist but were very sympathetic to EAM and many, including many women, joint it not only as an act of defiance against the fascist occupation but also in order to participate in social life from which they had always felt excluded. According to Clogg (1979:150) «by the end of the occupation the membership of EAM has been variously estimated at between a million and two million».

If the end of the first World War found the Greek nation deeply divided the end of the second World War triggered the beginning of a devastating civil war fought on the pretext of who was patriot and who was a traitor. Many royalists and populists, but not only, during the war expressed German sympathies or even co-operated with the enemy. For most Greek people these were traitors (prodotes) or dosilogoi (Ekdotike Athinon 2000:43-47). On the other hand, the fear of a communist take over after the war, enhanced and by the intervention of the British and later of the Americans, contributed greatly to present all the communists and a large part of left sympathisers as enemies of Greece. With the defeat of the «democratic army» of the left at the end of the civil war in 1949 communism and communist became dirty words and ethnikofrosyne (loyalty to the nation) was elevated onto highest virtue indispensable for every citizen. The communists were not just outlawed but exiled and enclosed in concentration camps unless they confessed and denounced their horrendous ideology. The literature on this is so large that there is no room or need to be mentioned here but the historical bibliography already cited gives a comprehensive picture of the division of Greek identity over that period.

What has been called the Kingship of the Right (Svoronos 1975: 144-148) meant «a new nationalism, fanatic and self-complacent, which resembled that previous one of the 19th century. In contrast to that, however, the new nationalism was not embedded in a general holistic irredentist programme, but was defensive, reactionary and inward looking» (Tsoukalas 1986:36). From about 1946 to 1974 Greek citizens had to
produce a certificate of social thinking (pistopoitiiko koinonikon fronimaton) not just to exercise a citizen’s right or get a job but even to enter a hospital. The social, economic, ideological and political implications and complexities of this period have been ably analysed by Tsoukalas (1986); Alivizatos (1983); Kateforis (1976) and many others. During this period although the polity was ostensibly democratic in reality «the parliament never, or almost never, was entrusted and a status quo of liberties never developed. Sometimes the will to retain power, sometimes fear, always the excuse of difficulties and conspiratorial threats, marked, maimed and finally killed democracy in Greece» (G.Vedel in preface to Alivizatos 1983:16).

The shift of Greek nationalism to the right culminated in the dictatorship of the Colonels 1967-1974. This was not simply a shift towards an extreme right, nationalist ideology it was also a blow to civic nationalism and an affront to the idea and practice of democracy. The basic political ideology of the dictators was, as with previous dictatorships, a specific mythologization of Greek history. Again the term «Hellenocchristian» was installed to the core of Greek identity and the official ideology of the state but in a barbaric totalitarian sense that was not only a distortion but also an affront to both, the values of classical Greece and those of the Christian Orthodox religion. Greece, of course, became isolated in Europe and the world over that period - although the US Cold War foreign policy seemed to favour the Colonels access to and retaining power. But this regime, apart from being inefficient, was an anomaly in the sense of suppressing all freedoms and thus could not last. The collapse of the dictatorship (July 1974) opened for Greece a rapid development of socio-economic life and more importantly a new period of political, economic and social presence in Europe with access to symmetrical European status as a member state of the EU.


The discourses relating to Greek identity and Hellenism are many and vary according to the political and economic circumstances from one period to another. For this reason we have dwelt a little on history in order to show, on the one hand the general strands which have constituted Greek nationalism and Greek identity in modern Greece, and on the other to point to the specific historical landmarks which gave it a particular twist, emphasis or combinations of elements and tensions in each particular period.

We stressed the fact that the concept of Greek ethnic identity at the point of establishment of the Greek nation state was ambiguous to say the least. Although the unity of the Greek nation (to genos) became well formed during the period of the Ottoman rule (Svoronos 1975) and the Greeks fought the war of independence with a Greek consciousness, that consciousness consisted of complex cultural and historical strands. Following the establishment of the Greek state the ambiguity of what constitutes Greekness was enhanced and has persisted to the present day. Gourgouridis (1996:277), quoting (Vacalo 1983:129), expresses this ambiguity well: «The reference to the notion of Hellenicity varies in perception, differs in content, is utilized as pretext, and projected as a target, but it is always conceived as a self-evident notion». Others have pointed to the fact that modern Greek identity has been in constant crisis and the crucial problem has been how to convert a historical cultural identity to a political one. Thus, Tsaoussis (1982:17) states that: «One could say, without exaggerating that the crisis of identity constitutes the central problem of
modern Greek society the constitutive element of contemporary Hellenism and the axis around which our modern history revolves».

Ambiguity and tension, thus, over the central issue of identity underpinned the dominance of the state over society from the beginning. Indeed, it would be no exaggeration to say that the identity of the nation and an imagined idea of what constituted ‘the national interest’ was, at each particular time, largely constructed by the political elite. Nationalism, of course, was basically an imaginary construction everywhere (Anderson 1991; Gellner 1964). But for the Balkans complex socio-economic and historical circumstances determined the process of nation building. (Kitromilides 1997; Sfikas 1999). For Greece especially unique cultural and socio-economic factors and above all the interests, the influence and the intervention of significant others has contributed to the dominance of the state over society. As a result politics in modern Greece have become the most dominant part of social and cultural life. The monarchy was a foreign imported institution and modernization for the Bavarian administration meant above everything else a centralized bureaucratic state (Legg and Roberts 1997:195). This set the parameters for a highly centralised public administration, which has persisted to the present day. This, and the dominance of the state over society, also meant that a constructed ethnic nationalism instead of a civil one became prevalent in modern Greece.

The dominant discourses on ethnic identity and nationalism in Greece changed according to the social, economic and political circumstances. Thus, from the 1840s to 1922 the dominant discourse has been that of ‘Megali Idea’ and an irredentism for the ‘unredeemed brothers’ (alytrotoi adelfoi). In the mid-war period, the disappointments of a politically and socially divided nation were expressed through a popular and/or anti-western nationalism, through idealised socialism and through pessimistic or utopian literature. In the post war period and after the civil war the discourse is set by a fanatic, exclusive right wing nationalism, which pursues ruthlessly its enemies inside the country. That discourse culminates and ends with the dictatorship (1967-1974). Since then, the period called ‘metapolitefsi’, there has been a process of democratisation and development. The discourse presents a variable character, the goal of modernization/europenization remains constant and the ambiguity over identity remains central.

The basic constant variables in all facets of modern Greek identity and nationalism have been Hellenism, Greek Orthodox Christianity and, to a lesser extent, the question of the Greek language. From the end of the 19th century some literary men, Psicharis (1854-1829) for instance, identified the struggle for nation building with the struggle for the linguistic problem. Namely: the problem of the language of the state, of formal education and everyday literary communication. They argued that the ‘demotic’ not the ‘katharevousa’ should be the official language of the nation. It should be stressed at this point that the ‘linguistic problem’ reflected deep social, political and ideological cleavages in Greek society. Vergopoulos (1978:107) states that katharevousa succeeded to become the privileged language of authority and the bureaucracy of the state and as such it formed the structures of power but it did not manage to modernize and Europeanize the country. The linguistic problem has been basic and hotly debated in Greek society well up to the 1980s when the PASOK government adopted the demotic as the official language of the state.
The struggle and soul searching for the ‘psyche’ of modern Greece has been expressed in the poetry and literature of distinguished men who rose above politics and managed to transcend the tradition/modernity dichotomy to a significant degree. Starting with Solomos (1798-1857) and Palamas (1859-1943), followed by Kavafis (1863-1933), Kazantzakis (1882-1957), Seferis (1900-1971), Ritsos (1909-1990), Elytis (1911-1996) and others we have examples of a creative synthesis of modern Greek identity. All these men synthesised, from different perspectives, the values and ecumenical elements of both the Hellenic and the Orthodox Byzantine culture but always in a creative civilizational context attempting to reach beyond the confines and the negativity of contemporary socio-economic and political conditions and contradictions. Not an inward looking, closed, defensive nationalism here. There is instead an agonizing search for a deeper universal spirit, combining tradition and modernity without rejecting the values of either but with a critique of the moral and cultural decay, which may be found in both. In recognition the international community awarded Nobel Prizes for literature to Seferis and Elytis with Kazantzakis as another serious candidate.

At the social and political level, however, the various debates and the tensions have unfolded within the matrix and the dichotomy between tradition and modernity. This paradigm which Smith (1998:8-24), Gellner (1964;1983) and others, have called classical modernism constitutes a wide umbrella, which covers both various trends as well as various sociological analyses of Greek nationalism and Greek society generally. The core concept is that of modernization, and this covers also Greece’s relationship with the west and with Europe, which is explored more extensively in part two.

Compared to most western societies, the social sciences in Greece developed only recently. For political reasons, sociology in particular was hardly in existence before 1974, and there was since then a prevalence of Marxism while other sociological theories were almost absent (Kokosalakis 1998). Not surprising then, the most serious and sociologically powerful studies on Greek society came from within a Marxist perspective (Tsoukalas, 1969;1977;1981;1986;1991;1996; Mouzelis, 1978; 1986; 1994;2001; Filias, 1974; 1980;1983; Vergopoulos, 1978; 1978a; and many others). These have been very important works for understanding the unfolding of Greek nationalism from the establishment of the Greek state until very recently. They pointed to the deficits of democracy and to the obstacles of democratization and analysed Greek society as a totality. They showed that the facets of nationalism and the tensions in Greek identity are not endemic in some notion of the Greek character but are directly linked to economic interests and class structures and transformations. At another level they showed that the development of Greece was largely determined by foreign interests and by wider formations and transformations of capitalism in general.

Yet, on the negative side, all these studies carry within them, in varying degrees, the general epistemological and theoretical problems, which beset Marxism. Here, we are not just referring to the specific problems of the Marxist theory of history, or to the deterministic character of the economic factors over the cultural and political ones, but we are mainly concerned with the concept of class as a dominant analytical tool, which in the case of Greece is not applicable as it is to the western countries with a feudal background. There is also a certain problem is the way in which these studies
handled the relationship between tradition and modernity. It is true that the Marxist perspective lacks sensitivity to an anthropological understanding of tradition considering it largely as anachronistic cultural lag. Certainly this is its position vis-à-vis religion.

In modern Greece, it is true, the relationship between tradition and modernity has been one of tension and at times it has been emotionally charged. Positions on either side have perceived the relationship as one of polarity. The historical opposition between the Greek Orthodox East and the Latin Catholic West is transferred into a traditionalist/modernist opposition. This was the case between Oikonomou versus Pharmakides and their followers in 19th century and between Papadimantakis and Kontoglou against the modernist aspirations of the higher classes up to mid-twentieth century. At the same time the intense traditionalism and anti-westernism of Giannopoulos is the opposite pole of the intense modernist and prowestern attitude of Skleros, who considered modernism and Europenization a prelude to the transition to socialism. Throughout the mid-war period the political divisions are also charged with modernist or anti-modernist attitudes and certain literary men such as Kariotakis, Sikelianos, Lathapiotis and others advocated a pessimistic escape from reality altogether. The tradition/modernity tension runs right through to the present day and has been expressed recently in the debates over the policies of the government over modernization.

The problem in most of these polarizations is one of emphasis and in certain cases one of ideological closure and this applies mostly to the traditionalists. But even at the level of analysis, both the Marxist as well as certain right of centre ideological perspectives cannot escape a closure and sharp dichotomy between tradition and modernity. This is, of course, an immense topic to be dealt with here but it should be stressed that in real life there is continuity and a mixture of tradition and modernity in everyday life. At least in the Greek case what is often presented as a cultural civilizational conflict and incompatibility between a Greek culture and a western European culture seems to us a social ideological construction. The Greek culture, in both its classical Hellenic strand as well as in its Orthodox Byzantine one, is really not contrary to the central values of the Enlightenment. The religious side of this culture is, of course, in conflict with the antimetaphysical, anthropocentric and individualist strand of an arid, instrumental western rationalism but this type of rationalism has also been rejected by western Romanticism and has been critically analysed by eminent western sociologists such as Max Weber. In any case, contemporary Greek socio-economic and political life has been functioning on the basis of western prototypes and institutions for almost two hundred years by now.

Another major factor inseparable from all discourses on Greek ethnic identity and nationalism is that of religion (Makrides 1996). For various historical, economic, political and cultural reasons mentioned earlier Greek society has not become secularised anywhere near to the degree that western European societies did over the last three hundred years or so (Kokosalakis 1996a). Church and state never separated and the Greek Constitution (article 3) states that the Eastern Orthodox Church is the official religion of the country. After the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey in the 1920s Greece has become a homogenous society concerning religion with over 96% Orthodox. Although tensions have been endemic in the relations of Church and state from the beginning (Kokosalakis 1995a; Manitakis 2000), a
separation between these central institutions of Greek society does not seem likely because the Orthodox religion is a crucial part of Greek ethnic identity.

The Orthodox religious culture, despite secularization and modernization, never ceased to be part of Greek everyday life. Not that the Greeks are especially Church going people - like the Irish are for instance - but compared to western Europe in general Church attendance is high and growing lately (Georgiadou and Nikolakopoulos, 2001). The rights of passage are practised almost universally and no Greeks (ethnic) would fail to have their children baptised, or neglect the duty of commemoration rights (mnemosyna) for their dead. Festivals, especially Easter, are celebrated by all and popular religiosity concerning the cult of the Saints and Virgin Mary in particular is very high. There has been thus an unbroken continuity of tradition in Greece through religion (Kokosalakis, 1996;1996a). The Church explores this to the full and has claimed an unbroken cultural hegemony over Greek society. Thus, the Byzantine culture is present and alive in Greece today, many centuries after the collapse of the Byzantine empire.

Politicians cannot afford to ignore this aspect of Greek cultural heritage without political cost and most of them have stressed the connections between Hellenism and Orthodoxy. Thus, the Prime-Minister and then President Karamanlis stated on several state occasions and speeches that: «the concept of Hellenism and Orthodoxy have been interwoven inseparably in the consciousness of the nation». Prime-Minister Papandreu before his access to power had planned in the party’s manifesto for «an administrative separation of Church and state» but when in power the issue was shelved. Instead, he declared the Virgin Mary Patron of the armed forces (15 August 1982). Prime-Minister Mitsotakis stated in parliament that «Orthodoxia constitutes the support of the nation. Orthodoxia can and must play a significant role, especially today, in the context of cosmogonic changes which take place around in the Balkans, in Eastern Europe, and in the Soviet Union. It is a spiritual force of global dimensions and surely supports the state in our ethnic concerns» (Minutes of Parliament, 24 April 1990).

With the global revival of the social significance of religion over the last ten years, Orthodoxia has again become a central factor in the debates over contemporary ethnic identity and national developments in Greece (Manitakis 2000; Cynaxi, 2001). The latest most heated debates between Churchmen, politicians and intellectuals concerned the question whether religious affiliation should continue to be stated in the citizens’ identity cards. The government decided that the mention of religious affiliation should be omitted on the identity cards issued from now on. The Church, especially the archbishop, some bishops, and above all some Orthodox fundamentalist groups reacted against this very strongly. The Church proceeded to collect signatures of the people in the parishes petitioning for a referendum on the issue. The Church claimed that it collected over three million signatures asking for a plebiscite but when it presented this petition to the president of the republic the answer was that the Church’s activity over this issue was unconstitutional. Some claim that PASOK, the governing party, has had serious political cost over this but others have seen it as a victory of the State over the Church. What is certain is that Orthodoxia remains an important component of Greek ethnic identity but this is not necessarily an obstacle for the modernization of the country (Mouzelis 2001) and its integration in the EU.

The fortunes of modern Greece have been largely determined by significant others. The new-born nation started with a foreign monarch and a foreign government in the 1830s. The ‘protecting powers’ (Britain, France and Russia), and often their conflicting interests, determined, to a large extent, internal political developments and the actual political parties were named after these countries. Thus, throughout the period of Otto, one gets the impression that the Greeks were completely absent from the formal political procedures (Svoronos 1975:79). The question of Greek irredentism from 1844 to 1923 cannot be separated from the ‘Eastern Question’ which involved a complexity of conflicting interests of the dying Ottoman Empire, the young Balkan states and the Great powers. The whole process of nation building and the gradual formation of Greek national boundaries up to 1923 involved frequent military conflicts and a diplomatic political process within which much horse-trading took place amongst the interested parties.

In general terms the significant others, who were involved in deciding the fortunes of the Greek nation up to 1923 were: Turkey, the great powers (Britain, France, Russia and the Austro-Hungarian empire), Serbia and Bulgaria. Turkey has always been the historical enemy not just because of the four-hundred year Ottoman occupation but because it has been a constant threat for modern Greece to the present day. So the bilateral interests and relations of the two countries have been constant variables in the life of the Greek nation. During the Balkan wars Greece was also in conflict with Bulgaria and Serbia over the question of Macedonia, which consisted of a mosaic of ethnic groups.

From 1923 onwards Greece has continued to be the cross-roads of conflicting interests of both neighbouring nations and of the superpowers. In fact the complexity and the volume of these interests are such that only a brief mention can be made here. The exchange of populations, on the basis of religious identity, by the treaty of Lausanne (1923) meant that Greece became probably the most homogenous nation in the Balkans (Mavrogordatos 1983:226). Nevertheless, small ethnic minorities remained within the Greek boarders. According to the 1928 census the total population of the nation was 6,204,684 out of which 5,819,742 (93.8%) were Orthodox Greeks and 384,942 (6.2%) were various ethnoreligious groups. The three major ones were: Turkish/Moslem 86,506 (1.39%); Slavo-Macedonian/Orthodox 81,844 (1.32%); and Jewish 63,000 (1.02%). Apart from the Jews, these and other smaller minorities, which the Greek governments insisting on calling religious or ethnic and not national, represented conflicting interests of neighbouring nations within Greece and kept affecting political alignments in the inter-war period. (Mavrogordatos 1983: 226-272). The Muslims of western Thrace have been always defined as a religious minority by the Greek state according to the treaty of Lausanne. The minority itself was initially happy with this definition but from the 1960s it claimed an ethnic status which created some tensions with the Greek state. During the 1990s tensions have decreased and the socio-economic conditions of the minority have markedly improved. A small Albanian Moslem minority (around 18,000) in western Macedonia called Tsamides co-operated with the Germans during the war and committed atrocities against the Greek population. Most of these, however, left into Albania at the end of the war. Apart from the Moslems, who are concentrated mainly in Thrace and constitute an important factor in the bilateral relationships between
Greece and Turkey until today, the rest of the ethnic minorities ceased to be of real significance in the post-war II period. There is, however, some literature (Karakasidou 1993; 1997; Makridge and Yannakakis 1997), which argues for the importance of a Slav minority in Greek Macedonia. Such arguments do not concern us here. We can only say that according to most accounts (empirical and literary) the linguistic minority known mainly as Vlachs and speaking Slavic idioms have been always known to have Greek consciousness and have not claimed for themselves an association with another state outside Greece.

Amongst the very important internal significant others of contemporary Greece is the large influx of immigrants in the country during the 1990s. Apart from the minorities mentioned above, Greece until the mid 1980s was largely a homogenous society. Since then, however, significant numbers of Greeks form the area of Pontus and the former Soviet Union started emigrating to Greece. Reliable statistics are not available but there are about 160,000 registered and an estimate of as many and more unregistered economic immigrants. As ethnic Greeks, their social, cultural and economic integration has been a serious concern for the Greek state (Kassimati 1992). The other most significant immigrant group during the 1990s have come from Albania. Again the numbers can only be roughly estimated not only because of lack of statistics but also because, due to the proximity of the two countries, there is a flux of movement forward and backward. Their total number is now estimated over 500,000. For those of them of a Greek ethnic origin, the so called Voriopeireotes, settlement in the country has been less painful than the large numbers who have encountered all the usual stereotypes and even the racist attitudes of a host society unprepared to large scale-influx of immigrants. In addition to the Albanians there has been significant immigration from other Balkan countries, Poland, the Middle East and elsewhere. The overall estimate of immigrants to the country during the last fifteen years has been well over one million which has substantial economic, social and cultural implications for Greek society. On the whole such implications are considered positive especially at the economic level.

The major involvement of external significant others in Greece occurred during and after the Second World War. The attack on Greece by Mussolini in October 1940 and its subsequent occupation in the spring 1941 by the forces of Hitler, apart from the devastation of the country, had two very important effects: On the one hand it gave the opportunity, mainly to the forces of the left, to organise a fierce resistance; on the other hand it meant the automatic, immediate and long-term involvement of the British and later the Americans in the political developments in the country. Churchill himself recognised the importance of the initial resistance of the Greeks, especially in Crete in delaying the forces of the Axis, but the gathering momentum of the influence of the communists on the National, Liberation Front (EAM) worried the British, who favoured the creation of new resistance organizations (Svoronos 1975:140). By the end of the war the British intervened militarily to avert a communist take over and were involved in the developments throughout the civil war because Greece should not fall to the communist block at any cost. In any case, «at Churchill’s meeting with Stalin in Moscow in October 1944, the ‘percentage’ of British interest in Greece was put at ninety, that of the Soviet Union at ten.» (Clogg 1979:150).

With the declaration of Truman in 1947 that «the US should help Greece to preserve its democratic polity>, starts the direct American intervention in the country. Since
then and up to 1974 Greece in fact felt deeply the effects of the Cold War through particularly oppressive internal politics. American foreign policy not only condoned but actively supported the Colonels regime (Ekdotike Athinon 2000:284-285). Also, along with American Aid, Greece was obliged to accept American military bases since the fifties, including the storing of nuclear weapons which infuriated the Soviets.

Another major factor in Greek foreign policy and Greek politics at large has been the Cyprus problem over the last fifty years. This issue has been extensively dealt with in relevant literature and there is a concise presentation in Ekdotiki Athinon (2000:430-503). Here we shall only mention certain highlights concerning not only the fortunes of the island itself but also the bilateral relationships between Greece and Turkey as well as Greece’s relationship with Britain, the US and lately the EU. Under the treaty of Lausanne (1923) Turkey recognised officially the British sovereignty of the island, which in 1925 became a colony of the Crown. But from early 1930s there was general agitation in the island toward union (enosis) with Greece. During the second World War hopes were raised that the island might be ceded to Greece after the war but the British Colonial Office quashed such hopes.

With the diminishing influence of Britain over Greece from the 1950s onwards agitation for enosis in Cyprus and in Greece increased markedly. At a referendum organised by Makarios, just before he became Archbishop and ethnarch (March 1950), 96% of the Greek Cypriots voted for union with Greece. British reaction to the National Organization of Cyprus fighters (EOKA), led by general Grivas, resulted in hostilities between the Greek and Turkish community of the island and the exile of Makarios to the Seychelles (March 1956). Also, certain leading fighters of EOKA were executed by the British. This further inflamed spirits both in Cyprus and in Greece and diplomatic activity between Greece, Britain and Turkey resulted in the agreement of Zurich (1959), finalised in London (1960), according to which Cyprus would become an independent state with a Greek president and a Turkish vice-president. Makarios was elected president and Kurtsuk vice-president.

Violence ended for a while but the constitutional arrangements for the Turkish Cypriot minority (18%) and the Greek majority (82%) gave rise to new conflicts between the two communities in the 1960s. Meanwhile the enosis issue was shelved while the politics of Cyprus kept constantly affecting domestic and foreign politics in Greece. Just before its collapse the dictatorial regime in Athens committed the blunder of organising a coup against Makarios, which gave Turkey the excuse, which she was seeking for a long time, to invade the island. The tragedy became complete with the forceful division of the island. About 200,000 Greek Cypriots lost their homes and properties and moved to the southern part, and 1619 persons are unaccounted to the present day. The problem has remained unsolved and from time to time it preoccupies the UN, the decisions of which Turkey keeps ignoring while its bilateral relations with Greece are seriously affected over this issue. The Cyprus republic thus remains with its northern part, which is occupied by Turkish troops, not being recognised by the international community as a separate state. Meanwhile the official Cyprus state has progressed economically and now is one of the first candidates to join for the enlargement of the EU, a move opposed by Turkey and the leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community.
After the collapse of the socialist block, Greece has been exercising a special influence in the Balkans. Greece’s participation in NATO, the Western European Union and the E.U., in connection with its history and interests in the region, placed her in a unique diplomatic position as a mediator between the west and the developments in what was Yugoslavia (Ekdotiki Athinon 2000: 413-417; Kokosalakis 1999). Economically too Greece has been an important agent in introducing the rules and institutions of the free market in the region. At the same time the new situation contributed to increase the tension in the relationship between Greece and Turkey in mid-nineties for a while.

Another issue, which placed Greece on a defensive position in the early nineties and gave rise to nationalist feelings with large demonstrations in Thessaloniki and Athens has been the issue of the name for the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). The insistence of Greece that the term Macedonia should not appear as a name or a constituent part of the name of this new Republic have weakened the diplomatic position of Greece on this issue internationally. The strong nationalist feelings and attitudes, which it generated in the country have been widely discussed and strongly criticized by some intellectuals (Liakos et al 1993; Mouzelis 1994). Nationalist and anti-western feelings in Greece have been also expressed in solidarity with Serbia during the bombardment of the country by NATO over the ethnic conflict in Kossovo in the summer of 1999.

A last but important significant other for Greece has been Hellenism outside Greece or what is called the Greek Diaspora. There is no official way of assessing the number of people with Greek ethnic origin and identity outside Greece but there is an estimate between 2,700,000 minimum and 4,500,000 persons maximum (Ekdotiki Athinon 2000:538-539, for these and the figures below). The largest part of these up to 1,250,000 is estimated to live in the US. The next group in size is those living in western Europe, estimated at 650,000 of which 250,000 come from Cyprus. In the former Soviet Union, at the time of ‘perestroika’ the number is estimated between 476,000 and 631,000. These numbers, however, must have been reduced drastically today as a large number of the Greeks from the former Soviet Union have returned to Greece over the last twenty years. In Australia the number is estimated over half a million and the same number is estimated for Canada.

The difficulty for estimates, apart from the lack of official statistics, has to do with the constant flow of emigration and return. Between 1956 and 1964 for example around 100,000 Greeks were expelled from Istanbul and Smyrna and most of these came to Greece. It is estimated that the Greek population, which remained in Turkey after the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, was around 110.000 but there now only about 3,000 remaining mainly in Istanbul. What is important and should be stressed, however, is that during the 1950s and 60s emigration from Greece was very high. For Europe alone between 1955-1975, the emigration was recorded at 758.351 persons (Kassimati 1984). The reverse stream is observed from the early 1980s and especially during the 1990s. It is estimated that only from Northern Epirus (southern Albania) over 170.000 persons of Greek origin (Orthodox) have come to Greece during the last ten years. Also it is estimated that over 80,000 Greeks have settled in Greece from the countries of the former Soviet Union during the last fifteen years or so. Greece, of course has become a place of immigration not only for people of Greek ethnic identity but for large numbers of Albanians and other Balkan and Eastern European countries.
Another significant agent for the Hellenism of the Diaspora is the Greek Orthodox Church outside Greece. The Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, although an honorary spiritual leader of all the Orthodox Churches with a supra national, ecumenical Christian role, which is becoming increasingly recognised in Europe and beyond, for reasons already pointed out, it carries also a special historical and cultural significance for Greece. Under its direct ecclesiastical jurisdiction are all the Orthodox Churches of the Greek Diaspora, the most significant being: the Greek Orthodox Church of America; Australia; the Greek Orthodox Churches of Western Europe; and lately, the Orthodox Church of Albania. The ethnic and spiritual role of the Greek Orthodox Church outside Greece cannot be overestimated. It carries a massive educational, social, cultural and even political role, which can only be mentioned here.

Concluding this section we must state that the most important significant other for contemporary Greece is, of course, the EU. For this reason we devote to its relationship with Greece the second part of this report.

8. Concluding Remarks

In this concise profile of ethnic identity and nationalism in Modern Greece we have attempted to show that both concepts are fluid and ambiguous yet both of them have been at the heart of modern Greek history and development. The notion of Greek identity, thus, remains crucial for all Greeks everywhere and links the present with the past as well as with the future. The concept of identity, in the human social context generally, is not static but open and dynamic. In the Greek case, however, this is even more so. Modern Greek identity is a process rather than a structure. As such it is characterised by severe tensions and even contradictions without ever disintegrating or loosing its historical character and continuity.

All ethnic identities have their specificity but in the Greek case, as in the Jewish one, the specificity is more pronounced, because it is deeply rooted in the long history of western civilization from the beginning. Unlike Judaism, however, which has strictly to do with the ethnicity of a people, Hellenism always involved an open, ecumenical aspect, which was enriched by Eastern Byzantine Christianity. The basic problem has been that this long cultural heritage could not be turned into a political identity in the confines of a weak and dependent modern nation state. And yet this has been exactly the effort and the struggle of modern Greece and it is at this point that most analysts and commentators, both Greek and non Greek, locate the tensions and the contradictions in modern Greek identity. Yet, despite this, modern Greek identity seems to flourish by taking on its stride both tradition and modernity.

We have attempted to give a profile of the historical highlights of this political struggle by reviewing relevant literature and by stressing the point that the basic constituent cultural elements of Greek culture are not incompatible either between themselves or with the outside world and Europe in particular. Indeed, despite the apparent and real heightened tension between tradition and modernity in modern Greek society as a result of the process of modernization, there is cultural and historical continuity in Greece which goes beyond the dichotomy between tradition and modernity. The Greek culture apart from being a bridge between East and West is
also at home in what been called postmodernity or late modernity and the developments of globalization do not come as a surprise. This, far from making Greek identity incompatible with the European one, could be a positive factor towards the integration of the EU and a vision for an open civilised Europe.

PART II

1. Introduction

This second part of the report focuses on developments concerning Greek identity and its relationship to the EU since 1974. The analysis reflects upon the main political and social landmarks and certain ideological tenets that have determined or influenced Greece’s relationship with Europe.

The first section is a brief exposé of developments after the junta, (1967-1974) and how the country paved the way for its final entry into the then EEC. In the second section we present certain quantitative data on pro and anti-EU attitudes in the country. Following the historical and socio-cultural framework presented in part one, this section provides a platform for the analysis of social parameters which may inhibit or not Greece’s integration with the EU. Section three summarizes the relevant literature on the relationship between Greek and European identities. Part of this section explores the question of Greece’s political culture(s) and discusses dominant discourses on national identity, which may serve as typologies that explain the country’s relation with the EU and the European Community. The section on paths of development takes further the whole issue of the relationship with the EU through a theoretical discussion of two main orientations of development, (i.e. structural adjustment and the blending of traditions with innovations), which indicate the complexity and multi-diversity of the relationship between national identity and European political and economic initiatives.

2. The Background to Greece’s Membership in the EEC/EU

As we have seen in part one, well up to the 1970s, Greece was plagued by continuous political conflicts and social divisions. According to social analysts, Greek society was relatively underdeveloped and as such differed substantially from Western European countries (Mouzelis 1978).

Yet, during and after the civil war (1949), the country was seen, especially by Britain and the US, as a “place” of western tradition that should be preserved, perhaps at any cost, from “the communist threat”. The understanding that Europe is facing “common” global challenges has further enhanced Greece’s geo-political position and the country’s significance for political and economic alliance with the West. In fact, Greece has joined NATO soon after the end of the civil war and in 1962 signed its treaty of associate membership with the European Economic Community. The issue then was that Greece’s economic and political future is closely linked to the military, energy and trade interests of the West and therefore there was a need to break away from the country’s traditional isolation and left-wing/communist led tendencies (Gallant 1995).
When the Colonels came to power with a coup in 1967, they suspended most trade links and diplomatic relations with various cultural centres and foreign ministries in Europe. They also froze relations with the EEC and suspended democratic rights at home. At the same time they developed structures and relations which, supported the interests of multinational corporations and local financial interests, and regulated economic and political life on the basis of an authoritarian-corporatist ideology of the state (Crouch 1999). The former was mostly evident through the operations in Greece of major MNC’s in the areas of energy and oil (Pechiney, Texaco, Cruppe, Calvin and Oceanic Exploration Company), as well as in the areas of construction (Knappen and Omnium Lyonais) (Kostis 1999; Psimmenos 1997), and in the shipping industry.

At the end of the dictatorship (1974), the new conservative government restored many of the 1962 Association agreements signed between EC and Greece. For Karamanlis and his New Democracy party to join the EEC meant more than an economic association. The argument for the country’s joining EEC were also political and concerned the issue of internal security, and the restoration and protection of democratic freedoms against a future coup d'état. In June 1975, Greece formally applied for a full EC membership. Up to 1976, the ministers of the EC believed that due to Greece’s poor economic record as well as its internal political fragility, there should be a somewhat prolonged pre-accession period. However, such reservations were lifted and the then foreign EEC ministers were satisfied that Greece would be ready to join by the end of 1978. One political obstacle worrying the EC ministers was the growing political momentum of the anti-EC lobby amongst PASOK (socialist party) MP’s and of the Left in the country (Clogg 1979:214). Yet, this seemed more an internal tactical political ploy on the part of PASOK rather than a long-term political position.

The negotiations between Karamanlis’ government and the EC foreign ministers, gave the green light for the signing of the treaty of accession in May 1979 and Greece’s full membership into the EC coming to effect in January 1981. A few months later (October 1981), PASOK under Papandreou’s leadership won the elections. There was a strong pressure by the socialist ministers to the EEC special committee for a renegotiation of the signed treaty (1979) of the accession. The 1983 Commission’s proposal for a better economic assistance to Greece together with the start of economic aid through the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes (1985) met most of the Papandreou’s government aims and postponed almost indefinitely PASOK’s threat for a general referendum on whether or not Greece should stay in the EC. In fact the government managed to reverse anti-EC political arguments adopting the position that exit from the EC would not serve the interests of the country which could be better promoted by negotiating from inside. Following this, the “setting” of the agenda for a common fishery/agricultural policy amongst Southern European member states (February 1985) allowed the then president of the European Commission Jacque Delor to argue that: “All the family quarrels have been sorted out. The family is now going to grow and we can think of the future” (Urwin 1995:211).

3. Attitudes towards the EU

In this section we focus on attitudes of the public, which indicate the Greek people’s understanding and fears about the EU and its institutions. Contrary to what some commentators and scholars believe about Greek people’s attitudes to Europe and the
EU, the 1981 Eurobarometer opinion poll shows that the majority expressed a clear preference for the country’s unification with the EU. During the same period (i.e. June 1981), Greece ranges second (30%), after Italy in supporting “very much” the idea of European unification. (see Table 3.1)

Table 3.1: Attitude towards the Unification of Western Europe -- 1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Italy(%)</th>
<th>Belgium(%)</th>
<th>Greece(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For – very much</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to some extent</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against - to some extent</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against - very much</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total n</td>
<td>1183</td>
<td>949</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer June 1981

One could read in the table the political attitudes of the Left (i.e. the Greek communist party) against the unification of Western Europe, and of the PASOK and New Democracy’s partial or complete support for it.

Twelve years later (1993) table 3.2 shows that amongst the twelve member states of the EU, Greeks (54%) come in second place, after the Danes (68%), expressing an interest in European politics and in matters related to the European Community. In comparison, the least interested people in the EU to know more about European politics and EU affairs were the German and Belgian people (tables 3.2 and 3.3).

Table 3.2: Interest in EC affairs - 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer 1993 June
Table 3.3: not interested in EC affairs - 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer 1993 June

Another important landmark for testing public opinion toward pro-national or anti-EU sentiments was also the signing of the Maastricht treaty. Again Greece (86%) comes second in hierarchy (i.e. after the Netherlands) in support for the Maastricht treaty. This, despite the fact that the majority of the Greek public seems to be less informed about the issues of the treaty (74%), compared to people in other member states. Even when one takes the number of the undecided still the absolute majority in Greece are in favour (i.e. 55%) of the Maastricht treaty.

In relation to the single European currency, table 3.4 shows that the majority of Greek public opinion is in favour (71%) of the EURO currency. On the other hand, those Greeks who are against (14%) the single European currency come last except Italy (13%), while the Germans (58%), the British (63%) and the Danes (69%) seem to come first amongst those who least prefer the introduction of EURO.

Table 3.4 : Preferences on single European currency - 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>For</th>
<th>Against</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer 1993 June

Also, Greece’s public opinion on whether or not the single market is advantageous for the country shows a positive response. Table 3.5 shows that Greece’s overall majority supports the idea of a single market and finds it advantageous for the national economic development (67%).
Table 3.5: The Single Market advantageous for own country - 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer 1993 June

In June 2000, in the EUROBAROMETER survey the EU citizens were asked how proud they were of being identified as European. A large percentage of Greeks (62%) declared that they were very proud of being European, and found no conflict between their national and European identity. This compared with (50%) in Denmark and (45%) in the UK. Greeks also expressed a strong sense of national identity but not as strong as the British or the Danes. However, when they were asked to express their satisfaction with democracy in the EU, less than half (45%) said they were satisfied compared with (33%) in the UK and (32%) in Denmark. Yet, table 3.6 shows that Greeks overall tend to trust the European commission (52%) against the British (24%) and the Danes (36%).

Table 3.6: Trust in the European Commission -- 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>tend to trust %</th>
<th>tend to not trust %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer 2000, Autumn

In conclusion we can say then that the statistics of the Eurobarometer show that the attitude of the Greeks to the EU is a rather positive one and certainly there seems to be no conflict between their conception of the Greek and the EU identity.

4. National and European Identity: Review of Literature

The question of Greek identity and Greece’s relationship with Europe and the EU has been a complex and highly debated issue in Greece by both politicians and various ‘schools’ of intellectuals. The debates are usually set between a traditionalist, fundamentalist and inward looking political culture, and a more modernizing, outward looking one that adopts Western European economic and social values.
According to Mouzelis (1995), the first type of culture is understood, as an “underdog” culture. The characteristics of such an “underdog” culture are: a kind of parochialism, authoritarianism, xenophobia, and a political “introvertedness”. The philosophy behind this culture leads towards:

...“a conspiratorial interpretation of events and...a pronounced sense of cultural inferiority towards the Western World, coupled with a hyperbolic and misguided sense of the importance of Greece in international affairs and, more generally, in the history of western civilisation”. This cultural outlook of mostly the least competitive social strata and sectors of the economy (small business owners, white collar workers, state-protected industrialists) contrasts with a more Western oriented modernising-universalising culture that favours reforms toward “a rationalisation along liberal, democratic, and capitalist lines”... (N.Diamantouros, in Mouzelis 1995:20)

For Mouzelis (1995), this “underdog” culture is further subdivided into two subcultural groups: the populist and the clientelistic. The first is centred around the “glorification of lay people”, sees Western allies as powers that conspire against Greece and searches for anti-Western traditional developmental exits from Europe, and is in line with what Mouzelis calls a national essence of the local culture and of the roots of Romiosyni (i.e. Greekness). Such a conspiratorial view of Western and in particular of the US role inside Greece, has lead many to argue, according to Mouzelis (1979), towards an understanding of the recent catastrophes in political terms (i.e. the colonels’ coup and the Cyprus invasion by Turkey), as a result of Western interests.

A typical debate, following the above course of viewing Greece’s relation with the West, would probably focus on the antipathies Western-European leaders may have for Greece, concerning the latter's specific national characteristics. The argument of Greece’s homogeneous culture coupled with its strong religious identity, is said to be in conflict with Western culture and its values. So in the context of this discourse, many Greek people reject the cultural fashions and ideologies of the West, holding tightly together the ideas of ethnos (i.e. Nation), the family, and of the Christian orthodox belief. In relation to the latter, there is a significant part of the Greek population who view Greek Orthodoxy tied together with Romiosyni, and both put together are understood as being in conflict with the catholic and protestant traditions and the secular west.

Recently, and due to the further economic and political integration of the country with the EU, there has been a substantial revitalisation of the link between orthodoxy and Greek National identity. Kokosalakis (1995,1996a) argues that in this context religion operates as a “fluid cultural resource” that re-activates populist ethno-religious identity. Although he finds that Orthodox theology is not incompatible with the humanistic principles of the Enlightenment he states that:

...at an ethnic level, the church has always considered itself to be the conscience of the nation and as over 95 percent of the Greek population are orthodox the church has always claimed a cultural hegemony over Greek society... On the other hand, the state also considers Orthodoxy inseparable from Greek identity and regards the church as a central pillar of Greek society. This turns Orthodoxy into a basic component of Greek ethnic identity in both a political and cultural sense. (1995:258)...
The relationship between Greek orthodoxy, the Church and ethnic identity is also the issue discussed by Constas and Stavrou (1995). He argues that in the case of Greece-EU integration there are visible signs of a deeper and wider schism between tradition and the European community project.

...This (i.e. the fact that the 95 percent of the Greek population declare themselves Orthodox) would be a matter of little concern if it did not impinge on questions of human rights, religious tolerance, and freedom of choice, questions that are minimum expectations from members of the European Community... (Constas and Stavrou 1995:5)

In a similar vein Manitakis (2000) has criticized the civic implications of the Church’s nationalism.

The second subcultural tradition followed by certain sections of the population in Greece is that of clientelism. For Mouzelis as well as for Diamantouros, “clientelistic” in contrast to “populistic” discourse:

...lacks the internal consistency and ideological sophistication of populism and is usually reduced to what Juan Lintz has called “mentalities”: a set of political orientations that have very little connection with legitimising discourse or are linked up with it only by an ad hoc, incoherent assortment of ideas... (Mouzelis 1995:21)

The “clientelistic” mentality, which has significantly declined after 1974, although not a unique characteristic to Greece, is being associated by Mouzelis with a kind of “amoralistic” political culture where “anything goes” for as long as personal and family interests are being satisfied. This kind of personal-particularistic discourse according to Mouzelis is in conflict with state interests and a more general rational-bureaucratic ethos, most prevalent in Western European states. More than anything else this clientelism is presented as being responsible for the displacement of more substantive issues in Greek politics. Thus for Mouzelis, it is not an accident that, in the post-junta era, Greek students got involved in personalistic and sectional party politics rather than in struggles for educational reform.

4.1 Paths of development

Paths of development in Greece are thought, by intellectual elite, to involve important questions about the country’s future in the EU and the global capitalist process. The debate on Greece’s future development involves three main themes or areas of concern. These are: the theme of structural adjustment, that of blending of innovation and tradition together and that of regional and sectionalised development. All involve important questions but in no way we represent here a typology about current intellectual thought or current developments in the country. Their separation signifies only the different emphasis intellectuals have put in their works concerning Greece’s integration in the EU and its route of economic and political development.

In relation to the first theme, the basic argument is that Greece in order to develop itself must first leave behind a certain mentality and overcome political and economic obstacles in order to adapt to EU policies on state and market activities. In Greece, this intellectual proposition is known as eksinchronismos (i.e. modernisation) and the main exponents of it are some intellectuals and leading political elite of the PASOK
government. A recent manifesto (2000) of eksinchronistes (the modernist section of the party) sums up the whole argument for modernisation through two main propositions. These are: first that if Greece does not adapt to the EU market policies and the global economy it will (in the future) become isolated and marginalized in the economic and political sense (Mouzelis 2000). The second is that for Greece to adapt it must: first join and become integrated with all major international alliances (including the IMF and the EU), and second it must do everything possible to remove all “internal obstacles”, so that the country can becomes an equal partner amongst advanced capitalist democracies (Verelis, Paschalidis, Christodoulakis, 2000).

4.1.1 The structural adjustment theme

For the Greek government, “modernisation” must first start with the restructuring of the state bureaucratic organisation. The proposed schema is to pursue the further flexibilisation of the Greek administrative apparatus, cutting down in cost-spending, and introducing for the first time a kind of productivity-led management of services by officers. In addition, the project for the advancement of partnerships between government, local authorities and local entrepreneurs, is thought to be of great value for the structural adjustment of the Greek welfare system (Robolis, Dimoulas 1998). Similar projects for the further liberalisation of the Greek public services from trade union, political or past welfare policies are discussed amongst ministers as possible exits from the patterns of development of the past. More and more individuals and local authorities as well as state welfare agencies (i.e. Manpower Organisation) are being encouraged to perform in a market economy “selling themselves in the market place” as Beck would have argued (2000:3), becoming thus more self-financed and more competitive.

“Structural adjustment” is represented in Greece as an evolutionary leap towards the future, where adaptation is presented as a panacea to all internal problems. But unlike a Parsonian understanding of systems changing, and evolutionary transition, adaptation according to the Greek government and mostly according to the major representatives of eksinchronismos, can only take place from above rather than from below. Constas and Stavrou (1995:5) commenting on a text by Mouzelis state:

...changes within Greece will be brought about by outside influences, since they cannot be mediated or monitored by broad indigenous interests. Through granting the possibility of growth and change, Mouzelis nevertheless ends on the pessimistic note that Greece’s political culture, unless appreciably modified or altered, will inevitably lead to “mindless consumerism and apoliticism with the corruption and servility/authoritarianism that are the legacy of Greece’s Ottoman past”... (Constas and Stavrou 1995:5)

The centre of Mouzelis’ argument lies in his analysis of Giddens’ “Third Way” resolution to past national legacies in Europe, which focus on the role of the state as the last guarantor of Greece’s modernisation project. Against a political culture that favours a pro-labour or a thatcherite strategy of economic development, Mouzelis proclaims that the answer lies with the structural adjustment of the country’s institutional framework. For Mouzelis, the left wing parties with their populist orientations and the right or conservative party of Greece with a clientelistic attitude and dominance by the entrepreneurial elite, do not answer the present questions about Greece’s future development. The first fail to notice that a return to the past is an
anachronism, and any attempts to blockade a further wage relation or linkage to productivity will result in greater inflation and greater disparities between the rich and the poor in the country. On the other hand, the clientelistic/conservative orientation fails to notice that a growing population of an unprivileged “army” of Greek civilians, is the least guarantee of development and future economic successes. For this reasons, Mouzelis asks for the mass mobilisation of eksinchronistes in all major parties and at the same time, for the political dominance of a modernisation project in the country. He states his position as follows:

...growing pressure from the EU and the disenchantment with the parties among the young will take different forms according to whether or not the genuinely modernizing forces prevail (by regrouping on their own or by becoming more dominant within the existing parties). If they do modernization will be such as to lessen the growing inequalities between Greece and its northern partners; modernization will put our human and non-human resources to more effective use and will better preserve our cultural identity and autonomy within the EC... (Mouzelis 1995:31)

To this end the L.S.E. in 1998, through the funding of some Greek companies and the National Bank of Greece, set up the Hellenic Observatory which includes a Venizelos Chair of Modern Greek studies and some grants for Modern Greek studies. The Foundation has the task to fund independent research and to assist Greek post-graduate students financially with scholarships, in order to promote a further understanding of how structural adjustment in Greece is going to be achieved. Similar foundations in Greece are: the institute for Mediterranean studies, the Greek Centre for European Studies (EKEM), the Spyros Vryonis centre for the study of Hellenism, the United Hellenic American Congress, the Woodrow Wilson International centre for scholars and many other publicly funded organisations and research centres in Athens.

In a similar vein towards “structural adjustment“, Constas (1995) argues for a path of development that on the one hand strengthens further relations between the Greek state and the EU member states, and on the other, allow Greece to envisage its regional political and economic role in the Balkan area. Constas thus argues that the EU project provides the best opportunity for a synthetic approach of Greek future development by combining together wider market interests with National security interests.

...The link between economic performance and pursuit of Greek national interest in the “political security” area is easily established. Since its admission to the European Community in 1981, Greece has often played the EC card in its relation with Turkey... At the same time Greece, as the case of the recognition of the Republic of Macedonia has shown, now needs the EC support to eliminate potential threats of emanating from its new security environment in the Balkans... (Constas 1995:78)*

According to the above understanding of national and European identity issue, the EU project of integration seems to present for the country a major challenge, namely Greece’s role in the Western European Union (WEU). For Constas (1995), Greece since the Maastricht treaty (1991), could become even more adaptive to the EU through the “conversion of Greek national security concerns in Union action” (i.e. W.E.U.). This could be achieved not by abandoning the Greek national concerns but by seeing them almost as W.E.U. concerns or as interests and concerns that could be enhanced by the Western European Union.
4.1.2 Blending tradition and innovation: ethism and progress

Following from the above section, an equally reputable group of contemporary intellectuals present the Greek society as a place where tradition and modernity can coexist side by side. In fact, behind the traditional and somewhat reluctant stance of Greek people towards new market and political initiatives taken by the EU, for a number of theorists lies the way ahead not in the bipolar schism between traditional and modern cultures, but rather in their creative synthesis. Babiniotis (1995) argues that, in most cases, modernity in Greece has been criticized not for its aims and principles but rather for its association with foreign interventions and a political climate of uncritical accommodation and endorsement of everything that came from the “West” or from “outside”.

...The basic reason there was much reaction in this country against innovative movements... was that they were assessed as foreign and intrusive in the Greek intellectual space and even as dangerous in undermining the hellenicity of our intellectual life... the “fear of the foreign”, rather than the “fear of the unknown”, was what appeared to frighten scholars who saw in modernism (or synchronism, as it was initially called) the sterile, superficial and affected imitation of the foreign, which imposed itself by drawing on the prestige of the European, educated, and superior spirit rather than persuasiveness of a real and essential model... (Babiniotis 1995:228)

According to the above argument, since the end of the Cold War and Greece’s full entry to the EU, the bipolar dichotomies of East-West, traditional-modern, Greek-European, can be further surpassed through the projection of Greek ethism (Babiniotis calls it nationism). Unlike nationalism, which for Babiniotis was the cause of the sterile undemocratic, political past of Greece, ethism is a more representative term of the Greek identity and civilization. Its major characteristic is that it is based on an understanding that cultural identities, in a meta-state Europe, are vital as a point of reference for the history and traditions of the people of Europe. This would strengthen the common values of community and solidarity in Europe and would promote integration while ethnic cultures would retain their specificity and identity value. For Babiniotis the synthesis between tradition and modernity through ethism is best reflected in Elytis’ proposition for the blending of Greece’s diachronic and synchronic cultural elements.

...The problem for those of us who followed, was to carry the great dogmas that we inherited and, each one of us in his own way, to adapt them to the contemporary sensitivity. Beyond the limitations of technique, we had to arrive at a synthesis which on the one hand would recast the elements of the Greek tradition and on the other would express the social, psychological needs of our time. In other words, we had to bet to the point of projecting the type of the European-Greek... (Elytis in Babiniotis 1995:250)

Apart from other writers such as Kavafis, Kazantzakis and Seferis, who synthesised in their work tradition and modernity, a good way to demonstrate that a synthesis is possible and that it “mirrors” certain characteristics of the Greek society and identity, one could refer briefly to the Orthodox tradition and the issue of the Greek family.

In relation to the first, for many theorists Orthodoxy, despite the conservatism and nationalism of the Church and recent tensions with the State (i.e. over police identity
cards, civil-marriage, and burial rights), it is based on certain ecumenical cultural values that could probably contribute and strengthen Greece’s presence in a united Europe.

Orthodoxy’s ethos of theosis (i.e. divinization) and its concept of the person as the image of God (kat eikona), and its consequent acceptance of the other as an ontological entity could be of great cultural value in a pluralist Europe. Theosis which is the: “struggle of a person to reach ever so closer to the image of the Creator in the context of a sinful fallen world” is a cultural and spiritual value conducive to the spiritual needs of contemporary society (Kokosalakis 1995:262;1996). In fact, it seems that spirituality and traditional religious values are sought even in many high-tech corporate strategies as a way to increase productivity and to enhance stability and a sense of “mission” amongst employees. The rediscovery of humanity for corporate managers of Europe and the pursuing of core values and beliefs has in fact led the World Bank (2001) to organise its first conference on spirituality and the “US Academy of Management to set up its first interest group on religion, management, and spirituality” (Overell 2001:11). The point has been made (Kokosalakis 1996a; Manitakis 2000) that the orthodox ethos and values are not incompatible with the humanistic values of modernity.

Mouzelis (2001) has also argued that Enlightenment rationalism is not necessarily in conflict with Orthodoxy. In his article Enlightenment and Neo-Orthodoxy (2001), he argues that in post-modern Europe, Greece’s answer to the issue of National identity within Europe is a stronger civil-society and a further development of the Greek state. The development of a civil-society and of the Greek state will strengthen further the social framework of the European modernity project and will allow further the distribution of economic and political benefits towards the marginalized groups of the Greek population. Spirituality and collective identities, according to Mouzelis, are thought to be compatible with the modernisation of the Greek society and therefore the “old” understanding that one had to choose between Greek orthodoxy and a modern society, in post-modern Europe is no longer there as an issue. Through the abolition or rejection of modernity’s most negative features (individualisation, materialism and the spread of it in public life) one could manage, through spirituality and collective identities, to salvage modernity’s most precious and central features (i.e. the democratic-populist and welfare or redistributive spirit of the state).

Relating the notion of blending tradition and modernity on the issue of the Greek family, Mousourou (2000) argues that recent developments in Europe and in Greece concerning the fate of the welfare systems are more in line with the country’s cultural identity. In her article “the only value that has been sustained in time”, she argues that:

...we must also say that the traditional (Greek) family at the beginning of the century had the emotional responsibility of its growth, its economic securing and the personal care of the family unit... This responsibility has been undermined by the expectations and the development of the welfare state... (Mousourou 2000:114)

The understanding is that in the post-welfare Europe, family in Greece could very well adapt to economic initiatives through a revitalization of some traditional cultural elements that are connected with the personal-psychological care of family members.
As an answer to the flux of values and economic benefits, Mousourou is reinventing a useful old “tool” of how to develop and accommodate progress and adapt to current needs through the comeback of old values. One such value was always there for Mousourou but it became inactive in the late post world-war Greece together with the rising expectations for care facilities from the Greek bureaucracy. This understanding is not far from the new communitarian tradition and theory concerning family and the post welfare states in Northern Europe (Dennis, Erdos 1995).

4.1.3 Regional development

Scholarly debate on *paths of development*, in the fullest sense of the word, is also centred around themes and perspectives that try to answer questions over the regional and/or sectional development of Greece. For a number of studies the EU is represented as an almost *heterogeneous* central institution that organise the Greek economy and politics according to the regional interests of certain advanced capitalist economies and in accordance with the interests of certain elite or pressure groups in those countries.

According to Kassimis (1994; 2000) the lack of a strong Greek regional policy for the protection of Greek farmers interests in the EU, has led to a kind of a superimposed agricultural policy that limits the freedoms and benefits of the country’s agricultural sector. Kassimis (2000) states that:

... the reformulation of common agricultural policy, the GATT agreement, and the direction (i.e. of agricultural policies) towards a non-protectionist national markets and the expansion of the EU, are being expected to lead towards further losses of income...

Following from this, Hadjimichalis (1983) considers the Greek membership into the EU as a case that shows Europe’s regional/sectional interest diversification and segmentation. Regionalist and sectional interests, for Hadjimichalis, are of primary importance for Greece’s activity into the EU, because they are strong parameters that influence pro-anti EU attitudes and are cultivators of Greek people’s consciousness on the subject of Europeaness and/or nationalist tendencies. He argues that “the economic roots of the separatist movements should not be underestimated” (Hadjimichalis 1983:137; quoted in Williams 1987:251).

The understanding by Hadjimichalis of the importance of a *core-periphery* antithesis and of Greece’s uneven development, tends to explain not only the development of *separatist* and *anti*-EU attitudes within the country, but it also leads towards the development of sectionised policies by the EU and the Greek government. At the same time it is argued that such policies could lead to the establishment of a new elite group in Greece that benefit directly from Europe’s monetary union and of PASOK’s social and economic policies. These people are: all those who are thriving in the banking and service sectors of the Greek economy; the mass-media corporations; and those who are active in tourism and industrial production (Hadjimichalis 2000: 111). The thriving development of those elite groups, seems to take place within a framework of social policies that heavily eliminate early decentralised proposals of the PASOK government. At the same time these elite groups thrive at the cost of the social status of a number of people like those who are owners of small sized enterprises and work in traditional industrial and primary sections of the economy (Psimmenos 1993). Furthermore, with the rise of EU and PASOK’s Schengen
agreement, a number of scholars have raised through their studies their concern over the recent development of a new “underclass”. This new “underclass” consists mainly of undocumented immigrants, refugees and a number of inner-city poor (Mousourou 1993; Psimmenos 1995).

5. Concluding Remarks

Part two has examined briefly three important aspects of contemporary relations between Greece and the EU. The first aspect concentrated mostly upon the political and historic landmarks Greece has passed through prior and during its integration with the EU. The 1974-1980s period is considered to be crucial at a diplomatic level for preparing Greece’s entry into the EEC from a diplomatic sense. In addition it is considered to have been most advantageous for the development of a public debate on Greece’s future and achievement of a more modern organisational framework. Despite the ideological efficacy of a general belief in the achievement of a non-aligned and autonomous or anti-EEC development, in practice PASOK and a major part of the Greek Left, have interpreted the European common market as an institution that corresponds or could (i.e. if changed from within) correspond with popular-progressive interests.

The second aspect, has focused upon general attitudes of the public concerning the EU. According to public opinion polls, conducted by EUROBAROMETER, the majority of the respondents are favourably disposed towards the EU. They perceive both economic and political benefits for Greece as a result of its membership in the EU and find no conflict between Greek national and European identity.

The third aspect (i.e. political culture and paths of development) presents an analysis of the main scholarly debates on the EU and on national identity issues. The specificity of Greek culture, with its religious and other cultural parameters, is seen by some analysts as being in conflict and/or as incompatible with European modernity, while others see no incompatibility between the various strands of Greek culture and Europe. This difference is, of course, one of interpretation. There are clearly different understandings of modernity and paths of development, and all these seem to produce an even more complex and variegated picture concerning the cultural and ethnic identity of Greece and the role it could play inside Europe and the EU.
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Nation, State and National Identity in Modern Hungary

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PART I

1. Introduction

Seen from outside and from a distance, Hungary is a small spot on the map of Europe: it is in the centre of the continent in a geographical sense, and on the eastern border of the political unit of (Western) Europe. After the Second World War, Hungary was melted into the amorphous mass of the Soviet bloc. If the country was remembered at all, it was only for the Hungarian revolution in 1956, when the heroism of Hungary and Budapest and the desperate appeals for help won international attention and sympathy.

After 1989 Hungary began to blend into the colourful national-political whirlpool of events that echoes around the splitting up of states, the cracking of borders, the noisy competition of opposing elite groups and the fracturing of shaky economies. It is already almost forgotten that Hungary, precisely because of its insignificant size, could serve as a vital pillar in the bridge between East and West, and greatly contribute to the collapse of East Germany, by letting thousands of East German citizens escape across its western border.

This paper tries to give a very brief introduction to the most relevant historical facts and events of Hungarian history. Although there is a general sequential order in showing the past that gives a background for Hungarian national identity, the titles and sub-titles also represent some of the possible components of national identity (e.g. collective memory, geographical place, prerequisites of national existence) in Part I. A completely thematic order can be found in Part II, where the questions about Hungary’s European integration are raised. At the end of both sections there is a rather extensive summary of relevant empirical research (stereotype research or opinion polls) based on a several pieces of decade-long research by the first author.

2. Ancient History in Hungarian Collective Memory

It is an often recalled element of national consciousness that Hungarians came to the Carpathian Basin from Asia in the ninth century, by the time of which states formed after the great migrations had long become stable at the western end of this land. Individual analysis of the language lists Hungarians among the Finno-Ugric ethnic groups, but there are also many signs of living together with Turkish people for long periods. The myth of Asian origin has appeared repeatedly; it should be noted here that distant Asian nations also consider Hungarians as their relatives who were swept to Europe by the tide of history. The turning point in joining the cultural community of contemporary European states was the cultural-religious change appearing with the foundation of the state: Hungarians adopted Christianity at the end of the tenth century, at the same time as the Scandinavians and Slavic nations, who were settling in the eastern part of Europe. Despite temptations to the contrary, the country followed western Catholicism, which again brought a sharp distinction between Hungary and the southern and eastern Slavs. The establishment of the Christian religion brought the country into a system of cultural and political relationships; the attacks and attempts at subjugation from Asia, the Mongol invasion of Hungary in 1241-42, and several centuries of struggle with the Turkish Empire all strengthened the idea that Hungary was the eastern bastion of Christianity; this also became a
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building block of national identity. Hungary, which was a regional power in the Middle Ages, suffered severe losses in her fight against the Turkish conquerors, who were able to extend the rule of the Muslim empire to a considerable part of the country for a century and a half.

3. Between East and West

An experience which is often recalled, and which is fundamental to Hungarians’ self-perception is that the nation stands alone in Europe (indeed in the world) with its linguistic isolation; furthermore, every aspect of its past has been preserved through historical awareness, which attaches Hungary to the Carpathian Basin in the centre of the continent. Against a backdrop of social and cultural stimuli, and also in the context of historical sacrifices, the Hungarian people have repeatedly fought for national independence and autonomy, either militarily or through cultural-political movements.

It is impossible here even to sketch what ‘East’ and ‘West’ meant to Hungarians during their history, being geographically in the centre yet culturally at the edge of Eastern and Western cultures in Europe. It is somewhat symbolic that a literary periodical between the two world wars – in an outstanding peak of Hungarian high culture – was called Nyugat (West). This title indicated the primary source from where the bourgeois middle class and intellectuals with highest standards took their inspiration. As a response – and this is not without symbolism, either – the literary periodical of intellectuals emerging from the peasantry and urging the long needed social changes adopted the title Kelet népe (People of East).

In the modern times, the European intellectual currents beginning with humanism, through the waves of reformation and the age of enlightenment, to shifts in modern political ideas and trends of arts have been orienting Hungarian culture and political system. In the twentieth century, political conflicts and economic difficulties made masses of emigrants leave for every state of Europe, and even for South and North America until recent times. These people provided a vast amount of personal help for those remaining in Hungary and supported the exchange of cultural and political ideas or trends.

In light of Montesquieu’s claim, it is argued that the study of national character presupposes that climatic conditions influence the temperament of people. In social psychology, stereotype research has shown that northern people are extensively perceived as more distant and disciplined than southern people. The hitherto most comprehensive monograph on national stereotypes (Peabody 1985) reports that the difference between the Northerners and the Southerners in self-control is widely known and mutually accepted, and is a fundamental factor in the evaluation hierarchy of nations. Parallel to the North-South dimension, the perceived difference that appears in Hungarian thinking between the Easterners and the Westerners deserves further investigation. This could identify another fundamental factor in the evaluation of nations. With a little exaggeration we would maintain that Hungarians do not perceive the Earth as round, but as if it extended from an eastern end to a western end. Differences in social-economic development and dynamism appear in an orderly manner as a part of lay worldview.
4. Nations, Ethnicity in East Central Europe

The modern nation, nation-state and nationalism are the products of the last few centuries. Thus they are historical phenomena. In medieval Europe people’s loyalties attached them primarily to local communities, religions or to seigniorial connections. National development as a historic phenomenon is associated with modernity, or more specifically to industrial society that needed a common language and culture for the previously deeply divided states.

The developing nationalist movements in East Central Europe from the eighteenth century essentially followed the developmental patterns of civic nation-states in West Europe, although their background was significantly different (Kosáry 1999). The evolving nations did not have integrated and independent states, they were part of multiethnic empires (e.g. Ottoman, Habsburg, Russian) that they shared with other ethnic groups. The political borders did not correspond to ethnic divisions, which themselves were not clear-cut either. These countries were behind in civic development. Despite these difficulties, nationalist movements evolved quite swiftly, gained strength in a short time (the already existing examples might have guided them). National dimensions gained ascendancy in the debates on civic liberalism or individual freedom in these movements. In the middle of the nineteenth century, before the European revolutions (e.g. in Paris, Vienna, Budapest), these nationalist movements had been over the first, cultural, stage of national development and were to step forward into its next, political, phase (Kosáry 1999; Romsics 1998).

Even though these nations sought independence, they also recognised that building a small nation-state is a rather dubious enterprise in the region. Thus, there appeared new plans for integration parallel to the impetus for disintegration. There is an extensive historiographic literature on the diverse restructuring attempts of the Habsburg Empire. These attempts expressed the worries of small nations in East Central Europe that on their own, they would not be capable of resisting the attempts at domination from East or West.

The Hungarian nationalist movement in the modern sense emerged in the last decades of the eighteenth century, led by an enlightened nobility that wished to modernise the existing social-political system, although they did not aim to change it completely. This elite also arrived at political aims through a cultural stage of nation building. By the time of the 1848 civic revolution, these movements considered Hungarian as a language that was to be used throughout the historical land of Hungary. Széchenyi, one of the most prominent initiators of this movement within the Hungarian nobility, forewarned that the attempts at quick and radical assimilation would have its repercussions, but the majority of the Hungarian elite did not take his advice. They envisaged building a nation-state similar to that of the French. The conditions here significantly differed from the French model: The ethnic ratio was worse for the Hungarians, other nationalist movements in the country were more advanced, with more assertive political leaders and better means. More importantly, there were national heartlands behind most of the minorities (e.g. Serbs, Romanians, Slovaks) around Hungary, which was not an independent state, but a part of the Habsburg Empire. Accordingly, it was not a surprise to see other national communities revolting against Hungarian domination when the 1848 revolution abolished all feudal
privileges and gave all citizens the same individual civic rights irrespective of their nationality. Other nationalities fought for what Hungarians had achieved within the Empire. These opposing ambitions and the resulting conflict among nationalities within the historic Hungarian state had long-term effects on all sides. The Hungarian elite later became reluctant to support democratic and civic changes in the reformed Austro-Hungarian Empire. Other nationalities saw Hungarians as ultimately working towards the complete assimilation of their minorities.

5. Nations and Empires in East Central Europe – External Others

In modern times chances and opportunities in Hungarian history have been influenced profoundly by the international context and power-balance. The key question has always been how the Hungarian political elite estimates and uses the possibilities provided and avoids the pitfalls. While a crucial stage in the development of Europe as a political community is the emergence of nation-states, Hungary was many times under the threat or domination of outside powers, multi-national empires.

5.1 From East and South

The Mongol horde swept through Hungary in the thirteenth century but the Hungarian feudal state survived this eastern invasion, became stronger, and grew to become a regional power under the economically prosperous and Renaissance-spirited rule of the House of Anjou and then of Mátyás Hunyadi. However, Europe as a whole was threatened from the south-east by the Muslim Turkish empire. A key component of Hungarians’ historical memory is that the country served as ‘the bastion of Christianity’; this is commemorated by the cultural historical fact (less well known abroad) that the Pope introduced the noonday bell in honour of the Hungarians’ resistance to the Turks. By the beginning of the sixteenth century, however, Hungary could no longer resist the expansion of the Turkish empire: it suffered a crushing defeat in 1526, as a result of which a considerable part of Hungary lay under Turkish rule for as long as the next 150 years. The Hungarian bastion had fulfilled its duty to Christianity by absorbing the main force of the onslaught – indeed, the Turkish advance stopped in Hungary – but the country paid a heavy price: it was badly damaged economically, and its political independence was lost.

5.2 From the West

First its north-eastern part, then the whole country came under the rule of the Austrian Habsburgs. After the Turks had been driven out, the Hungarian kingdom became a province of the Austrian empire. There were several waves of Hungarian battles for freedom against the Austrian rule; the most famous ones are linked to the names of Rákóczi and Kossuth. The fighters for independence hoped that the enemies of the German-Austrian Empire would help them, but they did not get genuine help in the eighteenth, nor in the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, in the search for allies, the leaders of the movements created distant relationships and nurtured interests in the direction of Europe beyond the German land. It is worth mentioning that the efforts at technical and social renewal of the agricultural-feudal country received a boost from the example of England, which Hungarian aristocrats who represented and insisted on reforms visited and observed. After the defeat of the 1848 war of independence (when the weakened Habsburg House received military help from the Russian Czar), Austria
– having been excluded from Germany – accepted a compromise with Hungary in 1867. This is the time when the dual Austro-Hungarian monarchy was formed, the coexistence of the two countries merged at the top of state-life, but internally being relatively independent. In accordance with the above, the socially and economically more developed western neighbour represented Europe as an attractive example and a cultural filter, as a dominant political power, and a potential confederate. In spite of this and together with this, the bourgeoisie – increasing in number after the turn of the century – and the intellectuals looked beyond German-speaking countries and cast their glance first of all at Paris.

At the border of the German and Slavic cultural regions and spheres of influence Hungary joined feudal Europe several hundred years late. Isolated in the middle of the continent, she had no colonial possessions, and did not play a significant role in commercial relations even in her brightest period. Thus, there was little stimulus for industrialization, urbanization, or the development of bourgeois mentality in the area, even though Hungary was rich in natural resources. A considerable proportion of the city dwellers were of immigrant origin, at first German, and later Jewish. Economic development began to accelerate in the second half of the nineteenth century, and at the same time Hungarian culture became stronger. This culture not only accepted the national minorities who constituted almost half of inhabitants, but even tried to assimilate them. Nevertheless, Hungary was still perceived by Western Europe as the agricultural hinterland of Austria, beset by great social differences and increasing problems with the minorities, and whose small aristocracy was determined to preserve the monarchy and its feudal features.

5.3 From East again

Slavic nations and the Slavic environment aroused the attention and worry of Hungarian leaders when Russia was only a distant eastern power whose primary ambitions did not yet encompass the Carpathian Basin. The First World War severely affected both countries; to this is related the first strong political impulse from Russia, i.e., the Hungarian soviet republic following the Bolshevik example and leaders. Even the few brief months of existence of this soviet republic contributed to the anti-Soviet attitude of the returning conservative political system, also weakening the attempts to pull out of the Second World War. After the Second World War, in accordance with the agreements and power relations of the victorious powers, Hungary was placed in the Soviet zone of influence, and as a direct consequence, a typically Stalinist party dictatorship was created in Hungary in the period of cold war – headed by the so-called Muscovite communists, i.e., emigrants returning from Moscow. After Stalin’s death, the most significant revolution eliciting the strongest international reaction broke out in Hungary in 1956; the fundamental goal of this revolution was escape from the Soviet-Russian empire. The armed intervention of the Russian troops led to a communist restoration that, assuming the resistance of the people, looked for a modus vivendi in internal policy, and initiated economic reforms that were unique in the eastern block. As a consequence, Hungary was in the most advantageous situation in the Soviet zone of influence with respect to the standard of living and intellectual openness; she was the most ready – as soon as the international situation allowed her – to leave this zone (as the Hungarian revolution in 1956 showed) and to influence her neighbours and East Germany by her example and steps in this direction. Thus, even in her defeated position in the Russian-Hungarian relation, Hungary considered
herself – with a certain pride – as a representative of the West, and in the end, it played a role in eliminating the eastern Bolshevik system through a civil war and careful reforms.

6. History and National Identity

There are already existing ‘spontaneous’ factors from which a national identity is developed, which might be called the pre-modern roots of national identity (Romsics, 1998). Firstly, ethnicity and descent played a role in early national development, although the more developed a society the more it accepts exogamy. Secondly, the emotional attachment to a shared territory is important, even though feudal patronage covered a much smaller territory than that of a state. The history of local patriotism is as long as human history, and is present even in animals’ territorial behaviour. This spontaneous attachment, or ‘love of homeland’ was altered to national identification when it became a deliberate moral-political commitment. Thirdly, religion as a major form of collective experience, had profound impact on developing national identity. Neither the Orthodox nor the Roman Catholic Church was as homogenous a group as could be expected from their claimed universality. There were national differences in major forms of Christianity, which is even more apparent in Protestant churches organized primarily at a national level. The role of religion is particularly important for those nations that lost their political autonomy. But the link between religious and national identity may not always be reinforcing. In those cases where the conquerors have the same religion as the dominated, it might be a tool for assimilation. The fourth factor is language, helping national identity to develop. Language is the main tool for interpersonal communication, and the use of a dialect or language has been a major criterion for identifying people, apart from skin colour and other anthropological features.

Modern national identities were developed from these other forms of identification and collectives. But this development was not done without self-reflection. As any kind of group, nations also needed collective memories to commemorate a shared past and common faith (Halbwachs, 1925; Middleton and Edwards, 1990). In ‘national awakenings’ the cultural and scientific elite played a significant role by creating and popularizing intellectual or artistic products to strengthen the ties among members of these virtual communities.

Remembering a common past, cultivation of its values, and passing on the real or assumed consequences of the lessons learnt from the past are essential conditions for, and content of, national identity. The nation as a collective actor can be unfolded, created, and understood from its historical ‘deeds’, struggles, and achievements. The difficulties and strategic dilemmas encountered in the life of the state and in society, have an impact on national identity, and require one’s strength to realise common aims. They motivate us to think over historical antecedents repeatedly, and to search for inspiring examples and critical lessons.

Historiography and collective memories of national history thus play a significant role in any national identity. In Hungary, this role has even been strengthened. The special role history plays in arts, in scientific research, in political thinking, and in public opinion can be attributed to many causes.
One such cause is the simple fact that Hungary and the Hungarians do have a history, a history of a thousand years which may justly elicit the interest of the present age. The first Hungarian king, Stephen I, received the crown from the head of the Roman Catholic Church in 1000 AD. But the history of Hungarians differs in many respects from that of Western European nations. After four centuries of independence, Hungary was divided or dominated by outside empires throughout its history. The short periods of political autonomy were only in the twentieth century, between the two world wars and after the democratic changes in 1989.

This history can also be characterized by the duality of transformation and instability. In the long run, the trend was not favourable: after the glory of the Hungarian state in the Middle Ages came a series of defeats and the loss of sovereignty; in the twentieth century the harmony of social and economic development was disturbed by severe and irremediable territorial losses. Instability arose from the intermediate position between East and West, from the internalised tensions, choices and the ill-starred position as a buffer zone. Hungarian history is rich in thought-provoking problems. The lively history of modern Hungary provides much scope for analysis, but little scope for practical action.

Reflections on Hungarian history arise especially at times of crisis. They play a role not only in forming a bright background for present-day prosperity, but more often in reviewing and reconsidering the facts and decisions which had led to undesirable consequences. In the context of twentieth century Hungarian history, the peace treaty following the First World War presented the greatest challenge for an unprepared political and cultural elite and for the entire nation.

6.1 The Trianon Peace Treaty and the Horthy regime

The Austro-Hungarian monarchy joined the losing side in the First World War, and the consequences of defeat for the newly independent state of Hungary were even more severe than those suffered by Germany. She lost two thirds of her historical territory, and one third of the Hungarian-speaking population – which had once been the majority – found itself living outside the borders of Hungary, forming minorities in the newly created Yugoslavia, in Czechoslovakia, in Romania (which doubled her territory), and even in Austria. The Trianon Peace Treaty failed to create national states, while anti-Hungarian co-operation became established within the Little Entente system of alliance. The spectre of national dismemberment also contributed to the fact that the republic announced in 1918 under the presidency of Mihály Károlyi gave way to the second Bolshevik dictatorship in the world, but even that could not survive the political and military pressure of the Entente.

The Monarchy – including the still quite feudal Hungary – entering into an alliance with the Germans did not win the sympathy of the politicians and the society of France and England. This greatly contributed to the fact that in the so-called Treaty of Trianon after the First World War, Hungary became independent with the division of the monarchy between nation-states, but lost two thirds of its former territory. After the war, this loss of territory and millions of ethnic Hungarians laid the foundations for the anti-socialist and anti-liberal system consolidating its power in a ‘kingdom without a king’ to follow a policy demanding the revision of the newly established national borders.
The military leader of the successful counter-revolution was Miklós Horthy. The kingdom was formally re-established, but without a king: Horthy was appointed regent. Political pressure was exerted on labour movements, liberal forces and the Jews (it was at this time that the ‘numerus clausus’ was passed, the first law which discriminated against Jews by limiting their educational opportunities). The national system that emerged was a complex one: it maintained the feudal symbols of the past, and large estates survived within the restricted borders of the country, but a multi-party parliament operated, and the Jewish plutocracy also preserved the positions it had achieved under the dual monarchy. Pre-fascist methods were used in the attempt to control the social conflicts which, inevitably, began to emerge.

The generation which lived through the Trianon Peace Treaty could not cope with this destruction of their historical traditions; they yearned for the continuation of statehood and economic integration, and the irredentist demand for territorial revision enjoyed unanimous support. The counter-revolutionary system mixed this policy with conservatism, which was renewed in the name of anti-Bolshevism. Later, the foreign policy of Horthy’s Hungary drifted towards Italian and German fascism, which was seen as the only hope of breaking the restrictions imposed by the Little Entente. The radicalism of fascism was foreign to the ruling circles of the Hungarian system, whose political ideals were closer to those of English conservatism, at least as they perceived it. Nevertheless, these ideals were not enough to save the country from the tragic step into the Second World War on the side of Nazi Germany, which eventually led to the confirmation of the Trianon Peace Treaty, and to the inclusion of Hungary, along with the rest of the region, in the power zone of the Soviet Union.

The programmatic historical analysis of the Horthy regime was written by Gyula Szekfu, who analyzed the causes that led to the apparent problems after the First World War (Szekfu, 1920). His genuinely conservative and Habsburg-oriented perspective placed nineteenth century Hungarian history in a special light, where liberals and ethnic minorities appeared to be the cause of the unbalanced development of Hungarian society. This approach was clever in finding historical causes for current political-social problems, and affected a heated debate in the Hungarian intelligentsia between the two world wars.

6.2 Hungarian character and historical blind alleys for Hungary – the question of internal Others

When Szekfu (1939) followed the European scientific discourse of the time, and analysed the Hungarian national character, he did not refer to any genetic attributes; rather, he assessed the impact of history on the present characteristics of the Hungarians.

Between the two world wars, nation was a key concept in ideology, a target of self-criticism, and a tool for self-assurance. The character that was dragged out from the flow of history received less attention in the debate than questions as to what the expanse of nation is, and who belongs to a nation. Paradoxically, Szekfu, who was not an anti-Semite after all, accused assimilating Jews and liberalism for the mental decrement of the nation. In contrast, László Németh (Németh, 1992), who could
appreciate German power, considered the assimilating German minorities as also diluting Hungarians. Compared to them, Babits (1939) said the most and the best:

‘… I would not be afraid of the dilemma that we become either Jews or Germans. Still, I think that Jews and Germans will become true Hungarians among us. Political trends come, political trends pass. The spirit of the time that produced them disappears itself. Here in Hungary, behind the Zeitgeist out-shouting but not drowning it, there is another spirit that is free from it. This is the old brave Christian spirit of Hungarians that turned its back on barbarism even at the time of István I, broke with the pagan life of tribes and began to assimilate the stranger. This spirit gave the moral support and strength of Hungary in Europe and provided a life among civilized nations.’ (p. 571).

After 1945, following the second collapse of the nation in the twentieth century, István Bibó (1986) presented a line of thought that followed Szekfu in its style, but opposed him in the content of reasoning. He also analyzed historical developments in order to learn from a historic downfall. Instead of external corrupting influences, he blamed the social structure and the counterselection of the elite, alienated and divided from the people. In searching for the causes of the revolution of 1956, the official ideology blamed the previous – anti-German – nationalism for the uprising. The peak achievement of the emerging scholarly debate is Jeno Szucs’s (1997) analytic work devoted to the historical development of the concept of nation and to the social constraints of national characteristics. He points out that national character is not eternal, but is a consequence of a given historical development. It does not explain anything in a nation’s history, but national character itself needs explanation. We could add the social psychological processes of national identity to the historic causes.

7. Communism and National Issues in East Central Europe

After the war, a multi-party ‘coalition government’ existed between 1945 and 1948. Even with Soviet support, the Hungarian Communist Party was unable to win a swift electoral victory, but the communists took possession of the key positions within the government. In 1948, one-party ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ was instituted in Hungary as in other countries.

This revolutionary change did have some social support: the society at the beginning of the century and the Horthy era had been highly polarized, and provided no opportunities for social advancement to the farm labourers, workers and clerks who craved it. It was above all the Hungarian villages that exerted social pressure and put new blood into both state owned heavy industry and the new intelligentsia of the revolutionized society. This accelerated social movement was refreshing, but because it involved the most nationalistic sector of society, it tended to work against the officially international ideals of the prevalent philosophy.

The dramatic events of 1956 were the outcome of several years of fermentation. They left two unforgettable memories with all those who lived them through and participated in them. The first was the feeling of unprecedented national unity on 23 October, when hundreds of thousands of people expressed their unanimous wish to break with Stalinism. Everybody felt the same way: ex-Stalinists who wanted to erase the memory of their own role over the past ten years, through their own courage, workers and young people who missed and desired the realization of the ideals of socialism, everybody who had suffered from the persecution, disadvantages and
poverty of the Rákosi era, including the promoters of civil society and democracy, the small groups of conservatives, and the extreme right wing. The troubled and repeatedly re-formed government of Imre Nagy followed events rather than directed them, and after initial hesitation the government committed itself to political pluralism and national independence. In the meanwhile, the evanescent experience of unity faded, communist and anti-communist terror-actions harassed the public, and the full range of political opinions re-emerged, re-uniting only after the Soviet military intervention in a brief outburst of national and democratic resistance. At this point, the second fundamental truth of 1956 emerged, one which was to become the determining political experience of a whole generation: the loneliness and defencelessness of a country, being entirely on its own, the knowledge that despite their reassurances, declarations of solidarity, and real humanitarian intentions, not one other country was prepared to help Hungary. True to the spirit of the Yalta agreement, the ‘free world’ treated Hungary as a province of the Soviet empire, abandoned her as a pawn in the internal power struggles of that empire, and did not even consider supporting her against the armed invasion by the Soviet Union.

János Kádár became the head of a new puppet government. In the name of the so-called ‘two-front struggle’, he prevented a second return of the Stalinist Rákosi from Soviet exile, but he also co-operated in the arrest, trial and execution of Imre Nagy. Independently of Kádár’s personal motives in the power struggle, and possible external pressures, he could never forget his personal responsibility for the bloody retaliation; neither could the latent public opinion of the country.

A peculiar profile of the Kádár system developed after 1962. The forced creation of co-operatives continued, but a fortunate combination of collective economy with small-scale farming in the hands of peasants also emerged. Nationalised heavy industry was preserved and expanded, but the rigidity of the centrally planned economy was relaxed, the independence of companies increased, and foreign trade relationships were opened up. All of this could be felt in both the variety and the level of services. A pragmatic attitude gained ground, and with it the recognition that both expertise and financial interest are necessary for economic progress. Hungary became the most open country in the Soviet block to the international flow of information. Cultural and social expenditures were almost greater than the economic load-bearing capacity of the country, and, in retrospect, Hungary was an economically immature welfare state. None of this changed the basic facts of the social system: the international and internal restrictions, the deficiencies of constitutional statehood and human rights, the paralysing rigidity of the centralized economy, which was not eased by readily offered western loans.

Stalinism and the ensuing Soviet policy used the nationalism of the so called ‘peoples’ republics’ in East Central Europe (Kiss, 2000). They permitted the cultivation of anti-German traditions, but at the same time demanded the submission to Soviet supremacy. They wished to separate the satellite states from each other. Czechoslovakia and Poland could keep their national herald, for Romania and Hungary a new one was fabricated that was surrounded by a corn-ear coronary taken from the Soviet herald. The national holidays were changed in all dominated countries, the major ones were remembrances of the anti-German victory in the Second World War. The national uprisings starting with the Hungarian revolution of 1956 would have been jarring for the Soviet leadership, and as a response the role of
national traditions was re-evaluated. The communist party used the ‘progressive’ elements of national history, and national heritage or patriotism were used more.

In the 1960s-1970s, as a communist national awakening, the Bolshevik totalitarianism was engaged with national traditions. Thus, nationalism itself appeared even before the democratic changes in East Europe. Part of this nationalist turn was the revival of nineteenth century mythology, the upgrading of the importance of independent statehood, the undervaluation of neighbouring nations and minorities, the use of the totalitarian means to extinguish these minorities. In literature, the historic novel and essay became popular, historic monuments were built, journalism referred to national pride, and national prejudices and anti-Semitism appeared. Only one taboo remained, namely, relations towards the Soviet Union were not disputable. In Hungary, 15 March, the day for remembering the civic revolution of 1848, was not an officially recognised holiday; it even became an occasion to express reservations towards the existing regime. Discussing the problems of the Hungarian minorities in the neighbouring countries remained a taboo for decades. It was a form of resistance of the intellectuals to express solidarity toward these Hungarian minorities. In the 1980s the values of national independence and democracy were connected to each other.

7.1 Returning to national symbols during transition

The democratic changes after the fall of communism in East Central Europe naturally gave birth or rebirth to the national principle. The questions arose and the national differences emerged over how this shift from a quasi colonial status to an autonomous national policy had happened. It would have consequences for internal social-political processes and international relations. Despite the fact that drawing ‘just’ borders among national states is virtually impossible, the Soviet policy after the Second World War was also responsible for trying to increase ethnic, national tension among the small East Central European states. As for the dominant ones, Bolshevik ideology and the pan-Russian aspirations were closely connected. Those who were dominated, had to live without any protection of national identity, in a minority status, and were better off forgetting any national ties to those outside the borders of the state.

We do not have enough space here, nor perspective or source material, to give a deeper analysis than a rough overview of the critical historical period of the transition. Among others, even social psychologists have analysed the components and consequences of this varied and prolonged process (see Erös, 1993; Forgas et al., 1995; Garai, 1993, 1995; Halász, 1987, 1992; Pataki, 1993), but several credible recollections, interview-materials, essayist studies, and the psychologically sensitive flow of papers by political scientists rival them. (For the variegated nature of views also see Fehér & Heller, 1992; Schöpflin, 1993; Krausz, 1994; Vásárhelyi, 1995.)

By the time Kádár died, his system had become obsolete: despite its previous success, it had lost almost all internal support by the end of the 1980s. Not only had the young people, but the whole population, especially the most influential groups, the leaders of the economy and the intelligentsia turned towards the market economy and the world of democracy. The Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party was also disintegrating; its dominant majority declared itself social democrat.
Hungary was the first country in the region to start changing, but as her neighbours followed suit, the significance of Hungary’s pioneering role soon decreased. In several of the surrounding countries the transformation was a matter of the socialist leaders embarking upon openly nationalist programs. This political half-turn towards nationalism could be rationalised and justified in various ways:

a) it ensured the political survival of those in power, and the continuation of the government with new partners in a situation where no new political elite was ready to fill a possible power vacuum;

b) it did not usually upset the advantages and achievements of ‘existing socialism’ by attempting to restore or radically renew social aims;

c) it recognised that society was not ready for the development of a private economy and individualistic ideas yet, but still understood and spoke the political language of collectivism;

d) it meant that with the disappearance of Soviet influence, the struggle for national independence and autonomy, traditionally linked with each other, similarly oppressed views such as religious convictions, could come to the surface without resistance;

e) it offered emotional and mental security, while other social and political attachments which might have provided a sense of identity either lost their object or became less credible. (Thus, for example, the possibility of European integration and the sense of ‘being European’ might curb the one-sidedness of nationalist ambitions, but as the possibility of integration fades, these ambitions are likely to increase.)

f) finally, the struggle to preserve national and ethnic values would encourage the appraisal and conscious defence of wider moral and social standards in an otherwise dangerously de-stabilized situation.

This sort of policy might also have developed in Hungary under the leadership of Imre Pozsgay, but he disappeared from the scene in 1990 because the Hungarian situation differed from that of her neighbours in many respects. First of all, the likelihood of political change had been maturing both in the economy and in political thinking for years. On the one hand, a group of economic leaders with some skill, or at least some experience of market economies, had developed, with a relatively wide background of small contractors. On the other hand, small groups of intellectuals who ‘thought differently’ rapidly formed: They had been isolated and unheard for a long period, but the social criticisms which they expressed at a high intellectual level were shared by broad social strata and by many age groups. Furthermore, Hungary could look back to the civil middle class and the system of parliamentary democracy that she had once enjoyed until 1949. These memories, briefly revived in 1956, had survived for more than half a century; dim and fragmentary as they were, they still served as a kind of cultural breeding ground for the change of the political system. (This factor also distinguishes the Czech Republic and Poland from other countries in the region; there too, it may have had a significant effect on the direction and speed of social transformation.)
A gradual reinstatement of the public elements of national consciousness is detectable in social-political changes during the transition. Efficient tools are available in modern societies for the socialization to national symbols. But in the context of distinctive Central European conditions, the cult of national symbols manifested itself differently. They belonged to the civil sector more than to the public. The communist regime devoted a great deal of attention to symbols in the forms of soviet monuments, controlled national days, even celebrating the Bolshevik revolution. Between 1945-1949 the day of the Hungarian civic revolution in 1848 was a major occasion for national commemoration. After the communist take-over it disappeared from the official holidays. Other major holidays were reshaped, e.g. day of Stephen on 20 August had always been a celebration of the establishment the Hungarian state; during the communist rule it became the feast for the 1949 Constitution and for the new bread.

During the transition, the values of independence were stressed, and traditional national values were revitalized in the re-establishment of national symbols. Regarding national days, the foundation of the Hungarian state and the revolutions of 1948 and 1956 have become celebrated as a means of expressing historical continuity.

8. Empirical Data on Hungarian National Identity

8.1 The Concepts of ‘Nation’ and ‘Our Nation’

One prerequisite for the investigation of national attitudes is to find out what people consider as a nation, how this concept is defined in general and in relation to the respondents’ own nation. The relationship between the two levels of abstraction lies in the fact that people consider their own nation as the typical example of the more abstract concept.

In the mid-1960s, the definitions given by pupils reflected two approaches to the definition of nation (Hunyady, 1998). On the one hand, it was the country as a geographical-territorial unit and as a state organization into which this large group was placed. But this was complicated by the existence of Hungarian national minorities abroad. The other approach involved the comparison of the people constituting a nation, and then the abstraction of their common features and traits that were different from others. Both starting points suggested a static concept of nation; the students were not really aware of the historical nature of the formation of nations.

The adult respondents and those of the different social classes indicated common language and/or common culture in a wider perspective as the relevant features of nations. The older generations and less well-educated people tended to hold the initial view that belonging to one particular nation was a matter of natural endowment. The bonding force of traditions and ideas was mentioned more frequently by the more educated groups, but even among intellectuals only 20 per cent mentioned economic foundations in the development and cohesion of a nation. In contrast to the abstract definition of a nation, participation in common work, personal commitment and origin

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were mentioned quite often among the criteria of belonging specifically to the Hungarian nation.

In the long period of the 1970s and 1980s, the overwhelming majority of adult and student respondents thought that national minorities in Hungary belonged to the Hungarian nation, and the same proportion rejected the idea that those who had emigrated or fled from the country belonged to the Hungarian nation. However, opinions were deeply divided over the issue of the Hungarian minorities who had found themselves outside the borders of Hungary after the First World War, whether they belonged to a nation according to their country or according to their culture. In this respect, a change took place in the early 1990s. The majority of the respondents thought that Hungarians living outside the borders of Hungary belonged to this nation. However, opinions regarding those leaving the country voluntarily, and regarding the national minorities living in Hungary were deeply divided. The importance of the role of culture increased, the significance of the geographical location of where one lives and citizenship decreased.

There was a large group in both phases who thought that both the national minorities living in Hungary and the Hungarian minorities living in the neighbouring countries belonged to the Hungarian nation, either without recognizing this logical contradiction, or simply accepting it. The proportion of such people was practically constant, about 20 per cent. There was a further re-arrangement affecting another 20 per cent: those who no longer considered national minorities living in Hungary as part of the Hungarian nation, but did think that Hungarian minorities in the neighbouring countries belonged to it either. The percentage change in attitude towards people who moved to the West was even greater, even if it was still the minority who thought that Western emigrants were part of the Hungarian nation.

‘Nation’ is charged with emotions, and this was manifested in the cognitive side of the definitions. The respondents occasionally referred to their positive feelings toward their own nation, and several definitions of the conceptual features of nation included the idea that their members had common feelings, and that they formed an emotional community. The quality, conceptual cues and consciousness of the emotions colouring the image of the Hungarian nation were investigated by means of a few questions. It was a unanimous finding of the investigations of the past 20 years that the great majority of the adult and student samples saw reasons for national pride, and a much smaller proportion thought that there were reasons for shame in present and past Hungarian history. In 1973, 91 per cent saw reasons for pride, 35.5 per cent saw reasons for shame.

Pride was considered by a substantial and increasing proportion of the respondents as a natural concomitant of national belonging that needed no further explanation. The general and economic development of the country was quite often the object of pride. Judgements about the significance of cultural achievements varied. In 1973, the national representative sample did not appreciate cultural achievements very much, in 1975, the intellectual sub-samples stressed it heavily, even in comparison with industrial and agricultural achievements, while in 1981 it was pushed to the back again in the responses of students. National past and a history fraught with struggles were highlighted in the 1981 investigation. The ‘small country’ motif came to the fore
again and again. The position of ‘small countries’ was seen as defenceless, having no chance, thus every achievement they made bore increased significance.

The object of national shame was often indicated in recent history, or in the eternal flaws of the Hungarian national character. The historical cases of military or political defeat, collapsed systems, widespread alienation of the masses from the political system were cited from the history of the twentieth century.

The responses of the less educated social groups reflected greater national pride, and admitted fewer reasons for shame. The ‘small country’ motif was more prevalent in this class, too. The worker respondents and their children within the student subsample were especially characterized by the cult of productivity. Students with good academic records indicated more reasons for both pride and shame than poor achievers. The respondents with higher education, especially university students, found fewer sources of pride, and admitted considerably more often that there were reasons for shame in national history. They admitted that an emotional bond was more complex, they tolerated and accepted inconsistencies in this respect better. It was the intellectuals who repeatedly identified national values in the area of culture.

After the democratic changes there was no essential change in the argumentation about national pride and shame. The responses were less rich in content, with pride in economic achievements becoming fainter. The ‘small country’ motif did not appear often, but overcoming difficulties and pure survival in the past seemed to be national virtues for many respondents. The ambivalence of national emotions increased: in the student sample, the acceptance of pride and shame shifted to 74 per cent and 56 per cent, respectively. The nation was not often reproached for the propagation and perseverance of communism, nor for co-operation with it. On the contrary, critical reference to the past influence of fascism was often more frequent.

8.2 Patriotism and International Expectations

An individual’s personal relationship with the national category and the native land – patriotism – was an important issue for our research. Repeated attempts (Hunyady, 1998) have been tried to learn more about the perception of this personal relationship and the related normative expectations in the widest possible circle. Researchers had no illusions that they were measuring the beliefs that lay beneath the behaviour of the respondents, it was possible to grasp only its mental image and verbal manifestations – although the normative demands that appeared may have had the effect of controlling behaviour, similar to the effect of moral consciousness. The investigation of the concept of patriotism served two purposes. On the one hand, the components of personal attitudes towards norms were revealed. On the other hand, the mental content of the construct of ‘patriotism’ was investigated, a marked area of evaluation in the characterisation of specific individuals and large social groups.

More than half of the national representative sample in 1973 interpreted patriotism in terms of attachment and devotion to the homeland and the socio-political system, and almost half of the sample thought that patriotism also meant activity for the country. The younger generations emphasized the active nature of patriotism, while older ones stressed passive acceptance and an emotional bond. Most of the respondents seemed to think that historical changes were present in the manifestations of patriotism rather
than in its nature. In 1975, the responses of four sub-samples indicated even more clearly that the patriotism of the past was perceived as combative, while that of the present was more conventional and peaceful, expressed in work well-done.

From 1973 onwards, the same method of measurement was used to investigate the requirements of patriotism and how strict the different sub-samples were in determining these requirements. 15 to 17 items were offered to the respondents, who had to choose the forms of behaviour that did not conform to patriotism. The selection of an item meant that the person who behaved or felt or made judgements in a certain way did not meet a requirement and broke a ‘rule’ of patriotism. There was a clear-cut tendency that no matter how varied the composition of the samples were, the number of requirements fell and the concept of patriotism became more and more indistinct and tolerant. The average number of requirements, transformed to a 16 item scale, was 9.5 on the national representative sample in 1973, varied between 7.3 and 10.1 according to social class in 1975, was 7.1 in a stratified student sample in 1981, was 5.4 in a similarly composed student sample in 1991, after the change of the political system, and was 3.3 in a small student sample in 1994. This change is unidirectional and large, even bearing in mind the fact that young people are usually more tolerant in this respect, and that the data collected since 1981 have come from student samples, rather than from adults.

In 1973, more than 75 per cent of the national representative sample indicated that if people emigrated from their country, evaded military service, did not work according to their abilities, did not feel homesick when abroad, or could not sing the national anthem, they could not be considered as good patriots. There was general agreement over the necessity of obeying the laws. The importance of activity related to work was emphasized, while public activity was considered necessary by only 32 per cent. The preference for the homeland and its inhabitants, and for Hungarian intellectual and physical goods as opposed to foreign ones divided the respondents: The older generation was stricter, the younger generation was more tolerant in this respect.

In 1975, the above-mentioned criteria of good patriotism still prevailed. Those emigrating from the country were excluded from the circle of good patriots by more than 90 per cent. The symbol of the national anthem and longing for home were especially important for the worker sub-samples. Intellectuals emphasized the importance of public activity and political interest. The older generations of the stratified sample mentioned the necessity of military service and an attitude of reservation about foreign countries more often than the younger respondents. The younger generation seemed to believe more in informality and openness. This was the first time respondents were asked whether or not commitment to socialism was a criterion of patriotism. 73 per cent replied in the affirmative.

In 1981, loyalty to socialism took a considerably more modest position in the responses of the students: Only 52 per cent of them indicated it as a criterion, which was a sign of political erosion. Public activity was not considered by many respondents as very necessary, either. Private life had also become more independent of patriotism than for any previous sample. The acceptance of foreigners and foreign goods no longer posed a problem for 90 per cent of these student respondents.
In 1991 and 1994, after the socio-political changes had taken place, the above-mentioned tendencies became more pronounced: resistance to foreign countries disappeared completely in the younger generation. Both public activity and private life vanished from the criteria; attachment to the country and respect for national symbols remained the narrow core of the norms of patriotism. Neither the socialism of the past, nor the social program of the future seemed to conflict with patriotism in the opinion of the great majority, but the demand for and acceptance of democracy was required, and authoritarianism was no longer regarded as compatible with patriotism.

The strictness of the criteria of patriotism and the degree of tolerance were influenced by the social-educational situation of the respondents. It was true throughout the period of the studies that workers, their children, and future workers still studying in vocational training schools were more demanding and more reserved about foreign countries than intellectuals and their offspring. In 1981, students with good academic records made more demands than their school-mates, while in 1991 polarisation depended on origin: Students whose parents were workers were more demanding, while students with intellectual parents were the most tolerant. This is a good example of the long-range effect of familial socialisation and of the fact that workers had and still have particular attitudes.

8.3 National self-image

A recent detailed public opinion poll (Gallup Hungary, 2000) asked a large representative sample of adult Hungarians about their image of Hungary, attitudes and values attached to their national identity. The analysis covered subjective well-being and the image of Hungary. As a general result, it was found that most people hold an auto-stereotype of Hungarians as talented, dynamic, assertive and creative. They see the conditions of the country itself more negatively. In the answers, 8 persons out of 10 were more proud of being Hungarian. Also the majority of people preferred Hungary as compared to various other nations (Czech, Irish, Japanese, French, Austrian, American, German, English). Three quarters are happy to live in Hungary and two thirds would remain in Hungary even if they had the possibility to move to a foreign country. Most of the respondents agreed that Hungary is a country with picturesque sites and that it is a country which suffered a lot. Most of them agreed that this country has a bright past and a great history, that it is a talented nation with high culture, an industrious nation with valuable scientific achievements, and good results in sport. Most of them found that social justice, solidarity, good economic performance, tidiness and order were not characteristic of Hungary, and it was not a highly developed country.

As to the future of Hungary, the majority envisaged a safe, humanistic, fair-minded, rich, moral Hungary. Fewer people adhered to a more powerful and religious Hungary. Most of the Hungarians evaluated the time of the renaissance king, Mátyás Hunyadi, as the peak of Hungarian history. They also appreciated the reign of István I, the founder of the Hungarian state. More than half of the sample evaluated positively the period from the 1960s to the 1980s in Hungarian history. The darkest past times were judged to be the Turkish dominance, the hard-line communism of the 1950s and the Horthy area. The time of transition was evaluated moderately positively. The claims that 'Hungarians will endure in all situations’ and ‘we have the talent to advance to the most successful nations of Europe’ had general support. It is
thought-provoking that people blamed ‘our fate’ for our miseries and only one quarter saw the responsibility of Hungarians themselves.

Individual differences correlated with the respondents’ subjective well-being. We could draw a conclusion that those respondents who believed that this society failed to give them agreeable living conditions and consequently relatively good standards of living and well-being, had the least positive image of the nation. People perceived less happiness and content of others. They judged themselves more satisfied than the majority of Hungarians. Even though the majority were proud to be Hungarian, but less so in Budapest than in the villages, less the young than the elderly. Whereas only one quarter of the population would rather choose to be English, American, German or Austrian, this proportion was higher among the young, it was far above one third. Two thirds would choose to remain in Hungary even if they had the chance to move to another country. The most popular target countries were the United States and Germany. These data, of course, do not express aims of migration, rather a sort of mental openness.

With regard to temporal changes, the majority saw a positive change in the availability of goods, they experienced an increased closeness to Europe, found free exercise of religion easier, faith and religion more widespread, and an improving reputation for the nation. More than half of Hungarians saw freedom of speech, unconstrained achievement, independence of the country, opportunities for participating in local public matters, and democracy as being more characteristic with the passing of time. Negative changes were perceived in public safety, in existential security, in the climate of opinion, and in social care. With regard to foreign policy priorities, there was slightly less support for regional relations with neighbouring countries, less attention was given to the Hungarian minorities living outside the borders than in the previous surveys, but a majority still supported these aims.

The most powerful stereotypes were attached to history. Generally speaking, the medieval periods in ancient history (kings István I and Máté) were the most luminous, then epochs alternated between being evaluated very badly and very positively. Factors involved in social structuring had a strong effect on the evaluation of different epochs. Pronounced differences appeared in the evaluation of the 1970s-1980s. Older and less educated, less prosperous and village-dwelling people were more in favour of the late communist period. This question is above all shaped by political views: supporters of left-wing (post-communist) parties were more in favour of this period than right-wing supporters.

PART II

1. Historical Visions of Europe in the Hungarian Elite

Europe was in the centre of elite discourse throughout all of Hungarian modernity. It was the model for economic and social reforms, and the main inspiration for artists and writers. When analyzing the possible role of Hungary at the beginning of the twentieth century, László Németh, an esteemed writer and a passionate historian of art (1992) organized European history in a rather impressionistic way into four categories: Cretan-Greek, antic Roman, Christian-barbarian and modern. If European
culture was the life of a creative civilization in the first period, he said, then the highly appreciated peace of Pax Romana was in the second, a flame carried on the ship of the Church to new peoples was in the third, and the common circulation for affiliated cultures in the fourth. He stated, in a critical vein, that constitutional nation-states in this fourth phase went wherever the economical interest urged them. The more Europe’s development relied on the economy, the more the crises of the economy threatened her entire culture. Németh, as an original political theorist of the time, was searching for a new Europe, to which Hungary should tie its fate. He rejected Russia’s Marxism, Mussolini’s fascism and Hitler’s national socialism, and searched for another alternative in European development.

As for Hungary, Németh saw her future in Central European co-operation attached to humanist thought. He opposed the then popular irredentist reactions to the loss of territory and population. He even formed the hypothesis that a smaller but independent Hungary might have better chances for development. Referring to the dispersion of Hungarians throughout the Carpathian Basin, he concluded that this is either agony or a mission: agony, if there is no significance in being Hungarian, a mission if Hungarians as Christian Jews can disseminate a thought. For him the thought to propagate was the concept of Central Europe. But he did not leave much space for reflections on the ideal of Central Europe as an integration of free nations, as a culture. For him, Central Europe was something to be done. And a new Central Europe could even be an endeavour in renewing Europe. He himself called this mission a dream but not an illusion, as it does not draw attention from reality.

Another major political theorist of the time, István Bibó (1986) who disagreed on several points with Németh (as could be seen above), also found the European context important for Hungary. In his essay on the Misery of Small States in East Europe, he also claimed that the forming of nations was the most significant process of Europe as a political community. He doubted that nations were formed only at the time of the Great French Revolution. In his opinion nations as characteristic entities of Europe are the results of a development over the course of one and a half millennia. What changed in modernity is that political processes attached to nations became mass movements and emotions attached to them became mass reactions. Modern nationalism established unity within already existing states in West Europe, but he believed that in Central and East Europe the Habsburg Empire mixed up the paths to nation formation. He could see three major problems which the historic Hungarian state and nation faced at the beginning of the twentieth century: (a) there was a historic state that was not entirely Hungarian speaking, (b) after the defeat of the war of independence in 1849, a fear became entrenched in the Hungarian elite: that pursuing the full consequences of democratization would lead to a loss of those territories dominated by national minorities (c) the shock caused by the Trianon Peace Treaty obscured existing differences between detached territories.

In Bibó’s view the problem with political culture in Central and East Europe was that: (a) deformations occurred during her development when entering into historical blind alleys (b) there are blurred philosophies and demagogue propaganda, (c) the national frames are precarious, (d) nationalism is anti-democratic, (e) democracy itself is distorted.
He suggested a solution for stabilizing the region after the Second World War by putting across two principles: preserving the historical status quo and following the ethnic distributions in forming new states. He warned that the disputes over state borders should be solved before establishing any kind of integration. He proposed the right of people to self-determination (census) as a democratic solution to disputes about borders. He imagined the art of making a good peace treaty after the Second World War was if it avoided passions and revenge, if it was based on established principles and historic legitimacy.

The great powers negotiating a new order in Europe did not follow any of these principles that were based after all on the Wilsonian ideals. Some of these thoughts might still be relevant today but they are primarily historic proofs of a recurrent line of thinking about Hungary within East Central Europe that did not develop more in Hungarian public thinking. It is a notion of integration for which there seemed to be a need occasionally in one or other of the newly born nation-states in East Central Europe in the course of the turbulent twentieth century. Parts of these aims might be solved in a new type of, and much more extended, integration based on democratic principles.

2. Hungary and the European Integration

After the Second World War there was a chance and also a need to stop policies of isolation and opposition in the relationships between the great powers (Hülvely, 1998). There came a conviction that the problems threatening each nation were not exclusively caused by external factors. In a new European integration national interests should be harmonized with each other (with bottom-up approaches and focusing on interests). It is not favours or historic jurisdiction that should determine any enlargement, but a complex constellation of interests. Even though Europeanism remained an idealistic end, politicians were able to solve concrete conflicts between interests.

In Hungary, people and political movements accepted almost immediately and without serious doubts that there is no real alternative to joining the EU after the democratic changes. In this matter, there is a great consensus, aspirations of the elite and the public coincide. Even though there are some who would be affected negatively by this integration process, the political elite would achieve an overall gain that would be impossible to accomplish without it. There is some hesitation among the member states: e.g. fears of migration, the estimated costs of integrating a less developed and a precarious region. Today the EU states are not motivated by any direct interest in politics or security to accelerate the integration process. Postponing the date of integration is evidence that strategic considerations were overshadowed. West European countries could easily reach Eastern markets well before integration.

In the Eastern enlargement process, former communist countries, whose domestic conditions were less well known and who were observed from a distance in the rest of Europe, are candidates for membership. In this rather stereotypical view, a greater role is given to historic events before the Second World War. A wider information exchange may help in solving this problem, but new problems arise as our region is still considered to be a source of tension among nationalities.
2.1 Nation-state and European integration

The sovereignty question seems to be answered by pointing out that it is not a supranational federation that European countries are aiming at, but intergovernmental co-operation. The interesting question is still open: how a European citizenship will develop. As integration is deepened and increasingly affects the everyday life of people even in ‘materialized’ forms (e.g. the Euro), it will increasingly affect affiliations and identity as well. Nevertheless, it could be conjecuted for the foreseeable future that even with stronger ties to Europe, national identification will survive. As a consequence, a new phenomenon will arise with multiple levels of identification (Dosie & Devos, 1999; de Rosa, 1996, Breakwell & Lyons, 1996). In the development of this dimension, it is also interesting that parallel to the formation of a more inclusive continental category, the attachment to a region is receiving more attention. This is again not independent of social and political changes. Apart from internal factors, there are also interesting social changes outside Europe. Where will a European identification fit into a more globalized society?

These massive changes in the targets of identity might also influence identifications themselves. Or other social factors of the changing world might affect identity mechanisms. As far as post-modern identity theories are concerned, they envisage a major change in identification (Green, 2000) where supranational integrations become the foci of political identities, identity will be more contextually driven (multiple and shifting), will be built more on a set of values rather by opposing ‘Others’, will be built on the respect and even celebration of diversity, will be shaped not by socialized emotional responses, but will be built on its instrumental and intellectual qualities. Debates over alternative citizenship parallel these developments in identity research. It is not a surprise that the rights and obligations of a citizen already extend over the borders of a nation state. This will undoubtedly lead to pluralized attachment patterns, yet the centre of gravity will be the national level for quite some time.

2.2 A Small Country in the EU

Hungarians consider their country a small country – with all of its brighter (less responsibility and visibility in world politics) and darker (less independence, greater need for accommodating outside influences) sides. The aims and results of a small country’s integration may be different from those of a great power: her dependence on outside influences is more pronounced, her main interest lies more in commerce than in safety, there may be corporate characteristics within internal structures. Small countries are more oriented toward the status quo, and have regional ties to great powers. The best milieu for a small country is a functioning power balance.

2.3 Central European co-operation and the EU

Another aspect of Hungarian integration is that the goals of small nations in the region have been in conflict, resulting in the creation of adversaries and nationalism. The search for allies in foreign relations has gained importance. It is a remarkable fact that Hungary does not have a real alternative to European integration, except that of standing alone, which is outdated and expensive. While the citizens of European countries have a more or less developed system of arguments concerning the enlargement process, consisting of both pros and cons, the Hungarian public supports
European integration without knowing really why and at what cost. There have been no public debates about economic, cultural and political gains or losses of joining the EU. The consensus among political parties and the generally positive feelings of the public have prevented the Hungarian public from reflecting on the European integration process.

Central European regional co-operation appeared recently after the democratic changes, though these connections are animated mainly by the preparation to the EU integration. Thus, also taking earlier experience into account when considering the lack of co-operation, we may risk saying that wider European identifications reinforce regional connections among small states in Eastern Central Europe.

2.4 Minorities and the EU

There is a growing chance for Hungary to be among those candidates that can soon complete the necessary preparations and before long be members of the EU. Although up until recently the political-economic scenarios and their impact on Hungary were the issues of integration that received greater attention, gradually, minority and nationality problems have come to the fore (Gergely, 1998). The minority status is no longer stigmatised extensively. Gradually, since the mid-1980s, the minorities have begun to participate in local politics more and more extensively. Tradition-oriented, value-driven attitudes help to maintain the identity of minority groups. Interestingly, in most of the nations, the majority of people are full of fears, turn to the past, and lack a positive perspective.

The integration of minorities is impossible if there is no place for diversity in political culture that may reflect ethnic differences. Although ethnic identity usually outlives the groups, geographic separation or economic fragmentation, ethno-regionalism tends to be included in minorities’ spatial-historical perspectives. Regionality means horizontal coherence, it is a juxtaposed spatial relation that may be free of hierarchical relations, and form an economic-ecological unit. The various regional identities had been labelled as ‘provincial’ or ‘particular’ for a long time. The over-centralized states could not integrate them, but they came out strengthened from this passive resistance. The Hungarian political or even scientific approaches are often too idealistic. They start from the presumption that now Hungary does not have a substantive number of national minorities, therefore minority problems do not exist within Hungary (discounting the large gipsy minority as a non-national one). But a history without ethnic minorities should not become a dominant perspective in Hungary. Even though the conditions of the minorities (even of gipsies) are acceptable at the level of policy, further efforts are needed in practice.

For the Hungarian minorities in neighbouring countries, integration into the EU offers as many advantages as challenges. For the mainstream political and cultural movements, the ultimate solution to these problems would be the integration of all neighbouring countries into the EU within the near future. Then dividing borders would not separate Hungarians from each other. But for the time being, challenges might also arise, such as the introduction of Schengen rules. Hungarian foreign policy has had three principles since the democratic changes in the 1990s that were more or less consensual within the Parliament and in the dominating political discourse: (a) European integration, (b) support for Hungarians outside the borders, (c) good
relations with neighbouring countries. In changing international and national situations, every time a new equilibrium is to be found among these principles. After and during the integration of Hungary into the EU a new balance is possibly needed.

3. Public Opinion and European Integration

Gallup Hungary conducted a study on random French, German, Austrian, and Slovene samples (N=800-1000). Germans, Austrians, and Slovenes had slightly less positive attitudes to the EU than the French and Hungarians. 97 per cent of the Hungarian population had heard about the Hungarian request for admittance into the EU. Three quarters of the Germans, more than two thirds of the Slovenes, six out of 10 of the Austrians, five out of ten of the French had heard about the Hungarian aims. About half of the respondents thought that Hungary may offer much to the European Union. Most of them thought that their nation would profit more than lose by Hungarian integration. There is a general consensus among all nations that ‘the more members the EU has the more secure peace is’; ‘the more members EU will have the more important role it will play in the world’, ‘with more member states, the European Union will be richer’; ‘Hungary’s membership in the EU is both historically and geographically reasonable’; ‘the EU membership could help the Hungarian economy’; ‘with the enlargement, Hungary would gain importance in Europe’; ‘Hungarian leaders do what is necessary for Hungary to be a member of the EU in the near future’. A general conclusion of the research is that the likelihood of Hungarian integration was perceived quite positively, most of the people within these nations knew that Hungary was applying for EU membership, and it was generally supported in these countries.

The support for European integration was measured in another research project by CEORG (Central European Research Group, 2000) in the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary (N=1000-1500) in May 2000. There are significant differences among the three countries that are the most likely to join the EU. More than four fifths of the Hungarian population are in favour of Hungarian integration, this proportion is somewhat lower in Poland (70 per cent) and the Czechs are surprisingly indecisive, two thirds would vote for integration and one third against it. A little more than half of the counted responses accepted that economic development and modernization should precede EU-integration. Hungarians were the most optimistic regarding the time-scale for acceptance.

4. National Stereotypes and Europe

4.1 Hungarian Auto-stereotype

One’s own nation and the stereotypes related to it have an outstanding psychological character and significance. Group self-characterization, which is a collective work in itself, emerges as a collective product, while it is also an extremely simplified and biased mirror of collective functioning and culture. Its bias is inevitable, since it plays a role in group cohesion, in the acceptance and facilitation of group existence, while each member of the group develops, expresses, supports, and emphasizes his or her own self-image. In the present stage of national states and increasingly broad international relations it is of both ideological and practical significance what image a
The general position of these characteristics did not alter radically in the responses of the sample, but interest in politics was now lower. Naturally, its meaning had also changed in the given context: politics could mean not only compliance with the monolithic system, but also the utilization of the possibilities of democratic pluralism. A fact which deserves just as much attention is that the evaluation of ‘honest’ as a feature of Hungarians fell: in 1991, it came just before ‘diligence’ at the bottom of the scale. The altered political system and the conditions of economic privatization lay behind this change for the worse, and behind the fact that the general level of evaluation of the national in-group fell over the decade from 5.5 to 4.7 on the seven-point scale.

4.2 Perceiving Other Nations

The data regarding the characterization and evaluation of nations are particularly interesting for considering the relationship to Europe (Hunyady, 1998). ‘Russians’ undoubtedly received a favourable evaluation at the beginning of the 1980s, but it is typical that the evaluation of ‘Englishmen’, the ideal depository of western culture was not worse than that, either. A latent tension could be seen in the fact that the trait profile of the relatively highly esteemed ‘Russians’ was very similar to that of the ‘Romanians’ who belonged to the eastern block, but were evaluated with clear
reservations. After the change of the political system the ‘Russians’ retained this profile, but fell back next to ‘Romanians’ in the evaluation hierarchy.

In the 1980s the political division of the world and Europe was better seen in the judgements of the situation and performance of countries than in the national stereotypes. The countries of the eastern block (as a ‘super ingroup’) were evaluated more favourably in several respects than the countries of the western world. Although it was difficult to doubt the western economic and political potential, the welfare care, social-political equality, and rate of development in the countries of the eastern block were evaluated more favourably. It is noteworthy that the relatively favourable position and prosperity of the country as measured by the internal scale of the eastern block encouraged national self-esteem. The change of the political system – through the disappearance of this frame of reference and the widening of perspective – also caused a significant drop in national self-esteem, as expressed by a shift in national auto-stereotype. It is a typical circumstance that national auto-stereotype fell back with respect to other elements of identity, too, and became problematic just at the beginning of liberation and self-determination.

A general drop in the level of evaluation of the most varied categories could be observed in two perfectly comparable samples between 1981 and 1991, thus in that of different nations, too. This was also true of the evaluation of the Germans, but in other respects their relative evaluation improved.

A sudden and radical rearrangement of the international panorama could be observed in the months of the political transformation. The previously reserved characterization of the ‘Germans’ and the two Germanys was followed by a change in evaluation even among the politically non-educated and non-involved pupils in schools. The two German states were not yet formally united when the pupils already began to emphasize how significant they saw the role of Germany in the past and in the future of Europe alike. In 1990, the students replied to a triple question – ‘Which country left its mark on the overall image of Europe the most in 1900 and in 1950, and what can be expected in 2000?’ – that Germany is the leading power of the continent in 1900 and in 2000. In 1991, a larger sample was asked about the countries and nations of the region. The evaluation of Germany was definitely positive in a Central European comparison. It is worth mentioning that, within this narrower region, the evaluation of Hungarians is relatively favourable both among the countries and among the nations. This fact also illustrates the importance of the frame of reference, the respondents still perceived ‘cultural supremacy’ over the neighbouring and the Balkan nations. The characterization of the Romanians was again at the bottom, demonstrating that despite the fast changes in stereotypes arising from the reorganization of the view of the world, the negative attitudes across nations can live on for a long time. It should be noted that a grotesque ‘mirror-image effect’ appeared in the responses of the Hungarian and the Romanian sample: the national auto-stereotypes and the image formed of the other nation were almost perfectly identical – the two nations see themselves the same way, and they see the other nation as the other nation sees them. Even their European perspective is very similar: They ranked the other nation toward the eastern, negative end marked by the ‘Russians’, and ranked themselves toward the positive, western end. The only difference is that the latter means an approach towards the Germans in the case of the Hungarian sample, and an approach towards the French in the case of the Romanians.
In a recent representative survey, CEORG (2000) conducted in October 2000, the preference of nations was measured in four East Central European countries (the Czech Republic, Poland, Lithuania and Hungary) on representative (N=998-1100) samples. General preference or rejection towards 24 nations from different continents, including the respondents’ own nation was measured. These people generally have the most positive attitudes toward West European nations (Swedes, the French, Italians, Germans) and the English-speaking nations (the British, Americans). There is a sort of a division in the appreciation of Americans: Polish and Hungarian respondents preferred them more than the others. There are also differences in the judgements concerning the Germans, while the Czech and the Polish respondents rejected, Hungarians and Lithuanians preferred them. Patterns of preference and rejection are obviously dependent on collective memories, contacts, perspectives and aspirations.

Two dimensions might have influenced all responses: firstly, the geographical and related political dimension of East and West had an effect on the responses, the nationals of the Visegrád countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary) had a better picture of each other (and the Slovenians) than other East Central European countries (e.g. Romanians, Serbs, Ukrainians). Secondly, another dimension intersects with the first one: the aspect of neighbourhood. The historical-personal experiences shaped the attitudes toward the neighbours. Czechs and Hungarians disliked Slovaks. Hungarians disliked Romanians, Serbs, and Ukrainians even more. There was a non-preference in all four countries against Romanians. And Romany people were the least preferred by all respondents.

4.3 Countries forming and representing Europe

The concept of Europe gained new political significance in the 1990s in the opinion of the Hungarian respondents, too (Hunyady, 1998). It was mentally associated above all with the continental power of Germany and France. When thinking of Europe, the respondents thought of all the other member states of the European Community and all the other countries of the continent significantly less often than of these two countries and the insular kingdom of Great Britain. The only exception was Hungary, the respondents’ own country; Hungary was mentioned by 51 per cent as a typical European country in 1991, but this ratio decreased considerably by 1994. The mental association of Hungary with Europe was a matter of wishful thinking, and certainly did not mean that the same role was ascribed to Hungary as to the leading Western Powers, or that the evaluation of her role would run parallel with theirs.

The twentieth century role of the leading countries of Western Europe was described as a U-shaped curve. In the 1950s they were pushed to the background in their own continent, while Russia and the United States of America gained control, but the respondents expected the relationships of the turn of the century to return by the turn of the millennium. This was true of Russia, too. Her career, shaped like an inverted U, was expected to bring her status back to almost the same as it had been before the First World War. The USA would not lose the strong influence she had gained in the 1950s, but Germany would regain the first place.

This anticipation of the future appeared almost immediately, simultaneously with the socio-political change. The roles expected in the Europe of 2000 were not independent of the specific evaluations of different countries. However, it was also
evident in the answers of the respondents that the roles of various countries in Europe were seen as different in the years 1900, 1950 and 2000, but the judgements related to these years varied together.

In 2000, the question relating to European countries and nations was repeated in a Hungarian representative sample, and the results were not very different from those of a decade previously. What was different, however, was that in the even more heterogeneous adult sample the frequency of responses was much lower than in the student sample: even Germany, being at the top of the list, got close to, but did not reach 50 per cent. In this year, however, a new method was introduced: the respondents were asked to indicate on a seven point scale how close members of certain nations ‘stood close to Europeans in general with respect to their typical traits’. The distances between Europeans and the Germans, the English and the French were the smallest, they were less than 2 on the scale. As to the East Central European region, the distance was greater in the cases of Hungarians (2.22) and the Poles (2.94), while the distance between Europeans and Romanians was almost 4. The respondents saw the Serbs and the Russians even further away. It should be noted that the different demographic and educational groups of the sample showed an agreement on the subjective estimations of distance. Nevertheless, there were slight differences in this respect that did not necessarily reach statistical significance. There is a slight difference between men and women: men tend to put the English into second place, women rank the French second. Groups with a university diploma do not put the Germans at the top of the list, but give preference to the French. Among the inhabitants of Budapest – as opposed to those living in the country – Germans rank only third, both the English and the French come before them, although the advantage is quite narrow. There are statistically significant differences, however, among groups with a political commitment: the supporters of the national conservative Smallholders’ Party ranked Hungarians as the closest to Europeans. The voters of the successor of the former state-party, namely, those of the Socialist Party, indicated a moderate loyalty towards the Russians, thus they thrust the Serbs farthest away, to the bottom of the list.

4.4 Image of ‘Europeans’: delimitation and stereotypic content

The other side of the definition of Europe is delimitation. An open question was asked as to which area or continent differed definitely from Europe (Hunyady, 1998). The respondents chose Africa the most often, followed by Asia (in the latter case a much greater number of countries were specifically mentioned, almost 3 per cent said China). These replies constituted about one third of the sample, only a quarter of the sample mentioned the American continent in one way or another (half of them definitely pointed at the United States). It should be noted that the Balkans appeared as separated from Europe, and even as opposed to Europe, in a moderate (3 per cent) proportion. For the sake of the many-sided study of delimitation, this problem was dealt with through closed questions as well, when we pointed at different societies and asked for judgements of their similarity and dissimilarity. The assumed distance between Africans and Europeans and that between the former and Americans reached almost 6 on the seven point scale. The distance between Europeans and Americans from Asians was not much closer, only by less than half a point. Accordingly, the perceived difference between Europeans and Australians was the smallest, only 3.55 (approached by the similarity between Europeans and Australians). The subjective
distance between Africans and Asians was one scale point greater than that. This arrangement was present in the most different groups of the national representative sample. There appeared a (non-extreme) Euro-American connection and delimitation in the overall subjective image, while differences at the other ‘pole’ of the world, between Asia and Africa were perceived (although in a rather dull form).

The question arises what role skin colour plays in this classification, and what the role of the perceived cultural and economic differences is. The replies to the other question ‘Which nations and ethnic groups are non-Europeans?’ may help in answering this. Due to the richness of possible answers, the spontaneous replies were quite varied: the most frequent (23 per cent) reply was the diffuse ‘blacks’, ‘Chinese’ was under 20 per cent, then came Arabic already under 10 per cent, then even fewer respondents said Japanese, (US) American and American Indian.

After determining the limits of categories (in which listing the ‘Americans’ obviously presented a little problem) we can now turn to the question of stereotyping: what are Europeans like? The answer will be the image of richly coloured cultures and that of historically separated societies in the dimensions of personal characteristics. On reflection we have to admit that this is not an easy task, but the anthropomorphous thinking about society does not stand far from many people, thus, they will be able and will be ready to express the impressions arising in this form. Recently, in January 2000, we asked for free characterizations of ‘Europeans’, and three quarters of the national representative sample indicated one or more typical traits. Following our previous line of thoughts, we also asked for the characterization of ‘Non-Europeans’, which is evidently an even more heterogeneous mass, nevertheless, more than 60 per cent gave sensible spontaneous responses (obviously as the reverse of ‘Europeans’).

Clearly, most of the respondents attributed positive mental traits to the label ‘Europeans’. Over 41 per cent thought that this social type is erudite, educated, intelligent, intellectually open, deep-thinking, and open to the achievements of science. With respect to the obscure mass of Non-Europeans, a mere 2.5 per cent talked about these traits, while 12 per cent mentioned some kind of mental negativity: lack of education, illiteracy, stupidity. With respect to Europeans, only three respondents brought up these negative traits.

The position of ‘Europeans’ regarding ambitions is not so marked, but favourable. Almost 18 per cent said Europeans are determined, industrious, hard-working, and active. The opposite did not occur much. Non-Europeans also received recognition of diligence and the ability to fight in quite a large proportion (12 per cent), but doubts were more frequent. 9 per cent indicated helplessness, laziness, and resignation. Evidently, the judgement of material wealth is not independent of efforts and effectiveness in public thinking. Prosperity appeared in a more moderate proportion (5 per cent) with respect to ‘Europeans’, but nobody stated its opposite. Among the characteristics of non-Europeans, however, 8 per cent talked about poverty, while less than a third of that referred to wealth.

Morality and sociability did not come up in this sphere of thinking. Correctness and goodwill of Europeans were mentioned by less than 5 per cent, but non-Europeans were not appreciated, either. Social sensitivity, tolerance, and friendly attitude characterize Europeans in the opinion of 6 per cent, less than half of that expressing a
contrary opinion. 4 per cent of the respondents thought that these traits characterize non-Europeans, another 4 per cent thought the opposite, thus there were relatively more indications of isolation and selfish self-imposed seclusion with respect to non-Europeans.

Although ideals and ideologies were used in the characterization of ‘Europeans’, almost twice as many respondents mentioned these traits in describing the other party. Ideological attitudes – including social ideals, conforming to traditions, attachment to the ethnic group, religious belief – were mentioned by a little more than 6 per cent and by more than 11 per cent in relation to ‘Europeans’ and ‘non-Europeans’, respectively.

It is not surprising that slightly more respondents suggested that ‘Europeans’ were similar to others, and thus to the respondent himself or herself (5 per cent), and that ‘non-Europeans’ had similar traits (2 per cent), so that in this respect they were not typical. A dissimilarity between ‘non-Europeans’, however, was emphasized by less than 1 per cent.

The recent full free characterizations support the findings obtained in student samples, almost ten years ago, and again more than five years ago, which used fixed questions at essential points, and placed them in a temporal perspective. In 1991, intellectual features and self-assertion were to the fore, too, moral and social traits were less pronounced, although the level of evaluation proved to be uniformly high. Respondents characteristically identified ‘Europeans’ as intelligent, self-assertive, interested in politics, educated and patriotic at a level of over 5 on the seven-point scale. Europeans’ honesty, diligence, and friendliness were evaluated positively, but at a lower level. These sets of judgements were differentiated by factor analysis, and we examined the effect of the pupils’ social status on the development of these stereotype-components. Three points were taken into consideration when this situation of socialization was defined: a) the social status of the student’s family, b) the type of school the student attended, as a determinant of possible careers, c) level of school performance, as the first step in social career. Without going into the details of results, we can draw two conclusions regarding the evaluation of ‘Europeans’. On the one hand, cultivating this highly esteemed ideal which can be considered as a social orienting point is not the privilege of those students whose social background is the most advantageous and who are set on a course that would lead them to the top. Students with an intellectual background, living in urban conditions, and attending high schools are more critical. On the other hand, the reservations shown by students with definitely disadvantaged social backgrounds (e.g. un-educated labourer parents) and by students with frustrating school failure (poorly performing children of intellectuals) were also stronger in this respect.

In the 1990s, in addition to ‘Europeans’, the characterization of ‘Asians’ and ‘the Balkan people’ were also asked for. This provided an opportunity to reveal the respondents’ internal system of comparison, and the findings were interpreted this way, too. In 1991, ‘Europeans’ won the first place in the global evaluation received form the trait judgements (an average of 5.0 on the seven point scale), followed by ‘Asians’ (4.41); ‘the Balkan people’ were the third (with the definitely neutral average of 4.0). It should be noted that placing the so-called continental categories into the rank order of national evaluations, they took an easily interpretable position:
‘Europeans’ came after ‘Germans’ and immediately before ‘Hungarians’ in the hierarchy of evaluations. ‘Asians’ could be found between the characterizations of the ‘Chinese’ and the ‘Russians’, while ‘the Balkan people’ were inserted between the latter and the ‘Romanians’. Inspecting the content of the three characterizations, it is noticeable that the advantage of ‘Europeans’ is striking in the intellectual-cultural field, the difference is more than one scale-point in the case of erudition, and almost one point in the case of intelligence, while in the case of sense of humour it is exactly one point. In this comparison ‘Asians’ are clearly superior to the others in moral traits, they are seen as the most honest, diligent, and patriotic. ‘The Balkan people’ are at the bottom of the hierarchy in every respect: their popularity, diligence, intelligence, honesty, and sense of humour are particularly doubted. Their evaluation in these respects is negative not only relatively, but absolutely, too. Only political interest is assumed in their case.
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ITALY: NATION FORMATION, THE SOUTHERN QUESTION AND EUROPE?

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PART I

1. Introduction

Despite its fascist legacy and tragic experience during World War II, in the post-war era Italy has developed into a stable democratic country with a strong European vocation and a modern economy. The country has won a position among the large European democracies and the world’s leading industrialised countries despite the frequent governmental crises that have characterised Italian politics in the post-war period. Italy affirmed its European vocation as early as the 1950s: it was one of the founding states of the EEC. Furthermore, from the 1970s onwards and especially during the last two decades, the Italian economy has grown dramatically. The Centre and North of the country experienced industrial growth during the 1960s and 1970s while the north-eastern regions took the lead more recently with their extensive network of small- and medium-sized enterprises that has become exemplary for the whole of Europe.

Nonetheless, Italy has been and still is tormented by the ‘Southern question’, namely the social and economic divide between North and South. Moreover, during the 1990s, the country faced a severe social and political crisis, manifested in the Tangentopoli scandals and the Mani Pulite investigations. The situation was further complicated by the emergence of the Northern League (Lega Nord), a political party which has openly challenged the unity of the Italian nation and state. The Northern League started as a regional protest movement but later developed into a party with secessionist tendencies. Through its political action and discourse – notably the proclamation of a Padanian Republic on 15 September 1996 and the mobilisation of its supporters against the government in Rome – the Northern League has brought to the fore the question of national identity in Italy. A fervent media and academic debate has developed, questioning the strength of the national identity and the (dis)unity of the nation. Political debate and action concerning institutional reforms and the development of a federal system of government in Italy have followed suit. Italian identity and national sovereignty have also been challenged from above as a result of the deepening and widening of the European integration process during the past couple of decades. It may seem paradoxical at first glance, but Italians have experienced integration into the Union and delegation of power to European institutions as a positive development for their national pride. Survey results suggest that support for European unification has been consistently high, much higher than the European average and the country has been perceived to benefit from participation in the EU (see also section 7 below).

In recent times, and more particularly from 1989 onwards, Italy has also faced increasing migration flows from Central and Eastern European countries, Africa and Asia. This was a new experience for Italian society, given that emigration rather than immigration had been the issue throughout the post war period. Both push and pull factors played a role in attracting immigrants to the Italian soil. Among the push factors, one may identify the political instability and low level of socio-economic development in the countries of origin as well as the globalisation of migration processes and the overall geo-political

restructuring in East and West. The pull factors however were also strong, namely the lack of controls initially and the existence of a large informal sector (the *economia sommersa*) which provided employment opportunities for undocumented immigrants.

Contemporary Italian society is faced with conflicting tendencies. On the one hand, it is characterised by a strong European orientation and modern profile as an industrial force. On the other hand, inefficient governance, corruption, undocumented immigration and regional protest challenge this view and put Italian democracy to the test. The country is under constant pressure to keep pace with economic and social development in the EU while facing, together with the other member states, the prospect and process of incorporation of Central and Eastern European countries into the Union. These developments raise a number of social, political and economic issues, not least in relation to citizens’ identification with the nation/Italy and/or the EU/Europe as well as the representations of these entities in the media, political party and lay people discourse.

The scope of this paper is to review the historical process of nation formation in Italy (section 2), the dominant discourses of nationhood (section 3) and the country’s Significant Others, both internal and external (section 4). In the second part of the paper, I shall offer an overview of the relations between Italy and the European Union concentrating on public attitudes and representations of Europe/the EU and Italy’s position in it (sections 4.3, 4.4 and 7) rather than the actual geopolitical relations between the two parties. These will be surveyed only briefly (section 6), so as to offer the political framework within which identity issues are inscribed. Last but not least, the main lines of research on European integration and collective identities that have developed in recent years in Italy will be discussed in the last section (section 8).

2. The Formation of Italy as an Independent State

In this section, I shall discuss Italy’s development as an independent state from the eighteenth century to our days.\(^35\) Clearly this brief overview cannot but offer a sketchy account of Italian modern history. My aim is to provide for the historical background against which the main tenets of Italian national identity and its interaction with Significant Others should be analysed.

Italy’s history has been marked by its borderline geographical position between the eastern and the western Mediterranean, which influenced also the political and cultural orientation of the peninsula’s eastern and western regions.

‘Until the fifteenth century Venice looked to the Levant and its art and culture, with their concern for ornament and ritual, bore the imprint of Byzantium. The threat from Islam, and the challenge of Orthodoxy in the Balkan mountains, gave Catholicism in Friuli and the Veneto a distinctly militant flavour. Apulia, further south, faced Albania and Greece, and for long periods its history was more closely tied up with theirs than with that of the peninsula. The western seaboard moved in a different sphere. The papacy in Rome was shaped by forces emanating from France and Germany; Naples and Sicily were for centuries coveted by Spain; and the fact that the Renaissance emerged in the cities of the west of the peninsula was due in part to their economic ties with the great cultural centres of Flanders and Burgundy.’ (Duggan 1994: 11)

\(^35\) This brief overview of Italian history in the past two centuries is largely based on Duggan (1994) and Doumanis (2001).
The opening up of the Atlantic Sea connections for trade and the westward advance of Islam in the sixteenth century contributed to the country’s economic decline and political marginalisation. Thus, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the centres of political and economic power moved to the states of northern and western Europe (Great Britain, France and Holland) while Italy retained only its cultural prestige.

The proximity of northern regions to the German, Austrian and French markets should be taken into account as one of the factors that contributed to their economic development. Similarly, the decline of trade and cultural exchanges between southern regions and Africa and the Levant, which had significantly contributed to their high levels of prosperity and culture until the thirteenth century, and their conquest by France and Spain delegated them to the periphery of European economic and cultural development. Despite these differences in the patterns of economic development, the whole of the Italian peninsula, in the pre-unification period, was characterised by low levels of agricultural production, shortage of livestock and an under-developed economy. Although areas of rich agriculture existed in Lombardy and Piedmont in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, poverty was widespread. The demographic explosion caused by the fall of mortality rates in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was not followed by a significant improvement in agricultural productivity. Overpopulation was partly met by massive emigration to central Europe and also South and North America in the late nineteenth century.

Italian regions did not take part in the first phase of the industrial revolution in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, partly because of their lack of minerals and energy to support heavy industry. Until the second half of the nineteenth century, silk was the only major industry, concentrated mainly around the city of Bologna. Some textile factories emerged in the mid-1800s in the Naples and Salerno area. Two thirds of all the grain produced in the peninsula before 1860 was consumed by its very producers and a market economy hardly existed. The patterns of economic and demographic development differed between the North and the South: small rural communities were prevalent in the Centre and Northern regions while in the Southern ones the rural population concentrated in large ‘agro-towns’. Nonetheless, in either area poverty and lack of communication with the outside world were a general feature. This in fact justifies the persistence of linguistic diversity at the local level until unification. The hardship endured by the rural populations led to occasional spontaneous and violent revolts. Nonetheless, the remoteness of the communities, the different type of relationships held between landowners and leaseholders in the South, Centre and North, the linguistic diversity and the lack of any type of class-consciousness rendered almost impossible a proper revolutionary movement.

Napoleonic conquest and the wars that followed in early nineteenth century exposed the Italian states – that had been living under mainly Spanish rule for the past two centuries enjoying a relatively long period of peace but not much economic or social transformation – political and economic weaknesses in a dramatic fashion. Thus, the Piedmont under the Dukes of Savoy but also smaller states, both republics and duchies (including Tuscany, Lombardy and the Kingdom of Naples), entered a period of reforms which aimed at improving tax collection, rendering more effective the legal system, tackling unemployment, improving educational standards and protecting
internal production through a tariff system. However, even in the better-organised and more powerful Piedmont these reforms were more nominal than substantial. The administrative confusion and economic crisis of this period opened the way for the spreading of Enlightenment ideas in Italy.

The collapse of Napoleonic rule in Italy in 1813-14 and the Restoration of the deposed rulers by Austrian armies in 1814-1815 marked the beginning of a new era of conservatism, under Austrian influence, even though many of the reforms enacted by the Napoleonic governments were maintained. The economic decline experienced across Europe in the middle of the nineteenth century, was particularly marked in Italy whose agriculture stagnated. Many farmers migrated to the cities becoming day labourers or simply beggars or bandits. Large landowners tried to face the crisis by intensifying labour, especially in the South where there was no tradition of capital investment. Even though the rural population remained too disorganised to revolt, the educated classes, notably the middle- and high-bourgeoisie youth, often educated abroad, started expressing their concern with regard to the life conditions of the masses.

As Enlightenment cosmopolitan ideas started taking root among Italian intellectuals, the national question emerged among the elites, partly as a reaction to the Napoleonic regime. The centralised, uniforming character of the Napoleonic regime and its sacrifice of the French Revolution’s principles of equality and freedom to fiscal and political considerations, especially concerning the Italian lands, resurrected among intellectuals the ‘cultural nationalism’ of the Renaissance (Duggan 1994: 96). The revolutionary uprisings of the 1830-31 in central Italy failed partly because of the lack of unity and co-ordination among the different cities in favour of a common liberal cause. However, developments in the rest of Europe contributed to the rise of a mild form of nationalism among Italian intellectuals (many of them in exile) which, however, did not enjoy much support from the growing commercial bourgeoisie in the peninsula.

This early nationalism was romantic in character and mainly took root in Piedmont and Lombardy. A number of well known now intellectuals took part in this movement: Giuseppe Mazzini, the historian Cesare Balbo, Massimo d’Azeglio, the priest Vincenzo Gioberti and the young liberal Count Camillo Cavour. As early as 1848, the Piedmont kingdom started an unsuccessful national war against Austria. Constitutional governments emerged in the South and the Papal States and in Tuscany and Rome movements for independence and liberty were started. Nonetheless, much disagreement existed among the leadership of the various movements and cities as to whether their objective was Italy’s unification (as Mazzini preached) or some form of loose federation.

The influence of the liberal and progress-oriented Count Cavour on Piedmontese politics in the 1850s and the development of parliamentary government in that region shaped early Italian politics. Cavour, who became prime minister of Piedmont in 1852, promoted the economic and socio-political development and strength of his state with the aim to make Italy independent and enlarge Piedmont (Duggan 1994: 123). However, the failure of his alliance with Napoleon against Austria in 1859 and a series of patriotic risings in central Italy in the same year created the opportunity for
Garibaldi’s popular movement to liberate southern Italy in quite an unexpected, at least by Cavour, manner.

Giuseppe Garibaldi was born in Nice. He got involved in the Italian National Society set up in 1857 to promote Italian unity. In the war of 1859 he commanded a force of patriotic volunteers and when later that year a peasant uprising started in Sicily, he was sent there to convert the revolt into a national revolution. Enjoying the King of Piedmont’s Victor Emanuel sympathy (but the hostility of Cavour) Garibaldi went to Sicily with the hidden aim not simply to support the goal of unification but also to install republican rule. The expedition of Garibaldi and his one thousand followers was a major success. Within a few months he conquered-liberated Sicily, crossed the straight of Messina and entered Naples on September 7, 1860.

Garibaldi’s success was due to a convergence of different factors. Among those, it is worth noting Francesco Crispi’s earlier infiltration to organise democrats in Sicily, the hope of the peasants for relief from suffering, the landowners’ wish to overthrow the Bourbons, the middle-classes’ aim at seizing control of local government and of each faction of the middle classes to win over its enemies. Clearly, these hopes and wishes had little to do with Italian unification as such, as it became painfully obvious very soon. The republican character of Garibaldi’s expedition was soon suppressed by Cavour who invaded and conquered the Papal states in the effort to resume control of the situation and defeat the Republicanists.

King Victor Emanuel and Cavour’s government viewed the national unification as Piedmont’s achievement: they basically expanded their rule and system of government to the rest of Italy without taking into account any different opinions concerning regional autonomy and/or the creation of a federal state. Discontent over the imposition of a centralised rule from Piedmont was increased by the economic hardship endured especially in the South where the introduction of free trade tariffs after unification damaged the local manufacturing sector and agricultural exports.

In the decades that followed unification, the national government often had to rely on coercion and military power to defend the status quo against republicans and the impoverished peasants. Furthermore, the Catholic church waged its own war against the national government after it had seen its power seriously undercut and the Papal states absorbed into the new nation-state. Coercion was supported by a centralised administration and bureaucracy, initially dominated by northerners. The government’s feeling of insecurity towards not only external but also internal threats fuelled an attitude of distrust between the bureaucracy and civil society.

The newborn state had to face acute social and economic issues such as illiteracy, poverty and an extremely weak industrial sector. The leftist forces of Garibaldi and Mazzini’s followers were divided among themselves and soon saw the state as a resource to defend factional interest rather than as the embodiment of public will. The internal fragmentation of the political forces into interest groups and the insecurity of the state in front of possible mass revolts led to the development of what is now known as the politics of ‘trasformismo’: ‘the process whereby during the 1880s the old party labels of Left and Right lost their meaning, as governments became shapeless amalgams of one-time opponents’ (Duggan 1994: 161). In these conditions, a national platform that would unite the middle classes (far less the peasants or
workers) was hard to find, even more so as the North and the South followed different paths of development, mostly at the expense of the latter.

Giovanni Giolitti and his government (1901-1914) marked Italy’s entry into the twentieth century. Giolitti’s economic reforms concentrated on industry and introduced important changes in traditional sectors like textiles, developed new sectors such as engineering and chemicals and also reformed the banking system. By contrast, in southern agriculture the bleak conditions of the late nineteenth century remained unchanged except for the emigration of some four million people who sought work abroad, principally in North America. Still the industrialisation experiment of Giolitti failed to transform the structure of the Italian economy: although the urban population grew, rural workers were absorbed into construction and domestic service while the industrial labour force remained limited in size (it grew only by about half a million in the period 1901-11).³⁶

The uncertainty of the new economy, the real or perceived Socialist threat and the disorganisation of the political forces paved the way for the fascist movement’s growth in the late 1920s. The insistence of the Italian government to maintain a neutral stance in World War I and the increased liberalisation of the regime (universal male suffrage was introduced in December 1918) created both a sense of hurt national pride and a growing fear of the ‘Socialist threat’ among young Italian men. The occupation of a number of factories by almost half a million of workers in September 1920 increased the feeling of unrest and social disorder in the country. It was this background that fuelled the creation of paramilitary groups in central and northern Italy, led by ex-junior officers and often backed by police and the military. Benito Mussolini, leader of the fascist movement, secured the paramilitaries’ support while he presented himself to the liberals as the only leader that could tame the extremists. He thus became Prime Minister in 1922.

Mussolini managed progressively to establish a one-party system, introduced a number of authoritarian laws suppressing the freedom of the press, condemning trade unionism and promoting ‘Roman-ness’ as the national cult. He also invented the ‘cult of the Duce’ which was based on a view of heroic men as the makers of history. Fascist nationalism was complemented by colonial expansion (campaigns to Libya and Ethiopia were organised in 1932 and 1935) and a cult of ‘rural morality’ and demographic growth propagated by the regime. In 1929, the fascist leadership reached also a compromise with the Catholic church, which was initially overtly hostile to the new authoritarian rule. The Concordat brought the Church back into political affairs from which it had formally abstained following the papal decree (Non expedit) that had refused to recognise the legitimacy of the Italian state at unification.

Concerning the economy, the regime engaged into a set of large public works aiming at reforming agriculture, which however yielded results only in a few regions because they were not pursued systematically. On the other hand, industry continued to progress along the lines set out in the Giolitti period. In the foreign policy front, Mussolini’s tactics based on sudden changes between aggressiveness and amenability proved little successful eventually. The country was drawn into a war – World War II – that it was little prepared for. Moreover, the economy suffered because of the

³⁶ Italy had a population of 26 million at the moment of unification (1860).
sanctions imposed on Italy by the League of Nations after the invasion of Ethiopia. The ‘racial laws’ against Jews introduced in 1938 eroded the internal support of the regime.

The fascist regime collapsed in 1943, Italy was invaded by both the Nazi and the Allied forces, and against popular expectations for peace, fighting continued. When in June 1944 Rome was liberated, the national political forces came together with the aim of reconstructing the country. The Resistance played an important role in this phase not only because of the partisans’ contribution to the defeat of Fascism and Nazism but also because they provided the necessary political symbols on which to build the new Republic: democracy, freedom, honesty, and modernity. At the wake of liberation, Italy had to deal with three main issues: the purge of the state from the fascist forces, the institutional changes needed and the resurrection of the national economy that had in the meantime collapsed.

In founding the Republic a number of problems that had burdened the Italian state at the unification period appeared again. The degree of centralisation and regional autonomy (how to combine regional autonomy with national unity) and the republican or monarchic character of the new regime were two of the most important questions that divided the political forces and also the northern and southern regions. The Conservatives took the initiative after a Republic was voted in at the referendum of 2 June 1946 and a Constituent Assembly voted for the new Constitution that came into power on 1 January 1948. The Catholic church sided with the right-wing forces (notably the Democrazia Cristiana (DC) party) and secured overwhelming support for DC in rural areas through the mobilisation of Catholic associations. This signalled the start of a new era for political Catholicism championed by ‘the second generation’ of the DC rank-and-file. The younger generation of DC leaders saw the party and through it the state as an instrument for the creation of a civiltà cristiana (Christian civilisation) in Italy (Bedani 2000: 224-7). In the first national elections of 18 April 1948, the DC won an absolute majority of seats in Parliament thanks to the Church’s influence and the backing of the American relief programme.

The Communist forces (PCI) played an important part in the post-war Italian democratic framework as the main opposition party albeit never came into power. The Communist and Soviet-oriented ideology of the party was complemented by a somewhat contradictory emphasis on its national character. This Italian mission of the PCI was a source of strength for the party as it appealed to the Italian electorate beyond the limited strata of industrial workers. However, it also eventually weakened the party’s position as it led its leadership (both Togliatti in the immediate after war years and Berlinguer in the 1970s) to make concessions to the Catholics, searching for legitimacy. These concessions, however, were neither returned nor recognised by the DC or the Vatican (McCarthy 2000).

In the 1950s and 1960s the South suffered from a limited agricultural reform, little socio-economic development and a patronage system in which politicians based their support on clientelistic ties with their voters. The new Republic was predominantly geared towards the industrialised North who benefited, among other things, by Italy’s early entry into the Common Market. State support and private investment contributed to industrial development. The ‘economic miracle’ was however limited to the northern regions. Furthermore, it was not matched by a similar development of the
public services and relied heavily on cheap labour provided generously by the impoverished southern regions.

The 1960s in Italy, as elsewhere in Europe, were characterised by the growth of social protest movements. Despite the reforms introduced in 1968-69 to appease the student and worker revolt, discontent with the state’s corruption and inefficiency continued. The organised crime in the South and extremist political forces (both right-wing and left-wing) in the North resorted into terrorist actions to create social and political upheaval and destabilise the political and economic system. As violence escalated in the mid-1970s, the Italian Communist party (PCI) proposed an ‘historic compromise’ to the incumbent Christian Democrats (DC) so as to help restore peace, prosperity and social order in the country. In return for this conciliatory move, the PCI asked for a share in the government’s policy and social reforms. Eventually, Communist Party paid a high price for this ‘historical compromise’. It was eventually isolated from the country’s government and although it gained support among the middle classes, many of its traditional voters were alienated from it.

The 1980s were characterised by a sense of moral regeneration in society and politics and steady economic growth. At the end of the decade, however, recession set in and the structural weaknesses of the national economy as well as the huge public sector deficit became all the more apparent. The sweeping changes in international politics in 1989-90 and a series of economic and political scandals that broke out in the early 1990s plundered Italy into a new period of crisis. Political and economic confusion prevailed as the party system underwent radical change. The PCI was dissolved and transformed into a Social Democratic party following the debacle of the Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe while the DC and the smaller Socialist party collapsed under the sweeping scandals of Tangentopoli in 1992-93. In the same period, Mafia activities increased in the South, reaching unprecedented levels in the Campania and Calabria regions.

A radical re-shuffling of the party system followed the early 1990s turmoil. A new party was formed, Forza Italia, by the media tycoon Silvio Berlusconi. During the same period, two new parties also increased their electoral strength: the regionalist Lega Nord and the right wing Alleanza Nazionale, heir to the extreme right-wing formation Movimento Sociale Italiano.

A short-lived coalition government of Forza Italia and Lega Nord in 1994 was followed by the centre-left-wing coalition L’Ulivo headed by Romano Prodi as Prime Minister who was later replaced by former Communist Massimo d’Alema. The Ulivo incumbency marked a period of relative (by Italian standards) governmental stability. During the second half of the 1990s, a number of institutional reforms were introduced aiming at improving the efficiency of the public administration and conceding an advanced level of autonomy and self-government to the regions. Furthermore, a drastic reduction and rationalisation in public expenditure enabled Italy to meet – despite the gloomy predictions – the financial criteria for participation in the first round of the Euro currency zone.

At the turn of the millennium, Italy faces the new century headed by a new (following the national election of May 2001) right-wing governmental coalition formed by Forza Italia, Alleanza Nazionale and Lega Nord. The participation of this last in the
national government has marked the – perhaps provisional – end of the secessionist parenthesis in Italian politics. The new government’s platform includes measures for the further liberalisation of the economy and the labour market, reform of the welfare system and a highly restrictive immigration policy.

During this period, Italy has maintained its support for European integration. It appears as if participation in the European Union has been seen as a means for both political regeneration and economic development. Thus, crisis and change at the national level have co-existed with stable policies and continuous support for integration at the EU level. The relationships between Italy and Europe will be examined in more detail in the second part of this report. In the following section, I will highlight the discourses of nationhood that have prevailed in Italy since the unification in 1860 and their links with the historical events outlined above.

3. Dominant Discourses of Nationhood

Analytically speaking, nations are distinguished with reference to their primarily ethnic or civic character (Smith 1986; 1991). The main elements constitutive of an ethnic nation are the belief that its members are ancestrally related, a common set of cultural traditions, collective memories and a link to a specific historical territory, the nation's homeland. Civic nations in contrast are based on a common political culture and a legal system that assigns equal rights and duties to all members, a common economy with a single division of labour and a territory that is the geo-political basis of the community.

Each national identity includes both ethnic and civic features (Smith 1991: 13). Therefore, the distinction is better understood as a continuum. I shall define ethnic nations as those in which ethnic features are prevalent and civic ones as those in which civic and territorial elements play the most important part in defining who belongs to the community and who is a foreigner.

Italian identity, as in most nations (and national states37) may also be seen as a blend of civic and ethnic elements. The notion of ‘Italianness’ initially developed in the Renaissance period as a cultural concept. Only in the nineteenth century was it transformed into a political project, which became reality with the unification of Italy in 1860. Of course, in Italy just as elsewhere, there are competing discourses and conceptions of the nation. My aim here is to discuss the main elements involved in the formation of the Italian identity – including both its unifying forces and its centrifugal tendencies – and thus highlight the predominant conception of the Italian nation.

Ever since the creation of the independent Italian state, the nation has been conceptualised as a community of people living in a territory and sharing a common set of political and cultural traditions. Thus, the national community has been primarily defined with reference to a specific territory and a particular political culture (Rusconi 1993). The idea of its historical continuity has been formulated through the integration of the Roman tradition, the Risorgimento – the movement of national revival in the first

37 I use the term ‘national state’ here to denote countries which include a national majority that views the state as its own political entity, and one or more ethnic minorities whose collective identities are more or less recognised. Most of the states that are considered – by themselves and others – to be nation-states, are actually ‘national states’ (Connor 1978).
half of the nineteenth century – and the fascist legacy into a common national past. The blending of these traditions and historical memories has, however, been characterised by internal contradictions that played an important role in impeding the consolidation of a national identity (Brierley and Giacometti 1996: 172-6).

The formation of the Italian nation was compromised not only by the cosmopolitan heritage of the Roman empire and the Catholic church but also by the failure of the emerging Italian bourgeoisie to incorporate within it the intellectual and literary elites (Gramsci 1985). These last remained idealist and cosmopolitan in their attitudes and promoted the Risorgimento movement as a counter-reform – re-discovering tradition through change, linking revolution with restoration and avoiding radical ruptures with the past (Veneziani 1994: 8-10) – preventing, thus, the development of a strong national bourgeoisie class and the spreading of a secular and scientific ideology, as happened in the rest of western Europe.

Moreover, this division between the producing class and the intellectuals perpetuated the existence of two cultures, a high culture of the literary strata and a variety of low, popular cultures and their respective dialects among the peasants and workers. This duality impeded the spreading of a common Italian vernacular, which would allow for the linguistic and cultural homogenisation of the rural population. Gramsci (1979: 16) points to the gap between the literary and the popular strata and the absence of a romantic nationalist movement in Italy in the nineteenth century. Eventually, Italianness remained a legal, idealist concept that failed to penetrate the popular culture and identity.

The intellectual movement of the Risorgimento sought to integrate ‘from above’, as part of the nation, the artisan and peasant populations. The high, humanist culture created through the exaltation of the rural ethic in the works of Alessandro Manzoni, the reconstruction of the history of the Italian Republics and the denial of the imperial tradition were thus re-interpreted as the core element of Italianness. In reality, the idealisation of life in the countryside – the myth of the Italian peasant developed by Vincenzo Cuoco and his praise of the system of ‘patriarchal cultivation’ – was a strategy for opposing the advent of industrialism (Bollati 1983: 101; Duggan 1994). Instead of promoting the socio-economic development of the country, the Italian nationalist movement fostered a different way of being modern: ‘Italia non facit saltus’ (Bollati ibid.: 97).

Italy’s economic backwardness by comparison to other European states was masked and implicitly justified by a discourse on the country’s aesthetic superiority. The beauty of the landscape, the rich artistic and cultural heritage and the beauty of its people were seen as intrinsic national characteristics, emphasised as emblems of the nation’s superiority (Gundle 2000: 127-9). This discourse has been reproduced throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century until nowadays. The term ‘bel paese’ (literally ‘beautiful country’) is still used in common parlance and by the media as synonymous to Italy. The recent development of Italy’s fashion and design industry has only corroborated this view. However, this aesthetic conception of the nation has often been intertwined – especially during the Fascist regime but also by liberal politicians like D’Annunzio in the early twentieth century – with authoritarian, imperialist and racialised views concerning the inherent superiority of Italians towards other peoples and civilisations (Gundle 2000).
Furthermore, the myth of a presumed Italian ‘national character’, i.e. a specific constellation of personality features that characterises people belonging to the same nation, was built on the basis of the aforementioned rural ethic and beauty discourses. This myth, which is still evoked nowadays, depicts Italians as inherently ‘kind people’ (brava gente) and emphasises the cult of virtue and beauty and the Catholic tradition of solidarity as the essential elements of Italian culture and identity.

Religion and language, although usually identified as two fundamental elements intertwined with national identity, in the case of Italy play a contradictory role. The universalistic dogma of the Catholic church, which is by definition in contrast with any nationalist ideology, and the standard Italian language, that has never been able to completely override local dialects, tend to weaken rather than reinforce the national identity.

Another important element that characterises Italy is regionalism both as a political-administrative reality and as a civic tradition including cultural and linguistic traits. As a matter of fact, Italy is constituted by a plurality of territorial units with their own separate histories. The division between North and South is not a mere matter of geography that can be attributed to environmental differences or to supposed ethno-biological features, which distinguish northern from southern Italians. The origins of this division lie in the past, in the different economic, social and political experiences that each region has had (Putnam 1993) but also in the discourse on the South’s ‘alterity’ that has been dominant in the Italian society and politics ever since the Unification (Schneider 1998a).

The importance of regionalism for the concept of Italianness is obvious if one considers that more than a century after the unification of the country, regional identities and socio-economic realities continue to threaten the national unity, as the success of Lega Nord has demonstrated. The key to understand this problem lies, first, in the relatively late formation of the Italian nation-state and, second, in the fact that the unification was imposed by a small elite rather than the masses (Bollati 1983; Duggan 1994). The unification process was experienced by a large part of the population, mainly the southern peasants, as a civil war, or as a war for the conquest of the central and southern parts of Italy by the Piedmont region. It was certainly not a fight for national liberation (Duggan ibid.: 133). Moreover, the policies of the new state were not successful in inculcating a feeling of belonging to the nation to the rural populations of either the North or the South. The opposite interests of the northern bourgeoisie and the southern landowners prevented the new state from tackling effectively its main social problems – such as low level of literacy, poor transport and communications and land reform – and creating a national consciousness among the masses (Brierley and Giacometti 1996: 174). Nonetheless a ‘historical block’ (blocco storico) was formed between the northern bourgeoisie and the southern landowners was reached soon after the unification, which served the interests of both classes but seriously hampered the South’s economic and industrial development (Davis 1998; Schneider 1998b).

The failure of integrating regional diversity into the nation-state may also be attributed to the fact that territorial identities have been neglected for a long time. The creation of a centralised state left little room for local or regional politics. The state administration and institutions introduced after the unification succumbed to the pre-existing traditions and socio-economic realities, instead of fostering the homogenisation of the regional politics
(Putnam 1993: 145). Thus, *campanilismo*38 and clientelistic politics prevailed instead of a modern bureaucracy that would have supported national integration.

The conception of the Italian nation has also been influenced by the fascist legacy. A strong nationalist sentiment was generated only during the fascist era, though again for a short time. According to Biocca (1997: 229-31), support for the fascist regime was relatively widespread in both the North and the South of the country39 and remained so even after the approval of anti-Semitic legislation in 1938. The collapse of the regime in 1943, the subsequent occupation of Italy from the Nazi forces and eventually the double defeat of the country: within its own alliance and from the allied anti-Nazi forces marked Italy’s post-war re-birth. The need to rehabilitate the idea of the nation and the nation-state as a territorial and cultural community, to dissociate it from the racial overtones of Fascism and Nazism and to provide thus for a basis for the rebuilding of a democratic society and political system led to the rejection of the fascist past. Any earlier popular support of the Mussolini regime was drawn into question and reconsidered (Biocca *ibid*.

The complete rejection of and dissociation from Fascism however led to a somewhat paradoxical effect. Instead of elaborating the fascist experience and integrating into the national history, the Mussolini years were simply silenced and if not literally at least symbolically ‘hidden’. Fascism is therefore seen to play an important part in the definition of Italian identity. Its influence is not direct however. It does not derive from its political and cultural legacy, even though some scholars suggest that such a legacy persists in many sectors of the public life (Veneziani 1994: 259-60), but rather from its opposite movement, namely anti-fascism. The re-construction of the national identity after the collapse of Mussolini’s regime was based on the common sorrow and the desire to forget the fascist experience rather than on a critical, self-reflexive political debate.

This lack of critical inquiry has in fact obscured cruel ‘details’ of the Fascist policies such as the Italian military civilian concentration camps where the Slav populations of the northeastern regions and Dalmatia were interned in 1943 and overall the Fascist policies against ethnic minorities in that region (Bon Gherardi 1989; Vinci 1996; Walston 1997). Masking Fascism behind the ‘brava gente’ national self-stereotype has also prevented a critical analysis of the continuities that exist between earlier conceptions of Italian national identity and Fascist ideology and policies. Indeed, the Fascist representation of the Slav population as a threatening internal Other were built on pre-existing stereotypical images of the Slavs as *allogeni* (literally ‘of another kind’), culturally inferior to Italians and a ‘problem’ for the nation-state (Sluga 2000).

The foundation myth of the new Italian Republic has been based on the movement of Resistance against the Fascists and the German occupation (1943-45). Nonetheless, the symbolic value of the Resistance as a national liberation struggle has been contested by many. The movement was divided into minority groupings which claimed to fight for national liberation but who fought also with a view to imposing their own socio-economic model for the reconstruction of the new Italian state (Dunnage 2000; Rusconi

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38 The term comes from the word *campanile* (the church’s tower bell) that symbolises the strong affiliation with one’s family, friends, village and local patron who are one’s group of reference and allegiance, and through which one pursues and protects one’s interests.

39 Biocca argues that it is unclear whether this support reflected a concomitant nationalist ideology or it was inspired by Mussolini’s charismatic personality.
Thus, the Resistance was from its very beginning intertwined with party politics and failed to provide for the symbol of national unity. More recently, historians (De Felice, cit.in Biocca 1997: 228) have questioned the size, spread and strength of the Italian resistance movement. Resistance appears to have been more a doubtful unifying myth than a historical reality or indeed the main tenet of Italian post war national identity.

Many scholars argue (Biocca 1997; Galli della Loggia 1996) that both the military and the civilian elites failed to respond to the acute social, political and economic problems that the country faced during and immediately after the war. Traditional institutions like the monarchy or the church did no better than the elites. Nevertheless, a small ‘Italian miracle’ took place in the second half of the twentieth century. The country experienced remarkable economic growth and social development and managed to establish a democratic if unstable political system. These changes however did not help overcome the fundamental weakness of Italian nationhood. Distrust towards state authorities, regional diversity and disparity and the lack of strong national symbols and historical memories that would resonate with the feelings of Italian citizens across the peninsula made national identity fragile.

The most recent developments of the 1980s and 1990s, notably the crisis of the party system and economic elites, the reform of institutions in favour of de-centralisation and the consistent support for Italy’s full (political and economic) participation into the European integration process have generated both centripetal and centrifugal tensions within Italian nationhood. Integration into the European Union, for instance, has been perceived as a remedy for national ills and a source of national pride (for ‘having made it’ to be part of Europe and the Euro zone). Similarly, crisis and reform of the political and institutional system was seen as an expression of Italy’s non-existent national identity and at the same time as a desire to re-affirm national unity albeit within a decentralised, regional system of government. The national currency (the Italian lira) was at the same time a national economic symbol and a source of worry and shame for its constant fluctuation in the 1990s.

In sum, post-war Italy bears with it the signs of its national past. On the one hand, national identity has been consolidated through democratic politics, the granting of autonomy to the regions and the integration through national politics, the media and consumerism of local or regional identities as sub-cultures within a common national culture (Brierley and Giacometti ibid.). On the other hand, however, it still has not come to terms with regional diversity and autonomy nor has it succeeded in creating a common national myth.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{40} Scholars and politicians tend to disagree on this matter. Opinions vary between those who view Italian identity as a feeling of belonging to a civic-territorial community (Rusconi 1993) and those who, like Bocca (1990) or Umberto Bossi, the leader of the Northern League, are quite sceptical as to whether an Italian identity exists at all. Nonetheless, debate is fervent over the meaning of ‘Italianness,’ the historical roots of the nation and, most importantly, its future. One of the most prestigious Italian publishing houses, Il Mulino, has launched a book series entitled ‘L’identità italiana’ (the Italian identity), whose purpose is ‘to re-discover the Italian national identity’ (Panorama weekly magazine, 28.04.1998, pp. 150-4). Only to confirm that the question of national identity and unity is still an open matter, the President of the Italian Republic Carlo Azeglio Ciampi in a speech given on 14 October 2001, on the occasion of a commemoration for Resistance fighters, referred to the unity of the nation. He asked that ‘those who made different choices [from the Resistance]’ be included in the nation because they did so ‘believing that they served the Patria as well’ (Paolo Cacace, ‘La pacificazione di
A number of scholars (Diamanti 1999; Nevola 1999; Rusconi 1994) have argued that Italian national identity is predominantly a civic territorial concept that for some is weak and problematic (Galli della Loggia 1996; 1998) and for others stable and flexible (Diamanti 1999). Although, as I will argue in section four below, I have strong reservations about the prevalence of a civic conception of nationhood in Italy today, I agree that from a historical point of view only a civic territorial concept of nationhood appears possible in Italy. The lack of nationalist elites, the uneven development of the country after unification, the pre-existing regional social, cultural, political and economic differences and last but not least the universalist tendency of the Catholic church have created a fragmented concept of nationhood and a divided national reality. In this context, common historical experience mainly after – but also before – national unification in sharing the national territory and a civic conception of community appear to be the tenets on which the Italian nation rests.

Nonetheless, the rise and crisis of the Italian Republic in the post war era and the persistent distrust between citizens and the state suggest that even these civic foundations of national identity are weak. According to Galli della Loggia (1998) and in agreement with Eurobarometre results (Eurobarometre, November 1998, *cit.in* Diamanti 1999: 304), integration into the European Union provides for a necessary and much desired support for the construction of a civic Italian nationhood. This view is also indirectly supported by survey results (Cinirrella 1997: 26) that show Italians to be proud of their cultural heritage and artistic achievements but not of their democratic institutions. A more recent survey (Ceccarini and Diamanti 1999; Diamanti 1999) suggests that Italian identity is weak because of, or rather thanks to its strong adaptation capacity. National identity, according to this survey, is based on a civic conception of nationhood that focuses on citizenship and legality and rejects ethnic origin as a criterion for national belonging or exclusion.

Contrary to these findings, my own research as well as that of other scholars suggests that when confronted with the question of immigration, Italian national identity, as expressed in the media, political but also lay people discourse, takes up an ethnic connotation *in addition* to its civic dimension. Emphasis is put to the ethnic origin of the immigrants, their being ‘foreigners’ in ‘our’ country and also to the existence of a ‘national character’, namely a stable psychological predisposition that supposedly characterises each nation (including Italians).

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41 As is common in nationalist thinking, culture is seen here as an object, that is bounded in time and space and hence can be defined as ‘property’ of the nation (see Handler 1988: 142).

42 Italians’ mistrust and discontent towards their state institutions and governing elites has been the subject of much political and scholarly debate that goes beyond the scope of this paper. The interested reader may consult for a brief overview of the literature Triandafyllidou (1996: 372-7).

43 Xenophobic and racist attitudes or behaviour have been documented in sociological (Campani 1993, among others), social psychological (Sniderman et al. 2001), anthropological (Cole 1996; 1997), media and political discourse studies (ter Wal 1996; 1998; 2000; Triandafyllidou 1999; 2001; 2002).
This ethnic component of the nation has in fact been cherished and preserved in the context of nationality law. The evolution of Italian nationality law has largely been characterised (until its recent reform with law no. 91/1992) by the desire to keep and strengthen the links of Italian emigrants abroad with their mother country (Bianchi 1998; Pastore 2001). Far from any perception of weakness, in the context of nationality legislation, the existence of the Italian nation as a community and the idea of ‘being Italian’ as a primary social identity for the individual are seen as an undeniable fact. The role of nationality legislation has been both symbolic and practical in promoting national unity and, more recently, in preventing the integration of non-EU immigrants that reside in Italy. Italian citizenship is predominantly ethnic in character because related to kinship by blood or through marriage. The law allows for foreign permanent residents to apply for naturalisation and does not require cultural assimilation (knowledge of the Italian language, for instance, is not required). However, the bureaucratic procedure established for the naturalisation is so complex, time and effort-consuming that it effectively acts as a deterrent to potential applicants. Thus, while the law adheres to a conception of the nation as a civic community and not only an ethno-cultural one, it does so only in form but not in substance (see also Triandafyllidou and Veikou 2001).

In conclusion, in my view, and in line with Ernest Gellner’s approach to nations and nationalism (1983), the Italian nation has been a product of the era of nationalism. But ‘the course of true nationalism never did run smooth’ (Gellner 1983: 58). Contemporary Italian nationhood emerges as a force of opposition, in contrast to political corruption and to immigrants, and as identification with a complex and diversified community of people that are bound together by a varying combination of ethnic, cultural, territorial and civic ties. These last appear to have been reinforced in recent times through European integration. It is not clear yet however – and it is one of the tasks of this project to respond to this question – if the trust in and support for a united Europe as a means to redeem the civic values of the nation will further strengthen or weaken national identity.

4. Italy’s Significant Others

One among the main objectives of this project is to explore the representations that media, elites and lay people hold with regard to the nation, the EU, Europe as well as the inter-relationships that exist between them. It is in fact our contention that national identity and indeed any kind of collective identity is built through interaction. National identity is formed through common ties that bind the members of the nation together but also through contrast to and differentiation from Others that help clarify the boundaries of the ingroup (Triandafyllidou 2001; 2002). In order therefore to achieve an in-depth understanding of the representations of the nation and the EU in current political, media and popular discourses it is necessary to examine not only the

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44 Immigrant naturalisation has hardly been an issue of concern in Italy. In a symbolic move the Social Affairs Ministry declared 1999 to be the ‘Year of the New Citizens’. Nonetheless, 1999 was not really the year of the new citizens, since the naturalisation process remained arduous and a majority of the thousand annual applicants were rejected. According to the SOPEMI report issued in January 2000 (SOPEMI 2000: 34), ‘[t]he “citizenship” promised by the government is one in which the immigrant can hope to receive a permanent residence card after five years, eliminating the need to meet the criteria for biannual renewal.’
main discourses on nationhood in Italy but also those on the nation’s Significant Others.

Quite surprisingly, Italy’s Significant Other par excellence since the national unification, is its fragmented national Self and, more specifically, ‘the South’. Indeed, the ‘Southern question’ and the dominant image of a country divided in two opposite poles, ‘the North’ and ‘the South’, is an element that permeates and characterises Italian society and politics. Rather than debating on the variety of regional Others that potentially exist in the Italian peninsula, the national discourse has concentrated on the North vs. South opposition, which has been largely reified and has absorbed into it the plurality of regional identities and realities that actually exist in the country.

By contrast to the ‘Southern question’, ethnic and linguistic minorities that have historically existed at border areas, like the French-speaking minority of Val d’ Aosta, the German-speaking population of Trentino-Alto Adige or the Slav population of Venezia Giulia, occupy a marginal position in the Italian public and political debate as Significant Others. With the exception of Apih (1966) and Rusinow (1969), there has been very little research on the role that minorities in border regions played in the formation of the Italian national identity. Despite the initial conflict and divided national allegiances that have characterised their incorporation into Italy and their oppression by the Fascist regime, these regions have gradually been integrated into the Italian national state, partly also thanks to the special statutes of autonomy conceded to them.

The Northern League has not been framed as one of Italy’s Significant Others, either. Its extremist actions and discourse, including for instance the proclamation of a Padanian Republic in the autumn of 1996, the subsequent creation of a Padanian parliament and a Padanian civil guard, have attracted relatively mild reactions from the central state. While anti-Italian sentiment is one of the main features of identification with Padania and the League (see Diamanti 1998; Ceccarini and Gardani 1998) – in short, Italy is Padania’s Significant Other – the League’s secessionist movements have not been perceived as the Italian nation’s Significant Other. Rather the League’s discourse has been interpreted as another manifestation of the national malaise that has its roots in the North-South divide and the inefficiency of the central government.

A new Other has emerged for Italy in the past two decades: non-EU immigrants who have followed both legal and unlawful paths to enter Italy and find employment there. The rising immigrant population in the country, which is now in its largest part legal after successive waves of amnesty programmes and efforts to regulate entry and stay of immigrant workers (see Veikou and Triandafyllidou 2001 for an overview), has attracted the attention of the media, the government and, naturally, the public. For this reason, the second part of this section (see section 4.2 below) will explore the construction of the immigrant Other in the Italian public and political debate and the relationship between this image and the conception of the Italian national identity.

45 At the beginning of 1999 there were 1,250,214 documented immigrants in the country or approx. 2% of the total resident population (57,269,000 in 1995). The undocumented immigrant population is estimated to reach another 250,000 people, bringing the total number of immigrants present in Italy at 1.5 million or just over 2.5% of the total population.
This section will be completed by the presentation of the findings of a recent study (Triandafyllidou 2002a) on the representations of Europe, the EEC/EU and Central and Eastern European countries in the Italian press in the past twenty years. By presenting these findings here I will seek to highlight the role of Western Europe and the EEC/EU as Italy’s Inspiring Other and also to attempt a first exploration of Italy’s relationship with Central and Eastern Europe. The results of this study offer a first glance at some of the questions studied in this project, notably that of the representation of the nation, the EU and the relationship between the two in the national media.

4.1 The Southern Question

The term ‘Southern question’ is used to refer to the social and economic disparities existing between the northern and southern regions of the country. These differences and their causes have been the subject of research from a number of disciplines, including anthropology, sociology, politics and economics. The debate between and among scholars and politicians on the issue has concentrated on the presumed existence of a North-South divide and a contrast between an advanced industrial well-governed and civic-oriented society in the North and a backward, agrarian, clientelistic and corrupt society in the South. This debate has taken such essentialised and racialised connotations that Jane Schneider (1998a; 1998b) qualifies it as ‘orientalism within one country’. Schneider (1998a: 4-7) sees as typical of this North-South opposition and orientalising discourse two well known studies on the topic: Edward Banfield’s (1958) The Moral Basis of a Backward Society and his concept of ‘amoral familism’ and Robert Putnam’s (1993) Making Democracy Work; Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Aside from providing for a comprehensive critic of the two studies – a task that has been fulfilled also by other scholars, see for instance Tarrow 1996) – Schneider emphasises that these as well as most studies on Italy’s ‘Southern question’ from the unification of the country onwards adopt an opposition perspective, assuming that there exist two homogeneous poles, the North and the South.

Analysing critically and to the full either the Southern question or the debate around it goes beyond the scope of this paper. It is however my aim in this section to highlight the discourse of alterity that has developed since the Italian Unification, which has constructed a homogeneous South (rather than a multiplicity of diverse regional socio-economic realities) that is the main internal threatening Other for the Italian nation and state. It is worth exploring how this construction of the South as the negative Other has helped justify the incomplete realisation of the national Self, creating a paradoxical situation in which national unity is defined in contrast to an Other that is part of the ingroup and, at the same time, its very source of division.

As Schneider (ibid.) points out the South’s pejorative image has not been constructed only by northerners or outsiders but also from southerners themselves. In this section, I will therefore concentrate on the discourse of northern intellectuals and scientists and Meridionalisti, discuss Gramsci’s conception of the Mezzogiorno and conclude with reviewing more recent critical debates over ‘the South’ and ‘the Southern question’.
The term *Meridionalisti* refers to the southern intellectuals, most of them in exile after 1848, who wrote about southern problems for a northern audience in the second half of the nineteenth and the early twentieth century. The first waves of Liberal aristocrats and emergent middle classes in the South clung to Enlightenment ideas but favoured reforms that would take into account the native customs and institutions. However as they progressively grew disenchanted with the potential for change in their native regions, they became relentless critics of the southern realities. As Moe (1992; 1998) and Petrusewicz (1998) show, the disappointing political experiences of these southern intellectuals led them to envisage the South as the uttermost social evil in Italy and the main impediment to national integration and progress. The works of Villari, Franchetti and Sonnino (Moe 1998) in the second half of the twentieth century are permeated by similar views towards the South: they look at it from the outside, amplify its differences from the ‘civilised’ North, express their indignation to its backwardness, which they largely attribute to features inherent in the southerners’ ‘nature’ and propose as the only possible remedy to this situation an intervention from the North and imposition of its institutions, laws and administration on the ‘deviant’ South.

These views were later supported and indeed complemented by official statistics of the young Italian nation, which gave ‘scientific’ backing to the South’s alterity. Through classification and measurement, they pointed to the economic and cultural gap that existed between the South and the North (Patriarca 1998). Northern Italian criminologists of the late nineteenth century – including Cesare Lombroso, Enrico Ferri and Guglielmo Ferrero – complemented this homogenised image of ‘the South’ through their treatises about the supposedly inferior Mediterranean-type genes that determined the abilities and inclinations of southern men (Gibson 1998). As Gibson argues (*ibid.*) many albeit not all southern intellectuals were complicitous with their northern colleagues in essentialising the South. Some, like the Sicilian statistician and criminologist Napoleone Colajanni criticised their assumptions and uses of ‘scientific evidence’. However, as Rosengarten (1998) shows even modern Sicilian writers like Giovanni Verga, Leonardo Sciascia and Tomasi de Lampedusa, were deeply ambivalent about their homeland and its presumably homogeneous and unchanging nature.

This orientalising discourse was confronted with Gramsci’s alternative and critical work on the question of the *Mezzogiorno*. For Gramsci,

> ‘the Southern question was a national question, in so far it was a question of lack of communication between the social classes of the South and between the North and the South. Thus, the Southern Question was a cultural problem, whose solution would be the conquest of individual moral autonomy by Southerners and Northerners alike, and it was a political question, whose solution would be a democratic transformation of both society and the State.’ (Urbinati 1998: 137)

Gramsci recognised the diverse realities that were included in the homogenised and essentialised image of the *Mezzogiorno* (Giarrizzo 1977). He defined culture as a living entity constantly subject to transformation (Gramsci 1971: 418-9) and focused on the political nature of popular culture and folklore. His work adopted a critical perspective; he pointed to the *‘Blocco Storico’*, the interested alliance between the northern industrialists and southern landowners that had suffocated the southern economy and society. He also wrote about the southern peasants and the causes of
their failure to organise and become aware of themselves as a ‘people’ (Gramsci 1958). Gramsci studied the relationship between the Communists and the peasants: he argued that the peasants could not simply be considered as allies of the workers but rather that their consent needed to be won through the work of the intellectuals (Gramsci 1978). In sum, Gramsci saw in the Southern question another example of the moral and intellectual condition of the nation that lagged behind the rhetoric of national unity. For him the South represented the whole nation:

‘the Italian people [who] did not exist as a concrete ideal, as active organisation .. an enormous mass of individuals who were disorganised in all senses .. indifferent to every ideal, estranged from every collective activity, and who refused every responsibility because they were removed from every enterprise’ (Gramsci 1958: 181).

A line of critical sociological inquiry on the Southern question and thus a counter-discourse that confronted the orientalising image of the South was developed more recently by sociologists like Alessandro Pizzorno (1971) and Sidney Tarrow (1996) who criticised Banfield’s (1958) and Putnam’s (1993) work. Recent economic and sociological studies have documented in depth the economic diversity of the regions that constitute the South and the unpredictable, unstable and disruptive nature of economic change in these regions (see Davis 1998 for an overview). These studies have attempted at creating a new discourse on the ‘Southern question’ that traces the links between the South’s ‘modernisation without growth’ and the overall socio-economic development of Italy (Bevilacqua 1993, for instance), explores the rationality of the southern elites’ seemingly irrational and pre-modern behaviour in the advent of modernisation (Cafagna 1989; Piattoni 1998) and tries to re-examine the social institutions of the South and the ways in which these have conditioned the paths of its socio-economic development (Davis ibid, for a critical overview and discussion).

The critical academic and cultural discourse that has developed in the last decades has not yet managed to displace the dominant political, media, and to a certain extent scholarly, discourse that has constructed the South as Italy’s Other within and as the main impediment to national integration and development. Cultural essentialist and racist explanations of the South’s supposedly unchanging backwardness and the Southerners’ negative personality traits continue to permeate public stereotypes, at least in the North (Sniderman et al. 2000: 86-7). The Northern League’s propaganda against the central government is based on an essentialised and polarised distinction between a hard-working and civic-minded North and a chaotic and corrupt South. Thus, the South is represented as the cause of national disunity. Not only Padanian but also Italian identity is built paradoxically against the South who is the nation’s negative Other. It represents what the nation is not and should not be.

4.2 The Immigrant Other

In the past two decades, immigration from non-EU countries has become a major public issue putting the Italian state and society to the test both with regard to the

46 A comedy film with title ‘A Milanese in Rome’ produced in 2000, with the support of the Culture Ministry, is one among the few recent initiatives aiming at de-constructing the North-South stereotypes.
effectiveness of its border controls and with reference to its humanitarian values and tradition of solidarity. In the media and political debate, *extracomunitari* – literally people from outside the EU – have often been represented as the nation’s new Significant Other.

A recent study of parliamentary debates on immigration (ter Wal 2000) points to the different discourses developed by the then (the study was based on data from 1997) incumbent left-wing forces and the right-wing opposition. Either side organised its discourse in terms of an ingroup (the host society, Italians) – outgroup (the immigrants) contrast. All parties recognised the problem of crime and the need for ensuring citizens’ security. However, while the right wing forces, *Alleanza Nazionale*, *Lega Nord* and partly *Forza Italia*, attributed agency to immigrants involved in deviant or criminal activities, the left-wing government pointed to the legitimate motives of immigration adopting the perspective of the hopes and needs of the immigrant outgroup. The only party who engaged in an overtly racist discourse Othering the immigrants through concentrating on cultural differences as a problem and in particular on Islam as a ‘threat’ was the *Lega Nord*.

My own study (Triandafyllidou 2001) based on the analysis of the weekly press discourse in the period 1990-95 and on interviews with social and political actors conducted in 1996, has yielded similar results. In the press, the tradition of solidarity was contrasted to the need for imposing respect for the law and guaranteeing the welfare of the host society. The belief in the existence of a presumed Italian national character was used to support the argument that immigrants are intrinsically different from Italians and therefore cannot be accepted as members of Italian society. Nonetheless, the representation of Italians as ‘good people’, ‘humane’ and ‘brave’ led to a critical debate that reveals the development of racist and intolerant attitudes among Italians, contrary to the positive self-stereotype. The Italian press discourse expressed also a tension between ethnic discrimination and a strong tradition of solidarity. Overall, civic values provided a marker for distinguishing between insiders and outsiders: immigrants were excluded because they were ‘illegal’, that is, undocumented. They violated the law of the host country and threatened the socio-political order of the nation. Nonetheless, the press appealed to the civic consciousness of the domestic population and placed emphasis on the values of solidarity and tolerance. The Italian press suggested that immigrants might be accepted if they abided by the law: the boundary was thus permeable.

The analysis of the political discourse (see also Triandafyllidou 2000) developed by the actors (trade unions, ministry employees and NGOs) interviewed shows that religion, territory, language and national character were rarely used as dimensions for the exclusion of immigrants from the host society. In contrast, the elements used to raise the boundary between Us and Them were ethnicity, culture and civic values. Cultural difference was rarely seen as a good thing. More often than not immigrant cultures were linked to negative features such as dishonesty, criminal tendencies, inability to adapt or poor educational background. Besides, immigrants were expected to assimilate to the host society’s culture.

47 Ter Wal’s study analyses the debates of the First Parliamentary Commission on Constitutional Affairs which discussed the new immigration bill, that the then left-wing government had brought to Parliament, in its sessions held between May and September 1997. That bill later became law 40/1998 and is currently in force.
Not surprisingly, civic values constituted the main element in the political discourse: immigrants were required to comply with Italian laws and civic traditions if they were to be accepted in Italian society. However, the analysis highlighted also the contradictory nature of Italian civic culture, which combines the humanist tradition of solidarity with a desire for a more efficient administration and stricter control. Moreover, the problematic relationship between Italian citizens and their state and the inconsistent and inefficient policy practices of the latter were intertwined with the issue of illegal immigration. On the other hand, and contrary to what was expected given the marginal role that ethnicity plays in the definition of Italian identity, ethnic origin was emphasised as an important feature that differentiated immigrants from the domestic population. More specifically, it was suggested that a certain level of ethnic discrimination was ‘natural’ and could be accepted as an expression of nationalist or ethnocentric attitudes, which, after all, ‘are common to all peoples’ (sic). Thus, the civic character of Italianness was complemented by ethnic beliefs despite the country's regional diversity.

In both the political and press discourse analysed in my study and in ter Wal’s analysis of parliamentary debates, two features are common. First the existence of competing normative discourses: solidarity and humanism vs. national preference and law and order. Second, in either study, a culture of legality is emphasised and represented as the boundary that divides Italians from immigrants. Last but not least, in my study, references to a common national character and to presumed ‘natural’ pre-dispositions towards ethnocentrism also appeared.

The ambivalent views towards immigrants that permeate Italian society have been documented in an anthropological study too, conducted among working class people in Palermo, Sicily (Cole 1996). Cole argues that very few Palermitans viewed immigrants as a specific racial group with unalterable and undesirable qualities that constituted a threat to Sicilians. Most of Cole’s interviewees expressed contradictory opinions regarding the contribution of immigrants’ work to the progress of Sicilian society and generally rejected parallels between their earlier emigration and the contemporary immigration of non-EU citizens. In either case they based their arguments on issues of performance and merit rather than racial prejudice. Their view on immigrants was situated in a network of power relations between working class natives, the Mafia, employers and the Italian state, the three last seen to exploit native workers as well as immigrants. The interviewees constructed a positive identity partly in relation to their (presumed) superiority over the ‘Turks’ [immigrants].

A recent survey study conducted by the Italian journal LiMes (see Ceccarini and Diamanti 1999) has explored the views of Italian citizens concerning immigrant integration. Diamanti’s analysis of the survey findings (Diamanti 1999: 308-17) concludes that even though immigration is a source of worry for Italians and indeed perceived as something undesirable or threatening by some, a civic conception of citizenship is largely prevalent. According to his analysis, the results of the study show that Italian citizenship is based on a set of civic values including the respect of the law and a feeling of territorial belonging (expressed as stability of residence) that potentially open the way for immigrant acceptance and integration. In other words, Diamanti points to the relative absence of cultural and ethnic closure and of perceived links between nationality and genealogical descent. In my view, in the light of the
qualitative studies presented above, the LiMes survey largely corroborates the finding that legality and a supposedly strong (but in reality rather weak) civic culture are used as a formidable barrier to exclude immigrants who are by definition ‘illegal’ as their presence was, and still for a minority among them, still is undocumented. To put it bluntly, this civic conception of the nation offers a suitable discursive strategy to fence off the outsiders without however expressing ‘politically wrong’ \(^{48}\) prejudiced beliefs.

The findings of these studies should be read in relation to, on the one hand, the normalisation of the phenomenon of migration and the progressive regularisation of migrants’ stay, work as well as entry to Italy and, on the other hand, the exclusionary character of Italian citizenship. At the same time, even though much lip service has been paid to multiculturalism and the social integration of immigrants, the content of such terms remains vague and acceptance of cultural and religious diversity in Italy is a contested matter (Triandafyllidou 2002b).

4.3 (Western) Europe as an Inspiring Other

This section is taken from a recent study (Triandafyllidou 2002a) of the Italian press discourse and aims at highlighting differing representations of the relationship between Italy and the EU in the past couple of decades. The press here is seen as the discursive arena \(^{49}\) in which public and political debate develops and personal opinions and attitudes are formed. Attention was thus paid to the range of arguments presented, the representations of the various collectivities and the discursive devices used, rather than to the agents of the discourse. Two large mainstream newspapers were selected for the analysis *La Repubblica* (*LaR*) and *Corriere della Sera* (*CdS*) \(^{50}\), on the basis of two sampling periods (the last week of February \(^{51}\) and October) in the years 1983, 1989, 1993 and 1999. These years were deemed to represent four important phases in the European integration process. \(^{52}\) 1983 represented the Cold War era; 1989 was the *annus mirabilis* of the collapse of the Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe; the Maastricht Treaty marked 1993; and 1999 reflected the launch of the Euro.

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\(^{48}\) Ter Wal (2000: 348) suggests that a strong anti-racist normative control may underlie the self-censoring of political parties in the immigration debate, which avoid to express overtly racist or discriminatory beliefs.

\(^{49}\) For a more detailed presentation of the theoretical approach on media discourse adopted in this study, see Triandafyllidou (2002a: 57-8).

\(^{50}\) *LaR* is a large daily published in a tabloid format, of progressive political orientation. The newspaper is organised into two sections. The first one refers to national and international news and general commentaries on politics, the arts, sports or leisure. The local section refers to news of local relevance and its content varies according to the place of publication, namely Naples, Rome, Florence, Bologna, Milan, Turin or Genova. *LaR* belongs to the De Benedetti-L’Espresso group of media enterprises. *CdS* is the Milan newspaper *par excellence*. It is published in Milan (a Rome edition exists too) in a wide sheet format and has a large circulation at a national level. *CdS* is of centre political orientation and belongs to the Fiat-Rizzoli group. Although a clear distinction between tabloid and wide sheet press in the sense understood, for instance, in Britain, does not apply to the Italian newspaper market, it is worth noting that *LaR* uses generally dramatic and sensationalising language while news reporting in *CdS* tends to be more sober.

\(^{51}\) The data set does not include February 1999 for *CdS*, because the relevant issues were not available for consultation during the period of the empirical research (November 1999-June 2000).

\(^{52}\) For a more detailed discussion of the sampling method see Triandafyllidou (2002a: 58-9).
The material analysed included a total of 974 articles: 595 articles were selected from LaR and 379 from CdS, which referred to Italy as a country/nation/ingroup, to the EU (and earlier EEC), to Central and Eastern European countries and Russia or to a combination of these countries and/or transnational units. The database included all articles referring to the EEC/EU, foreign policy with regard to Central-Eastern or Western Europe, and migration, while articles referring to domestic matters or news were retrieved selectively. Among those, only articles that referred to the country, the people, the nation, Italy, the Italians and/or some representation of any of the previous as an ingroup and dealing with issues such as the national economy/currency, welfare policy or employment were collected. Table 4.1 represents the distribution of the articles over time and table 4.2 with regard to their reference to Italy, Western and Eastern Europe.

This section examines the representation of the EEC and later the European Union and its relations with Italy, and also the strategic use and interplay of ‘European’ and ‘national’ features and symbols in the discourse. Over half of the articles included in the database (497 out of 974) referred to Europe in general, the European Union or one or more member states.

Table 4.1: Articles coded – Distribution over time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>La Repubblica (LaR)</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corriere della Sera (CdS)</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

53 Articles referring to non-European countries (or socio-political actors) such as the USA, Japan, Arabic countries, Latin America and others were excluded from the database.

54 I refer to Europe and the European Union as two separate though closely related concepts. The term European Union refers to the material reality of the social, political and economic entity called European Union. This reality includes of course culture and identity elements but these are demarcated by the institutional forms and geo-political boundaries of the Union. The term Europe, in contrast, refers to the more general idea of Europe, or better to the ideas of what is Europe (a political, cultural, geographical or other type of entity) that may be used in the press.

55 Current member states (EU15) were included in this count throughout the period studied (1983-1999) so as to take note of any evolution on the press reporting and representation of these countries.
Table 4.2: Articles coded – Distribution in relation to references to Italy, EEC/EU and Central and Eastern Europe per newspaper

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference to</th>
<th>LaR</th>
<th>Cds</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU/other member state/Europe</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central and Eastern European countries or Russia</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy and EU/other member state/Europe</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy and Central and Eastern European countries or Russia</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Representations of Europe, the EU and fellow member-states

The press coverage on European affairs was divided into two sub-themes. On the one hand, discourse threads that referred to the representation of the EEC/EU as such or a specific member state and, on the other hand, the discourse on the relationship between Italy and the EEC/EU. As regards the first theme, there were two types of representation of the EEC/EU in the press. One referred to the EEC/EU as an international economic actor and the second concerned the status of the EEC/EU as an international political entity. Both remained relatively marginal in the overall discourse and in 1993 were collapsed into the wider debate on the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the creation of a European Union and the foundations of the Union (social, economic, and political).

The economic part of the representation referred to the EEC/EU mainly in contrast to the USA and Japan in 1983 and 1989 and again in 1999, only that in 1999 the emphasis was placed on the financial duel between the Euro and the American dollar. As regards the profile of the EEC/EU as a political entity in international relations, this debate was non-existent in 1983, not surprisingly since the EEC had at the time a predominantly economic character. It attracted more attention in 1989 in relation to the Rushdie affair and the related political value debate, which offered the opportunity to contrast the EEC to Islamic countries. In 1999, the EU appeared as an international political actor with reference to the civil war in Chechnya and the Kurdish issue (the Ochalan arrest) in Turkey. Thus, the EEC and later the EU was represented as a unitary political actor that could intervene in international relations, an area that had hitherto been reserved to (nation-)states.

With regard to international politics, the EEC was superseded by wider references to Europe, mainly Western but occasionally also Eastern. The discourse on nuclear armaments, and the East-West relations in 1983 was framed in terms of ‘Western Europe’ vs. ‘Eastern Block’ and the USSR: the EEC was not seen as playing a part in the geo-political and military sphere. The same was true for 1989 with reference to the upgrading of nuclear armaments in the UK and Germany, and in 1993 with regard

56 More detailed references to the newspaper material analysed can be found in Triandafyllidou (2002a: 85-116).
to the NATO enlargement. Otherwise, however, there were no references to Europe as a separate cultural or political area, distinct from the EEC/EU.

Reports on news from other member states included a variety of issues, namely general information on party politics, mundane issues (e.g. scandals or social habits of politicians), industrial action and strikes, social issues such as poverty, welfare or crime. There had been a number of news reports on other member states as far back as 1983. In later years, this type of news was partly integrated into EU affairs and hence information on society and politics in individual states appeared less frequently. The prevalence of the EEC/EU as the socio-economic entity that represents Europe and the gradual assimilation of the coverage on other European countries into the EEC/EU coverage suggest a relative dominance of EU issues in the Italian public debate.

There was an individual thread of discourse developed concerning Germany. The role of Germany in Europe and the EEC/EU was seen as important, but more often than not, controversial. More specifically, concerns were expressed with regard to Germany’s fascist and Nazi legacy and the risk that authoritarian tendencies might re-emerge as the German people faced social unrest and economic recession after the reunification. This concern was expressed in all years studied except for 1999. Moreover, Germany was seen to play a pivotal role between East and West. This was the case in 1983 with reference to the controversial relations between the GDR and the FRG and also the close relationship between the FRG and the US, which was seen as a rejection on the part of Germany of its European character and affiliation. Attention was paid to the unification of the two Germanies from 1989 onwards. The focus was on the role of a united Germany as a link between the EEC/EU and Central and Eastern Europe, but also with reference to the increased size and economic and political weight of the united Germany within the EEC/EU. This concern adopted both negative and positive tones. Germany was seen as ‘the engine’ of the EU (locomotiva) and the ‘first in class’ (il primo della classe) and the German Mark was the point of reference for the Italian lira, until the creation of the Euro. At the same time, this (perceived) primacy of Germany adopted a negative overtone because of its excessive influence on decision-making in the EEC/EU and its (perceived) intransigence in intra-EU negotiations. This Germano-centric thread characterised the Italian newspaper discourse throughout the period studied.

This discourse thread reflected not only current concerns but also strained relations in the past between Italy and Germany. The Nazi legacy still weighed heavily on Germany’s image in the Italian newspapers. At the same time, the representation of the post-war German ‘economic miracle’ was also salient. This debate is strikingly parallel to the two dominant currents – the ‘Holocaust’ nation and the ‘Wirtschaftswunder’ nation (Giesen 1998: 148-64) – in the German national discourse (see also Triandafyllidou 2002a: 149-84).

The relationship between Italy and the EU

As regards the representation of the relationship between Italy and the EEC/EU and the positioning of the former within the context of the latter, two competing discourses were identified. The first, which I have called the EU primacy discourse, subordinated Italy’s position and role to that of the EU as a supranational political and economic entity and recognised the primacy and expertise of the EU over both
domestic (Italian) and international affairs. The second discourse, in contrast, which I have called the national interest discourse emphasised the independent political will and socio-economic interests of the country. This does not necessarily imply that European integration was viewed negatively. Italy was seen as an independent national actor that had to protect and negotiate its interests with the EU, which was also subject to the influence of the other member states. In both discourses, there were references to 'Europe', 'Europeans', 'Italy', ‘the people’, ‘Italians’, ‘the country’, ‘the national currency’, ‘the Union’ and so on, the meaning, however, attached to them varied.

Both discourses developed around political as well as economic issues. Thus, in the EU primacy discourse, the debate over the national economy and Italy’s compliance with the preconditions for integration was developed as a self-criticism, while the EU’s competence and legitimacy to check the country’s economic development and decide over its performance was recognised. In this discourse, Italy’s interest was represented as identical to EU integration and EU interests. Acquiring a decent position in the united Europe was seen as the main national goal and the country’s political and economic elites were criticised by the press for failing to face up to the challenge. The nation was seen as an integral part of Europe and national pride or shame was expressed in relation to its ‘Europeanness’. This discourse prevailed in the press in 1989 and 1993, while it appeared weaker in 1999.

The national interest discourse, in contrast, discussed Italy’s participation in the EEC/EU in critical terms. Competing interests between national currencies and member state central banks were emphasised and the need to protect the Italian lira and safeguard the country’s interests was underscored. This discourse was not critical of European integration as such but rather pointed to the fact that Italy had to protect its own, national, interests from EU regulation, harmonisation and competing member state interests. In some cases, the two discourses were intertwined, even within the same article.57

Naturally, in 1983, the antagonistic national interest representation with regard to Italy and the relations of other member states with the EEC and negotiations among them, prevailed. Indeed, European integration was still at an early stage then. In 1989, in contrast, the Europeanising discourse was more pronounced. Despite the satisfactory course of the Italian economy during that period, the representation of the country was totally subordinated to its belonging to Europe. Moreover, the planned 1993 integration was represented as a milestone in both national and European development. In 1993, despite the domestic turbulence that Italy was going through after the Tangentopoli political and economic scandals and the related decline of the national economy, the Europeanising discourse was developed more critically. The stagnation of European integration and the lack of political will to go ahead with reforms and harmonisation of member state policies were criticised by the Italian press. In this context, Italy was represented as a pioneer but also as a referee who sought to reconcile the competing national interests of other countries. Thus, Italy’s wish and struggle to be reintegrated into the European Monetary System was emphasised and the delayed ratification and implementation of the Maastricht Treaty

57 LaR, 27.10.1999, p. 1, title: Rates, European Central Bank agrees to their increase. Italy, Belgium risk debt. Please note that all quotes from Italian have been translated into English by the author.
were criticised. This framing was particularly pronounced in the press discourse of October 1993.

However, as early as 1993, the debate on the challenges of integration brought forward a ‘national interest’ discourse, which was further reinforced in 1999. This discourse did not essentially challenge the path towards European unification albeit it represented Italy as an independent entity within Europe. This tendency may not be surprising to the extent that closer integration involves more issues and more complex arrangements and, hence, often involves more conflicts among partners. The shift was not from a pro- to an anti-European discourse, but rather a shift from a European representation of Italy to an Italian representation of Europe.

Even though both discourses were present in all four periods studied, there was a change in the representation of Italy and the EEC/EU and the definition of the ingroup and outgroup across time. The EU was overall integrated into the Italian identity as one of its constitutive elements. It was however perceived as one to be striven for. In 1993, Italy’s Europeanness was more secure in terms of identity, despite the country’s poor economic performance and severe political crisis. Thus, the identification of Italy with the united Europe was dominant while, at the same time, the specific mode of integration was criticised. Most recently, in 1999, when EU integration was a reality, Italy seemed to rediscover its national distinctiveness, not against Europe but within it. Interests and policies were nationally defined, while the EU was recognised as an integral part of the nation/country and as a unitary actor in relation to third countries, under which Italian interests were subsumed.

In 1999 a number of articles published in LaR addressed the social and economic principles that were to guide the path to a united Europe. Terms like ‘competition’, ‘growth’ and ‘flexibility’ were opposed to notions of ‘welfare’ and ‘solidarity’. These articles referred to both the European and the Italian economy and society as one whole, representing the two as intertwined but also interacting: Italy, together with other member states, was seen as part of a common decision-making process concerning the social and political guidelines for European integration.

The lack of polarity between Italian and European identity is striking, albeit not surprising. In recent times, integration into the European Union has fulfilled a double function with regard to Italian identity. On the one hand, it has been perceived as the model of civic community that is absent from national politics. Thus, a European identity somewhat paradoxically may have reinforced national identity. Identifying with Europe was seen to provide the common civic basis necessary to consolidate the nation’s unity. On the other hand, the economic welfare and political power (perceived to be) involved in the European integration project have provided a means for achieving a positive identity within the international community. Italy’s all too common political crises during the post-war period, the country’s relative poverty (by Western European standards) until the 1970s and the more recent monetary and public finance crises provided a weak basis for achieving a positive national identity in the increasingly competitive international scene. Integration into the European Union has been seen as a powerful remedy to such past illnesses.

58 See for instance, LaR, 23.2.1999, p.29, Fazio: Italy is growing old, our welfare is at risk; LaR, 24.2.99, p.21 The pound sterling goes to the attic, London too will have the Euro. Blair accelerates towards Europe; La R, 22.2.99, p.27. The new EU policy should not be assistentialist.
The ambivalence, however, between the two discourses suggests that one should be cautious about inferring that European integration is an element that may provide for the civic cultural basis of Italian national identity. The press expressed concerns regarding the kind of civic and social values inherent in the EU project. The two discourses reflect varying views concerning ‘the state of the nation’ which lie between the two extremes of seeing Europe as ‘the saviour’ of Italy and being attached to ‘the beautiful country’ (*il bel paese*) and taking pride mainly in national accomplishments. Eventually, this is also a discourse about the priority of social vs. economic principles in defining a ‘good’, ‘modern’, ‘developed’ society. The Italian press saw the EEC/EU to privilege economic welfare and efficient government while an Italian representation of Europe was concerned more with social welfare and democracy. For instance, the eagerness in the 1993 press discourse to ratify the Maastricht Treaty expressed this concern over the democratic deficit and (perceived) lack of a strong political vision in the EU.

### 4.4 Views on Central and Eastern Europe

A large number of the articles analysed (see tables 4.1 and 4.2 above) referred to Central and Eastern European countries and, in particular, the USSR and later Russia. Nonetheless, the press discourse said little about Italy’s possible new role within the changing European context. Only 83 out of 974 articles linked Italy to the CEEC with a peak of 35 articles in 1989.

The representation of the CEEC and their relationship with Western Europe followed a predictable path. It reflected the political and economic reforms that marked the end of the twentieth century. In 1983, the Cold War discourse dominated the press coverage on Eastern Europe. The main issue of concern was nuclear armaments and the East-West competition concerning the installation of new missiles on European (both Eastern and Western) soil. The Warsaw Pact countries and more particularly the USSR were represented as the threatening Other for Western Europe. They were to blame for the polarisation of the ‘armament race’ because they were intransigent. The USSR in particular was viewed by the Italian press as highly rigid and authoritarian. Very few articles attempted to provide a balanced account of the competing interests between East and West. On one occasion, the press referred to the ‘other Europe’, the ‘Communist Europe’.\(^{59}\) This was the only reference to any geographical or historical connection between Western and Eastern Europe. Aside from this issue, there were a few reports on internal affairs in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the USSR. These reports pointed to political and economic reforms that took place in these countries and were on the whole neutral or positive.

Not surprisingly, in 1989 the discourse concentrated on political and economic reforms in the CEEC, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary in particular. Emphasis was put on the popular struggle for reform in these countries and repression by their respective Communist regimes. Hungary was seen as the most progressive of the three, following a stable and peaceful path towards democratisation and liberalisation of its economy. Poland was regarded with some scepticism in the beginning of 1989 but after the dominance of the opposition and the election of the new prime minister

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\(^{59}\) LaR, 22.2.83, p.9, title: Andropov, the second de-freezing, Prague applauds and Budapest is enthusiastic.
Mazowiecki, it was represented positively and closer relations with Italy, and the Vatican more specifically, were highlighted. Czechoslovakia was seen as the most reactionary of the three regimes. Wide publicity was given to the arrest of Vaclav Havel by the police for political reasons.

Another issue that attracted the attention of the Italian press was the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the rapprochement of the two Germanies. The change in the political leadership of the GDR was depicted negatively. The country was said to ‘want a Walesa’ and ‘wait for its own Gorbachev’. However, contacts with the FRG were intensified and the ‘return’ of the ‘other Germany’ to the ‘mother nation’ was welcomed.

The discourse on the USSR in 1989 was dominated by references to Gorbachev that were overall positive. The country was seen to be in a state of rapid and radical economic and political change and, hence, suffering from large-scale social upheaval, including strikes and social unrest. As one article of LaR put it, perestrojka seemed unable to deliver the rights it had legitimised. Many reports made gloomy predictions about the political and economic collapse of the USSR. The openness of Gorbachev to disarmament was partly rejected by the ‘West’, where the West was seen to include also the US and NATO. (Western) Europe was said to welcome such initiatives and, more particularly, the will of the USSR to abstain from the internal politics of the CEEC. A couple of articles cast doubt on the changes taking place in Eastern Europe – ‘But does the Warsaw Pact still exist?’ (LaR, 24 and 27.2.1989) – and commented on the changing geo-political order in the world. Nonetheless, this discourse left out the EEC/EU and Italy. It rather pointed to the fact that the USSR might still be alien to the ‘West’ but was no longer threatening.

In 1993 and 1999, the CEEC and Russia discourse took a different turn. Coverage was much narrower in terms of numbers of articles. The Italian press’s interest in social, political or economic developments in these countries diminished. It was mainly news, such as ethnic conflict, civil wars, strikes and political crisis that attracted media attention. In 1993, attention was paid to the conflict in the former Yugoslavian Republics. Serbia was represented as the evil authoritarian Other of Europe. Not surprisingly, in 1999, the spotlight was again on Serbia and the ethnic conflict in the Kosovo region. Balanced and neutral accounts of the peace negotiations were given. Nonetheless, the main issue of concern in both 1993 and 1999 with regard to Central and Eastern Europe was the political situation in Russia, which was related to its economic collapse. The decline of moral values, the loss of a sense of purpose or direction among the Russian people, the precarious power of Yeltsin and the authoritarian methods he used to regain it were seen by the Italian newspapers as signs of a country that was lawless, on the verge of collapse and easy prey to authoritarianism. These gloomy reports were repeated in 1999, with a lesser intensity however. Russia was represented as semi-authoritarian and totally corrupt, at the mercy of organised crime.

Last but not least, in 1993, the Italian leadership was reported to be discussing the prospects of the EU’s enlargement to the East, in relation to the Maastricht Treaty and

60 LaR, 26.02.89, p.15, title: Twelve months to save the USSR.
the overall process of European integration. ‘Europe a world force’ was the eloquent
title of one of the articles (CdS, 27.10.1993, p.7).

This change in coverage between 1989 and 1993/1999 was certainly related to the
news value of specific issues or events at given periods of time. However, it also
reflects the perceived ‘distance’ – not geographic but cultural, political and social –
between these countries and Italy. Little information was provided on these societies
or the socio-economic conditions of their transition to capitalist democracies. The
intensive coverage of ethnic conflict and political crises promoted an alienating image
of Central and Eastern European countries as ‘underdeveloped’, ‘war-ridden’, hence
‘un-European’.

In conclusion, the press discourse on the USSR/Russia and the CEEC reflected the
changes in the international context, the geo-political reorganisation of the relations
between East and West and the related political and economic reforms. On the whole,
the discourse was detached from the Italian reality: it remained fully in the context of
foreign news and only marginally related (see also the previous section) to the
EEC/EU or representations of Europe. The position of Italy appeared anchored
exclusively in ‘the West’ and the European Community/Union. The country was not
seen to play a particular role with regard to Central and Eastern Europe. Rather, the
CEEC provided the Other in contrast to which the European-Italian ingroup was
constructed.

5. Concluding Remarks

This report has aimed to offer a concise review of the historical and socio-economic
framework within which Italian unification took place and the Italian nation-state has
developed until nowadays. In section 3, I have reviewed critically the principal tenets
of Italian nationhood discourses with a special focus on the issues identified as the
‘problems’ of Italian (dis)unity. Section 4 has concentrated on the Significant Others
in relation to which the Italian nation has been formed, consolidated and developed.
Attention was paid to the ‘Southern question’, Italy’s main Other but also to more
recent Others, both threatening and inspiring, namely immigrants from non-EU
countries, the EU and fellow member-states and, last but not least, Central and
Eastern Europe.

It is difficult from this analysis to conclude what is the ‘state of the nation’ in Italy. In
my view, there is no single nor definitive answer to the questions that many Italian
scholars and politicians have tried to tackle, namely ‘what is the precise content of
Italian nationhood?’, ‘what it means to be Italian?’, ‘is Italian identity weak or is it too
stable to be a matter of contest?’ As I have argued elsewhere (Triandafyllidou and
Paraskevopoulou 2002) national identity is a process not a ‘thing’. It is fluid and
constantly at a state of coming-into-being. We need to explore the mechanisms that
condition the development and (trans)formation of national identity, and, more
particularly, the interplay between its content (the historical elements that have shaped
the national tradition, culture, history and politics) and its interaction with Others.
Through this interplay, national identity is shaped, changes, goes into crisis and is
revived again. There can be no definitive answer to what it means to be Italian or to
whether Italian identity is weak or strong. We can however point to the mechanisms
that have contributed to its weakness or stability at different historical periods. We
can also explore, both sociologically and social-psychologically, the mechanisms that underlie interaction between the ingroup (and its representation of itself) and salient outgroup(s) and their representations. This kind of analysis will help us understand a nation’s particular development and the attitudes and policies adopted by a given nation and national state towards its neighbours and minorities.

PART II

In the second part of this report, I wish to place Italy’s participation in the European Communities and later European Union into its historical context. I will review briefly the relationship between the two parties and identify the advantages and disadvantages for both (section 6). In section 7, I will review existing research on public attitudes towards Europe paying attention to the interrelations between national and European identifications, and the levels of trust in European vs. national institutions. In the last section, I will provide for a critical overview of the Italian literature on the issue highlighting the main approaches within it. In the concluding section, the national particularities of Italy with regard to national identity, processes of nation formation, Significant Others and relations with the EU will be summarised and their relevance for comparison discussed.

6. Relations with Europe: A Brief Overview

Italy has been one of the founding states of the European Economic Communities. It was a co-signatory of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and has ever since played an important albeit ambivalent role as the third (after France and Germany) and later the fourth (when the UK joined the EEC) largest country participating in the Community.

The end of World War II and the fascist regime left Italian economy destroyed and the Italian state discredited in the eyes of its European neighbours. The will of the Italian government to support the project of European economic (and possibly later political) integration was a clear expression of its will to put the fascist past aside, confirm its peaceful and democratic vocation and follow a path of socio-economic development in collaboration with the rest of western Europe. Italy’s participation to the EEC may be seen as a participation ‘against the odds’: Italy was the only Mediterranean country among the EEC founders, it had a weak industrial sector, important regional disparities in its economy and an unstable political system after two decades of Fascism and the turbulent years immediately after the war in which the Communists were bitterly confronted with the Conservative forces.

From an economic point of view, Italy benefited enormously from its early participation in the Common Market. As Duggan argues (1994: 263), northern Italian industry was sufficiently developed in the late 1950s to take advantage of the free trade conditions created by the Treaty of Rome. Italian exports towards other EEC countries doubled between 1958 and 1963. The boom of the Italian industry in the late 1950s and 1960s was a combination of a number of forces, including the availability of cheap labour from the South, the construction of communication and transport infrastructures by the state, the benefit of new energy sources available at low prices, and a developing steel industry thanks mainly to government investment (Duggan
However, this growth potential found its full realisation within the European Common Market.

The southern regions remained outside this small economic ‘miracle’. Not only were they less economically developed than their northern counterparts, but they were also further disadvantaged by the Common Agricultural Policy decided by their fellow EEC partners. Its limited political influence within the EEC prevented Italy from successfully defending the interests of its farmers whose Mediterranean crops (fruits and vegetables) differed largely from those of France and Germany (wheat and cattle). Moreover, it has been argued (Sbragia 1992: 81) that the Italian delegation failed to negotiate favourable conditions for the national agriculture at the Treaty of Rome because of internal disagreement. When later Italian governments tried to rectify the situation, they realised that gains in negotiations were hard to achieve.

The unfavourable conditions of the southern Italian economy became a further matter of contention between Italy and the other EEC countries as the former put pressure on the latter for measures and funds (like the European Social Fund and the Structural Funds) that would assist the socio-economic development of the Mezzogiorno and combat unemployment. According to Sbragia (1992: 84), Italy played a crucial role in setting the foundations of the structural and regional policies in the Treaty of Rome already. It pushed for the creation of the European Investment Bank, the European Social Fund and the Guidance Section of the European Guidance and Guarantee Fund of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) which constituted the main instruments to combat regional underdevelopment before the establishment of the European Regional Development Fund in 1975.

Somewhat paradoxically this marginal position of Italy with its ‘peculiar’ regional problems may be seen also as its point of strength as these very issues that were dear to Italian governments, namely combating regional underdevelopment and promoting certain sectors of the CAP, became central concerns for Community policy as successive waves of enlargement brought into the club Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal. It may thus be argued that Italy’s institutional and policy contribution to the EEC/EU has been important. It anticipated the development of the Community and is still pertinent in the wake of the Union’s enlargement to the East.

In discussing Italy’s contribution to the institutional design and political decision-making in the EEC/EU, two elements must be taken into account. First and foremost, the relative incapacity of the Italian administration – which to a certain extent persists until nowadays – to deal with the breadth and complexity of Community issues (Wallace 1973: 25). Both the lack of administrative skill and internal divisions (Padoa Schioppa 2001: 19) concerning the definition of a common national interest prevented Italy from handling Community affairs effectively and influencing the decisions taken in the EEC.

Italy has been also famous for its enthusiastically pro-European attitude and support for deeper and larger integration and its low record of compliance with Community directives. However, this paradoxical situation can also be read inversely, as Padoa Schioppa (2001: 35) suggests. The country’s political elites have alternated periods of non-compliance with moments of exceptional effort and stamina in pursuing large scale reforms of the national financial and administrative system in order to bring it
into line with EU policies. Thus, regular non-compliance, which in any case has been receding in the more recent years, should be considered also in relation to the breadth and depth of the reforms undertaken in some cases.

The second element to be considered here is Italy’s role and capacity as mediator between its fellow member states. Italy played a difficult part as the cushion between France and Germany in the early years of the EEC and later as the ‘quarto incomodo’ – the fourth largest and somewhat uncomfortable power in the club of the big three, France, Germany and the UK. However, the positions supported by Italian governments have been consistently pro-European favouring compromise rather than conflict. The influence of Italian politicians and thinkers who like Luigi Einaudi, Altiero Spinelli and Mario Albertini, who got actively involved into EEC affairs and promoted European integration alongside the more famous French thinkers and politicians like Jean Monnet and more recently Jacques Delors, has generally been underestimated.

Moreover, the Italian ‘crafts’ of building consensus and forging compromise, which are often deplored in the domestic political arena, proved useful at the European level where the achievement of consensus is a sine qua non for decision making. Typical Italian devices such as delaying decisions when an agreement was hard to reach, searching for support from the opposition, aiming at compromise decisions acceptable to all participants in a coalition, proved to be useful techniques for bargain and accommodation at the EU level (Padoa Schioppa 2001: 27)

In sum, the relations between Italy and the EEC/EU are both complex and ambivalent. Economic gains from early participation into the EEC have been significant albeit concentrated on specific sectors of the economy (industry and small and medium enterprises) while other sectors paid the price for integration (agriculture). From a political point of view, Italy has gained from the political stability of the EEC/EU environment but at the same time has also made an important contribution to the Union as a mediator and negotiator. The poor performance of the national administration in complying with EU norms has been to a certain extent counter-balanced by the intensity of effort and the pro-European enthusiasm of Italian governments and voters (see also the following section concerning public attitudes on the EU).

More recently, after the public corruption scandals of the 1990s, Italian citizens seem to have turned to Europe hoping that it will constrain their domestic elites and literally impose an efficient and transparent system of governance in the country. In fact, the political and social crisis caused by and manifested in the Tangentopoli affair may be considered to have marked a turning point in the relationship between Italy and the EU. The shock of the revelation of widespread corruption amongst even the most high-ranking figures in the business world (senior managers of Fiat, for instance) began a wide-ranging debate in the media and the political parties on the foundations of the Italian polity and, most importantly, on its position among EU member states. The purging of the corrupt politicians and the rationalisation of the public finance came to symbolise the European orientation of Italy.

The extent to which a set of civic values identified with EU governance can provide for a link between an emerging European identity and a feeling of belonging to the
Italian nation is a question for research. It is however a matter of fact that Italy’s pro-European policy and public opinion have persisted and guided the country into the first round of the Euro zone implementation despite gloomy predictions.

The meaning of Europe and the EU for Italian elites and citizens is a subject for research in this project. Nevertheless, a first glance into public attitudes towards the nation and Europe can be gained by looking into the available survey data presented in the following section.

7. Attitudes Towards Europe

In this section I shall review some recent results of Eurobaromètre surveys with regard to Italy with a view to providing some hints concerning the bases of the pro-European attitude of the Italian public opinion and the relationship between Italian national identity and identification with the EU/Europe. I will discuss briefly the issue of trust towards institutions and the different degrees of confidence that link Italian citizens to their national vs. the European institutions. I will thus seek to highlight some identity aspects that need further exploration in the Italian case.

Italians view the European Union as compatible with their national affiliation. Only about one third – and in 2000 less than one fourth – of the respondents to the Eurobaromètre survey saw themselves as Italians only in the second half of the 1990s (see table 7.1). This percentage is markedly lower from the EU15 average which at 1996 and 1997 was just under 50% and in 2000 still close to 40%. These survey results, superficial though they may be, suggest that Italian identity and Europeanness are inter-related (65% of the respondents identified as both Italian and European in 1999 while in 2000 the score rose to 72%) and may be supportive of one another rather than mutually exclusive.

Table 7.1: National and European Identity: In the near future, do you see yourself as... ? (percentage of respondents, EU15 average in parenthesis)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>European only</th>
<th>European and nationality</th>
<th>Nationality and European</th>
<th>Nationality only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>4 (5)</td>
<td>6 (6)</td>
<td>52 (40)</td>
<td>35 (46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>6 (5)</td>
<td>6 (6)</td>
<td>52 (40)</td>
<td>33 (45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>5 (4)</td>
<td>8 (7)</td>
<td>56 (43)</td>
<td>29 (43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>6 (4)</td>
<td>9 (6)</td>
<td>56 (42)</td>
<td>26 (45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>3 (4)</td>
<td>7 (7)</td>
<td>65 (49)</td>
<td>23 (38)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobaromètre, Reports no. 46, 48, 50, 52 and 54. Years refer to when the fieldwork was conducted, not to the publication of the report.

The link between national loyalty and a feeling of belonging to Europe does not stem from the presumed weakness of national identity in Italy. A recent survey shows that still about two thirds (71%) of the respondents identified primarily with the nation in contrast to half of them who stated their city as the basis of their feeling of belonging.
and under one third who identified with their region (see table 7.2 below). These results are all the more striking if compared with the opinions expressed in other EU member states in the context of the same research. In countries with strong regionalist and peripheral nationalist tendencies – partly similar to the internal divisions of the Italian society – like Spain or Great Britain these percentages were lower (67% and 61.3% respectively). Only in France with its strong Republican nationalist tradition, does the percentage of respondents identifying with the nation exceed that of Italy (72.8%). Moreover, identification with Europe is higher in Italy (23%) in comparison to the other major EU member states ranging from approximately 13% in Germany and Spain to a mere 7.7% in Great Britain.

Table 7.2: In which area do you feel to belong primarily? (sum of the two most important areas of belonging, in percentage on the respondents in each country)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Great Britain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>71.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>45.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nation</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>61.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total responses</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In another recent survey (Ceccarini and Gardani 1998), the responses of a statistically representative sample of northern Italian adult population (see also Diamanti 1998) were cluster analysed. The results showed that the single largest cluster (which accounted for 33% of all responses) was that of the ‘pro-Europeans’ (Europeisti) (Ceccarini and Gardani ibid.: 164-5): these respondents considered the European Monetary Union both necessary and advantageous for the well being of Italy, were against the secession of the North, which they judged as catastrophic, and showed an elevated degree of trust to the national state institutions. In short, according to survey research, the picture is relatively clear: a large part of Italian citizens express a feeling of loyalty and belonging to both their home country and the EU/Europe.61 The two are seen as perfectly compatible.

Nevertheless, survey results also show that changes in Italian citizens’ attitudes towards the EU have occurred in recent years. Support for the EU has fallen from 69% in 1997 to 59% in 2000, and hence its difference from the EU15 average, has been reduced to 10 percentage points (see table 7.3). The same has happened with the perceived benefit that the country has enjoyed from the EU. The positive view has fallen by 5 percentage points while the EU15 average has remained mostly unaltered. These changes suggest a more critical attitude towards EU affairs within the framework of overall support for European integration.

61 It is worth noting that in these surveys the term Europe and the EU tend to be used interchangeably. In this project, the possible differentiation between a representation of the EU as a specific socio-political reality and of Europe as a wider cultural, historical or geographical area is taken into account.
The most striking discrepancy in these quantitative measurements of the general attitudes of the Italian public towards the EU is found in the role that respondents would like the EU to play in the future. Thus, nearly three out of four Italians, in contrast to less than one out of two in average of all Europeans (on the basis of the EU15 average), would like the EU to play a more important role in their daily lives in the new century. Considering the distrust and dissatisfaction of Italian citizens towards their own political and administrative system and the relatively high support for joint EU decision making expressed in the Eurobarometre surveys (see table 7.3), it can be hypothesised that the desire for the EU to play a more important role in the 21st century relates to issues of efficient governance.

Table 7.3: Support for EU in Italian public opinion (expressed in percentage, EU15 average in parenthesis)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support for EU (good thing)</td>
<td>69 (49)</td>
<td>60 (54)*</td>
<td>68 (51)</td>
<td>59 (50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived benefit from EU (benefited)</td>
<td>54 (44)</td>
<td>50 (49)**</td>
<td>51 (46)</td>
<td>49 (47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average level of support for joint EU decision-making</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>66 (57)</td>
<td>66 (53)</td>
<td>62 (52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 21st century: perceived role of the EU in people’s daily life to be more important (EU will play a more important role)</td>
<td>60 (46)</td>
<td>63 (51)</td>
<td>63 (52)</td>
<td>64 (51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 21st century: Desired role of the EU in people’s daily life to be more important (they would like the EU to play a more important role)</td>
<td>68 (45)</td>
<td>73 (45)</td>
<td>73 (48)</td>
<td>71 (45)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometre, Reports no. 48, 50, 52 and 54. Years refer to when the fieldwork was conducted, not to the publication of the report.
* Average for EU9: IRL, L, NL, I, DK, F, West D, B, UK.
** Average for EU10, i.e. EU9 and GR.

Support for this hypothesis is provided by another survey study that looked into people’s trust to the various levels of institutions and governance that condition their daily lives. In this survey (see table 7.4), an overwhelming 72.7% of Italian respondents stated that they trusted European institutions while opinions in other countries ranged from a relatively high 57.8% in Spain to approximately 40% in both Germany and Great Britain. Italian respondents did not trust much either their regional or local institutions (just over 55% of the respondents trusted the latter and nearly 60% the former) in contrast to their French and German fellow EU citizens of whom between 70% and 80% expressed trust in their local and regional governance structures. Not surprisingly, the state institutions were the least trusted attracting the confidence of only 42.2% of the Italian respondents. This percentage was significantly lower than that expressed by respondents in the other countries, which
ranged between 52% approximately in Spain and 58.7% (the highest score among the five countries studied) in Great Britain.

Table 7.4: Percentage of people stating that they trust the following territorial institutions (‘a lot’ and ‘at least a little’ of trust, percentage on total of respondents in each country)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Great Britain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>77.6</td>
<td>67.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>62.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>58.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total responses</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Concerning Eastern enlargement, the Eurobaromètre provides for data on individual member-states only in its most recent issue (No. 54, section 5.9). Answering the question: ‘What is your opinion of the following statement: the European Union should be enlarged and include new countries. Please tell me whether you are for or against it?’ Italians rate second only to Greece (59% and 70% respectively) in supporting the enlargement of the EU, against an average of 44% for the EU15 and a mere 31%, 32% and 35% in UK, Austria and France. This first glance at Italians’ views on the Eastern enlargement requires naturally further study. The analysis of both quantitative and qualitative findings on the Italian public opinion on Eastern enlargement will also have to be seen against the country’s specific geopolitical position and historical background as a southern European state with ‘Northern’ elements and a ‘Western’ country adjacent to the Levant.

This first overview of data on the Italian public opinion confirms that support for European integration is strong and indicates a high level of support for the Eastern enlargement too. A more careful analysis suggests that there is a link between the civic value and efficiency deficit of the Italian national state and the pro-EU attitude, as expressing a desire for efficient and transparent governance. These first highlights serve as points of departure for understanding the relationship between identification with the nation and attitudes towards the EU in Italy.

8. Studies on European Integration and Collective Identities in Italy

Scholarly research on the social, economic and political-institutional aspects of Italy’s participation into the EEC/EU has largely developed within the wider domain of anglophone social sciences. Studies conducted in Italy and published in Italian or French are integrated into this larger framework of ‘European’ research and are not to be considered a particular national school of thought to be outlined here. Moreover,

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62 Eurobaromètre issues no.52 and 54 investigate the EU15 overall support for the candidature for specific countries, where Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic are ranked fourth, fifth and seventh respectively in order of preference in both surveys. The highest preference is given consistently to Switzerland and Norway.
there are few if any studies dealing with the issue of European integration from an identity perspective.

Recent literature in the field of International Relations that has started taking into account identity issues, adopting a constructionist perspective (see for instance, Marcussen et al. 1999; Risse et al. 1998; and Journal of European Public Policy, special issue 6, 4, 1999) has concentrated on France, Germany and the UK. Similarly, Italy has remained relatively marginal in social-psychological studies on the emergence of a European identity and its interaction with feelings of national belonging (see Breakwell and Lyons 1998). More recent media studies (Mussolf et al. 2001) also leave Italy outside and concentrate on Germany and Britain. Nonetheless, the rarity of studies dealing with identity aspects of European integration is not peculiar to Italy but rather reflects an overall bias in the study of European integration from a policy or institutional perspective, as pointed out already in the proposal for this project (p. 7 of Part B).

Some attention to the identity aspects of European integration has been paid, paradoxically, by Italian researchers studying the revival or demise of Italian national identity. Scholars (see also sections 2 and 3 and 7 above) point to the weakness of a civic value dimension in Italian nationhood and to the (potential) role of the EU as the basis for such a civic identity.

Last but not least, a small set of studies (see Limes, 1997, 2, part I; Limes, 1998,1; and Daedalus 2001) has developed, which discusses the relationship between Italy and Europe, including to some extent identity aspects often conceptualised as issues of ‘national character’ (Cavalli 2001; Gabara and Consoli 1997). This body of literature includes a strong ideological component: it often concentrates on interpretations of what would and should be rather than analysing what is. As a result, their ‘analyses’ and ‘criticisms’ are more political than scholarly and hence of limited usefulness for scholarly purposes.

9. Conclusions

Italy as a nation and as an EU member state presents a number of particularities that are worth noting for comparative purposes. Nation formation has remained incomplete, unifying national symbols are even nowadays hard to find and the nation appears fragmented and even divided within. The revival of regionalism in the late 1980s and 1990s and the continuing dominance of an orientalising discourse towards the South pose serious challenges to national unity. The EU, in this context, acts both as a resource for national identity, providing for the civic dimension that the former is lacking, and, by contrast, as a centrifugal force because it opens new levels of governance accessible to regions, independently from the nation state.

Participation in the Common Market and later the EU has brought many advantages to the Italian economy and industry. These have initially accentuated and even indirectly fostered larger regional disparities between the North and the South. Nonetheless, in the last two decades of the twentieth century Community funds have been used for the restructuring of the Mezzogiorno. Italy has played an important part in the institutional development of the structural and regional policies of the EU,
paving the way for assistance to the more recent southern European member-states like Greece, Spain and Portugal.

Immigration further complicates Italy’s relations with the EU and the related representations of EU nations and citizens as opposed to ‘extracomunitari’. The country’s recent transformation to a host has opened a debate on migration policy and also culture and identity issues. This debate may take a different twist when in a few years time a number of non-EU immigrants (both regular and undocumented) originating from accession countries (like Poland), will become EU citizens. Last but not least the divergent views on the relationship between Italy and the EU manifested in the national press discourse reveal interesting combinations of national and European loyalties and the ways in which the two can be intertwined.
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POLAND: STATE, NATION FORMATION, AND EUROPE

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PART I

1. Introduction

The very fact that Poland is placed in the geopolitical centre of Europe has exposed it to both Eastern and the Western influences. While on some occasions Poles have been given the historical opportunity to choose the path they would like to follow, as at the beginning of the Polish state (in the year 966) determined to be rooted in Roman Christianity and Latin culture (rather than in the Byzantine East), on other occasions the country was subject to alien control and an alien way of life, as in the case of the partition (in the nineteenth century), and the Yalta Conference Agreements (in 1945) that determined the post-war European order. During the thousand year history of the Polish state, Polish culture developed, and became a condition *sine qua non* for the survival and development of the Polish nation.

The three successive partitions that led to the loss of the independent state constitute milestones in the history of the Polish nation. From that moment onwards, subsequent generations of Poles dreamt, worked, and fought for the restitution of their state. Eventually the national determination, displayed by diplomatic, political and military efforts, paved way for the revival of the state in 1918. The Polish phrase ‘For Our Freedom and Yours’ epitomizes the Polish involvement also in the freedom of other European countries, as was the case in the role of King John the Third Sobieski in the Vienna victory in the seventeenth century, which saved Christian Europe from the Ottoman invasion.

This report is intended to outline the historical process of the formation of the Polish state, nation and national identity. It will begin by addressing the most important events in the history of the Polish state. Next, attention will be focused on the development of the Polish nation and national identity, the dominant themes of the relevant discourses will be identified. The subsequent section examines the issue of national minorities. The second part of this report discusses the issue of Poland’s place in contemporary Europe, and presents the debate that is taking place in the country on Poland’s accession to the European Union.

2. The Formation of the Polish State and Nation

The milestones in the history of the formation of the Polish state and nation have been: the kingdom of the Piasts and the Jagiellonian dynasties, the Royal Republic, the Partitions, and the making of modern Poland in twentieth century. The following discussion is organized around these decisive historical periods.

2.1 The Kingdom of the Piasts and the Jagiellonian dynasties

With the baptism of Prince Mieszko the First, as well as his court, in the year 966, the Duchy of Polonia became a part of Roman Christianity and of the Latin civilization (determining the alphabet and court language); the construction of the Polish realm recognised as such by the European powers of that time, and the Pope, had begun.

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63 In effect the Latin language had a considerable impact on the Polish language; Latin is, to this day, taught in so-called ‘humanistic classes’ in secondary schools.
Since the very beginning, the development of the Polish state was accompanied and strengthened by the erection of Church structures; in 999 the first capital Gniezno was elevated by the Pope to the level of an Archbishopric, and new bishoprics at Wrocław, Kolobrzeg and Kraków were also created. These acts were of both a religious and a political importance; they proclaimed the independence of the Polish Church hierarchy from the power of the older diocese of Magdeburg, which had hoped to control it in the German interest. With Gniezno as capital of both the state and the Polish Church hierarchy, the young, developing Polish state became fully recognized and legitimized in Roman Christendom. Thus the development of both the Polish state and the Polish Church hierarchy structures were intertwined, and the latter on numerous historical occasions supported the state structures.

The first Polish dynasty, the Piasts, ruled the country from 966 to 1386. The first parliament met in 1331 under the reign of Casimir the Great who raised the country to a high level of prosperity. Under the second, Jagiellonian, dynasty (1386-1572) Poland became a great power and the largest country in Europe when it was united with Lithuania (1569-1776).

2.2 A Royal Republic

On 1st July 1569 the Senate and Seym (the lower house of the Parliament) of Lithuania and those of Poland met at Lublin – on the border between the two states – and unanimously swore a new Act of Union. This is how the combined kingdom, ‘the Most Serene Commonwealth of the Two Nations’ known to foreigners as ‘Serenissima Republica Poloniae’ or the Polish Commonwealth – was established. In the early 1600s the Polish Commonwealth was the largest state in Europe with 990,000 square kilometres, its population was at ten million (equal to that of Italy and twice that of England), with only 40 per cent of Poles, concentrated in about 20 per cent of the area. The settled peasantry was made up of three principal ethnic groups: Polish, Ruthene, Lithuanian. The cities were also far from being ethnically homogenous: some such as Gdańsk were preponderantly German, another port of Elbing had a large colony of English and Scots, Kraków and Wilno hosted Hungarians and Italians, Lwów was made up of Poles, Germans, Italians and Armenians and had three Christian Archbishoprics – the Catholic, the Orthodox and the Armenian. Almost every town had its Jewish community, and there were quantities of small towns in the south and east almost exclusively made up of those communities. The Commonwealth’s population was heterogeneous also in the religious sphere, its significant proportions were of different Christian denominations, and there were also non-Christians. The Jewish community multiplied each time there was an anti-Semitic witch-hunt in other European countries. The descendants of Tatars who had settled in Lithuania in the fifteenth century and become loyal subjects, had nearly one hundred mosques. Anabaptists seeking refuge from persecution in Germany appeared in the 1530s, and Mennonites from Holland in the 1550s. Despite the fact that a freedom to practice any religion without discrimination or penalty was legally acknowledged, the Protestant movement failed to gain broad support in the country.

64 Elected kings followed the death of the last Jagiellion in 1570.
65 Soon, the Polish element (language and culture) of the Commonwealth came to dominate the Lithuanian one.
As seen, the ‘Serenissima Republica Poloniae’ was truly a multiethnic state, and its subjects enjoyed a legal religious freedom. A distinctive feature of this political edifice was the coexistence of the monarchy with republicanism. In principle, the Seym was the embodiment of the will of the nation, and therefore the font of legislative power, the Senate were the custodians of the law, the king was both a political entity in his own right and the mouthpiece of the Seym. Polish republicanism borrowed the style, the symbolism, and the concepts of the Roman Republic. The Polish political vocabulary of that time bristled with terms such as ‘liberty’, ‘equality’, ‘brotherhood’, ‘nation’, ‘citizen’, ‘tribune’, ‘republic’ (Zamojski 1994, p. 98). A privileged position in the ‘nation’ was held by the noble people, the gentry (szlachta) who inherited both status and land, were obliged to perform military service for the king and to submit to his tribunals, and were the independent magistrates over their own land. Noticeably, those included in the idea of ‘nation’ were the gentry of any ethnic origin: the Polish, the Ruthene, the Lithuanian, all of whom enjoyed full political rights in this multiethnic gentry democracy. The weakness of this parliamentary system was the under-representation of the towns in the Seym. The towns with their predominantly foreign population had always dealt directly with the crown, which guaranteed their status, but when the crown gradually began to abdicate its rights to the Seym, the population of the towns, such as the peasants, were left undefended. It follows that it was the state with its political system – the gentry democracy – that made up the nation; at that time to belong to the Polish nation meant to be a subject of the Commonwealth. That is why: ‘A baptized Jew from Volynia would sign himself “gente Ruthenus, Natione Polonus, origine Judeaus”’ (ibid., p.178). In the course of time, however, during the nineteenth century (the era of partitions) it became clear that the former ‘Serenissima Republica Poloniae’ contained the germ of three nations: Lithuanian, Polish, and Ruthene later know as Ukrainian, now based not upon a political, but the ethnic layers of language, religion, and ethnic identity.

2.3. The Partitions

While the Habsburgs (Austria), the Bourbons (France), the Tudors (England) and other ruling houses of Europe strove to impose centralized autocratic government the ‘Serenissima Republica Poloniae’ alone of all the major states took the opposite course; however, over time the gentry democracy gradually fell into decline. The causes of the decline were economic, political and moral. The economy had suffered from the twenty years of war in the middle of the seventeenth century. The Swedish invasion left the country – the towns in particular – ruined: the urban population declined by up to 70 per cent (ibid., p.176), which only fixed the unfavourable pattern of the Commonwealth economy focusing on production of the raw agricultural materials for the external markets. In effect the overall standard of living of the population went down between 1500 and 1700; among those affected were the peasantry, the majority of the gentry (szlachta), and the Jews, who also experienced massacres at the hands of the Cossacks in 1648 and the Russians a few years later. The elective monarchs tended to regard the Commonwealth not as part of their patrimony but as a sinecure to be enjoyed while it lasted; the Seym had lost most of

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66 As a rule the gentry (szlachta) were the landowners.
67 As Wallerstein (1974, p. 304) points out: ‘Poland is by the sixteenth century integrated into the European world-economy on whose markets wheat is sold, and for whose markets wheat is grown’. The Polish economy, however, occupies the periphery of the system: ‘We have been using Poland as our example of a country in the periphery of the European World-Economy’ (ibid., p. 307).
its executive power; and legislation was aimed at preventing the upward mobility of
town dwellers and peasants. Along with these developments, the old virtues faded
away: the religious freedom and the toleration of ethnic diversity had receded, the
ideal of political freedom evolved into the acceptance of anarchy, and the real
democratic freedom of citizens evaporated; all in all, the society had lost the will to
conduct a policy and to defend itself. The gradual disintegration of the
Commonwealth was seized as an opportunity by its neighbouring autocratic powers –
Russia, Prussia, and Austria – who had sharpened their appetite for the vast land, and
had pursued this goal, thus disrupting the country’s recovery.

In the mid-eighteenth century, fired by the spirit of the European Enlightenment, the
Commonwealth had begun a period of modernization and improvement: the schools
had been reformed, and educated people who, by this very fact transcended the class
barriers, gave rise to a new class, the intelligentsia, united by a common educational
background and political vision. The intelligentsia accepted the service of society as
its fundamental moral obligation, and made an attempt to transform the right to lead
the country from something based on noble descent to one of personal achievement.
The intelligentsia was the eighteenth century reincarnation of the former political
nation. These developments had an immediate impact on economic life: the
unfavourable balance of trade resulting from the lack of a manufacturing industry
began to be reversed. The twenty years between 1764 and 1784 saw a remarkable
development of mercantile and capitalist activity among the gentry. Between 1764
and 1766 a royal mint was established in Warsaw, the currency was stabilized,
measures standardized, and a state postal service founded. The greatest achievement
was The Constitution which became law on 3 May 1791 and was the first written
constitution in Europe (second internationally only to the American one). It was a
compromise between republicanism and monarchism; Catholicism was enshrined as
the religion of the state, although every citizen was free to practice another, the gentry
was declared to be the backbone of the nation and the peasantry was acknowledged as
its lifeblood, the Seym became the chief legislative and executive power, the
government of the Commonwealth was vested in the king and a Royal Council (ibid.,
p. 248). This event was hailed in western Europe: political clubs in Paris voted to
make the Commonwealth king (Stanislaw August Poniatowski) an honorary member,
Condorcet, Thomas Paine, and Edmund Burke acclaimed the Constitution as a
breakthrough (ibid., p. 249). However, in east-central Europe – in Petersburg, Vienna,
and Potsdam – the Constitution caused fear as being too revolutionary, the more so as
‘a steady trickle of peasants from all three countries flowed into Poland in search of
new freedom’ (ibid.). And it was the Constitution that triggered the close cooperation
between the three neighbouring autocratic powers in the final division among
themselves of a Commonwealth which had already been partially seized in the first
partition of 1772, and in two subsequent partitions of 1792 and 1794. At the moment
when western Europe began developing the ideas and ideals of liberal democracy the
Commonwealth, the enlightened monarchy, came to a definitive close. One of the

68 The Convocation Seym of 1733 debarred non-Catholics from holding office, this act brought the
noble tradition of tolerance to an end (Zamojski 1994, p. 221).
69 For instance, in 1697 the use of Ruthene for legal and administrative purposes was brought to an end
(Zamojski 1994, p.221).
70 It was boosted by the Seym’s 1773 decision to repeal the law forbidding the gentry to engage in
commerce (Zamojski 1994, p. 245f).
largest states in Europe disappeared from the map of Europe and its citizens were plunged into despotic rule under three autocrats for well over a hundred years.

The partition that put an end to the modernizing Commonwealth was perceived as a catastrophe not only by the gentry, the privileged social strata. In the first uprising known as the Insurrection (1794) the Warsaw ‘Jewish community formed up and equipped a special regiment of its own under the command of Colonel Berek Joselewicz, the first Jewish military formation since Biblical times’ (ibid., p. 256). The peasant volunteers from the Kraków region also took part in the fight; armed with scythes, they captured the Russian guns at the battle of Raclawice (1794).  

The subsequent uprisings of 1831 and of 1863 ended in military collapse. However, they revealed the firm determination of the nation to restore its state, and the no less firm determination of the partition powers to keep and guard the land they had seized. The uprisings also kept the European intellectuals aware of the ‘Polish Question’, and its relation to Europe and Europeanness. A prominent example of these concerns is the speech by Karl Marx, made in 1867: ‘There exist only two alternatives for Europe. Either Asiatic barbarism under the leadership of Moscow will fall on Europe like an avalanche – or else Europe will rebuild Poland, cutting itself off thereby from Asia with a wall of twenty million heroes’ (ibid., p. 287). As has been seen, for Marx Poland’s resurgence was a matter of preserving the European identity vis-à-vis non-European influences and deeds. This opinion, however, was not a widespread one. Metternich quite honestly stated that the Polish cause ‘does not declare war on the monarchies which possess Polish territory, it declares war on all existing institutions and proclaims the destruction of all the common foundations which form the basis of society’ (ibid., p. 299). Thus Russia de facto posed as the guardian of European values, and Prussia invoked a cultural and civilizing right to its Polish territories.  

The European system of that time rested upon the profound but hideous injustice accepted by the Holy Alliance which, nevertheless, arrogated to itself the right and the duty to defend European civilization and legitimacy. Ironically enough, since the eighteenth century, the persistent image of ‘Eastern Europe’ – portrayed as a hub of ethnic intolerance, xenophobia, the backward area that lags behind democratic ‘West’ – had developed, haunting the collective identity of Western societies to the present day (Romaniszyn 2001, p. 283).  

In economic terms, the partition equalled colonization of the captured lands. During the whole of the nineteenth century when countries like Britain and France developed, the three partition powers devoted resources of troops and bureaucratic machinery to policing and exploiting the captives. The Austrians saw the province they had seized as a pool of manpower for its armies; the attempts to develop the area economically were discouraged, so that the peasantry continued to operate the three-field system as they had done in the thirteenth century; nevertheless the province was heavily taxed. Prussian rule meant the gradual cultural and economic repression of the Poles, who

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71 ‘The red four-corned caps of these peasants from Kraków region were adopted by the National Cavalry, and later worn by the Polish regiments in Napoleon’s army, after which they became traditional wear for lancer units in all European armies.’ (Zamoyski 1994, p. 255).

72 To K. Marx ‘The fall of Poland is the cradle of Russia, the advance of Russia is Prussia’s right to expansion’ (Zamoyski 1994, p. 300).

73 The oppressive idea of ‘Eastern Europe’, which exemplifies the ‘camouflaged’ cultural racism that concerns whole societies, has outlived the collapse of the Iron Curtain, precisely because of its long tradition (Romaniszyn 2001, p. 283).
were perceived as ‘a nation of lesser cultural content’. In 1874 the use of Polish textbooks was forbidden by law, in 1876 German became the exclusive administrative language, in 1887 the study of Polish as a second language was abolished; furthermore, in 1898 a series of laws turned the Poles into second-class citizens: it became illegal for them to buy land, and in 1904 a law forbade Poles to build houses on their land, at the same time the German Colonisation Commission bought up land for the German colonists. In Russia there were two competing options for the seized province, one was to incorporate it into the Empire, the other was to grant it a semi-autonomous status; eventually both alternatives were tried. This lack of consistency served Polish interests, giving Poles an opportunity to speed up economic development, most spectacularly in the textile industry.74 Thus on the industrial level the colonial relationship was reversed; this was not so in agriculture, perceived by the Russians as an economic base for the rebellious gentry. The severe repression, both political and economic, introduced after the uprisings led to the economic ruin of thousands of gentry families. This had a direct impact on the other social strata, assimilating by marriage with the richer peasants and the town dwellers the remnants of the gentry brought their culture and ideas into these classes.

The colonization of the Commonwealth meant physical control, political and economic abuse, and an attempt to impose moral conformity on the conquered; however, instead of overwhelming them, this nurtured the Poles, and stimulated the development of the Polish nation. During the partition a unique phenomenon came into existence: the nation without a state developed a new view of itself and a new vigour for the restoration of its state. And it was precisely the nation’s will and vigour that led to the resurgence of the Polish state after the WWI.

3. The Making of Modern Poland

3.1 The Polish Republic, 1918-1939

The Polish Republic was created out of the peripheries of the three partition powers, and needed to unite different currencies, fiscal and administrative systems, and the railway networks; besides, the whole area had been greatly devastated by the six years of World War I. Despite the drawbacks, the Republic made real achievements over the twenty years: illiteracy was halved; industrialization encouraged,75 land reform launched.76 In 1918 the government passed decrees on social insurance and an eight-hour working day; in 1924 an unemployment insurance act was passed; in the 1930s state housing schemes for the low-paid were built (Zamojski 1994, p. 348). The constitution adopted in March 1921 was based on that of the French Third Republic, the Parliament consisted of a Seym elected by proportional representation, and a Senate, elected by both houses. The strongest single party was the National Democrats, their views however, alienated most of the others and they could not sustain a coalition; a rapid turnover of cabinets haunted the political scene until the coup of May 1926, when Marshal Pilsudski seized political power.

74 In 1821 a weaving centre was established in the village of Łódz, by 1900 Łódz had 300,000 inhabitants, over 1,000 factories and, along with other new textile centres at Białystok and Zyradów, had become the principal textiles supplier to the Russian market (Zamojski 1994, p. 310).
75 In the 1930s Poland was the eighth largest steel producer in the world, and ninth of iron, the Polish merchant and navy marines were built literally out of nothing.
76 The reform was vital since 64 per cent of the population lived off the land.
The Polish Republic was about half the size of the Commonwealth in 1772; in 1920 it had a population of 27 million, but only 69 per cent were Poles. The Polish state that revived in 1918 was a nation-state; while the Commonwealth nation had been open to all nationalities, now the nation was based on linguistic, religious and cultural characteristics. The Germans, Jews and Ruthene were expected to assimilate, and assimilation was last thing they wanted. Developments in the Ruthene’s national identity and their national movement aimed at establishing a nation-state, were marked by the change in phrasing, the old name ‘the Ruthene’ was replaced by the new one ‘the Ukrainian’. In 1930 a Ukrainian national organization funded from Germany began a campaign of sabotage, to which the authorities responded with ten weeks of military action; calm returned until 1939 when the followers of this movement re-emerged as a German fifth-column (ibid., p. 344). Relations with the German minority were peaceful but no more cordial as the numerous Volksdeutsche felt little or no loyalty to Poland. The age-old Polish-Jewish symbiosis decomposed during the partitions. In the Commonwealth, the Jews had fitted well into the political, economic and cultural framework; after the partitions they found themselves in direct economic competition with the impoverished gentry and the urban dwellers. This new pattern of coexistence was transferred into the Polish Republic; furthermore, the economic hardships of the 1930s had a negative impact on the mutual relationship. The majority of Jews were caught in a poverty trap: in 1931 they made up 62 per cent of all those involved in trade, but with development of peasant co-operatives aimed at selling produce directly to buyers, the livelihood of successive Jewish families vanished (ibid., p. 346). On the other hand, in 1931, 46 per cent of all lawyers and nearly 50 per cent of all doctors were Jews (ibid.), and this fact fuelled the envy of the upwardly mobile social categories. The hostility and resentment expressed by the latter was utilized by the National Democrats, who were by now losing their identity along with their membership, and had began to reinvent themselves around anti-Semitism.

In the face of German resentment and Russian reluctance to be pushed back eastwards when it was clear that the war was likely, Poland expended maximum diplomatic efforts to make itself secure. In 1932, a non-aggression pact was signed with the Soviet Union; in 1934 a ten-year non-aggression pact was signed with Hitler. On the other hand, in April 1939, a full military alliance was signed by Britain, France and Poland. On 1st September 1939 the Wehrmacht invaded Poland from the west, north, and south, on 17 September the Red Army invaded Poland from the east: a new partition of Poland had been accomplished.

3.2 The trauma of the Second World War

For Poland the Second World War would inexorably constitute a turning point of similar magnitude to the partitions. Following the 1st September 1939 the biological survival of Polish citizens was threatened by the policy of planned extermination introduced by the Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union. Hidden from the outside
world, both occupying powers conducted parallel massacres ‘a third of the educated elite’\textsuperscript{79} were “liquidated” and, in all, \textbf{six million} Poles lost their lives, half of them Jews slaughtered in concentration camps.’ (Webster’s New World Encyclopedia 1992, p. 891-892). Both the Germans and the Russians were, above all, executing the elites of Polish society – university professors, schoolteachers, engineers and other specialists, military officers, administrators, writers, clergy, etc. If not slain immediately they were sent to forced labour in the Third Reich, to German concentration and death camps, or to Soviet Gulag camps or remote republics like Kazakhstan. The Katyn Forest (near Smolensk) witnessed the massacre of 4,231 Polish reserve officers\textsuperscript{80} committed by the Russians who for decades tried to place this on the list of German crimes. From 1939 until 1944, about 750,000 Germans were imported into the areas attached to the Reich, some 2 million Poles were moved out of Reich into the ‘General-Gouvernement’,\textsuperscript{81} while 1.3 million Poles were taken from the ‘General-Gouvernment’ and shipped to the Reich as slave labour (Zamoyski 1994, p. 358). Among the places of mass extinction of the Polish intelligentsia were the Dachau (Germany) and Mauthausen (Austria)\textsuperscript{82} concentration camps, while the Auschwitz Nazi concentration camp\textsuperscript{83} – located on the Polish territory occupied by the Nazi Germany – has become a symbol of the Shoah (Holocaust). Polish occupied territory was made to witness the genocide of, and became the burial ground for, not only almost all Polish but most of European Jewry, as well as the Roma, the other group selected for extinction (Orla-Bukowska 2002:4).

The extermination policy deprived the country of an excessive number of its elites; along with those who fled to the West to escape the communist regime or stayed there in order to save their lives, post-war Poland was left without the majority of its most active and creative citizens. And as a rule, the post-war political leaders did not arise out of the intelligentsia or upper class elites, but out of the lower classes.

The Second World War ended in 1945, but in the Polish case the Red Army that marched into Poland in \textbf{1944} stayed continuously in the country until \textbf{1993}, in its own bases.\textsuperscript{84} The post-war European order that located Poland within the Soviet Union domain was decided by the victorious powers, however, ‘Stalin was master of the situation and proceeded to state his case with force at the Yalta Conference in February and at Potsdam in July. There was hard bargaining over who should form the interim government in Poland, with Stalin putting forward his men, and Churchill and Roosevelt urging the inclusion of political leaders from London. … The bargaining … was, in fact, academic. Behind the Red Army came Stalin’s secret police, the NKVD, and with it the new Polish security services’ (Zamoyski 1994, p. 260).

\textsuperscript{79} The Polish historians say about a half of the elite.
\textsuperscript{80} Altogether some 10,000 reserve officers, who before the war were university professors, lawyers, doctors, and other highly qualified specialists, were murdered in the USSR in 1940.
\textsuperscript{81} The Germans incorporated Pomerania, Silesia and Posnania into the Reich, while the remainder of their conquest was designated as the General-Gouvernment.
\textsuperscript{82} Located near Linz, Mauthausen had 58 branches, and, in just in one of them, namely Gusen, some 123,000 people lost their lives. Among other main German concentration camps in which Poles died were: Buchenwald, Gross-Rosen, Ravensbruck, Stutthof, and Sachsenhausen-Oranienburg.
\textsuperscript{83} In point of fact ‘Auschwitz I had been established as the Nazis’ instrument to subjugate the Poles into serfdom – an enslavement the Poles rightly interpreted as the initial step to a “Final Solution” to a Polish problem’ (Dwork and van Pelt 1994, p. 241).
\textsuperscript{84} On 17 January 1945 the Red Army marched into the ruins of Warsaw and within a couple of months the whole of Poland was in Soviet hands.’ (Zamoyski 1994, p. 369).
Agreements achieved at Yalta and Potsdam conferences prevented the establishment of a sovereign Polish state, and the country became a Soviet Union satellite until the beginning of the 1990s. The Polish eastern frontier was established on the Curzon Line, the country lost 181,350 sq km in the east to the USSR but gained 101,000 sq km in the west from Germany. The westward shift of the country had been portrayed, by subsequent governments, as a return to the cradle of the Polish state, settled there by the first dynasty of Polish kings, the Piasts.

This westward shift caused, however, the mass deportations of population in this part of Europe. About 3.5 million Germans either fled or were removed, their place was taken by Poles – 2.2 million persons returning from slave labour and concentration camps in Germany, and 1.5 million persons ousted from the eastern territories taken over by the Soviet Union (ibid., p. 370). It is worth noting that, altogether, the Second World War deportation and migration involved over 25 million people on Polish territory (Pogonowski 1993, p. 216). These mass population shifts have resulted in a persistent syndrome of loss on the part of both Poles and Germans.

The trauma of the Second World War and its aftermath significantly influenced Polish attitudes towards the country’s western European allies, perceived by subsequent Polish generations as those who had betrayed Poland. The country was abandoned despite its input into the defeat of Nazi Germany: Poles had fought on every anti-fascist front between 1939 and 1945 as soldiers of the legitimate government of the Polish Republic. The experience of abandonment – firstly in 1939, secondly in 1945 – remembered as betrayal may, to some extent, explain the disillusioned, sober and realistic rather than enthusiastic attitude towards the EU and Poland’s accession to it, displayed by many members of Polish society.

3.3 Poland under communist rule

Like the events, briefly presented above, the communist rule also marks an important period in the history of the Polish state. The post-war (Second World War) political order began on 22nd July 1944 when the so called Polish Committee of the National Liberation was established on the eastern territories already occupied by the Red Army. The introduction of communist rule under the auspices of the Kremlin was supported by a military presence of the Red Army and the Soviet secret police (NKVD) that soon helped to establish its Polish counterpart (UB). Those who had served in Polish forces abroad and returned were mostly shot. The Russian Marshal Rokossovsky was put in charge of the Polish army, staffed throughout by Russian officers. Tens of thousands of the Home Army members along with former officers, landowners, political activists were jailed, tortured and often murdered. The Polish Peoples Republic (PRL) was proclaimed only in the 1950s after the civil war.

85 600,000 Polish soldiers who had fled to the West fought together with the allied forces on the western front hoping to enter Poland from the west, while the Home Army of up to 300,000 fighters operating in occupied Poland and directly subordinated to the Polish Government in-Exile (in London) was tying down up to 930,000 German forces (Pogonowski 1993, p. 204).
86 Since 1939 the legitimate Polish government was in exile in France, and after the 1940 capitulation of France it remained in office in London until 1991.
87 The Polish Communist Party had never been a significant force on the interwar political scene. It was formally banned and, in 1938, several activists ‘disappeared’ into the USSR and never ‘reappeared.’ Only those jailed in the Polish Republic survived and formed the postwar Party, hence constituting the country’s political leaders after 1945.
1947) had come to an end. Forced imposition of the Soviet Union’s puppet government triggered off military resistance, which was answered by the regime with the massive combat and deportations to the USSR. Nevertheless, thousands of opponents gathered and fought in the underground military organizations (among others the Home Army, and the Freedom and Independence). It was also at this time that the Ukrainian Uprising Army (UPA), which aimed to establish an independent Ukrainian state in south-eastern Poland, continued its ethnic cleansing of Poles that had begun during the Second World War. To deprive the UPA of a local supply base the government commanded the mass deportation of ethnic Ukrainians from southeastern Poland and their resettlement in the northern and western regions newly granted from Germany. Current strained relationships between Poles and Ukrainians are to some extent shaped by the bitter memories, recollected by both sides, of these events.

During and after the civil war, political crimes turned out to mean basically ‘treason’ against the puppet government and communist rule, and trials that followed purged anti-communist and, to a lesser extent, anti-Jewish Poles. This stood in a sheer contrast with the Home Army’s stand which formerly – during the Second World War – had carried out executions of those collaborating with the either enemy (the Germans and the Soviets), including those who had handed over Jews. Nevertheless, the post-war newsreels showed the 1946 funeral of Jews killed in Kielce massacre; furthermore, Poles who had collaborated with the Germans – including those who had taken part in the Jedwabne and other wartime massacres of Jews – were rapidly tried and sentenced. As elsewhere, the Shoah actually began to enter public discourse in Poland in the wake of the Eichmann trial in 1961. Only since the 1970s, but especially the 1980s, has the unspeakable increasingly become presented and discussed; it was relatively recently that France tried Petain; Browning, Goldhagen, and Rosmus have delved into the guilt of ‘ordinary Germans’ (Orla-Bukowska 2002). Poles have also begun to debate not only the valiant hero, but also the unwilling witness, the helpless and sometimes pitiless bystander, and the perpetrator. It is, however, less problematic to accept the representations of the Shoah in Poland than of Poland in the Shoah. Libellous Western references to ‘Polish’ – as if they were not German – death camps, and to ‘Polish anti-Semitism’ as the reason for the Shoah would be defensively – though ineffectually – countered by citing the fact that only in occupied Poland was a German death penalty imposed for all involved in lending assistance to a Jew. Nevertheless, thousands of Poles – more than any other nationals – are recognised by Yad Vashem as Righteous Gentiles.

The Seym was nominally a superior representative power in PRL, however, until 1989 it was the Polish United Workers Party (PZPR) that enjoyed a real power (transmitted to it by Kremlin). It is worth noting that despite forced registration in some areas and workplaces, the number of the Polish United Workers Party

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88 During the war the UPA’s ethnic cleansing of Poles led to looting and burning of Polish villages and the slaughter of some 50,000 men, women and children in Volhynia, a region which is now part of the Ukrainian Republic.
89 The Home Army also supplied the Jewish resistance with arms before and during the uprising in the Warsaw ghetto; a special commission of assistance set up by the Home Army in 1942 saved the lives of 10,000 Jews (Zamoyski 1994, p. 361).
90 The bitter irony was that it would be economically facile for Germany to establish its ghettos and death camps on the land where an estimated 3.5 million Jews comprised the largest Jewish community in Europe.
members\(^{91}\) oscillated around 3 million people, and never reached even half the level of circa 10 million, which Solidarity would win in its brief 16-month official existence in 1980-1981. Thus, the 'peoples democracy' became a legally confirmed fiction. Three critical phases identified in the history of the Polish Peoples Republic were: the establishment of communist rule in years 1944-1948; the period of the Stalinist terror (1948-1956); and a period of hegemony of the indigenous apparatus (1956-1989) (Davies 1992, p. 687).

Poland re-appeared after the Second World War not only with 6 million of its civilians murdered and over 500,000 fighting men and women killed, its borders shifted, its socio-political system supervised by the Red Army bases, but also with 40 per cent of its national wealth destroyed. The reconstruction of the ruined country mobilized the whole nation; a spectacular example provided by the rebuilding of Warsaw – which had been 99% destroyed during and immediately after the Warsaw Uprising of August-September 1944\(^{92}\) – that mobilized masses of volunteers. Significant human ‘capital’ was, however, wasted; the economic order based on the deprivation of the private property rights did not secure economic development, despite the mass inflow of manpower from villages to cities and industrial centres. The so called ‘nationalization’ of private assets led to the mass confiscations of factories and real estate; further, in the late 1940s, the peasants were given land that formerly belong to the landowners.\(^{93}\) The development of a huge heavy industry sector was the result of the Cold War policy of militarism, in which the whole economy was set on military goals.

State communism constituted a foreign experience for the Polish nation. This episode was not just another stage in the history of the Polish state. Communism was introduced and safeguarded by a foreign power from 1945 to 1989, and upheld by its Polish protégés aimed at negating and annihilating the history of the Polish state. In their attempts to do so subsequent communist governments tried to enforce their vision of the country’s history, focusing on 22 July 1944 as a real breakthrough date (e.g., “Our homeland is now 40 years old!” proclaimed 1984 propaganda).

### 3.4 The Polish Roman Catholic Church

The partitions had pulled the Polish province of the Roman Catholic Church to pieces, the Papacy, entangled in European diplomacy, did not support it, and all three partition powers took measures against the Polish church hierarchy; two of the partition powers, Orthodox Russia and Protestant Prussia, also took specific measures against the Roman Catholic faith. The Polish peasants were particularly incensed by attacks on the faith with which they associated themselves even more than with the nation, and throughout the nineteenth century the village priests were the peasants’ closest advisers. Less so than in Italy, where a feeling of belonging to one nation fully emerged only in the late nineteenth century and a united state was created despite and in opposition to the Vatican, and more like the case in Ireland where Roman Catholicism and the Roman Catholic Church early defined Irishness vis-à-vis

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\(^{91}\) A disproportionate number of the Party members were Polish Jews who owed their lives to the USSR, to which they had escaped, running from death under the German occupation.

\(^{92}\) After the Uprising was defeated, German commandos methodologically and systematically blew up building after building.

\(^{93}\) The collectivization campaign that followed had been fiercely, and successfully, resisted by peasants.
Englishness, during the partitions, Poland’s Roman Catholic Church became the bearer of Polishness. Under strong pressure to Germanize and Russify and with their language banned, Poles sheltered their culture in religious songs and prayers expressed in churches. The clergy became proponents and leaders of, and even fighters for, Polish independence, and in 1918 the Roman Catholic Church strongly supported an independent, but weak Polish state. This pattern of supporting the Polish state by the Polish Roman Catholic Church would repeat itself during the dual occupation of the Second World War, and the years of the Polish People Republic.

During the German and Soviet occupations, the Polish Roman Catholic Church suffered along with the rest of the population. Like the members of the general population, the clergy were arrested, imprisoned, tortured, and killed. Although one could argue that such help was insufficient, many convents and parishes hid Jewish children, under threat of death for all involved. The heroism of many priests during the war led the Polish Roman Catholic Church to be seen, once again, as a symbolic defender of Polishness. After 1945 the Polish Roman Catholic Church became a deadly enemy and a subject of permanent persecution by the communist apparatus, aware that it had always supported the state’s independence and sovereignty. The ruling communist party adopted a strategy of gradual elimination of the Roman Catholic Church from public life. In the 1950s it was deprived of its assets, many priests faced persecution, and religious classes in schools were abolished. Nevertheless, the Church contributed significantly to the downfall of communism in Poland. The election in 1978 of Cardinal Karol Wojtyła as Pope John Paul II strengthened the Church position vis-à-vis the communist state, also at that time the opposition elite of all branches almost unanimously declared their appreciation of the Church. Contemporary critics of the Roman Catholic Church focus on its presumed engagement in politics, and its affect on people’s choices, the latter accusation relating to the issue of abortion and contraception. Noticeable, gradual change in the religiosity of Poles indicates the increasing secularization, nevertheless, some 90 per cent of the population declares its affiliation to Roman Catholicism.

The Polish Roman Catholic Church, unlike the Polish state, has continuously been present in the Polish territories providing moral support, giving a feeling of safety, and guarding patterns of behaviour. Its role in shaping and preserving the Polish national identity – a vital part of which has constituted the religious identity, especially the case among the lower social classes – has always been crucial. Today, the Polish Roman Catholic Church is still perceived as a reservoir that preserves the memory, tradition and values that constitute the core of Polishness. In current nationwide discussion on the European enlargement process the Church hierarchy unanimously approves and supports the Polish accession to the EU. A meeting between Gunther Verheugen and the head of the Polish Catholic Church hierarchy cardinal Józef Glemp on 18 November 2001 in Brussels and their discussion of the Polish accession only demonstrates the Church’s stance.

3.5. The Solidarity period

1980 was the culmination of the chain of previous upheavals of 1956, 1968, 1970, and 1976 in post-war Poland, that led to a build-up of opposition. It took an organized form in 1975 when the amendments to the constitution stating ‘a brotherhood between PRL and USSR’ were introduced. The group of oppositionists established the Workers
Defence Committee (KOR) with the mission to defend human and civil rights of the persecuted workers involved in the 1976 protest in Radom. Despite a permanent surveillance and terror launched by secret police, the opposition leaders intensified their activity internally and externally. The decisive moment in the crystallization of the opposition movement was the establishment of the Solidarity Independent Trade Union in August 1980. This time the workers took a political initiative supported and helped by intellectuals, and history did not repeat itself – the government was unable to put down this protest as it had those of 1956, 1968, 1970 and 1976. What made a difference was the nationwide coordination of the local workers’ protests, and the preparation of a common list of the demands, addressed to the authorities. In effect the ‘Solidarity’ trade union was established by the representatives of the local workers’ protest committees from all over the country.

The following factors – the election of the Pope John Paul II, the first papal visit to Poland in 1979 stimulating the moral, religious and national revival, and the establishment of Solidarity – all shook the Poles at the beginning of 1980s. In particular during the papal visit – when for the first time in history, public television transmitted a holy mass, the national and religious symbols were present everywhere, and the mass media reported the visit substantially – Poles became aware of their strength, and their implicit solidarity vis-à-vis the regime. ‘The emergence of Solidarity could be understood as a mounting point of a very long process. This is an organization of spontaneous movement fighting for a national revival. The seeds of change have been planted in very fertile soil a long time ago and have grown thanks to the warmth emanating from the Polish Pope. The symbols and motives of this organization have both a patriotic and a religious character’ (Davies 1992, p.804).

This nation-wide spontaneous movement was brought to an end in December 1981 when the communist regime proclaimed martial law, which lasted until 1983. The Solidarity leaders were interned; the streets were patrolled by armed soldiers and tanks. In the mid-1980s the Soviet policy of ‘glasnost’ and ‘perestrojka’ began to shape the Polish regime’s policy and a more positive climate for change emerged. The Round Table talks, during which the communists invited the opposition to discuss the future of the country, initiated the change. The most fundamental Round Table agreement was an introduction of the semi-democratic procedure of parliamentary elections in June 1989, an election which resulted in the defeat of the communist party candidates. This paved the way for the establishment of the first almost sovereign cabinet in Poland, after 1945, led by Tadeusz Mazowiecki. This was a signal for other Central-Eastern European nations. Shortly after the Polish elections, the Hungarians dissolved their communist party and began a series of reforms that led to the declaration of independence from the Soviet bloc. The Czechs brought down the rule of their party, and soon after that the people of Eastern Germany threw out their communist leaders and tore down the Berlin Wall. Thus six months after the election in Poland in June 1989 the Yalta system was dismantled in central Europe.

In January 1990, the Republic of Poland was officially proclaimed and the Polish People’s Republic (PRL) ceased to exist, along with its symbol: the eagle stripped of a crown. Leszek Balcerowicz initiated a radical departure from central planning and introduced a market economy. The Polish zloty became a convertible currency. The tough process of economic transformation continued. At the end of 1992, the industrial output and gross domestic product were much smaller than in 1989; the budget deficit
reached a level of 6 per cent of GDP. In order to balance the budget, the subsequent cabinets were forced to cut social policy spending, including education, health care, etc., which triggered social protests. Growing unemployment made the situation worse. In 1990, a process of privatization of state companies was implemented and is being continued to this day (see: Albert). For over a decade, Poland has been perceived as a country which has accomplished some economic successes and obeys the rule of law in its political life. Subsequent cabinets have continued the Balcerowicz macroeconomic policy. Despite many economic problems affecting the lives of many Poles, there is an acceptance of the free market economy. The key challenge now is to increase economic growth and reduce unemployment.

After 1990, the political scene has been subject to constant transformation. The right wing parties have multiplied themselves and divided, whereas the left is consolidating and changing its image. However, Polish foreign policy has steadily been determined by the will to join the European Union and Germany is perceived as an advocate of Polish aspirations to become a member of the EU. As to the relationship with Russia, subsequent Polish cabinets have tried to keep relations at the level of respect of mutual sovereignty and an equal status in international relations. The relationships with Byelarus, Ukraine and Lithuania are marked by a policy of partnership. Due to its location and historic past, Poland has tried to promote the aspirations of Lithuania and Ukraine to become members of European Union. Finally, the relationships with the Czech Republic and Slovakia could be treated as an example of a model cooperation between the countries that have followed similar economic and political paths.

4. Dominant Discourses of Nationhood

The concept ‘nation’ has been one of the main themes of the Polish political thought from the nineteenth century onwards. The Polish research on ‘nation’ introduces a number of definitions and approaches. There are, however, two general approaches, one defines a ‘nation’ as an outcome of historical processes, the other emphasizes a structural character of the notion, identifying features which make a given social group the nation. The definitions that frame the contemporary analysis and academic discussion on the concept of nation are: Florian Znaniecki’s (1882-1958) interpretation of a ‘nation’ as a society based upon a national culture; Stanislaw Ossowski’s (1897-1963) understanding of a ‘nation’ as a social group, which accepts given patterns of social bondage, and has a homeland that unites its members; and Jerzy Wiatr’s – a contemporary sociologist’s – perception of a ‘nation’ as a historic community established on the basis of common historical experience, a common type of economy and a common vision of political structures. Also, the concept of the ‘national will’, referring to the heritage of the gentry democracy, is present in the discourse of Polish national identity. The plurality of definitions reflects a complexity of the development of the Polish nation and state. Phrasing this distinct pattern of the state and nation development in one sentence one could say: from the state to the nation, and from the nation to the state (Szacka, 2002), with the partition as a decisive turning point.

During the Jagiellonian dynasty and the Commonwealth it was the state that created the Polish nation, Polishness was not an ethnic category and the concept of ‘nation’ had not been based upon the ethnic or religious affinities. The Third May Constitution of 1791 – never implemented due to the partitions it directly triggered– aimed at the full integration
of peasants and town dwellers into the nation. The loss of independence and the possibility to follow the country’s own distinct path resulted in a separation of a nation from a political community.

4.1 Two main discourses on the Polish nation: the Romantic and the Positivist one

At the beginning of the nineteenth century the nation was divided among the three powers, and suffering also because it was forsaken – the cries for justice addressed to the European powers were answered with silence – looked to poets to make sense of things, and the latter evolved into the role of the spiritual leaders. The messianic image of the Romantic poet, Adam Mickiewicz, that Poland had been crucified in the cause of righteousness, and that this would expiate the political sins and lead to resurrection, gave hope and offered a form of healing. The faith in Poland’s martyrdom and sacrifices endowed reality with sense, and saved the people from total despair.

The Romantic idea of the Polish nation was underpinned by an implicit assumption that it would be possible to combine a nation-state with a multiethnic society. The assumption rested on the perception of nation as composed of all ethnic groups, which formed the Commonwealth. As Joachim Lelewel put it: ‘Do not segregate the sons of Poland. It does not matter whether they speak Russian, Polish or Lithuanian or they pledge other religions, you should treat them as brothers since they fight arm in arm with against the oppressors of the people’ (J. Lelewel, ‘Address and political writings’, as cited in: Walicki 1991, p. 47). This perception of a nation, in general, and the Polish nation in particular, became a subject of critique in the third decade of the nineteenth century when the French concept of nation began to prevail in Polish political discourse. The French concept presupposed a unifying role of the state in nation-building, and thus viewed the nation-state as a homogeneous unit.

In the last three decades of the nineteenth century a new ideology opposed to Romanticism evolved among the intelligentsia, this time heralded not by the poets but the journalists and writers. Known as ‘organic work and progress’ it drew upon the works of August Comte, John S. Mill, Charles Darwin, and replaced the Romantic concept of the nation as a spirit with the concept of the nation as an organism. It viewed the downfall of the Commonwealth as the inevitable effect of the inefficiency of its political institutions and the blindness of its citizens; the prescription for progress offered was an ‘organic work’ in economic and social spheres. The Romantic ethos of fighting for independence was criticised by the Positivists as an ethos that deepened the psychological inability of the Polish elite to encourage the process of economic modernization of an economically backward country, to the extent allowed by the partition powers. The programme of organic work made a considerable impact on the society affecting everyday life, education and economic activity; the shortcoming of Positivism was, however, its failure to provide people with the hope they needed for the restoration of the state.

94 In fact this programme drew upon the Protestant ethic of work.
4.2. The development of Polish national identity

The main feature of the nation-building processes in western Europe constituted a conviction of belonging to a civil state. The concept of the nation-state that developed in the nineteenth century encompassed both the loyalty to the state, and the identification with the dominant group culture. The identification with the nation and the state were two sides of the same coin. The nation-building process in central and eastern Europe evolved within the different political circumstances as the nations of this part of Europe were engulfed by the multinational Empires.

As in other cases, the Polish national identity developed over centuries. After 1794 (the third and final partition) the Poles for the first time realized that certain sections of the society stood aside, and this raised a question: were the Ruthene, Lithuanian and Jewish population ‘Polish’? Consequently, a discussion on the nation and national identity followed. Besides, the historical events – in the first place the uprisings, and the colonization attempts made by the partition powers known as the ‘Germanization’ and ‘Russification’ – decisively influenced the development of Polish national identity in the nineteenth century. In effect, national identity was much better developed, and distributed among the various social strata in the beginning of the twentieth century than at the time of the partitions (Kieniewicz 1982).

The structure and ‘intensity’ of national identity varied not only from one epoch to the other, but also from one social group to the other, and from one region to the other. That is why historians have acknowledged the impossibility of producing a coherent model of national identity development that could be applied to Polish society as a whole. The complexity of these developments necessitates focusing on a given social group. The gentry, the intelligentsia, and to a much lesser extent, the capital class, set the core of national identity that drew upon the gentry ethos; it comprised individualism, liberty, courtesy, chivalry, and also became attractive for the other social strata. On the whole, religion was the core of the peasants’ national identity; as a rule it was Roman Catholicism for the Polish peasants, and Orthodox or Greek Catholicism for the Ruthenian and the Byelorussian peasants. The urban, ethnically Polish, population (basically craftsmen) assumed their national identity that meant loyalty to the state (the Commonwealth) prior to the partitions, and just revealed it during the partitions (e.g.: by supporting uprisings). On the other hand, the newly developing social strata, the workers, reacted in different ways to the state revival issue, and this corresponded with the ethnic and social backgrounds of a given person. There were differences between attitudes adopted by the workers originating from craftsmen and peasant families and those of Polish, German, or Jewish origin. However, with the passage of time differences among the workers’ attitudes regarding the state revival became blurred, and they joined the subsequent political and military movements. This involvement was, however, driven by the evolution of the working class political movement both in Poland and Europe (see: Tomaszewski 1991, p.10-21).

The revitalization of Polish national identity at the beginning of the twentieth century was augmented by the nationalist movement, that led to the formation of the National Democracy movement led by Roman Dmowski, and the socialist movement led by Józef Pilsudski. The independent Polish nation-state was an axiom and the common platform for both parties which, however, differed in the understanding of a nation itself. The nationalists opted for the interpretation of a nation as a separate ethnic
group, which has an indispensable right to organize itself into a political community, i.e. the state within the territory inherited from the ancestors. Thus a nation was defined in terms of a cultural and linguistic community, and from that followed the idea of assimilating the non-Polish speaking communities. This meant a departure from the Romantic vision of the Polish nation; the party leader, Roman Dmowski when commenting on the Romantic concept of the Polish nation argued that: ‘we differ from other nations by the fact that we celebrate defeats whereas other nations celebrate victories’ (see: Dmowski 1925). He was convinced that ‘there is no room for right and wrong in international relations but for power and weakness’, and that Realpolitik forms a system of rules in international relations. The nationalist party upheld the absolute priority of the state interest over the individual freedoms.

The other party saw the nation as a community based upon a common perception of history and culture, and united (but not unified) by the state in one political community; such a perception embraced all ethnic groups living in the territory dominated by one of them, where all become citizens of one state, while keeping their national distinctiveness. As seen, this interpretation was a direct continuation of the gentry democracy tradition. In the 1980s Solidarity, which had adopted the Romantic vision of the nation, was perceived as the heir to the best traditions of the gentry democracy. As Walicki (1991, p. 35) pointed out: ‘All national meaning of Solidarity was an outcome of subconscious acceptance of traditionally Polish and archaic understanding of nation as a huge family community, based on shared system of values, being able to control its own fate.’

Thus, in modern Polish history the two alternative views of the nation clashed and collided: the Romantic one that drew upon the practice and tradition of the Commonwealth and its civic and territorial interpretation of the nation (also known as the Jagiellonian idea); and the nationalist one that developed only in the nineteenth century when the state did not exist and which perceived the nation as an ethnic and cultural whole. These two interpretations were tried out in a short period (altogether twenty years) of state independence in the twentieth century, i.e. during the Polish Republic (1918-1939); the latter interpretation prevailed in the 1930s. Recent history (since Solidarity) shows that the former interpretation now prevails. Hence, as has been seen, the development of the Polish nation and national identity challenges Anthony Smith’s\(^5\) two ideal types of nation-building process in Europe: an ethnic-cultural one, characteristic of eastern Europe, and a civic-territorial one, specific to the western parts of Europe. If we situate Poland in eastern Europe we need to exclude – in order to validate the model – a substantive part of the country’s history and political tradition that is still alive, that of the Commonwealth. In order to recount Poland’s history and still validate the model we may perceive Poland as a country that followed the western Europe way (to the extent that it was allowed to do so by the neighbouring powers, i.e.: until 1791) however, for some this interpretation may be untenable. Thus, a possible solution that both validates the model and recounts Poland’s history is that in the Polish case the western (the Commonwealth model) and

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\(^{55}\) A. Smith defines a ‘nation’ as a human population sharing a historic territory, common myths, historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy, and common legal rights for all members, and is based on one or more ethnic groups; and an ‘ethnic group’ as consisting of a myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more differentiating elements of a common culture, an association with a common homeland and a sense of solidarity.
the eastern way (the nationalist model) of the nation-building processes have overlapped.

5. National Minorities in Poland: ‘Us’ and ‘Others’

The twentieth century witnessed the dynamic development of the relationships between the dominant group and national minority\(^{96}\) groups in Poland. Firstly, the WWI fuelled the national and ethnic revival process in north-eastern Europe, the Byelarussians, the Ukrainians, the Lithuanians, the Estonians, the Latvians, the Finns all with the aim of reviving or building their states. From the above list, the Ukrainians and Byelarussians failed to establish their nation-states, having been incorporated into the Soviet Union and their frontiers were set in 1921, by the Treaty of Ryga that ended the Polish-Bolshevik war of 1919-1921. Secondly, the Treaty set the standards for the minority policy in the Polish Republic (1918-1939), acknowledging the non-Polish populations to be the integral components of the Polish state. The constitution of 1921 adopted a set of laws securing minority rights, that followed the basic assumption that: ‘Each citizen is entitled to maintain his national identity and language. Specific laws secure all the minorities living in Poland full and free development of their national distinctiveness’ (quoted after: Tomaszewski 1991, p. 24). The law addressed a crucial social issue since 30 per cent of the Polish Republic population was constituted by substantial national minorities: the Ukrainians, the Germans, the Jews, and smaller groups formed the Byelarussians, the Lithuanians, the Russians, the Slovaks, the Czechs, the Tatars, and the Roma people. Apart from national and ethnic minorities there were also the folk populations who did not identify themselves with any nationalities, and called themselves the ‘indigenous’ people having been living in a certain place since time immemorial. They spoke the local dialects, which were actually mixtures of different languages, and lived in the eastern provinces of Poland.

Table 1: The ethnic structure in Poland in 1931 (approximation according to J. Tomaszewski 1991, p. 23)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byelarussians</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanians</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The relationships between the dominant and minority groups in the Polish Republic was jeopardized not only by the failure of the Ukrainian and Byelarussians national aspirations but also by class and economic relations. The Ukrainians and Byelarussians were overwhelmingly of the peasant background and, hence, in their case the ethno and the class tensions with the dominant group overlapped. The majority of Jews, who spoke

\(^{96}\) The national minority is understood as a social category made of those citizens who differ from the majority in respect to their ethnic or national identity and frequently religion and language.
mainly Yiddish rather than Polish, and often dressed differently were extraordinarily conspicuous and thus were often perceived as those who wish to separate themselves. They were no less conspicuous in their economic relationship to the rest of the population (see above). The economic tensions that built up during the economic hardships of the 1930s worsened the relationships between the dominant and minority groups exposing the latter groups to the racist cleavages. Hence, in 1932 the Parliament adopted a law that penalized religious, linguistic and national discrimination. At the political level, the right-wing parties opposed the law, while the social democratic parties made political alliances with the minorities (Tomaszewski 1991). These parties were the advocates, and thus heirs, of the Jagiellonian idea, arguing a need for a federation of the nations that formed the Commonwealth, the Poles, the Lithuanians, and the Ukrainians.

After the Second World War, the Shoah, the mass deportations, and the westward shift of frontiers changed the country’s ethnic structure. In the 1930s, Poland was inhabited by 12 million people of another nationality. In 1954, there were only 650,000 of them (Kwilecki 1963). The approximation of data related to ethnic differentiation is very general since statistical data do not provide the nationality of Polish citizens. It is estimated that national minorities constitute 2.5 per cent of the overall number of Polish citizens. The number includes 360,000 Germans, 300,000 Ukrainians, 240,000 Byelarussians, 240,000 Romas and 10,000 Jews (see: Borowka).

Ukrainians

Ukrainians live in dispersed communities in various regions of Poland. After 1989 and the establishment of the independent Ukrainian state in 1991, which Poland was the first country to recognise, the profile of the Ukrainian minority’s activities changed from merely cultural to political and economic ones. According to research, Poles evince more sympathy towards the Russians than towards the Ukrainians, and the only population disliked more than Ukrainians are the Roma. A negative stereotype towards Ukrainians seems to persist despite efforts by the Polish mass media to change it. The history of the Polish-Ukrainian conflicts dating back to the seventeenth century still overshadow current relationships. However, the enthusiastic applause by the audience of Ukrainians and Poles for the Pope’s moving appeal, made during his visit to Lwów in 2001, for reconciliation and forgiveness gives some hope for the future. For the time being an intense, model co-operation at the state level is accompanied by some reluctance displayed at the level of personal and social contacts.

Germans

The Germans have been settling in Polish territory for centuries, playing an important role in political, economic, and social life; they have enjoyed a reputation for being well organized, but aggressive and expansive. At present, the German minority, as only one of several national minorities, has its parliamentary representation in Poland. While on the one hand, Germany is perceived as the advocate of Polish aspirations to become a full member of the EU, on the other there is concern that Germans will buy-out the land lost in Potsdam. As in the Ukrainian case the intense, model co-operation at the state level is still accompanied by a reluctance displayed at the level of personal and social contacts.
Byelarussians

Despite its size, the Byelarussian minority has never caused a problem to the authorities nor attracted major social attention. The relationships with this minority have generally been good and relaxed. In recent times, the regime of Aleksander Lukashenka has introduced the ‘Cold War like’ climate in the Polish-Byelarussian state relationship. These relations have been worsened by the support of the Polish government and society for the Byelarussian opposition; for its part, the Byelarussian minority has also organized the Byelarussian press and radio stations in Poland, supporting in this way their compatriots in Byelarussia.

Jews

The Polish-Polish Jewish relationship is unique in many respects. Although Jews were not the largest pre-war minority, they were more evenly spread across the country and therefore more likely to come into contact with non-Jewish citizens. Since the Shoah reduced the number of Polish Jews from some 10 per cent to a fraction of percentage, stereotypes carved over centuries of coexistence are now more frequently applied, and mostly – though not exclusively – in their negative form, than judgments based on real experience. A major sociological study (Krzeminski 1996) identifies two kinds of anti-Semitism in Poland. The traditional, religious anti-Judaic form, confined mostly to the elderly and under-educated rural population, is disappearing; the modern, socio-political form known worldwide – envisioning a Jewish conspiracy of economic and political power – has supplanted it, at levels comparable to others in Europe. It is also 'manifested in declared attitudes rather than in overt behaviour (as opposed to e.g., France and Germany)' (ibid., p. 303).

Romas

Romas are the focus of the most negative emotions that the Poles show to national minorities. The Polish mass media provides examples of xenophobia and chauvinism displayed towards the Romas (Nowicka 2001). Romas are perceived negatively across Europe, including in neighbouring Slovakia and the Czech Republic.

97 For instance, ‘In April [2000] the Holocaust memorial in... Thessaloniki to the 50,000 Jewish inhabitants deported and murdered during the Nazi era was desecrated. On the same day swastikas were drawn on the walls of the Monastirion Synagogue in the city. … Five months previously, similar graffiti had appeared on the walls of the synagogue in Chalkis, Eubea.’ http://www.tau.ac.il/Anti-Semitism/asw99-2000/greece.htm.
PART II

6. Poland in Europe

In the year 1989 – the annus mirabilis – the Yalta system dismantled. Poland could finally exercise full sovereignty over its internal and foreign policy. The re-definition of Polish foreign policy took a form of support for the establishment of an all-European peace and security system based on the Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process, and partnership with democratic nations. At the beginning of the 1990s, foreign policy focused on: the establishment of partnership with re-unified Germany; the creation of an egalitarian relationship with Russia; and on a friendly relationship with the Ukraine. Contemporary Poland puts a special emphasis on regional cooperation. The Weimar Triangle (grouping Poland, Germany and France), and the Vysehrad Group (which includes Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) provide examples of this policy. A very special role in the Polish foreign policy was ascribed to the United States of America. The priority, however, has been attached to the Polish-German relationship, partly due to its place and role in the EU, and the speedy accession to the EU has been perceived as being in the Polish national interest. For its part, Germany manifests its commitment to assist Poland on its path to the European Union. The signing of the Treaty on Friendly Cooperation and Recognition of Borders marks a new chapter in Polish-German relations.

The Polish-Russian relationship has operated differently. It took some time for Russia to acknowledge that Poland was a sovereign state and needed to establish a relationship with its powerful Eastern neighbour based on the principle of respect for international law. In the first period of the new Polish-Russian relationship after 1989 Poland, while conducting its independent policy towards Russia, had to encourage the Russian troops (which resided in Poland until 1993) to evacuate. The other aspect of this very delicate relationship was the need for re-definition of the economic relationship between Poland and Russia. This was accompanied by a process of disclosing facts related to the Forest Katyn massacre of 1940. The current Polish-Russian relationship focuses on economic issues. After years of political deadlock, it seems that a watershed in the Polish-Russian relationship is becoming a reality.

Along with other nations, Poland has started to play a stabilizing role in the region. Indeed, it would not be possible without a multilateral cooperation undertaken within the realm of the Vysehrad Group. Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary are coordinating their economic policy with the aim of enhancing economic growth and paving the way for speedy accession to the EU. Western European countries have pointed to the Vysehrad Group as an example to be followed by other countries in the region. This cooperation has been important also in the context of the Balkan crisis.

7. Polish images of Europe

After 1945 Poland was forced to become a member of the Eastern block dominated by the USSR. It was the 1989 ‘Autumn of Nations’ that paved the way for re-orientation in Polish politics towards the West again (Illasiewicz 1992). The Solidarity elite took over and launched a policy of close cooperation with Western European institutions. The ‘return to Europe’ concept became the leitmotiv of Polish foreign policy in the early 1990s. The term was put in quotation marks since Poles believe that they have always
formed an integral part of the European West, at times paying the highest price, of their lives, for Europe. The integration with Western European economic and political institutions requires, however, a high social cost that must be paid whenever the adoption of certain of the legal and economic criteria for membership of the EU is involved. The benefits are said to be in the future but the costs of adoption must be paid now, as some Poles admit. This perception of the Polish ‘road to Europe’ suggests the emergence of the two main images of the integrating Europe.

The first image is shaped by the conviction that Europe constitutes an area of partnership and cooperation of civil societies. The second one portrays Europe as sphere of rivalry between nation-states, trying to dominate each other. We can, thus, identify two types of social attitude displayed by Polish society towards European integration, namely the ‘pro-European’ and ‘nationalist’ ones (see Karmowska and Pozarlik). The positive image of European integration stems from a conviction that integration into the EU constitutes a unique opportunity, providing the additional impetus to system transformation; increasing security; enriching the national culture; and strengthening the democratic rule of law in the country (Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, nr 1 and 2, 1996, nr 7, 1997).

The ‘nationalists’, unlike ‘Europeans’ claim that integration into the EU is already leading to negative outcomes for the national economy and in the future would mean a total subjugation to Brussels. Poland should not enter the EU since it would actually mean yet another limitation of national sovereignty – so the ‘nationalists’ keep saying. What, however, constitutes for them the major threat is a loss of national identity as a result of integration with the aggressive cosmopolitanism of the EU.

Let us consider these attitudes in depth. The polarization of attitudes is also manifested in political discourse. The ‘Euroenthusiasts’ or ‘Eurorationalists’ believe that integrating into Europe, as a sphere of economic cooperation based on a free market economy, constitutes an exceptional opportunity to escape from the legacy of communism, at the same time it is an objective necessity compelled by processes of globalization.

Euroenthusiasts insist on speeding up negotiations, mainly on account of an awareness of the scale of challenges related to macroeconomics and social transformation, and a potential turn round in the international situation. There is a lot of emphasis placed on the indispensability of modernizing Polish agriculture, heavy industry and other sectors of the national economy, which have been affected by the disastrous planned economy. In the sphere of political symbolism, they emphasize a fulfilment of a mission undertaken by Solidarity and its postulate to bring peace and justice for all Poles.

Eurorationalists argue that Poland has no choice but to join the common market since this may only guarantee a successful position in the global division of labour. They argue that integration into the EU is somehow a forced decision due to objective necessity to be competitive on international markets. Just as Schuman and De Gasperi coined the European common market in the response to the communist threat, Poland has to respond to the intensification of economic and cultural globalization by joining the most advanced regional integration organization (see Illasiewicz 1991, p. 59). A fear of marginalization and potential economic crisis in the internal market reinforce such an attitude.
Eurorationalists assume a need for prompt and efficient accession negotiations. They point to growing social frustration related to the scale of the social cost of both internal transformation and adaptation to the EU market. It is also very important to keep the public audience informed about the pace and essence of negotiations to avoid the accusation that public opinion is ill-informed. This argument goes back to the need to facilitate a social dialogue as a precondition of full support for accession.

One has to emphasize a national consensus with regard to accession to EU. This is reflected in the parliamentary majority, which has been asserting that a speedy accession to EU is in the Polish national interest. The overwhelming majority of the Polish political elite perceives integration into the EU as an irreversible process (see Illasiewicz 1991, Wesolowski 1995).

The second dominant attitude portrays Europe as an arena in which of nation-states compete for more power in order to impose their will on the weaker states. This attitude is based on Dmowski’s concept of nation-state as a community of ethnic origin. The probable loss of national identity is thus seen as a natural consequence of the hegemonic policy of Brussels, trying to impose its system of values on the weaker nation-states, such as Poland.

Hence, the national identity issue remains an important one in Polish political discourse. Integration into the EU may be seen by some Poles as the repetition of the historical experience of the loss of an independent state. In sum, while the Euroenthusiasts keep repeating that Poland is on its way into Europe, the Eurorationalists argue that Poland has always been in Europe and there is no need to return to Europe, and the Eurosceptics argue that there is nothing to return to.

These attitudes have dominated the discussions in the media, and hence, influence thinking on the European integration process. It needs to be noted that the attitudes mentioned are representative of both politicians and ordinary people.

7.1 Attitudes of Polish society towards European integration

Having signed the Association Agreement in 1991 and submitted an application for EU membership in 1994, Poland has chosen European integration as the driving force of its policy. In the beginning of the 1990s, Polish aspirations to become a member of the EU and of NATO were perceived by society as a guaranteed means of connecting the future development of the country with the affluent and safe Europe, that would finally and definitely close the Yalta chapter in Polish history. Nearly 89 per cent of Poles supported the prompt accession of Poland into the EC (CBOS, January 1992). It should be noted that the level of knowledge about European integration was rather limited at that time. The simple West-East division constituted a point of reference for making declarations about a strategic direction of the Polish politics. The current data complicates this simplistic perception. Here is a summary of a recently published report on that problem:
What would you consider to be the most desirable for development of Poland?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accession into EU</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutrality</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening of economic cooperation with the U.S.</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closer cooperation with Russia</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to say</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: X. Dolinska, Institute for Public Affairs, 2000

As can be seen, the majority of Poles still point to integration into the EU as the most desirable scenario for Poland. However, the level of support decreased significantly when compared with the situation in 1992. The integration scenario is mostly supported by young, well educated and relatively wealthy people. Their support for integration stems from their openness to Western values, and their acceptance of the rules that this implies.

In the debate over the future of Poland there is no other vision of Europe than the EU. Still, there are some, very rare, visions of Europe as a cultural *universum* already constructed, and still open to further construction by the European nations.

### 7.2 Knowledge about integration

It should be emphasized that the knowledge about European integration is still limited and incomplete. It is frequently constructed on the basis of misperceptions and stereotypes. However, Poles have gradually improved their knowledge about integration. Nearly 75 per cent had heard of the EC in 1990. In 1993, the figure was 83 per cent, who acknowledged the fact that EU exists (Eurobarometer No 48). There is a strong correlation between the activity of the mass media in disseminating information about the EU and public knowledge on that topic. The inconsistency in understanding of information produces a ‘mobility’ of opinions, difficult to predict. There is a great deal of confusion in the public perception since Poles cannot make up their minds whether EU integration constitutes a historical opportunity or historical necessity for them. This choice will undeniably influence the outcome of any prospective referendum on membership of the EU. The number of people who declare themselves as ‘sufficiently informed’ about the EU has gradually increased and rose from 18 to 27 per cent between 1998 and 2000 (ISP 2000). However, nearly 70 per cent of population consider themselves to be ‘poorly informed’. The question about an actual list of EU members identifies a real knowledge of respondents. In 1995, only 6 per cent of population was able to name all the members of the EU at that time (CBOS, June, 1995).

Interestingly enough, the Polish accession to the EU is a subject of concern for some 48 per cent of the population. On the other hand, only 7 per cent declared ‘a very strong concern’ whereas nearly 50 per cent expressed their lack of interest (ISP 2000). There are a number of factors strongly correlated to the level of knowledge about the EU. Among the most important ones are education and age. Younger and better educated people know more about the EU. The perception of the benefits and costs is also important. Those who believe that they are going to benefit from European integration are better informed. The main source of information is the mass media, political
statements, the public administration, and schools. However, a lack of coordination in keeping the public informed results in confusion and misperception. Nearly 55 per cent of all those polled declared their family, and their professional milieu constitute their main source of the information. Twenty per cent pointed to television (UKIE-OBOP, 2000). The public television has not yet developed a strategy of information about integration. According to statistics, in November 2000 the two big public stations devoted in total one hour to issue of European integration. The public administration is perceived as a source of information for less than one per cent of the population (UKIE-OBOP, 2000).

The lack of information creates irrational fears and stereotypes. One has to emphasize the insufficient level of knowledge about the complex nature of European integration. The full analysis of this process requires sociological, economic and legal perspectives. Additionally, when analyzing the attitudes of Polish society towards European integration one has to remember the interdependence of systemic transformation evaluation, and European integration. In this situation one has to be very careful in drawing conclusions from the research material selected.

7.3 Support for integration

Nearly 50 per cent of the population expressed their support for Poland’s accession to the EU in March 2001. The survey centres claim that this reflects the opinions of 45-56 per cent of the population (UKIE 2001). Sociologists have noted a gradual decline in support in the longer term. This is explained by tiredness of people who had previously supported integration. The Polish case differs from the Czech one, where support for integration has recently risen, but started from a relatively low level. In Hungary, on the other hand, support for integration remains stable and varies around 70 per cent (UKIE 2001).

The acceptance of the EU went down mainly among farmers and the working class. In 1996 only 3 per cent declared a scepticism towards the EU. A year later it was already 23 per cent (UKIE 2001). The most keen supporters of the EU are private entrepreneurs, management, young people, people with higher education and good salaries, inhabitants of big cities, especially those in the Western and Northern regions.

Currently, the date of Poland’s accession to the EU has triggered heated debates. Nearly 62 per cent believe that accession is going to happen within the next few years. However, the majority believe it will not be earlier than in four years. Only 25 per cent choose a speedy accession. The majority argues that the improvement in the national economy that should take place before the accession to EU (UKIE 2001).

7.4 Opportunities and challenges

On the basis of the surveys conducted that pertain to the potential benefits and disadvantages of EU accession one can draw a map of opportunities and challenges contemplated by Polish society (see: Mach, Niedzwiedzki 1998). Among the opportunities we have:

- positive changes in the national economy, stronger national currency, foreign investment
improvement of the standard of living
freedom of movement across Europe, open borders
more security

Among the challenges we can find:

difficulties related to the adaptation of the national economy to EU standards
competitiveness of EU products in national markets
difficulties in the agricultural sector
financial losses for the state
loss or limitation of sovereignty
rising levels of crime
the sale of national assets to foreigners
economic hegemony of other countries

As has been seen, in both cases economic incentives and arguments prevail. The general conclusion that could be drawn on the basis of research material is that Poles are likely to perceive the potential benefits from the perspective of the common – economic – good, which is not necessarily equated to individual advantage. According to a CBOS survey of 1997, 37 per cent believe that integration will improve the situation of private farmers, whilst at the same time 32 per cent believe the opposite. Nearly 30 per cent believe that Polish farmers will be able to compete with their fellow EU colleagues.

The negative scenario related to possible mass labour migration, foreseen by some EU politicians, does not find empirical confirmation. The largest proportion of all those polled, namely 35 per cent, declare they are not interested in undertaking jobs in the EU even if they were offered such jobs; of those who declared a willingness to work in the EU (30%), only 13% stated that they would definitely move. The reason for such low figures on this issue is the relatively low vertical mobility of the Polish labour force (CBOS 1997).

It is also worthwhile to consider the evaluation of the current relationship between Poland and the EU in the surveys. The question was the following: what is the motivation for the EU to accept new members? (CBOS, 1996). The answers included:

- a willingness to support Poland and her economic reforms
- a willingness to strengthen EU institutional structure
- a willingness to dominate weaker European states

Nearly 50 per cent of Poles believe that integration brings more benefits for the EU than for Poland. 26 per cent believe in equal benefits for both EU and Poland. Only 6 per cent believe it is Poland which benefits more than EU (CBOS, 2001).

If we change the perspective then we can see that nearly 44 per cent of EU citizens support Polish entry into EU (Eurobarometer Nos 51, 52), which places Poland in the middle of the ranking.

The analysis of the research material proves that it is the economy which dominates the discourse on EU accession in Poland. The hope for economic recovery dynamizes a
positive image of the EU. Poles, however, are afraid of the potential speculation in Polish farming land (and forests) by foreigners. Contrary to a common belief, religion and political sympathies do not influence significantly the attitudes of Polish society towards the EU. It has already been mentioned that arguments about a loss of national identity and state sovereignty advocated by Eurosceptics may, to some extent, influence the attitudes of Polish society towards EU accession. The results of the last parliamentary elections – where the anti-EU parties got around 20 per cent of seats – seem to prove this. However, the overwhelming majority of Polish society expects the positive outcomes to prevail over the negative ones. Among the former one can name the development of entrepreneurship, and of rational economic calculation, as for the negative outcomes one can name the disintegration of the family, and secularization of society.

In sum, the current perception of EU accession is rather sober, and thus much closer to the reality Poland will soon face. The euphoria of 1989 has been replaced with rational calculation and pragmatism.

8. Research on European Integration

The research on European integration has been carried out in Poland right at the beginning of the 1990s. The research has been conducted by specialist survey centres, i.e. CBOS (the Centre for Research on Social Opinion), Pentor, Demoskop, Sopot Centre for research on Social Opinion (PBS). The Institute for Public Affairs (ISP) – a non-governmental research unit – has specialized in this problematique since 1995. A significant part of the research project is contracted by the Office for European Integration (UKIE). The UKIE information web site is: www.ukie.gov.pl.

The European research is conducted by many university centres – most of them with an interdisciplinary profile. The European research contracted in Poland serves all sorts of purposes so it is difficult to get a coherent picture of what is happening in particular aspects.

9. Conclusions

The integration of Poland in the EU should be considered in terms of a strategic and deliberate choice of a given social order and a civilisational pattern. It stems from the determination to place a Central European country of 40 million people within the realm of the leading continental structures. The available research material shows that the majority of Polish society supports accession into the EU. The complex nature of this process precludes a firm prognosis related to the dynamics of social support for integration.
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SPAIN: ‘EUROPE’ AS A SYMBOL OF MODERNITY, DEMOCRACY, AND RENEWED INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE

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PART I

1. Introduction

The ideals and emotions of nationhood are often considered to be the fundamental obstacles which have always stood in the way of European integration, and which continue to block this process today. One author, for instance, has described national identity as ‘the biggest stumbling block on the road towards a united Europe’ (Odermatt 1991: 220). Others have suggested that if ‘a European feeling’ does not yet exist, this is due to ‘the predominant emotional fixation on our nation-states’ (Papcke 1992: 66), and that the ‘nationalism of the peoples’ still remains one of the ‘major problems besetting the idea of a European supernation-state’ (Llobera 1994: 207). Spain, however, is a country which exemplifies how in certain sociohistorical contexts, national sentiments may become harmoniously fused with the idea of belonging to ‘Europe’ and contributing to the project of European unity. As we shall argue throughout this report, Spain’s particular historical trajectory is one which ultimately transformed its membership of the European Union into a potent and widespread source of national pride (Jáuregui 1999, 2001). This is fundamentally because, in the aftermath of the Franco dictatorship and the transition to democracy, Spain’s ‘entry into Europe’ in 1986 could be celebrated as a great collective triumph, a major promotion of the country’s international prestige.

The notion of ‘becoming European’, in the Spanish context of collective memory, essentially represented the opportunity to leave behind what was popularly known as *el atrazo* (‘the backwardness’) of the nation’s past for good. It was by ‘getting into Europe’ that Spain could cease to be a sort of moral outcast after decades of rejection from the leading Western European powers, symbolized by its exclusion from the EEC throughout the Franco dictatorship. ‘Europe’, furthermore, was viewed as the chance to definitively jump on the train of Western modernity, prosperity, and progress, by overcoming the shameful legacy of Spain’s so-called ‘Africanism’ – in other words, its relatively poor levels of political, economic, and cultural development. For this reason, the dominant discourses of nationhood which emerged in post-Franco Spain depicted the achievement of ‘entering Europe’ as an emotionally charged symbol of national resurgence. To a great extent, this is a self-representation that has continued to colour the attitudes of Spaniards towards the EU until the present day, given that Europe has largely retained its association with values of freedom, modernity, and democracy. Consequently, in the case of Spain, national sentiments have rarely clashed with the project of European integration, since the ideal of ‘becoming European’ has widely been seen as a crucial source of international influence, economic prosperity, and collective self-esteem.

2. The Role of Europe in the Construction of Spanish National Identity

Spain is one of the oldest political units in Europe, having maintained practically identical borders since the alliance between the Crowns of Castile and Aragón in 1479, followed by the ‘Reconquest’ of Granada (the last Moorish Kingdom) in 1492, and the annexation of Navarre in 1512. This dynastic union comprised separate kingdoms with different legislations and autonomous institutions, as well as a multiplicity of languages. Nevertheless, the subjects of the Spanish monarchy shared the Catholic religion and viewed themselves as beset by common enemies, due to centuries of struggle against the threatening Other of Islam, and subsequently against the ‘heresy’ of Protestantism in
Northern Europe. As Álvarez-Junco has argued (1996: 89-90), this historical trajectory gradually forged an overarching ‘ethno-patriotic identity’ which was characterized by a fusion of religious and political identity, given that the subjects of Spanish monarchs were by definition Catholic. In this way, Catholicism became the most important agglutinating factor in the early stages of Spanish nation-formation.

However, in Spain the road to the construction of a modern nation-state ultimately proved to be littered with obstacles. Indeed, the tensions between the Castilian center and the peripheral nationalisms of the Basque, Catalan, and Galician regions which have characterized Spain until the present day clearly demonstrate that the Spanish state did not ultimately manage to create a fully unified nation with linguistic-cultural and emotional integration. This can be linked to the fact that after having previously enjoyed the status of an established European and world power, the era of nationalism coincided in Spain with a period of decadence and crisis, characterized by bitter ideological conflicts, the loss of its colonial Empire, economic backwardness, and uneven development. As Linz (1973: 99) has suggested, the nineteenth century was ‘a period in which the center, Madrid, and its government, had little to offer the periphery and limited resources for a successful policy of Castilization’. The poverty of the state, poor communications, and the polarized divisions between liberal and conservative versions of Spanish national identity led to the fact that the construction of a unified nation-state was still rather incomplete at the beginning of the twentieth century (Fusi 2000).

The weakness of Spanish national consciousness was also due to the fact that the country’s political elites did not adequately employ the main instrument of national socialization, education (as Eugene Weber explained in his classic study). Instead, they left this task in the hands of the Church, which was not interested in ‘creating’ citizens, but rather in building a community of believers. Furthermore, even when the Spanish state detected the necessity to create a public system of education, it never endowed it with the economic resources that it needed to compete with private educational institutions, which for the most part remained in the hands of the Church (Álvarez Junco 2001).

Given the concerns of this research project, what is particularly significant with regard to Spain’s conflictive nation-building process is the role which the contested concepts of ‘Europe’ and ‘Europeanization’ played in the rival visions of national identity which intellectual and political elites promoted.

The conflict between European modernization and Catholic traditionalism from the War of Independence to the Civil War

By the end of the eighteenth century, the desirability of adapting Spanish institutions to those of the rest of Europe had already become ‘the stuff of national political controversy’ (Preston and Smyth 1984: 25), when the ideas of the Enlightenment were alternatively seen by the country’s elites as a recipe for civilized progress, or as a dangerous foreign heresy. Indeed, it is noteworthy that at the time of the Napoleonic invasion of Spain in 1807-8, some of Spain’s liberal reformists – the so-called afrancesados – supported the occupation forces of post-revolutionary France, in the hope that this would lead to the radical transformation which they believed their country needed. The inevitable consequence of this was that, after Spain’s victory in what came to be known as the War of Independence against the threatening French Other, the
project of ‘European modernization’ was depicted as something alien and ‘un-Spanish’ in the discourse of the country’s conservative traditionalists:

The ‘real’ Spain was defended by reactionaries as an immutable social hierarchy dominated by the traditional triumvirate of crown, church, and aristocracy. Any attempt to challenge the socio-economic status quo could be condemned as the sinister maneuverings of national apostates and foreign agents: ‘Europeanizers’. (Preston and Smyth 1984: 26)

As Álvarez Junco (2001: 118) has argued, the historical trajectory of Spain is that of a peripheral country in which the project of modernization was adopted by the country’s liberal elites in a mimetic fashion, borrowing exogenous models, and for this reason it became tainted in conservative traditionalist discourses with the idea that the spirit of ‘the nation’ was being threatened by ‘Frenchified’ or ‘Europeanizing’ traitors.98

This impassioned dispute between europeísmo (European modernization) and casticismo (Hispanic traditionalism) became particularly intense in the aftermath of the so-called desastre (‘disaster’) of 1898, the year when Spain lost Cuba, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico, the last remnants of its colonial Empire, in a short war with the United States. At a time when ‘the possession of colonies was seen as the hallmark of a vigorous nation’ (Balfour 1996: 107), and when the fashionable theories of social Darwinism ranked nations into superior and inferior ‘races’, the disappearance of Spain’s last overseas colonies was experienced as a devastating blow to collective self-esteem. Adding insult to injury, the British Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, delivered a humiliating speech shortly after the Spanish defeat in which he described Spain as a ‘dying nation’ (Álvarez Junco 1998: 448).

It was in this context that the project of europeización (‘Europeanization’) was fervently promoted by the influential intellectual Joaquín Costa (1981 [1900]) as the most effective remedy to cure the national disease. Costa, the leading proponent of the current of thought known as regeneracionismo (‘regenerationism’), was convinced that Spain would only be saved from its deteriorating condition if it assimilated Europe’s rational mentality. What was absolutely indispensible, he proclaimed, was the ‘deafricanization and Europeanization of Spain’, and the ‘remaking of the Spaniard in the European mould’ (cited in Beneyto 1999: 23). ‘Europe’, in Costa’s mind, was essentially the land of science, education, technology, and progress. In his view, this was the only medicine that would allow Spain to survive in the global struggle of rival national ‘races’. Other important figures, such as the renowned Spanish neurologist, Ramón y Cajal, similarly believed that ‘the sickness of Spain is none other than its remoteness from Europe; in other words, from science’ (cited in Serrano 1998: 190).

Not all intellectuals, however, agreed with this invocation of ‘European modernity’ as the ideal solution for Spanish decadence, since many saw the adoption of ‘foreign’ or ‘alien’ ideas as a dangerous threat to the unique traditions, and above all the Catholic spirituality, of the ‘national spirit’. This was also a time when German Romantic theories of nationhood had spread to Spain, and began to inspire a number of literary attempts to define the ‘soul’ of the Spanish people through idealized depictions of the barren

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98 In a recent article, the Spanish sociologist Emilio Lamo de Espinosa has similarly suggested that the Napoleonic invasion created a ‘schizophrenic alternative’ in Spain between ‘patriotism’ and ‘modernity’, or between ‘being Spanish’ and ‘being enlightened’ (2001: 13).
Castillian landscape and the pious stoicism of the rural peasantry (Abellán 1988: 37-8). The diplomat and essayist Angel Ganivet (1990 [1897]), for instance, was repelled by the irreligious, egoistic materialism of ‘European modernity’. In his view, ‘European civilization’ was characterized by ‘anti-human’, ‘anti-natural’, and ‘pitiless mercantilism’, while Spain was a morally superior land of spirituality, generosity, and idealism (cited in Beneyto 1999: 83). Hence, according to Ganivet, the resurrection of Spain could only come from the inside, by looking for the truth and the strength that lay hidden in the depths of the national soul. In his view, Spain should fully resist the misleading temptation of European modernity, because with time it would ultimately be them, the Europeans, who would ultimately beg us, the Spaniards, to teach them the moral truths and the spiritual strengths of what he called la España eterna, virgen y madre (‘the eternal Spain, virgin and mother’).

One can see, therefore, the way in which during this difficult period of collective anxiety and uncertainty, ‘Europe’ was seen by some Spanish intellectuals as an inspiring Other, an ideal model which should be imitated to save the nation by modernizing it, while others viewed it as a threatening Other, a terrible danger which should be avoided at all costs to preserve the purity of the nation’s Catholic soul. Indeed, this opposition between European modernization and Hispanic traditionalism led to a notorious public confrontation between the two most famous and influential philosophers of early twentieth century Spain, Miguel de Unamuno and José Ortega y Gasset. Both of these thinkers were fully ‘Europeanized’ Spaniards, in the sense that they spoke several European languages and were very familiar with the intellectual currents of thought on the other side of the Pyrenées. However, while Unamuno ultimately developed a rather hostile attitude to the modernizing project of ‘Europeanization’, Ortega fully embraced it with passionate conviction. As Salvador de Madariaga pointed out, these two philosophers most clearly represent the two main patriotic responses which emerged amongst Spain’s intellectuals after the ‘disaster’ of 1898: ‘one saw the salvation of Spain in its own substance; the other, in its renovation through the influence and example of Europe’ (1989: 94).

In some of his early writings, Unamuno had originally promoted the idea that the Spanish people could only reawaken if they opened the windows of their patria to the influence of ‘European winds’ (1966 [1895]: 866). Eventually, however, he turned against the project of ‘Europeanization’, because he identified this notion with a dogmatic scientific mentality that would completely wipe out the spirituality of the Spanish people, and the vital consolation offered by their religious belief in eternal life. In a famous essay he wrote against ‘European modernizers’, Unamuno wrote:

I ask myself, alone with my conscience: Am I European? Am I modern? And my conscience responds: no; you are not European, that which they call European, you are not modern, that which they call modern... And if I do not feel European or modern, is that because I am Spanish? Are we Spaniards ultimately incapable of yielding to Europeanization and modernization?... I must confess that, the more I meditate on it, the more I discover the intimate repugnance that my soul feels towards everything that is supposed to represent the guiding principles of the modern European spirit, towards the scientific orthodoxy of today, towards its methods, towards it tendencies. (1983 [1906]: 926)

Furthermore, Unamuno proclaimed that the national religion of the Spanish people was represented by their great literary hero, Don Quixote, who stood for an undying, utopian faith in the immortality of the soul – in opposition to all rationalistic, scientifically-
minded ‘Europeanizers’. Therefore, he concluded that a full-scale ‘Europeanization’ was simply incompatible with the spiritual needs of the quixotic Spanish people. Spain, in his view, was a land of mystics with a medieval soul, and therefore it could never become a ‘modern’ land of scientists, unless it completely allowed its true national spirit to be conquered and swallowed up by the rationalistic European Other. In opposition to those who had turned modern technology and machinery into new objects of worship, Unamuno proclaimed, “¡Que inventen ellos!” (1988 [1912]: 289-90). Hence, although to some degree Unamuno acknowledged that European modernization was undoubtedly a pragmatic necessity, he insisted that the Spanish people would betray their own national soul if they gave up their age-old religious spirituality, and above all their faith in eternal life.

In contrast to Unamuno, Ortega fully took up Joaquín Costa’s proposals for national salvation through ‘European regeneration’. In his view, there were absolutely no doubts about what the Spanish raza moribunda (‘dying race’) needed to recover a respectable position in the world (1989 [1911]: 18). Only the adoption of Europe’s scientific rationality could rescue Spain from the calamitous, humiliating condition in which it found itself. In opposition to those who continued to idealize the supposed spiritual and cultural virtues of the nation, Ortega promoted what he called el patriotismo del dolor (‘the patriotism of pain’), which consisted in drawing attention to the miserable backwardness of Spain, in order to perceive, by contrast, the marvels of the ‘magnificent European possibility’ (1989 [1911]: 18). As he put it in a public lecture in Bilbao, delivered in 1910:

Regeneration is inseparable from Europeanization; for this reason, from the moment in which the reconstructive emotion was felt – the anguish, the shame, and the desire – the idea of Europeanization was conceived. Regeneration is the desire; Europeanization is the means to satisfy it. It was clearly seen from the beginning that Spain was the problem and Europe the solution. (1983 [1910]: 521)

Spain, in Ortega’s view, was an ‘invertebrate’ nation threatened by internal, egoistic particularisms and ignorant, indocile masses (1972 [1921]). It was, in short, a decadent country in danger of self-destruction, which could only be saved by the rise of a new, enlightened elite with a fully modern or ‘Europeanized’ mentality.

This discursive battle between Unamuno and Ortega was not, of course, a purely academic debate. On the contrary, these two intellectuals were very well-known public figures, and the issues they were debating with regard to the ‘problem of Spain’, and whether or not ‘Europe’ was the best solution, were at the heart of the political conflicts of the time. Indeed, during the turbulent decades that preceded the ultimate rise to power of General Franco, the opposition between ‘European’ modernization and ‘national-Catholic’ traditionalism was one of the fundamental cleavages that divided Spanish elites and contributed in a crucial manner to the ultimate outbreak of the Civil War. This was reflected, for instance, in the rival visions of national history promoted in school textbooks by the right and the left. On the one hand, conservatives proclaimed that Catholicism was intrinsic to the Spanish soul or ‘race’ and above all defended the nation’s providential mission to defend this true faith throughout the world. One the other, progressives lamented Spain’s continuing failure to modernize and promoted the need to adopt ‘European’ virtues industry, tolerance, and sobriety in order to revitalize the nation (Boyd 1997: 118-25). Some historians have illustrated this point by referring to the conflict of ‘two Spains’: ‘a contest between the Spain of progress and free thought
which looked to Europe and the inward-looking Spain of traditionalist Catholic values’ (Carr 1980: 12).

To a great extent, what one eyewitness observer of the Civil War called ‘the Spanish cockpit’ (Borkenau 1974 [1937]) was indeed a clash between two radically opposed, mutually exclusive projects of ‘national salvation’, in which the contested issue of religion played a key role (Gifford 1997). Both the right and the left claimed to be passionately concerned with the health of their patient (the ‘Spanish nation’ or ‘Spanish people’). However, while one side believed that the cure was to be found in the preservation of the nation’s Catholic ‘essence’, as well as the maintenance of its traditional socio-economic and political structures, the other was convinced that the only possible remedy was ‘European’ secularization, democratization, and economic modernization – or, in the case of its more extreme factions, the success of a Communist revolution. As Álvarez Junco (1997: 62) has suggested, the Civil War can largely be seen as the last bloody confrontation of the two idealizations of Spanish nationhood that had emerged in the nineteenth century: the liberal-progressive project, in which ‘European modernization’ was depicted as the example to be followed, versus the ‘national-Catholic’ one of Spanish traditionalism, which stood for the preservation of Spain’s supposedly unique spiritual personality against the imposition of ‘foreign’, ‘alien’ models. This situation was of course further complicated as a result of the fact that by this stage, alternative nationalist projects had emerged in Catalonia and the Basque country (Fusi 1990, Payne 1991).

_Franco’s defense of ‘Christian Europe’ against the threat of liberal ‘Europeanizers’_

Not surprisingly, Franco himself originally defined his military uprising in 1936 as a ‘national crusade’ to protect the Catholic values of _la patria_ from what he called the ‘bastardized, Frenchified, Europeanizing’ doctrines of modern liberalism (Franco 1975: 116). Indeed, throughout the duration of his life-long rule, the fundamental threatening Others of Francoist discourse were Communist ‘reds’ and liberal-minded ‘Europeanizers’, as well as Basque and Catalan nationalists. Franco proclaimed that he stood for _la España imperial_, the imperial Spain of the Catholic Kings, of Charles V, and of Philip II, the Spain of global prestige whose mission was ‘to defend and extend all over the world a universal and Catholic idea, a Christian Empire’ (Franco 1975: 116). In his view, liberal-minded ‘Europeanizers’ were directly responsible for the humiliating collapse of Spain’s position in the world, and therefore only a return to traditional ‘Hispanic’ principles of order, hierarchy, and authority could ensure the recovery of her imperial greatness.99

However, it would be inaccurate to define Francoist discourse as ‘anti-European’. In fact, from his own particular standpoint, _el Generalísimo_ actually claimed to be fighting for the authentic values of the ‘true Europe’. Essentially, the crusade of ‘national Catholicism’ represented by his forces was placed within the larger context of a continental struggle for the preservation of ‘Europe’s Christian civilization’, threatened by the ‘evil forces’ of liberalism and communism. In this way, Francoist discourse constructed a symbolic representation of the ‘real Europe’ which was said to coincide with the spirit of the ‘real Spain’. As in earlier centuries, when Spain had successfully protected ‘Europe’ from Moorish invaders, it would now proudly continue this role

against new infidels. Franco explained his position as follows, in a speech delivered during the Civil War in Burgos:

This is a conflict for the defence of Europe, and, once again, Spaniards have been entrusted with the glory of carrying at the point of their bayonets the defence of civilization, the maintenance of a Christian culture, the maintenance of a Catholic faith. (Franco 1975: 49)

When the forces of el Generalísimo emerged victorious in 1939, his regime’s discourse divided Spanish society into two camps: the vencedores (victors), who represented the ‘true’ Spain, and the vencidos (vanquished), who represented ‘anti-Spain’. The very survival of España was thus symbolically identified with the maintenance of the regime, while all of its opponents were classified as ‘traitors’ or ‘bad Spaniards’. Until the final years of his dictatorship, during which all media institutions of symbolic power were controlled by the Francoist state, only this exclusionist vision of the ‘Spanish nation’ and its foreign-inspired ‘enemies’ could be officially promoted in the public sphere (thereby alienating all Spaniards who did not share the Francoist version of España).

Although Spain remained formally neutral throughout the Second World War, Franco did not conceal his moral identification with the kind of ‘European order’ envisioned by Hitler and Mussolini. There were many occasions during the course of this conflict in which ‘Europe’ was invoked as a way of identifying the Francoist national project with the ambitions of the Axis powers. For instance, on 17 July 1941, the fifth anniversary of the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, Franco delivered a public address in which he presented the World War as an interrupted sequence of Axis triumphs, and spoke of:

these moments when the German armies lead the battle for which Europe and Christianity have for so many years longed, and in which the blood of our youth is to mingle with that of our comrades of the Axis as a living expression of our solidarity. (Cited in Preston 1993: 441)

In fact, it seems clear that until the victory of the Allies became increasingly obvious in 1944, Franco attempted to flatter the self-image of Spaniards by presenting himself as the leader who would wipe out the shame of 1898 and guide them to a new age of imperial splendour in which ‘the nation’ would finally recuperate its lost prestige in the world, through a powerful partnership with Hitler’s Germany and Mussolini’s Italy. Indeed, it was only in 1944, when the defeat of the Axis became increasingly evident, that Franco made the symbolic gesture of removing the pictures of the Führer and il Duce from his desk (Pollack and Hunter 1987: 13).

The Allied victory, however, radically altered Franco’s plans of renewed glory for the Spanish patria. Instead, his regime’s collaboration with the defeated totalitarian powers led to a harsh period of international ostracism and economic penury. Spain was excluded from the United Nations, as well as from the Marshall Plan for post-war recovery. Nevertheless, after this initial isolation, America’s strategic priorities in the Cold War ultimately provided Franco with a new vital source of money, prestige, and moral legitimacy. In return for allowing the establishment of US military bases on its territory, Spain would receive over one billion dollars of aid. Two years later, Spain was admitted into the United Nations, diplomatic relations were re-established with most Western countries, and hence the days of total international ostracism were over. The regime’s propaganda now symbolically constructed a self-image of Spain as ‘the sentinel
of Occident’, an honourable partner in the Western family’s struggle against the threatening Other of Soviet Communism. Furthermore, its disastrous traditional policies of economic autarky were abandoned, and a successful programme of capitalist development was implemented, which led Spain to achieve growth rates in the 1960’s which were exceeded only by Japan (Carr and Fusi 1981: 49). Until the end of his lifelong rule in 1975, Francoist propaganda therefore claimed that el Generalísimo had saved ‘the nation’ from economic ruin and transformed it into an advanced, prosperous ‘Western society’.

Franco, however, was much less fortunate in his attempt to gain an additional source of moral legitimacy by trying to get accepted into the European Economic Community. In February 1962, the Spanish state officially requested entry into the EEC. However, the authoritarian character of the Franco regime made this a futile pretension. Only a few days before the Spanish application was made, the European Parliament had approved a report which asserted that ‘states whose governments do not have democratic legitimization and whose people do not participate in government decisions, either directly or through fully elected representatives, cannot aspire to be admitted into the circle of peoples which forms the European communities’ (Pollack and Hunter 1987: 134). Hence, although the Spanish request received a sympathetic response from some conservative circles and sectors of European public opinion, accession into the EEC was not ultimately allowed to an old ally of Hitler and Mussolini. To a great extent, Franco remained an anachronistic symbol of everything which the ‘new Europe’ was being constructed against, a shameful reminder of the Nazi and Fascist past.

Nevertheless, throughout this period, the official Francoist propaganda constantly proclaimed that Spain had a ‘European vocation’, that it wanted to participate in the great collective project of the Common Market. At the same time, however, it continued to classify the liberal politics of other European countries as ‘dangerous’ and ‘inferior’ (La Porte 1992: 396). In opposition to the so-called ‘inorganic democracy’ of other European countries, which were viewed as a dangerous first step towards Communism, Franco claimed to stand for ‘organic democracy’ – a ‘natural’, harmonious order based on traditional ‘Spanish’ institutions such as the Church and the family. The ‘Europeanism’ of el Generalísimo was thus limited exclusively to the sphere of economics – in other words, to a desire to share in the prosperity of the Common Market –, but in no way did it imply a conversion to the principles of Western liberal democracy.

However, in opposition to this official ‘European vocation’ which the regime tried to promote, many Spaniards who rejected Francoism began to unify under the symbolic banner of a very different ‘Europeanism’, which stood for the full modernization and democratization of their country (Tusell 1977). In fact, one of the most notable gestures of anti-regime protest which occurred during the Franco dictatorship took place in Munich during the IV Congress of the European movement in June 1962, when opponents of the regime from both within the country and abroad demanded that the EEC should reject the Francoist request to enter the Common Market, unless a full-scale programme of democratic reform was implemented in their country. At the end of the meeting, all Spanish participants signed a joint manifesto in which they asserted that accession into the European Community should necessarily compel every member state to establish genuinely representative and democratic institutions, and to guarantee basic human rights. In opposition to the divisive, Civil War rhetoric which Francoist discourse employed to legitimate its existence, these anti-Francoist rebels proclaimed that a
democratic, truly ‘European’ nation in which Spaniards of all political tendencies could legitimately participate and live in peace with each other was possible. Hence, for the first time since the Civil War, Spaniards from across much of the ideological spectrum joined forces in the Munich reunion to oppose the Franco dictatorship and demand political reforms. In opposition to the regime’s own official ‘European vocation’, a new rival ‘Europeanism’ therefore arose which openly stood for the rejection of a ‘backwards’ regime and the ‘democratization’ of Spain. Not surprisingly, the Francoist press branded all those Spaniards who had participated in this gathering as ‘filthy conspirators’ who had stabbed la patria in the back. Egged on by this official propaganda, thousands of people gathered to demonstrate in many Spanish cities to denounce these ‘traitors’, and Franco delivered several addresses to condemn their ‘betrayal of the nation’. At that stage, the regime’s monopolization of national symbolism and sentiment was still relatively effective.

Over the course of time, however, the legitimacy of Franco’s version of Spanish ‘patriotism’ began to dwindle, and the rival national project of a modern, democratic, and hence ‘European’ Spain eventually gained the upper hand (Carr and Fusi 1981, Gilmour 1985). By the 1970’s, Spain had been transformed into a fully industrialized, better educated society by Franco’s own regime. At this point, students, intellectuals, workers, Basque and Catalan nationalists, and even many representatives of the Catholic Church were publicly rejecting the official discourse of the regime. A new national project was increasingly spreading, which sought the recovery of collective self-esteem through the achievement of the kind of ‘freedom’ and ‘liberty’ enjoyed in ‘normal European countries’. Although the regime itself had repeatedly made the promise that it would satisfy the country’s ‘European vocation’, the most it ever accomplished was a purely commercial trade agreement with the EEC in 1970. Full membership, however, was never allowed to Franco’s Spain, and ‘Europe’ therefore remained an unfulfilled aspiration throughout the dictatorship.

By the time el Generalísimo died in 1975, it had therefore become obvious, even amongst many elites within the authoritarian power structure, that if Spain truly wanted to become ‘European’, political democratization would be a necessary condition for this ideal to become a reality. By this stage, Francoism was increasingly seen as something which was still keeping Spain at humiliating, ‘African’ levels of political backwardness. From this perspective, it was thus only through a complete ‘Europeanization’ of the country that national self-esteem could be fully regained.

‘Europe’ as a unifying symbol of democratization during the transition

After Franco’s death, a new political discourse emerged in the Spanish public sphere which identified ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ with the desire to achieve a ‘modern’ and ‘European’ status. King Juan Carlos I, initially stigmatized amongst all the forces of the opposition for being Franco’s appointed successor, clearly positioned himself on the side of ‘European’ democratization, and therefore managed to legitimate his rule amongst a population that was now overwhelmingly demanding political change. Indeed, it is interesting to observe how, in his inaugural address to the Spanish Parliament in November 1975, the new monarch proclaimed that ‘a free and modern society requires the participation of all in the forums of decision-making’, and went on to emphasize the ‘Europeity’ of Spain:
The idea of Europe would be incomplete without reference to the presence of the Spaniard, and without a consideration of the acts of many of my predecessors. Europe should reckon with Spain, for we Spaniards are European. It is a necessity today that both sides understand that this is so and draw the consequences that derive therefrom.\textsuperscript{100}

In this way, the King suggested from the beginning of his reign that his aim was to lead Spain to ‘Europe’, via the achievement of ‘freedom’ and ‘modernity’.

Similarly, the leading politicians of the transition, such as the first democratically elected prime minister, Adolfo Suárez, often associated Spain’s modernization and democratization with the idealized concept of ‘becoming European’ (Armero 1989). Indeed, the aspiration to become a full member of the EEC was one of the fundamental issues on which there was a broad consensus in Spain amongst the political forces which made the negotiated transition to democracy possible. As the socialist politician Fernando Morán has put it: ‘At the time of the transition from dictatorship to democracy [Spain’s Europeanism] attained almost a metapolitical worth and constituted one of the facts on which the unanimity which permitted change was established’ (1980: 289). It is undoubtedly significant, for instance, that at the time of the first elections in June 1977, the campaign slogans of the two parties that gained the most seats in the Spanish Parliament, Suárez’s Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD) and Felipe González’s Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) both made references to their capacity to satisfy the country’s European ambition: ‘Vote Center. The ideologies that make possible a democratic Europe. The people that will make possible a democratic Spain’; ‘The key to Europe is in your hands. Vote PSOE’ (Desfor-Edles 1998: 57).

Indeed, when Suárez won these first elections, he triumphantly declared in his first press conference as Prime Minister that his government would do its utmost to get the country into the EEC, because, he proclaimed, ‘Spain is Europe and forms part of it’ (Bassols 1995: 187). The phrase ‘Spain is Europe’ could now be uttered with a renewed confidence in the public sphere. The nation’s leaders had now been elected through democratic procedures, and it was this above all that was seen as the key component of a ‘European’ status. In all of this, one can observe how the concept of ‘Europeanness’ had become not so much something a country could be through mere geographical location, history, or culture, but rather something that had to be achieved through the accomplishment of certain moral and political conditions.

If, as Paloma Aguilar (1996) has shown, the Civil War was viewed as the collective tragedy of the past that had to be avoided at all costs during the Spanish transition to democracy, one could say that ‘Europe’ was the mythical aspiration of the future which the majority of Spaniards desired to reach. In opposition to the radical, extremist, violent ‘two Spains’ of the past, the symbolic ideal that was promoted in the dominant political discourse of this period was the notion of a ‘third Spain’ characterized by moderation, tolerance, and dialogue.\textsuperscript{101} Only by respecting such values of mutual respect could the aspiration to ‘European modernity’ finally become possible. It is for this reason that Spain’s ultimately successful accession into the EEC in 1986 could be celebrated as the

\textsuperscript{100}ABC, 23 November 1975. 
\textsuperscript{101}The idea of a ‘third Spain’ was promoted in particular by the intellectual Pedro Laín Entralgo (Beneyto 1999: 216-25).
culmination of the struggle for the widely cherished, quasi-mythical ideals of la transición: freedom, modernity, and democracy.

Hence, one could say that it was precisely ‘Europe’ which played a crucial role in the construction of a cohesive Spanish national identity after Franco’s death, by functioning as a unifying prestige-symbol and a potent source of national pride. At the time of the transition, the aspiration to gain acceptance into the EEC became a common national project that transcended the separate interests of different parties and ideologies across the political spectrum, because essentially it stood for all the widely shared ideals of the new, ‘modern’ and ‘democratic’ Spain. In contrast to the monolithic, divisive definition of España that had characterized Francoist discourse, the concept of a ‘European Spain’ was therefore a key ingredient in the symbolic construction of a much more inclusive definition of nationhood grounded on the values of the transition, with which both Catholics and non-Catholics, progressives and conservatives, could conceivably identify.

This process of redefining Spain in a more pluralistic manner also crucially involved recognizing the right to autonomy of ‘the nationalities and regions which make up the Spanish state’ in the new 1978 Constitution (cited in Whitehead 1996: 256). Nevertheless, it is important to note that Spain’s successful transition to a ‘European’ form of democracy and the subsequent decentralization of state power through the creation of regional autonomous governments, has never fully satisfied the demands of nationalist movements in the Basque Country and Catalonia, as well as to a lesser extent in Galicia. For such minority nationalisms, the project of the European Union has rather represented an opportunity to bypass the Spanish state and to ultimately achieve a new international status as separate ‘nations in Europe’ (Corkill 1996: 160-1). The tension between center and periphery is thus a lingering problem which still remains to be resolved in Spain, particularly with regard to the continuing activities of the Basque terrorist organization ETA.

3. Dominant Discourses of Nationhood: ‘Europe’ as Spain’s Inspiring Other

Spain’s particular historical trajectory therefore led to the emergence of a dominant discourse of nationhood in which ‘Europe’ was portrayed as the inspiring Other that would allow the country to fully consolidate its democracy, modernize its economy, and recover a respectable role on the world stage. In a country where the very name of the nation, España, and notions such as patria and patriotismo, had become widely discredited by the time of Franco’s death due to their symbolic association with the aggressive nationalist rhetoric of the dictatorship, the idea of a ‘European Spain’ – in other words, a modern, tolerant, democratic, and pluralistic Spain – was employed in the dominant political discourses of the transition period to re-define and re-legitimate the project of Spanish nationhood. As Lamo de Espinosa (2001: 9) has written, ‘in opposition to an exceptional and abnormal, Hispanicized, traditional, and violent Spain... emerged the national project of maintaining peace by constructing the Spain that should be: normalized, Europeanized, modern.’

Following Smith’s distinction (1991) between the ethnic and civic components of national identities, one could argue that during the Franco regime, a predominantly ethnic version of the nation was promoted by the state, which fundamentally grounded the unity of Spain on two essential cultural ingredients: the Catholic religion and the Castilian language. During the transition period, however, this was replaced by a more
civic vision of Spanish nationhood based on the democratic values established by the Constitution of 1978, which guaranteed political and religious freedoms, as well as recognizing the linguistic diversity of Spain’s ‘nationalities and regions’. It was precisely this civic vision of Spanish nationhood which depicted the objective of ‘entering Europe’ as one of its fundamental aspirations, in order to fully insert Spain in the community of Western liberal democracies.

‘Europe’ as a source of national pride at the time of Spain’s accession into the EEC

The powerful emergence of this Europeanized national self-image can be illustrated by considering the triumphalist discourses which emerged in Spain at the time of its accession into the EEC, a period which I have analyzed closely in my own research (2001). A good example is the televised address which Prime Minister Felipe González delivered on 29 March 1985, when he announced to the Spanish people that his Foreign Minister had reached a definitive agreement in Brussels which would make possible Spain’s entry into the EEC at the beginning of the following year:

‘Entering Europe’ was therefore something which could be confidently announced in the Spanish public sphere ‘with honour and satisfaction’. It was ‘a deed of great significance’, because it signified the end of Spain’s ‘age-old isolation’, the culmination of the struggle for ‘freedom and democracy’, and the opportunity to rise up to ‘the challenge of modernity’. In short, it was ‘in Europe and with Europe’ that Spain’s future generations would benefit from a greater level of economic and cultural development, as well as a respectable moral standing in the world.

The Spanish Prime Minister also emphasized that the decision to opt for a ‘European future’ in no way implied a breakage of Spain’s historic links with ‘our South American brothers’. On the contrary, in opposition to the discredited imperialistic attitudes that had characterized Francoist discourse, the ‘new democratic Spain’ was portrayed as a global-minded, cosmopolitan nation which could act as a unifying bridge between Europe and Latin America. In this way, it was suggested that Spain would finally begin to play an honourable, worthwhile role in the international community.

This portrayal of ‘Europe’ as Spain’s inspiring Other was also very evident in the discourse which the two leading national newspapers employed in this ‘historic moment’. For instance, in an article entitled *Aleluia por Europa* (‘Alleluia for Europe’), the editor-in-chief of *El País* stated that the encounter with ‘Europe’ signified above all ‘the discovery of a mental and ideological space still new to us, in which the words invoked for so long by Spanish intellectuals – tolerance, freedom, and rights – are deeply rooted in a way which will inevitably and happily benefit us.’ Similarly, *ABC* displayed on its cover an EEC door which opened widely to welcome Spaniards inside its terrain of prosperity and prestige, while an editorial in this newspaper, entitled *Un Día Histórico*, ‘A Historic Day’ asserted that this achievement was:

> a turning point which will anchor us, for a long time, in the orbit of the nations in which individual rights, free enterprise, and the freedom of ideas impose themselves upon any totalitarian temptation… a space which is still, in spite of everything, the geographic platform of reason and liberty.

Another article in *ABC* also celebrated the way in which Spain had finally ceased to be ‘African’, by proclaiming that ‘from yesterday, Europe no longer ends at the Pyrenées’, and defining the accession into the EEC as a ‘genuine democratic baptism’ that had saved the dignity of the Spanish people.

‘Europe’ was thus presented in these emotionally charged discourses as the ideal antidote for all remaining traces of Francoist backwardness, and as the fundamental collective achievement that made possible the recovery of national self-respect by finally being recognized as a ‘modern democracy’. From this perspective, a shameful national past of bloody fratricidal conflicts, economic stagnation, political oppression, and international isolation were depicted as tragic disasters which should never again be repeated; an in opposition to these painful collective memories, a promising future of peace, prosperity, liberty, and European solidarity were presented as the fundamental objectives of a new, self-confident Spain. In this sense, ‘Europe’ clearly became the inspiring Other for the future, while Francoist authoritarianism was portrayed as the threatening Other of a past which had to be overcome for good. It should not be forgotten that only five years earlier, a group of armed civil guards led by Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Tejero had stormed into the Spanish Parliament, shouting *¡Todos al suelo!* (‘Everyone to the floor!’), in a shocking *coup d'état* attempt which was only aborted by the dramatic intervention of the King. With this memory still fresh in the collective consciousness of Spaniards, the entry into the EEC was thus widely seen as a definitive safeguard against the authoritarian ghosts of the past.

This same emotional climate of Europeanist enthusiasm was also displayed in the spectacular signature ceremony which was organized in Madrid to formalize the country’s accession to the EEC. The official entry of Spain into the Common Market did not take place until 1 January 1986, but the signing of the treaty of adhesion on 12 June 1985 was tranformed into a major ‘national event’ by the socialist government of Felipe González. The ceremony, which took place at the Royal Palace of Madrid, was

106 My description of this ceremony is based on the reports published in *El País*, *ABC*, and *Diario-16*, 13 June 1985.
attended by King Juan Carlos, González and his entire cabinet, the President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors and other EEC authorities, the leaders of all political parties, the heads of Spain’s regional governments, bankers, businessmen, trade union leaders, artists, writers, sportsmen, and many other national personalities. The mayor of Madrid, Tierno Galván, published a special proclamation on that day in which he called Europe ‘the Reason of the universe that guides the rest of the world’s peoples with the light of intelligence and the health of its sentiments.’ After declaring that on this day ‘we are more European than we have ever been’, he asked his fellow citizens to show the world their exhuberant happiness on such a joyous occasion. The enormous importance which Spanish authorities gave to the event was further illustrated by the fact that the main public television channel broadcast the entire ritual live from the grand hall of the Royal Palace. In this way, the entire country was invited to participate in this civil liturgy of national self-veneration.

The main highlights of the ritual were speeches delivered by the King and Prime Minister González, in which ‘Europe’ was depicted as the culmination of Spain’s triumphant passage to modernity and democracy. Juan Carlos I, for instance, welcomed Europe’s dignitaries as follows:

Spain is proud to receive the most illustrious dignitaries of the European Communities and the nations which integrate them. You represent what the Spanish people understand by Europe: the principles of liberty, equality, pluralism, and justice, which also preside over the Spanish Constitution. The Spanish people welcome you with satisfaction, and conscious of the great significance which this event implies.

The King also stressed that Spain, in spite of its centuries of co-existence with Islamic and Hebrew cultures, as well as its expansion abroad to America, ‘had never lost its desire to be European.’ In any case, this multicultural heritage, according to Juan Carlos, in no way diminished Spain’s ‘Europeanness’, because a closed, fortified ‘Europe’, disdainful of other peoples, would not be true to itself:

This is why Spain, by manifesting its ties to Hispanic-speaking peoples, and encouraging friendship with the African and Arab world, does not diminish its Europeity, but rather manifests it creatively.

In this way, the monarch’s discourse represented a repudiation of Francoist Spain and its Christian religious purity. The new self-image of Spain was one of tolerance and openness, and these were now defined as the true values of ‘Europeity’. Hence, in the name of his people, the King manifested Spain’s will to contribute to the construction of a united Europe, an objective ‘which fills our future with hope’.

Felipe González, similarly, called the event a ‘historic occasion’ for Spain, a country which identified entry into the EEC ‘with participation in the ideals of liberty, progress, and democracy’ and with ‘the challenge of modernity’. The symbolism of Spanish political discourse on ‘Europe’ therefore reached its ultimate climax: ‘the nation’ had finally become ‘European’ through a democratic transformation and a passionate desire to be ‘modern’. In this way, the project of European unification was equated with all the

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ideals that represented major sources of pride for a country that until very recently had suffered the painful stigma of ‘backwardness’.

‘Europe’ as a symbol of civic democratic values against the threatening internal Other of ETA’s terrorism

It is noteworthy, however, that the joy of the festive ceremony which formalized Spain’s ‘entry into Europe’ was partly marred by the Basque terrorists of ETA. On the very same day that the treaty of accession into the EEC was signed, ETA’s gunmen assassinated four people: an army colonel, his chauffeur, and a policeman in Madrid, as well as a Navy officer in the Basque city of Portugalete. The choice of this particular day was obviously no coincidence: a ritualized moment of ‘national celebration’ such as this one was chosen by this Basque separatist group in order to make clear that it had absolutely nothing to cheer about. On the contrary, for ETA and its supporters, España remained a symbol which stood for the oppression of what they saw as their own ‘nation’, Euskadi, and hence on a day which was supposed to mark the ‘Spanish national success’ of ‘entering Europe’, the terrorists attempted to spoil the festivities by murdering four men who in their own minds were classified as ‘enemies of Basque freedom’.

If one looks at the way in which the main Spanish national newspapers covered these events, it is interesting to observe the way in which the dominant vision of ‘Europe’ as Spain’s inspiring Other was directly contrasted to the threatening Other of ETA’s terrorism. Hence, all the main national dailies depicted the European signature ceremony as a symbol of the new, proud Spain of ‘liberty’, ‘modernity’ and ‘democracy’, in opposition to the old, shameful Spain of ‘violence’, ‘barbarity’, and ‘intransigence’ represented by the assassinations of the Basque separatist group.

El País, for instance, entitled its front-page headline ‘SPAIN JOINS THE PROJECT OF A UNITED EUROPE WHILE ETA ATTEMPTS TO SPREAD TERROR’, and in its editorial article, ‘Europe, against the enemies of liberty’, this newspaper stated:

Yesterday’s terrorist assassinations did not manage to overshadow the historic moment of Spain’s entry into Europe... The desperate attempt to spread terror in an indiscriminate manner clashed with our society’s vocation of modernity.110

‘Europe’ was therefore identified with the Spanish people’s ‘modern’ ethical aspirations, while ETA was defined as ‘a violent minority which tries to detain the clock of history’, and their actions were viewed as ‘a vain and desperate attempt to prevent the progress of solidarity and freedom in this country.’

Another leading national newspaper, Diario-16, significantly entitled its main front-page headline ‘DEMOCRACY INTEGRATED SPAIN INTO EUROPE’, an implicit allusion to the Franco regime’s incapacity to do so.111 Its second main story centered on the terrorist actions, and explicitly contrasted one event with the other: ‘ETA CLOUDED THE DAY WITH FOUR ASSASSINATIONS’. A cartoon published in the opinion section reflected the same dichotomy between the joy of Europe and the tragedy of terrorism: a bottle of champagne had been cracked open by four bullet holes. This was

also very visible in the emotive discourse of the newspaper’s editorial article, ‘ETA, against Europe’:

As on so many other occasions when the Spanish democratic system has taken successive steps towards its consolidation, the terrorist organization ETA, dramatically present in all the transcendental landmarks of the Spanish pluralist process, decided to leave its despicable stamp of blood yesterday on the signature ceremony of the Spain’s Treaty of Adhesion to the European Communities... Indeed, the entry of Spain into the European Community, which represents an explicit support for Spanish democracy, constitutes a serious setback for all of those who still believe they can still defeat the State, ripping off a piece of its territory and constructing an impossible Albania.

*ABC* entitled its own front-page headline, ‘MADRID, CAPITAL OF EUROPE’, and in its leading editorial called the accession into Europe ‘a Copernican change and the beginning of a rationality indispensable for our country’. 112 As in the other newspapers, one of its opinion columnists also wrote that the ETA terrorists:

> have covered in blood our entrance into the market of liberties and the concert of progress, as if they wanted to demonstrate that a country in which savage and ferocious beasts with a human appearance still exist has managed to slip through the doors of Europe. 113

Hence, an identical dichotomy thus characterized the discourse of all the main national dailies, and indeed it was probably a dichotomy that existed in many Spanish minds: ‘Europe’ stood for progress, liberty, democracy, and modernity, while ETA was the chilling reminder of an ‘uncivilized’ past in which guns and bombs, rather than words and ideas, were the main weapons employed in the political arena.

I have analyzed the discourses which surrounded Spain’s accession into the EEC in detail because I think that they perfectly encapsulate the key components in the dominant representations of Spanish nationhood which emerged in post-Franco Spain, and which are still largely observable today. Since the period of the transition, the idea of a modern, democratic, and hence European Spain has been the proud vision of Spanish national identity which has emerged in contrast and opposition to the backward days of the Francoist past, during which Spain was shamefully isolated from the project of European integration. As Moreno (2001: 171) puts it, ‘Spain’s incorporation into Europe and its participation in European integration was accepted as a positive step which was necessary in order to definitively bury our immediate historical past’. At the same time, as I have illustrated, this vision of a modern, democratic, and hence ‘European Spain’ has been symbolically constructed in direct opposition to the nation’s main internal threatening Other, represented by ETA terrorism, whose employment of violence for political ends is typically delegitimated by Spanish leaders as an attack on the principles of democratic life which all ‘civilized European countries’ (amongst which Spaniards now confidently include themselves) abide by.

*Roma gypsies and immigrants*

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Spain is the EU country with the largest population of Roma gypsies. Their entry into Spanish territory began at the beginning of the fifteenth century, and today it is estimated that approximately 500,000 gypsies live in Spain, although it is very difficult to know the exact number. Nevertheless, in spite of this long history of coexistence, the magnitude of the gypsy population, and the undeniable influence which some features of its culture have had on Spanish cultural life, the Roma have always been excluded from official definitions of Spanish national identity, at least in the discourse which the political and cultural elites have employed internally.

However, a very different picture emerges if we consider the Spanish discourse which has been articulated for ‘external consumption’ – in other words, for foreign audiences. Here it is evident that there has been an instrumentalization of certain features of Roma culture, which correspond to the Orientalist stereotype of Spain that began to spread throughout Europe during the Romantic period (Álvarez Junco 2001). This stereotype, typically symbolized by flamenco music and dancing, was utilized by the Franco regime to attract tourism in the 1960’s. It was during this period that the Minister of Information and Tourism at the time, Manuel Fraga, launched a famous tourist campaign which aimed to entice foreign tourists with the slogan ‘Spain is different’. The aim of this campaign was to exploit Spain’s tourist potential by accentuating the supposed ‘differences’ which distinguished Spaniards from other Europeans. In this way, it was implicitly suggested that a visit to Spain would allow Europeans to enjoy a sort of Oriental exoticism without leaving their continent. The main images of this exoticism, which included a certain dose of primitivism (once again, corresponding to the Romantic idea of an ancient Spain that jealously guarded its ancestral traditions, and was supposedly inhabited by bullfighters, gypsies, and bandits), were based on some of the most characteristic features of Roma folklore. Nevertheless, as we have already noted, it seems extremely difficult to find any references to the ethnic or cultural features of gypsies in the works of the leading intellectuals which, during the course of the twentieth century, have explored the nature of Spanish national identity. The country’s leading intellectuals, such as Américo Castro, have highlighted the Arab and Jewish legacy to a much greater extent than that of the gypsies, which is hardly ever mentioned, perhaps because what has been incorporated into Spanish cultural life from Roma folklore is no longer considered to be a characteristic of gypsies, but rather of Spaniards.

After Franco’s death, the Orientalist stereotype, which was so heavily exploited by the dictatorship, provoked – in the same way as the nationalist españolista discourse inherited from Francoism – a widespread rejection amongst the Spanish population. On the one hand, intellectuals complained that the image of Spain which had been exported abroad was utterly superficial and unrepresentative of the reality of a modern and plural Spain. On the other hand, Basques, Catalans, and Galicians have never felt represented in any way by an image of Spain which is primarily coloured by Andalusian features (curiously not Castilian ones), rather than by those of other Spanish regions. Finally, during the transition period, there was an obsession with leaving behind any traces of a supposed Spanish ‘difference’, which was generally viewed as a crippling historical legacy that had led to the country’s international isolation. This is why Europe played

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114 The fact that Catalonia has been one of the regions which has received the greatest number of Andalusian emigrants explain, nevertheless, that some of the best and most innovative expressions of flamenco are taking place there (such as the ‘Catalonian rumba’). However, Catalan nationalist discourse has similarly not incorporated these cultural features in its definitions of Catalan culture, since all nationalist discourses tend to negate internal plurality.
such an important role in the new definition of Spanish national identity, since it served to put Spain on an equal level with its neighbours, and to do away, once and for all, with the ‘Spain is different’ slogan, which was now widely despised along with all its political consequences.

These claims need to be qualified, however, since Spain’s Orientalist stereotype is still very firmly entrenched in Europe, and therefore remains a great source of attraction for tourism. For this reason, those Spaniards who are responsible for the development of the country’s tourist industry have continued to export that image, especially if we take into account that tourism is one of the main sources of income in Spain. All of this explains the ambivalence which Spaniards feel towards the stereotype which foreigners have of them: on the one hand, they fully reject the stereotype of ‘bullfights and tambourines’; but, on the other, now that democracy has been consolidated and that Spaniards feel that they are a part of Europe, to some extent they have begun to reconcile themselves with certain cultural features, particularly flamenco, which were previously scorned by leftist intellectuals, and are now considered to be highly valuable expressions of Spanish national culture. What now seems to be taking place is an attempt to maintain the traditional stereotype, but to simultaneously complement it with other images that transmit the idea of a plural Spain, by accentuating – without abandoning the old images – certain additional features that characterize other Spanish cultures, such as those of the Catalans, Basques, and Galicians.

Andalusian discourse, which like all Spanish nationalist and regionalist discourses has acquired considerable strength in the past few decades, has attempted to incorporate in its cultural self-image both the historic Arab heritage of the period which preceded the expulsion of the Moors, as well as some of the previously mentioned features of gypsy culture. In Andalusian rhetoric, the Arab cultural legacy is today being presented as a source of pride, and a distinctive Andalusian identity is celebrated for its splendid historic and plural cultural richness, exemplified by provinces such as Granada, Cordoba, and Seville. Since Andalusia is the region which has traditionally had the greatest Roma population, the integration of this community has had its fair share of problems. In spite of the evident intermixing which has taken place in many areas of this region, racist attitudes towards gypsies, which exist in the rest of Spain, have also been maintained in Andalusia, and in some cases have been particularly intense due to the high concentration of Roma inhabitants who live there.115

It is a well known fact that, aside from some exceptions, Spain’s gypsy population lives in conditions of poverty and marginality. Nevertheless, it is also true that the Roma are an ethnic group with endogamic traditions and a strong sense of racial pride which occasionally leads them to display racist attitudes towards all others (which they call payos). Furthermore, the fact that they have maintained a series of autochthonous laws which regulate their social life provoke more obstacles to integration than in the case of other communities, since this sometimes leads to incompatibilities between different codes of conduct which cannot easily be reconciled. At the same time, there is a widespread fear amongst the Roma population concerning the possibility that their integration in Spanish society would wipe out their own distinctive identity.

115 According to SOS Racism’s report on Spain in 1999, 70% of the Roma population in Spain live in Andalucia, Valencia, and Murcia, as well as Madrid and Barcelona.
As is well known, until the last few years of the twentieth century, Spain was not an immigrant receiving country, unlike many of its neighbours. As one of the most recent studies on this issue puts it:

Immigration, which has a long tradition in the United States and in some European countries, is a very recent phenomenon in Spain, which has taken place in a highly accelerated manner, as is shown by the fact that in the 1990’s, the number of non-EU foreigners residing in Spain tripled. Immigration, furthermore, is concentrated in a few areas, since 60% of foreigners reside in only six provinces (Pérez-Díaz et al 2001: 7).

All of this explains both the great degree of ethnic, and even religious, homogeneity which has existed in Spain until recently, as well as the fact that immigrants have not been incorporated into definitions of Spanish national identity. A country with borders that have remained practically unchanged since the end of the fifteenth century, which forged its political and religious unity in this same period, and which has not been a receptor of immigrants, but rather the other way around, has not had to deal with the problems of integration (with the exception of the Roma population that we have already analyzed) which other countries have faced. Religious homogeneity has been so strong that, even today, Catholic culture is an important component not only of the concept of the Spanish nation, but also of other nations or regions that are part of the Spanish state, such as that of the Basques, Catalans, Galicians, Andalusians, etc. The Roma, of course, also share this faith. Hence, the absence of challenges explains the hegemony of the Catholic Church in Spain and, as we have pointed out, the important role which this institution played in Spanish educational institutions, and in the process of socializing citizens.

Although Spaniards seem to be less xenophobic than other Europeans,116 this is probably not due to the fact that Spaniards are somehow more tolerant, but rather because, as we have stated, the presence of immigrants is a much more recent phenomenon, much more concentrated in certain geographical areas, and much less abundant than in other EU countries. This last point is illustrated by the fact that in 1998, foreigners made up 9% of the German population, 6.3% of the French one, and 8.8% of the Belgian one, but only 1.6% of the Spanish one.

Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that, even now that immigration – especially from North African countries – is becoming more visible in Spain, and in many cases begins to be perceived as a problem, Spaniards continue to display a greater degree of racism towards gypsies than against almost any other ethnic group. However, it is also evident that, as in so many other cases, what provokes the greatest feelings of repugnance against gypsies is their marginality, since wealthy gypsies, those who have triumphed in society (almost always through their talents as singers or dancers) are in no way rejected, but fully accepted by Spaniards.

In spite of the prolonged history of coexistence between gypsies and payos, according to figures published by El País on 4 September 1998, 24% of students and 16.3% of students affirmed that gypsies were not Spanish. Furthermore, 11% of the former and 5% of the latter were in favour of expelling them from society. SOS Racism’s report on Spain in 1999 states that although ‘violent racism is not a very widespread phenomenon’,

116 While 27.3% of Italians, 31% of Britons, and 25.6% of French citizens believe that ‘immigrants represent a threat for our culture and our identity’, only 10.6% of Spaniards agree with this statement.
'daily manifestations of racism undoubtedly occur every day, particularly against the Roma/gypsy population, blacks, North Africans, and Arabs.' According to this same report, although gypsies ‘have Spanish nationality and currently possess the same rights… in many respects they continue to be discriminated against and marginalized.’

According to a survey carried out by the CIS (Spanish Center for Sociological Investigations) in 1996, 50% of Spaniards view themselves as very or quite tolerant of the customs of foreigners, while only 32% felt this way towards the customs of gypsies. At the same time, in this study, 54% of the respondents defined Spanish society as ‘racist’ (Datos de Opinión, nº 3, CIS). In study nº 2212 of the CIS, 93% of Spaniards claimed that they would care very little or not at all if their neighbours were immigrants or foreign workers, while only 79% responded in this way when asked about people of a different race, such as gypsies or blacks (Datos de Opinión, nº 5, 1996).

Another CIS poll carried out in 2001 revealed that 80% of Spaniards claim that having immigrants in their workplace does not bother them ‘at all’, and that they do not mind if their sons and daughters share their classroom with children. At the same time, however, the same survey suggested once again that Spaniards clearly display a degree of ‘ethnic preference’ for some immigrants over others, with Latin Americans and EU citizens receiving the highest ranking in a scale of sympathy from 1 to 10 (7.1), compared to the lower sense of affiliation felt towards East Europeans (6.5), Asians (6.4), and North Africans (5.9). Furthermore, up to 27% admitted that they would be ‘quite concerned’ if their sons and daughters would marry a North African, while these figures are considerably lower in the case of EU citizens (6.3%), Latin Americans (10.2%), and East Europeans (11.7%). This suggests that there is a continuum of ‘strangeness’ in people’s conceptions of immigrants, which tends to favour those whose culture is perceived to be more similar to one’s own.

Peripheral nationalisms: the Basques and the Catalans

The inclusion of the Basque and Catalan cultures in Spanish national discourse has not taken place until very recently, when Spaniards learned to appreciate the richness of belonging to a plural nation, a ‘nation of nations’ as it was called during the constitutional debates, when the essence of ‘Spanishness’ became associated with the plurality of its cultural, culinary, and geographic manifestations.

It is interesting to note that, as Álvarez Junco has shown (2001), Catalan cultural elites played a very important role in the reinforcement of Spanish national identity during the nineteenth century. At the same time, Basque financial elites actively participated in the urban and architectonic design of Madrid, the capital of Spain. Nevertheless, it is clear that traditional Spanish discourse was excessively centered on Castilian culture and, as we have noted, on certain folkloric features which are particularly visible in Andalucia (curiously, these are two of the poorest regions in Spain, in direct contrast to Catalonia and the Basque Country). All of this, along with the age-old tradition of Spanish centralism, provoked feelings of isolation and humiliation in some regions with firmly entrenched cultural and linguistic characteristics, particularly Catalonia, the Basque Country, and – to a much lesser extent – Galicia. The widespread discontent and sharp sense of crisis which was provoked in Spain after the ‘disaster’ of 1898 spurred on

117 CIS, Estudio 2049, Barómetro de Febrero 2001 (www.cis.es/baros/baros2409.html).
Basque and Catalan cultural elites to articulate a national discourse which would distance them from a Spain which they considered to be a decadent nation, and which, furthermore, had never wished to incorporate the cultural contributions of other regions in Spanish national discourse.

These differentiated discourses achieved political recognition in the Second Republic (1931-1936), where Catalans were granted self-governing institutions (Basques only achieved them in the midst of the Civil War). The defeat of the Republican regime and the implantation, during almost forty years, of a rigidly centralist dictatorship, explains the radicalization which was provoked in the preexisting peripheral nationalist discourses, as well as the resurgence of others which had hardly existed previously. The Francoist repression of some of the autochthonous cultural features which existed within Spain, notably linguistic ones, as well as the insistent, dogmatic Spanish nationalist discourse of the regime, are well known. All of this led to the fact that during the transition period, Basque and Catalan nationalist elites, as well as leftist political elites throughout the whole of Spain (all of which had established close contacts in exile during the dictatorship), distanced themselves from Spanish nationalist discourse and embraced Europeanism. From their perspective, integration in Europe was the only way to ‘normalize’ the country and equate it with Spain’s European neighbours through a commitment to the ideas of modernity and democracy (rather than tradition and Orientalism).

Today, more than 80% of the population views itself as Spanish, although the abundance of multiple identities is noteworthy. Spaniards constitute one of the most pro-European countries in the EU and, interestingly, there are no differences in this respect between the left and the right (with the exception of extremists on both sides), nor between peripheral nationalists and Spanish nationalists (with the exception, once again, of extremists in both groups). There is a widespread consensus on the articulation of Spanish identity as a plural concept which allows the majority of Spaniards to willingly identify with their region, Spain, and Europe. Nevertheless, it is also true that some Basque and Catalan nationalists have inserted the idea of Europe in their discourse as a way to bypass Spanish identity. Yet in spite of this, the idea of a Spain in Europe is much more tolerable for them than that of a Spain outside Europe.

4. Concluding Remarks

Spain’s historical trajectory represents a fascinating illustration of how national sentiments may become smoothly combined with the incorporation of a European identity. As we have argued, it is precisely the notion of una España europea (a European Spain) which played a crucial symbolic role in the construction of a cohesive national identity in the aftermath of the Franco dictatorship. Since the notion of Europeanization became synonymous in Spain with the values of modernity, democracy, tolerance, and dialogue, this ideal became a key component of the national self-image which helped to heal the polarized oppositions of the past between the ‘two Spains’ that clashed in the Civil War. Hence, the historical self-understanding which predominates in current representations of Spanish nationhood typically depicts the country’s entry into ‘Europe’ in 1986 as the climax of a democratic transition process that allowed Spain to regain a significant, respectable status on the international stage. An illustrative recent example of this dominant national self-image can be found in the triumphant language which the leading national newspaper El Mundo employed on 20 November 2000, the
25th anniversary of Franco’s death, to describe Spain’s achievements since that historic day:

A quarter of a century later, there are reasons to feel proud… The bloody conflict of 1936 is today a page of history, the constitutional monarchy has obtained the consensus of the immense majority of Spaniards, Spain has found its identity in Europe, the economy has modernized, and most importantly, the mentality of its citizens has changed profoundly. The Pyrenées have ceased to be a spiritual and topographical barrier.

In short, echoing Ortega y Gasset, one could say that if the ‘backward’ Spain of Francoism was seen as the problem, then the Europe of ‘modernity’ and ‘democracy’ clearly became the solution.

The emergence in Spain of an emotionally charged Europeanist discourse illustrates how national identities have not only a cognitive, but also a crucial affective dimension. They not only classify individuals as member of nations, vis-à-vis other nations, but they can also ignite sentiments of superiority and inferiority, or pride and shame, in response to national successes and failures. As the German sociologist Norbert Elias (1987: xi-xii) pointed out, part of people’s self-love and self-respect typically becomes attached to the power and status of their respective nations. Hence, nationalized individuals can feel proud or ashamed, respected or insulted, with regard to their country’s shifting fortunes on the world stage. From this theoretical standpoint, one can observe how in Spain the achievement of ‘becoming European’ was viewed as a great promotion or a step up in the world’s pyramid of international prestige. It therefore became a crucial source of national pride, not only in the sense of acquiring greater political influence and economic prosperity, but also of recovering a sense of moral respectability in the international arena. To be accepted by ‘Europe’ was viewed as a just reward for the ‘peaceful’, ‘civilized’ way in which the Spanish people had managed to become a ‘modern democracy’ in which human rights were respected.

PART II

5. Relations with Europe: Brief Historical Overview

As I outlined in section 2, Spain was excluded from the project of European integration throughout the Franco dictatorship, as a result of the authoritarian nature of this regime. Although in 1962 Spain officially put forward an application to enter the EEC, this was impossible as long as el Generalísimo held the reins of power, and hence the only ‘European’ achievement of the Franco period was a purely commercial preferential trade agreement in 1970. Full membership, however, always remained out of the question until the democratic reforms of the transition were accomplished, and the first general elections took place in 1977. It was in this way that ‘for Spain, democracy was identified with Europe, and Spain’s renewed democracy became its passport to the continent’ (Arango 1995: 314). After Franco’s death, the ‘Europeanism’ which for decades had been a unifying slogan of the anti-regime opposition now became the officially sanctioned national project defended by the leading political figures of the transition period.
Once the first elections had taken place, the centrist UCD government of Adolfo Suárez immediately presented a new application to enter the EEC, now with the legitimacy of a full-fledged democracy. From the beginning, the aspiration to ‘enter Europe’ was presented in the discourse of the leading figures of the Suárez government, such as the Foreign Minister Marcelino Oreja, not only as a matter of economic interests, but also of Spain’s moral commitment to the ‘European’ values of democratic pluralism and human rights (Armero 1989: 81). Nevertheless, Spaniards still had to wait almost ten years before their European dream became a reality. This was largely due to the competitive threat posed by the entry of Spain’s agricultural products into the Common Market, which provoked the staunch opposition of French farmers (Bassols 1995: 193). Nevertheless, after a prolonged period of complex negotiations, Spain finally gained accession into the EEC in 1986 under the leadership of the socialist PSOE government of Felipe González. As I showed previously in section 3, this was an achievement which was celebrated as a great national triumph that symbolized the nation’s successful democratization and its recuperation of a respectable status on the international stage.

The legacy of this historical trajectory has clearly been reflected in the dominant discourses which have prevailed towards the EU in Spain until the present day. For the most part, there has been a widespread political consensus in Spain with regard to the crucial importance of EU membership for the country’s economic prosperity and international influence, both during the period of socialist rule under González, as well as under the conservative governments of José María Aznar since 1996.

An important dimension of this Euro-enthusiasm has been the benefits which Spain has received from the EU’s Cohesion Funds, which have been seen as a key instrument in the country’s continuing process of ‘catching up’ with its more developed European neighbours. During the negotiations of the Maastricht Treaty in 1991, it was above all the Spanish government led by González which staunchly defended the necessity of establishing these funds, not just in defense of Spain’s own national interests, but as a principle of solidarity that was necessary to ensure the future success of the EU project. The argument put forward by the Spanish government was that it was only by establishing this mechanism of economic solidarity that the harmonious development of European integration would be guaranteed, by avoiding the creation of a widening gap between the rich North and the poor South. In this way, Spain adopted the role of the EU’s leading promoter of ‘social cohesion’ as a central pillar of the European integration project.

At the same time, it is noteworthy that in Spain the importance of achieving the convergence requirements for the common European currency was always a widely uncontested objective, and it was therefore depicted in the dominant political discourse as a crucial aspiration that Spain had to achieve if it did not want to ‘fall behind again’ like in the past. Hence, when the successful entry into the euro was accomplished in May 1998, this was celebrated by Prime Minister Aznar as a demonstration of the fact that this time, Spain had caught el tren de la historia (‘the train of history’) by entering the common European currency (Barbé 1999: 169-70). This triumphalist discourse was also perfectly reflected in an article entitled La Hora de España, La Hora de Europa (‘The Hour of Spain, The Hour of Europe’) which Aznar published in February 2000, just one month before he won the last general elections by an overwhelming absolute majority:
Only three years ago, there were many in our country who were resigned to finding themselves permanently in the second division, and who did not believe that Spain would be able to make the effort of incorporating herself to the rest of the great European nations. I never listened to those voices: I always believed in the capacity of democratic Spain to rise up by its own merits to the position to which her history entitles her. Today the euro has become a reality. And Spain has regained its place, its weight, and if I may be allowed a term with an Orteguian eco, its level within this great European project.\textsuperscript{118}

Hence, one can see how in Spain, the European Union has been seen until today as the fundamental platform for the country’s continuing prosperity and international prestige. As Moreno (2001: 167) puts it, in contemporary Spain ‘there is no national project which is not directly linked to the recuperation of its European vocation’. Indeed, one could say that it is a taken-for-granted commonplace of Spanish political culture that only through the EU can Spain guarantee its future economic progress, as well as its capacity to maintain a significant degree of influence in the international arena. For a country with a history of military interventions in internal politics, the development of a European Common Foreign and Security Policy has also been seen in Spain as a new respectable outlet for the country’s modernized armed forces. Furthermore, the creation of a common European security space has been welcomed as a fundamental weapon to combat the continuing threat of ETA terrorism.

Nevertheless, as Torreblanca (2001a, 2001b) has shown, it is important to note that the conservative governments of José María Aznar have been characterized by a more pragmatic and utilitarian approach to European integration than its socialist predecessors. Contrary to the socialists, the conservatives do not see political integration as a necessary counterbalance to the liberal economic project of the EU. Hence, above all they have stressed the economic benefits which can be derived from the European Monetary Union, rather than favouring the construction of a ‘social Europe’ and promoting European federalism. For this reason, the conservatives have favoured a more intergovernmental approach with the aim of preventing the excessive interference of European institutions in the spheres of social and economic policy. In this sense, even if the importance of EU membership for Spain’s future is not questioned by either of the two major parties, some significant differences have emerged between their approaches to the process of European integration. This is something which should undoubtedly be further explored in the research on political parties which will be carried out by the EURONAT project.

Finally, with regard to the EU’s eastward expansion, Spain’s position has been characterized both by warm expressions of support for the candidate countries, as well as by a concern that this process may involve a drastic reduction of the cohesion funds from which the country has benefited until now. In 1995, Spain’s two legislative chambers approved a joint declaration in which they affirmed that the EU’s eastward enlargement was a ‘moral and political obligation’. Similar declarations of support have also been voiced by King Juan Carlos I, as well as by Prime Minister Aznar, who has stressed Spain’s ‘special solidarity’ with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, given its own recent historical experience of authoritarian rule and democratization (Torreblanca 1999/2000: 113). At the same time, however, successive Spanish governments have always defended the idea that solidarity with the East must not be carried out at the

\textsuperscript{118} \textit{El Mundo}, 5 February 2000.
expense of solidarity with the Southern Mediterranean countries, and have therefore sought to ensure the maintenance of the cohesion funds which Spain continues to receive from the EU (Torreblanca 1999/2000: 115-16).

6. Attitudes Towards Europe

The results from recent Eurobarometer surveys clearly suggest that the majority of Spaniards do not perceive a clash between their national identity and their membership of the European Union. On the contrary, as Table 6.1 shows, throughout the past five years, the percentage of those who see themselves as both national and European has consistently remained higher than those who define themselves as exclusively Spanish. This complementarity between national and European affiliations has in fact increased considerably during the course of this period: the percentage of those who define themselves as both national and European has risen from 50% in 1996 to 72% in 2000, while that of those who define themselves as exclusively Spanish has descended from 43% to 20%. Hence, the degree of compatibility between national and European identification is considerably higher in Spain than the EU average.

Table 6.1: National and European Identity

In the near future, do you see yourself as...?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>European only</th>
<th>European and Nationality</th>
<th>Nationality at European</th>
<th>Nationality only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>5 (5)</td>
<td>5 (6)</td>
<td>44 (40)</td>
<td>43 (46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>6 (5)</td>
<td>3 (6)</td>
<td>43 (40)</td>
<td>44 (45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>4 (4)</td>
<td>6 (7)</td>
<td>53 (43)</td>
<td>34 (43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>4 (4)</td>
<td>6 (6)</td>
<td>53 (42)</td>
<td>31 (45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>4 (4)</td>
<td>7 (7)</td>
<td>65 (49)</td>
<td>20 (38)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer Reports no. 46, 47, 50, 52 and 54.

In the Eurobarometer of Autumn 2000, it is noteworthy that Spain ranked first among all EU member states in the total percentage of people who feel ‘European’. This high degree of affiliation to Europe cannot be explained by reference to the length of time Spain has belonged to the EC/EU, given that it has only been a member since 1986. Neither can it be explained by the widespread perception of a common European culture, since Spaniards rank well below the EU average (coming in 13th place) when asked...

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119 I include here those who define themselves as either ‘European and national’ or ‘national and European’.
120 It is interesting to note, however, that the results from the Eurobarometer do not seem to coincide with those of the Spanish Center for Sociological Investigations (CIS). According to the latest figures from the barometer of the CIS in July 2001, 64.1% of Spaniards declare that they feel ‘Spanish citizens above all’, and only 20.4% state that they feel ‘both European and Spanish at the same time’. The reasons for the discrepancy between the Eurobarometer and the CIS are not clear, although one possibility is that people respond differently to these types of questions, depending on whether they are told that a given survey is being carried out for the Eurobarometer or for the Spanish CIS.
whether they agree or disagree that Europeans share a common cultural identity. Hence, considering the particular historical trajectory which I have traced in this report, the most plausible explanation for the affiliation which most Spaniards feel towards Europe is that EU membership has been closely identified with their country’s achievement of modernization and democratization, as well as with the recovery of its international prestige.

Indeed, it is noteworthy that in a recent Eurobarometer survey, 78% of Spaniards stated that they are proud of their country (compared to an EU average of 69%), and 59% referred to ‘being European’ as a source of national pride (compared to an EU average of 33%). Therefore, the majority of Spaniards currently display a relatively high degree of national pride, and a significant dimension of this sentiment of collective self-esteem can be linked to their status as ‘Europeans’. In other words, EU membership is widely seen as something which enhances Spanish collective pride, and can therefore be smoothly combined with national sentiments. One could in fact say that if being ‘European’ is widely seen as a source of national pride, then EU membership is something which makes the Spanish nation a more appealing object of collective identification.

If one looks at the recent Eurobarometer results concerning levels of support for EU membership, once again the evidence illustrates that in Spain, there has been a relatively high level of enthusiasm for the process of European integration. As Table 6.2 and Graph 6.3 illustrate, the idea that EU membership is a ‘good thing’, as well as the belief that Spain benefits from the EU, has consistently been higher than the EU average, particularly in the last two years. Furthermore, Spaniards have been relatively well disposed to the EU’s joint decision-making powers, and the majority of those polled have responded positively to the idea that in the new century, the EU should play a more important role in their daily lives. According to the Spanish Center of Sociological Investigations (CIS), Spaniards tend to see the EU as profitable for general economic development, job opportunities, infrastructure development, consumer rights, the introduction of new technologies, and culture, while they think it brings negative effects for wages and prices.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.2: Evolution of support for EU in Spanish public opinion.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Support for EU (good thing)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived benefit from EU (benefited)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average level of support for joint EU decision-making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 21st century: Perceived role of the EU in people’s daily life to be more important (EU will play a more important role)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 21st century: Desired role of the EU in people’s daily life to be more important (they would like the EU to play a more important role)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometers: 48, 50, 52 and 54.

121 Eurobarometer 52 (Autumn 1999).
122 These are net results for national pride (%Very+Fairly proud)-(%Not very+Not at all proud), Eurobarometer 54, Autumn 2000.
Graph 6.3: Evolution of net support for EU membership. Spain (EU good thing-EU bad thing)

Like in the Italian case, it seems plausible to link the support for joint EU decision-making in Spain to a relatively low level support of trust in state institutions. The Euronat-Pragma survey of 1998 (Table 6.4) showed that the trust deposited by Spaniards in European institutions was higher than that placed in state institutions (57.8% versus 51.9%), which undoubtedly helps to explain their generally positive attitude to the process of transferring decision-making powers to the EU.

Table 6.4: Percentage of people stating that they trust the following territorial institutions (‘a lot’ and ‘at least a little’ of trust, percentage on total of respondents in each country)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Great Britain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>77.6</td>
<td>67.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>62.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>58.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total responses</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Finally, with regard to the issue of Eastward enlargement, the results from the last issue of the Eurobarometer suggest that 61% of the Spanish population currently supports this process, a figure which is ten points higher than the EU average.124

This quantitative data therefore suggests that Spanish public opinion has largely mirrored the positive outlook towards the project of European integration which has characterized the dominant political and media discourses on ‘Europe’ in Spain. The evidence of these surveys clearly reflects a widespread harmonious fusion between national sentiments and EU membership.

7. Qualitative Studies on Spanish National Identity and European Integration

Relatively little qualitative research has been carried out on Spanish national identity and its relationship to the process of European integration, given the predominance until now of studies focusing on the ‘big three’ of Western Europe, Britain, France, and Germany. Jáuregui’s research (1999, 2001), which we have already referred to throughout this report, has traced the historical emergence of ‘Europe’ as a symbol of national resurgence and a potent source of collective pride, in the aftermath of the Franco dictatorship and the transition to democracy. In this section, we shall review two other recent studies which have also explored this issue employing qualitative methodologies.

The first is an interesting study carried out by a team of Spanish social psychologists (Rosa et al. 1998), which gathered three types of qualitative data in 1996 from a sample including members of three generational cohorts (university students, their parents, and grandparents) in thirty-three families. The participants were firstly asked to respond in writing to three open-ended questions about Spain’s past (‘How do you think Spain has arrived at its present situation?’), present (‘Describe Spain’s present situation, with its positive and negative aspects’), and future (‘Comment on how you think Spain will be in the future, and how you would like it to be’). A second set of data consisted of ethnographic notebooks that were filled in by the student member of each family, in which discussions concerning identity issues were described. Finally, a third source of data was a debate in which five students from the younger generational cohort discussed their views on Europe. This study thereby provided a rich collection of Spanish lay people’s attitudes towards the European Union and its impact on their country.

One of the main observations of the study was the way in which ‘Europe’ (practically always used as a synonym for the European Union) was typically portrayed not only as a key event in the history of Spain (linked to recuperating democracy and overcoming isolation after the Franco dictatorship), but also as a telos for Spain’s continuing development and as the fundamental vehicle for the country’s progress in the future. Hence, the discourses which emerged in family discussions frequently involved a representation of ‘Europe’ as something which has pulled Spain away from a backwards past, but which is still also a goal that remains to be attained, since there is still a rather wide perceived gap between Spain and ‘the European level’ or ‘the standards of other European countries’. In other words, ‘Europe’ was generally seen as both an efficient cause and a comparative criterion for Spanish progress.

The typical metaphor which was employed in the discourse of participants was that of a ‘road to Europe’ on which many important steps had already been taken. Nevertheless, for many there was still ‘a long way to go’ in order to reach the state of higher material and moral perfection implied by the notion of becoming more ‘European’. Hence, a heroic, self-flattering historical narrative prevailed in which following a black period of dictatorship, Spain has become a more open and tolerant country, and will gradually continue to progress through European integration. This discourse was especially evident in the younger generation, as well as amongst all those who placed themselves towards the left of the political spectrum. Even if the economic effects of joining the European Union were sometimes valued negatively by some of the participants, no plausible alternative was seen to Spain’s EU membership. In short, the authors of this study concluded that on the whole, ‘Europe’ is clearly a subject for identification amongst most Spaniards, but mainly through its role as a symbolic and emotional resource of...
Spanish national identity: ‘it is as if Spain’s joining Europe makes Spaniards become better Spaniards’ (1998: 127). Hence, Europe is primarily viewed by the Spanish citizenry as a key component of the national project (the fundamental vehicle for Spain’s continuing progress, influence, and prosperity), rather than as a supranational project with its own wider objectives.

The recent OPTEM study for the European Commission (2001), which has carried out a qualitative analysis of attitudes to and expectations of the EU in the 15 member states and in 9 candidate countries, has also provided some interesting data on Spain which is worth reviewing here briefly. For one thing, the dominant triumphalist self-representation of the recent Spanish past was evident once again in this study: most of the citizens interviewed spontaneously mention the positive political and economic changes that have taken place in their country in the last 20 years. A recurrent claim within this narration of the recent national history is that Spain’s international influence is much greater now, within the framework of the EU and NATO, than in the days of Francoist isolation and autarchy.

At the same time, however, a lingering sense of inferiority is revealed by the frustration which many Spaniards express with regard to the status of Spain in the eyes of more powerful countries in Northern Europe and the persistence of what is perceived as an arrogant attitude of these countries towards Spain. Furthermore, although the study revealed a widespread desire to be and feel more European, it also suggested that the Spanish feel naturally closer to the Mediterranean Latin countries, whose traditions, climate, lifestyles, view of leisure and cuisine are relatively similar to their own, while the countries of Northern Europe have connotations of gloominess and austerity.

There also appear to be some significant differences in the degrees of enthusiasm for the EU between different socio-economic groups. The relatively better educated urban Spaniards from big cities more frequently see themselves as citizens of a European political project grounded on common historical and cultural foundations. However, those from provincial middle-sized towns tend to associate Europe with a model of modernity that has been manufactured in the ‘North’ and is being forced on them from above.

Finally, this study has also explored the attitudes amongst lay Spaniards towards the EU’s eastward enlargement. As in other Southern European countries, the general outlook towards this process in Spain is firstly characterized by a feeling of solidarity for countries whose difficulties are viewed as similar to those which Spain suffered during its own experience of a dictatorial regime and the subsequent transition to democracy. From this perspective, the enlargement process is fully supported as a moral duty towards countries which are going through a similar difficult process of recovering prosperity and respectability by ‘returning to Europe’. At the same time, however, this empathy is combined with a concern that the entry of Central and Eastern European countries into the EU could imply a drastic reduction in the cohesion funds from which Spain has benefited until now. Nevertheless, these fears are coupled with the observation that it is now logically ‘the turn’ of the Eastern European countries to receive aid, just as Spaniards benefited from it in the past during their own incorporation into the project of European integration. Furthermore, the Spanish citizens interviewed also cited some important advantages which could be derived from the enlargement process, such as the opening-up of new markets, as well as an opportunity to increase Spain’s relative status.
within the EU, by establishing itself as one of the big powers of the more developed Western half of Europe. These are all undoubtedly issues which should be explored in greater depth in the research which will be carried out amongst European citizens by EURONAT.

8. Conclusion

The dominant discourses of nationhood which emerged in post-Franco Spain sought to replace the widely discredited image of an archaic and backwards Spain that was ‘different’ with the vision of a country that was ‘modern’ and ‘democratic’, just like any other ‘normal European country’. It is noteworthy that until the end of the Franco dictatorship, Spaniards were stung by a joke which was said to circulate in the countries of Northern Europe, according to which Africa began ‘south of the Pyrenées’. As we have attempted to show in this report, it was this historically conditioned self-image of relative inferiority which determined the eventual enthusiastic embrace of a ‘European’ status in Spain as a symbol of the country’s renewed prestige in the international arena.

In this sense, Spain represents a paradigmatic case of how national sentiments, far from standing in the way of European integration, may actually stimulate a general enthusiasm for the idea of ‘belonging to Europe’ and contributing to the project European unity. As we have argued, in the Spanish context of collective memory, gaining accession into ‘Europe’ became a source of national pride not only in the spheres of political influence and economic prosperity, but also of ethical respectability. In other words, only by ‘joining Europe’ after the transition to democracy could the stigma of an authoritarian regime led by an old sidekick of Hitler and Mussolini be definitively wiped off Spain’s image in the world. It is interesting to note with regard to this that in his writings on patriotism, Emile Durkheim suggested that:

As long as there are states, so there will be national pride, and nothing can be more warranted. But societies can have their pride, not in being the greatest or wealthiest, but in being the most just, the best organized, and in possessing the best moral constitution (1992 [1950]: 75).

From this Durkheimian perspective, one could say that in post-Franco Spain, national pride became widely identified with the adoption of a moral commitment to the values of democracy – a commitment which was seen as the indispensable condition to overcome the shameful isolation of the recent past, by becoming integrated into Europe. This historical experience crucially determined the relative smoothness with which national sentiments have been combined with EU membership in Spain, and it also underlies the considerable sympathy that exists amongst Spaniards towards the Eastern European countries that today similarly hope to stabilize their democracies by ‘returning to Europe’.

The case of Spain therefore reflects a historical trajectory in which a predominantly ethnic vision of Spanish nationhood (the ‘national Catholicism’ and linguistic homogeneity promoted by Francoism) was replaced during the transition by a civic ideal of Spain as a

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125 It is interesting to note in relation to this that both the current conservative government, as well as the Socialist Party in the opposition, have recently adopted the Habermasian notion of ‘constitutional patriotism’, grounded on a firm adhesion to the democratic values which were established during the post-Franco transition (El País, 4 November 2001). As this report has shown, Spain’s participation and commitment to the project of European integration has clearly been a key component in the development of this civic vision of Spanish patriotism.
plural modern democracy in which basic political freedoms had been reestablished and the linguistic diversity of the country's 'nationalities and regions' was recognized. It was within this framework that, as we have argued, 'Europe' became the inspiring Other of a Spanish national project committed to overcoming the backwardness and isolation of the past, fundamentally through participating in and contributing to the project of European integration.
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European Commission

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